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The Political Awaken‘teu. 
of the Kast 


STUDIES OF POLITICAL PROGRESS IN EGYPT, INDIA, 
CHINA, JAPAN, AND THE PHILIPPINES 


By WE 
GEORGE MATTHEW DUTCHER 


Hedding Professor of History, Wesleyan University 





THE ABINGDON PRESS 


NEW YORK CINCINNATI 


Copyright, 1925, by 
GEORGE MATTHEW DUTCHER 


All rights reserved, including that of translation into 
foreign languages, including the Scandinavian 


Printed in the United States of America 


CONTENTS 


CHAPTER ; PAGE 
HNL Th) CL LOIN RRetee, area t te tte iets ives tare nie, Ohcaita« % 5 
RIOT CO Hree er ie a eenen a nel as Cerner te ne Tue ead wel. re EG 7 

VE Edd 2 bee a el 7 Ba aR Nad Tas > nt ol oe nd eg 13 
TOL) LA ere er ete crs sesh Meat ce Ne a, eum go uote 52 
PLM LLLINGS tered cure cee ete dong eters Wie dna e/etore cacsays «cute 112 
PMP ER ERIN AUT atta Ie Cars ei eos chy eters ily cust ore istered erie e thdae 4 ts 174 
Wem Pe LIA LIN Aa ete cities es aye ta eit tere otha gtele as 238 





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INTRODUCTION 


GEORGE SLocuM BENNETT, a graduate of Wesleyan Uni- 
versity in the class of 1864, showed his lifelong interest in 
the training of youth for the privileges and duties of citizen- 
ship by long periods of service as a member of the board of 
education of his home city, and as member of the boards of 
trustees of Wyoming Seminary and Wesleyan University. 

It was fitting, therefore, that, when the gifts made by 
himself and family to Wesleyan University were com- 
bined to form a fund whose income should be used “‘in de- 
fraying the expenses of providing for visiting lecturers, 
preachers, and other speakers supplemental to the college 
faculty,” it should have been decided that the primary pur- 
pose should be to provide each year a course of lectures, by 
a distinguished speaker, “for the promotion of a better un- 
derstanding of national problems and of a more perfect real- 
ization of the responsibilities of citizenship,’ and to provide 
for the publication of such lectures so that they might reach 
a larger public than the audience to which they should, in 
the first instance, be addressed. 

In arranging for the fifth course of lectures on this 
foundation, the committee made a radical departure from 
their usual procedure in selecting as the lecturer a member 
of the faculty of Wesleyan University, George Matthew 
Dutcher, Hedding Professor of History. During the aca- 
demic year 1921-22 Professor Dutcher was granted leave 
of absence by the trustees of the University in order that 
he might make a first-hand study of political and social con- 
ditions in various eastern countries. In the course of his 
travels, which extended over a period of fifteen months, 
Professor Dutcher made the circuit of the globe, lecturing 
at a large number of foreign schools, colleges, and univer- 
sities, where he enjoyed exceptional opportunities for the 
study of educational problems, and for making the acquain- 


5 


6 INTRODUCTION 


tance of persons of distinction in all walks of life in many 
different countries. During the period of his absence im- 
portant political changes were taking place in the various 
countries of the East, which were bound to have far-reach- 
ing effects. In particular, the question of the relations be- 
tween the East and the West had begun to assume a greater 
importance, perhaps, than at any other time in history, and 
Professor Dutcher became especially interested in studying 
the growth and influence of western political ideas in eastern 
lands. 

The committee on the Bennett Lectures were glad to make 
available to a Wesleyan audience the result of these timely 
investigations, undertaken by a scholar whose training and 
experience admirably fitted him for his task, and they now 
take pleasure in presenting the lectures in printed form. 

STEPHEN Henry OLIN, 
Davip GEORGE Downey, 
ALBERT WHEELER JOHNSTON, 
FRANK EpGarR FARLEY, 
Henry Merritt WRISTON. 


PREFACE 


THE invitation from President Shanklin to give this series 
of lectures reached me in Egypt after I had spent a con- 
siderable portion of my year of sabbatical leave, 1921-22, 
in visiting Japan, China, the Philippines, India, and other 
parts of the East. On the voyage from India to Egypt I 
had been reviewing the crowded experiences and varied ob- 
servations of recent months in an endeavor to find some plan 
of formulating them in writing for my own satisfaction. It 
then became clear to me that, without quite realizing it, I 
had been making an intensive study of a great revolutionary, 
or transition, movement—perhaps the greatest in history— 
the penetration of modern ideas and methods among the 
peoples of the East. 

So it happened that the plan for a series of studies on the 
progress of modern ideas in eastern lands was already 
worked out in my mind when the invitation with which the 
board of trustees and faculty of Wesleyan University so 
generously honored me arrived to offer a most unexpected 
occasion for presenting my subject. 

The scope of the series of lectures precludes the treatment 
of the topic in all its amplitude. In addressing an audience 
composed primarily of students of history and government 
it was obvious that I should select for emphasis the factors 
involved in the acceptance by eastern peoples of western 
aims and methods in government rather than those of eco- 
nomic character or those of intellectual and ethical import. 
Even so, I have endeavored to indicate with some clearness 
the significant influence wielded by these other factors upon 
political developments in eastern lands. Though the coun- 
tries dealt with in the successive lectures are those in which 
I spent most time, they represent many different types of 
conditions and problems, and they exemplify practically 
every important issue involved in any part of the East. As 


7 


8 PREFACE 


the lectures were delivered on February 12-23, 1923, the 
account of each country has been brought up to the date of 
publication by the addition of a few paragraphs under the 
heading “Recent Events.” 

I cannot refrain from taking this occasion to express my 
sense of personal loss—a loss felt by all friends of Wes- 
leyan—in the untimely death of Reuben Nelson Bennett, 
who shared in the establishment of this lectureship in mem- 
ory of his father. It was my privilege to be associated with 
him in the arrangements for the original and several suc- 
ceeding series of these lectures, and so I may feel that I 
understand the purposes which he had in mind. My thoughts 
have often turned to him as I have endeavored to prepare 
these lectures in harmony with his noble ideals. 

I wish to express my gratitude for various forms of assist- 
ance in the preparation of these lectures, to several of my 
colleagues, but especially for the unstinted kindnesses of the 
two who are members of the committee in charge of this 
lectureship. I am also indebted for helpful suggestions to 
several friends who have read all or part of the proofs. 
These friends include natives of the countries studied and 
persons familiar with them through long residence or special 
study of their affairs. 

It is not customary in this series of publications to include 
a dedicatory page, so I must avail myself of this place for 
the purpose. The journey which furnished the basis for 
these lectures was an equal partnership with one who was 
then, as ever, a “good sport” on the dark days as well as 
the bright ones—My Wire, to whom I inscribe this volume, 
every page of which recalls experiences which we shared 
under eastern skies. 

At the same time we would both acknowledge our debt of 
gratitude to the many good friends scattered through all 
these eastern lands from whose intimate knowledge of the 
peoples among whom they live and work our own minds have 
been enriched. To their hospitality and kindnesses were 
due much of the comfort and pleasure of our journey. Nor 
would we forget the numerous nameless toilers of many 
races whose faithful performance of their humble tasks 


PREFACE 9 


assured our welfare and lightened our burdens by sea and 
by land. 

It is my hope that these lectures may contribute in some 
measure to the development in our western nations of a 
more enlightened sympathy for the peoples of the eastern 
lands and may help to advance the day when all the great 
human brotherhood shall share the privileges now enjoyed 
by the most favored. 

GVEA ID: 

Wesleyan University, 

November, 1924. 





WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY 
GEORGE SLOCUM BENNETT FOUNDATION 


LECTURES 
For the Promotion of a Better Under- 
standing of National Problems and 
of a More Perfect Realization of the 
Responsibilities of Citizenship. 


First Sertes—r1o18-1919. STEPS IN THE DEVELOPMENT 
or AmeRICAN Democracy. By Andrew Cunningham 
McLaughlin. 


Second Series—r1gr1g-1920. THE UNITED STATES AND 
CanaDA. By George M. Wrong. 


Third Series—1920-1921. THE VALIDITY OF AMERICAN 
IpEALS. By Shailer Mathews. 


Fourth Series—1g21-1922. ‘THE IDEALS OF FRANCE. 
By Charles Cestre. 


Fifth Series—1922-1923. THE PoLiticaL AWAKENING 
OF THE East. By George Matthew Dutcher. 


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CHAPTER 
EGY 


Ecypt, so far as we now know, is entitled to the double 
and paradoxical honor of being both the oldest and the young- 
est of the world’s nations. Five thousand years ago, more or 
less, it began with Menes; eleven months since it made a 
new beginning with King Fuad. What influences con- 
spired to produce the venerable Menes the world has quite 
forgotten these many centuries, but as for this Fuad, him I 
saw and the western influences which were operating in his 
eastern land I observed. Between the incorporeal Menes 
and the corpulent Fuad, as Egypt has swung along through 
the centuries, twice it has passed through periods when 
western influences have considerably affected its course, and 
now for a century and a quarter these western ideas have 
been even more potently determining its progress. 

It was in the year 168 B. C. that the Roman envoy Po- 
pilius Lzenas drew his famous circle in the sand near Alex- 
andria, forced the conquering Syrian king to retreat, and 
asserted the political authority of Rome, the rising power of 
the West, which was to dominate Egypt for well nigh eight 
centuries. Then came the Mohammedan, whose sway has 
now endured beyond a dozen centuries despite the era of 
western crusading pressure from Godfrey and Baldwin, 
from Richard the Lion-Hearted and Saint-Louis, and despite 
the more recent French and English interventions inau- 
gurated by the youthful Bonaparte in 1708. 

To Egypt, the first home of art and learning, came Alex- 
ander the Great and the Greeks with the flower of an- 
tiquity’s art and philosophy. To Egypt, where the arts of 
peace and the supremacy of law were first established, came 
Cesar and his Romans to embrace it, last of Mediterranean 
lands, within the all-inclusive pax Romana and to extend 
over it the sway of law in its most perfect ancient charac- 


13 


14 THE AWAKENING EAST 


ter. To Egypt, the world’s oldest nation of traders, of 
feudal lords, and of masters of linguistic refinement, came 
Venetian ships bearing the crusading Frankish counts and 
knights to reopen long-fettered routes for the rich trade of 
the East on which Venice was to batten, and to introduce 
Frankish speech and influences which have never entirely 
vanished from the land of the Nile or been completely for- 
gotten on the banks of the Seine. 

To Mohammedan Egypt, in 1517, came the Turkish sul- 
tan, Selim, to reduce it to subjection to Mohammedan Con- 
stantinople as Christian Egypt had once been tributary to 
Christian Constantinople, and to filch from the decrepit heir 
of the Abbasides Islam’s pontifical title of Caliph. There 
followed for the devoted country three cruel, dreary cen- 
turies. The Turk and his Mamelukes were extortioners 
and oppressors whose benighted sway can not fairly be ac- 
counted typical of Mohammedanism. At the end of the 
eighteenth century relief came suddenly and from an un- 
expected quarter, when there appeared in Egypt Bonaparte, 
the child of the French Revolution, posing as a new Alexan- 
der and a new Cesar, accompanied not merely with fleet 
and army but also by an academy of scientists and men of 
letters, to bring the land of the Pharaohs within the circle 
of western imperialism, liberalism, and enlightenment. 

While “from the summits of yonder pyramids forty cen- 
turies” looked down, the young conqueror transformed the 
land as by enchantment and gave to its people for the first 
time in generations the breath of new life. The lucky find 
of the Rosetta stone by one of Bonaparte’s officers enabled 
Champollion a score of years later to begin the interpreta- 
tion of the nation’s long-forgotten history from its mys- 
terious monuments. Thus a French general brought to life 
and activity once more the peoples of the land in which the 
world’s civilization was born, and a French scholar began 
the unraveling of the story of its ancient achievements and 
grandeur. Civilization had started a backfire; the West 
had begun to react upon the East; the progress of modern 
western ideas in eastern lands was under way. 

In 1769, in the same year as Bonaparte, there was born 


EGYPT 15 


in the native land of Alexander the Great, Mehemet Ali, 
the second of the creators of modern Egypt. At the age of 
thirty he arrived in Egypt as an officer in the Turkish army 
sent to expel the French. After participating in the events 
which led to the capitulation of the French to the English 
and to the English evacuation of Egypt, he intrigued and 
fought his way up until in 1805 he was recognized by the 
sultan as pasha of Egypt. It is no part of our problem to 
deal with his exploits and schemes outside Egypt, either as 
the agent or as the enemy of the sultan, which made him a 
conspicuous and sometimes troublesome international figure 
till his death in 1849. 

It is, however, significant to record Mehemet Ali’s achieve- 
ments inside Egypt. In 1811 he completed the destruction 
of the Mamelukes begun by Bonaparte, thus extinguishing 
the military organization which had dominated the country 
for centuries. His resumption, or confiscation, of extensive 
lands was accompanied by the first alterations in many a 
century in the tenure of the fellaheen, the tillers of the soil. 
He established various forms of manufacturing, built roads 
and canals, encouraged commerce, introduced improvements 
in agriculture, established hospitals, and, besides promoting 
education within the country, sent brilliant youths to west- 
ern Europe to pursue their studies, especially in medicine. 
Europeans were permitted and encouraged to settle in 
Egypt. His admiration for the French found expression 
not merely in his political policies but also in his borrowing 
of ideas and methods and in the utilization of the services 
of numerous Frenchmen for the promotion of his enter- 
prises for the improvement of the nation to which he had 
given a quasi-independent status after centuries of sub- 
jection. 

Valuable as was Mehemet Ali’s work for Egypt, it must 
be recognized that he was not laboring to promote the wel- 
fare of the Egyptian people but to create for himself and 
his family an empire. He was not an Egyptian striving to 
redeem and uplift his people, but an alien, thrown by chance 
upon Egyptian soil, where fortune and his own talents gave 
him the opportunity to seize the government and found a 


16 THE AWAKENING EAST 


dynasty with which the history of the country has ever since 
been linked. To this shrewd adventurer modern ideas were 
not an end in themselves, they were but means to the accom- 
plishment of his aims and to the establishment of a power 
which could maintain itself in the international competition 
of the new age, whose tendencies he was keen enough to 
discern. | 

Whatever may have been the reasons which lured ancient 
conquerors to Egypt, it was not Egypt itself which had at- 
tracted the Venetians in the time of the Crusades or Bona- 
parte at the close of the eighteenth century. To the Vene- 
tians Egypt was merely an entrepot on a great trade route; 
to the French it was a post of vantage, a half-way station, 
on the route of empire as well as trade which led from 
Europe to India and the East. To safeguard their trade 
and empire in India the English drove Bonaparte out of 
Egypt. Throughout the first three quarters. of the nineteenth 
century England proved strangely negligent of its interests 
in the Egyptian portal to India, while France steadily ex- 
tended its influence there and was customarily the best 
European friend of Mehemet Ali and his descendants. 
Only at critical moments did England rouse itself to active 
measures, and then, by good fortune, with success. French 
influence culminated in the construction of the Suez canal 
by Lesseps, but English interests soon countered with Dis- 
raeli’s famous coup of purchasing the Khedive Ismail’s 
shares in the canal company in 1875. 

Ismail, like his predecessors Mehemet Ali and Said, had 
welcomed numerous foreigners to Egypt, not a few of whom 
fattened themselves on the khedive’s favor. Ismail delighted 
to play before their eyes the enlightened patron of western 
ways while behind the curtain he was acting the oriental 
despot in outrageous exactions upon his subjects. Lord 
Cromer dubbed him “the great high-priest of Sham.” When 
his credit was exhausted, he was compelled by certain Euro- 
pean powers, in 1876, to permit the creation of a commission 
of the public debt, the caisse, to safeguard his creditors, and 
later to accept European members in his ministry to regulate 
his policies, especially in financial matters. This humilia- 


EGYPT 17 


tion he sought to evade by plotting the call of a national par- 
liament, but such audacity was punished by his dethrone- 
ment and supersession by his son Tewfik. Ismail’s vanity 
and craft had led him to patronize Europeans, to parody west- 
ern ways, and at the last to acquaint the Egyptians with the 
two great modern shibboleths of nationalism and democ- 
racy. For good or ill his tawdry rule inaugurated a new 
epoch in Egyptian history. 

Though Mehemet Ali had reserved the higher stations in 
the army for Turks, Ismail had permitted native Egyptians 
to work their way up in the service. One of these successful 
officers, Arabi Pasha, became the leader of a native group 
who caught at the new ideas, especially nationalism, and 
succeeded in arousing those who felt the insult of rule by 
European ministers and of foreign financial control. Other 
factors, no doubt, entered into the case, but suffice it to 
mention that in June, 1882, a considerable number of Euro- 
peans were murdered in Alexandria by a Mohammedan mob. 

A month later a British fleet bombarded the forts of Alex- 
andria, which it was believed Arabi, then minister of war, 
was strengthening in spite of a warning from the admiral. 
The previous day the French fleet had deliberately sailed 
away, and the sultan was temporizing. England thus was 
left to intervene single-handed to protect European interests 
in Egypt. Since that date, with unwillingness and hesitation 
and in face of the unfriendly attitude of the other powers, 
it has controlled the fortunes of the country. In September, 
1882, a British force captured Arabi and put his followers 
to flight; so, by the action of one of the most democratic 
nations, vanished the first dream of Egyptian nationalism 
and democracy. 

The British had awakened one morning to find themselves 
in control of Egypt. They explained that, finding themselves 
in Egypt, they could not possibly find their way out at once 
without being guilty of deserting their post, but that they 
intended to withdraw as speedily as circumstances might 
permit. The British government occupied Egypt as a sort 
of trustee for the despotic khedive and also for European 
bondholders, and yet the British people claim their govern- 


18 THE AWAKENING EAST 


ment is the most democratic in the world. Strange conflicts 
of interests and of ideas at London and in Cairo, un- 
certainty and wavering instead of clean-cut and consistent 
policies, became inevitable. Unkind fate did not omit the 
handicap of international jealousies. This was a problem 
in real life; someone must undertake its solution. Imagine 
yourself stationed at Cairo then as England’s agent, and ask 
yourself how many months you could have held the post. 
England’s first choice was Sir Evelyn Baring; he served 
twenty-five years and retired as Lord Cromer. The tangles 
he unraveled were many; the achievements he wrought were 
notable. 

With all his difficulties, Sir Evelyn Baring had certain 
advantages. The khedive, Tewfik, was a loyal supporter if 
not an intelligent co-worker. As he quaintly put it, “Tewfhk 
should be remembered as the khedive who allowed Egypt to 
be reformed in spite of the Egyptians.” Then, too, Baring 
had the advantage of an illuminating apprenticeship in India, 
where he had administered the finances of that empire and 
had learned how to govern eastern peoples. From India, 
moreover, he was able to draft experienced officials to aid 
him in directing every important undertaking. 

Toward the close of his administration the Anglo-French 
convention of 1904, at last, relieved him of his most jealous 
international critic and gave him instead his first interna- 
tional supporter. Still all did not go well. In 1892, Tewfik 
died and his successor, Abbas Hilmi, who had been educated 
at Vienna, added to his oriental heritage of despotic ideas 
the European conceptions of divine-right monarchy and dis- 
played a tendency to become a satellite of the infamous 
sultan, Abdul Hamid. Cromer’s masterful management 
irked him and he never ceased to tug at the leash. 

It was no easy task that awaited Cromer’s successor, one 
of his own pupils and lieutenants, Sir Eldon Gorst, who 
had scarcely entered upon his duties when the Young Turk 
revolution at Constantinople in 1908 suddenly altered con- 
ditions in the Ottoman Empire, of which Egypt was more 
than technically a part. The triumph of this aggressive 
group of nationalists and constitutionalists could not be 


EGYPT 10 


without its repercussion in Egypt. Many young Egyptians 
of the better classes had been getting their education in 
Europe, or at any rate along modern lines, and not a few 
of them were ready to grasp the lesson of the Turkish revo- 
lution. The khedive, Abbas, also read some of the signs of 
the times and, as the Young Turks became more nationalist 
and less constitutionalist, gradually came to align himself 
with them and, like them, to fall under the German influ- 
ences which were rife at Constantinople, where he was a 
frequent visitor. 

In 1911 Sir Eldon Gorst’s broken health compelled him 
to give place to Lord Kitchener, who combined both Indian 
and Egyptian experience, but as an army man, not as a 
diplomatist or a civilian like his predecessors. His justly 
won prestige in Egypt served him in good stead, but forces 
were at work both in Egypt and in the larger world which 
would soon compel more radical action than had yet been 
anticipated. Experience with the municipal, provincial, and 
legislative councils devised by Lord Dufferin in 1882 was 
bound to lead to an increased native participation in gov- 
ernment. This tendency was confirmed not merely by the 
Turkish revolution but by the corresponding developments 
elsewhere, notably in the Indian councils act of 1909. An 
even more striking case was the formation in 1910 of the 
Union of South Africa, including two states which had been 
at war with Great Britain within a decade. 

The Turkish disasters in the Italian and Balkan wars of 
I9Q1TI—1913 created a deeply unfavorable impression through- 
out the Mohammedan world, which included Egypt. Finally 
the behavior of Abbas was rapidly making his continued 
occupation of the khediviate incompatible with British ad- 
ministration. In 1913 Kitchener accorded Egypt an or- 
ganic law comparable to the Indian councils act of 1909; 
and early in 1914 he was apparently contemplating the ter- 
mination of the irritating career of Abbas. It should be 
observed that Abbas knew, as his grandfather Ismail had 
not known, how to play on the nationalist spirit while ad- 
hering unfalteringly to his despotic notions. 

Then came the World War and with it sudden and far- 


20 THE AWAKENING EAST 


reaching changes for Egypt. When Turkey entered the 
war as the ally of Germany, Great Britain declared, on 
December 18, 1914, the termination of the Turkish suze- 
rainty over Egypt and the establishment of a British pro- 
tectorate. On the following day there was announced the 
dethronement of Abbas, who had been for some months in 
Constantinople, and the accession in his stead of his uncle 
Hussein with the ill-chosen title of sultan. These transac- 
tions were accomplished by British fiat without any effort 
to give them the semblance of actions of the Egyptian na- 
tion, the chief party in interest. 

Great Britain not only flagrantly disregarded Egyptian 
sentiment, but also threw away the opportunity to develop 
among the Egyptians a spirit of voluntary loyalty and serv- 
ice which would have made them feel their membership in 
the British Commonwealth of Nations to which they might 
naturally assume they were now a party. While Egypt was 
expressly excluded from the privilege accorded, without 
question, to the dominions, the colonies, and even India, of 
volunteering to share the burdens of the war, various bur- 
dens of war were actually imposed upon the country, notably 
by the creation of the Egyptian labor corps and of the camel 
and donkey transport corps. 

In other ways the World War had its effects upon Egypt. 
The service of the fellaheen in the corps just mentioned 
could not fail to have an educating influence, nor could the 
presence in Egypt of the great British forces recruited from 
all parts of the empire. This utilization of Egypt as a 
great base camp and other war-time conditions, such as 
those affecting the cotton market, necessarily involved the 
pouring into Egypt of an unwonted amount of wealth, with 
its consequent effects. More potent still was the example, 
glaring in Egyptian eyes, of the more liberal policy pursued 
with reference to India which culminated in the Montagu— 
Chelmsford reforms. 

These measures stood out in flagrant contrast with the 
halting performances with reference to Egypt since the 
proclamation of the protectorate. During the war there 
were repeated changes in the office of British high commis- 


ee 


EGYPT 21 


sioner and also in the chief command of the armed forces 
in Egypt, and the selections did not invariably prove wise. 
It must be recorded as highly creditable to the Egyptian 
people that, despite these circumstances, they remained quiet 
and gave the British authorities practically no cause for 
anxiety throughout the war. The death, in 1917, of the 
highly respected Sultan Hussein was a serious loss for which 
the selection of his brother Fuad as his successor was slight 
compensation. 

These ineptitudes of British policy in dealing with Egypt 
did not cease with the war. Two days after the armistice, No- 
vember 13, 1918, Saad Pasha Zaghlul, a former cabinet min- 
ister and the elected vice-president of the legislative council, 
which had not been summoned to meet throughout the war, 
called with some friends on the British high commissioner, 
Sir Reginald Wingate, and speaking as the representative of 
the Egyptian people demanded the abolition of the protec- 
torate and the recognition of the complete independence 
of Egypt. The British statement issued at the time of 
proclamation of the protectorate afforded reasonable pretext 
for such a demand, and the delay in raising the question 
until after the armistice showed that the quiescence of the 
Egyptian people during the war had been a deliberate policy 
not to embarrass England. With the close of hostilities 
would come the peace negotiations and the readjustment of 
all questions of territorial status which had developed during 
the war. The case of Egypt was obviously one of these 
questions, and one in which the people of Egypt naturally 
felt they had a vital interest, especially in view of the public 
pronouncements on nationalism and democracy by the Brit- 
ish premiers, Asquith and Lloyd George, and by the Amer- 
ican president, Woodrow Wilson. 

After receiving a noncommittal reply, the delegation later 
returned with the request to be allowed to proceed to Eng- 
land to discuss the questions with the British ministry and 
lay their case before the British people. In view of the re- 
jection of this not unreasonable appeal and in view of other 
disquieting developments, the Egyptian prime minister, 
Rushdi Pasha, and his leading colleague, Adli Pasha, who 


22 THE AWAKENING EAST 


had both been in office throughout the war and were tried 
friends of the British interests, asked permission to visit 
London to discuss the situation with the ministry there. 
The reply that the British ministers were too busy with 
the peace conference to discuss Egyptian affairs was not 
unnaturally followed by the resignation of the whole Egyp- 
tian ministry on March 1, 1919. 

Up to this date the nationalist agitation had been con- 
ducted zealously, but in a perfectly lawful and orderly man- 
ner. A week later Zaghlul Pasha and three other nationalist 
leaders of nearly equal eminence and influence were arrested 
and promptly deported to Malta by the British general in 
command. It was only after this abrupt measure that the 
nationalist movement involved any disorder. Even then 
the earlier demonstrations were peaceful if not orderly, but 
they soon gave cover for disorderly elements to raid shops 
and street cars. To repress these disturbances the helpless 
police appealed to the military, who fired into the mob. 
Bloodshed was a most unfortunate argument to give the 
agitators, and worse trouble followed not merely in Cairo 
but in many important provincial towns. 

Just as the troubles were starting, General Allenby, the 
commander-in-chief in Egypt and Syria, had been summoned 
to Paris to give advice in connection with the peace negotia- 
tions. He had been in Paris only two days when the British 
ministers, perplexed by the bad news which poured in from 
Egypt, instead of burdening themselves with responsibil- 
ity for the matter, decided to pack him off posthaste to 
Egypt as special high commissioner with general orders “to 
take all such measures as he considers necessary and ex- 
pedient to restore law and order.’’ Three days later “the 
strong man” was at his post in Cairo. Allenby was a soldier 
without administrative or political experience. His slight 
knowledge of Egypt had been gained in the two or three 
years since his appointment to the command of the Egyptian 
Expeditionary Force, which had been operating most of the 
time in Palestine and Syria. 

General Allenby met the situation with sound common 
sense and with energy. His first task was to restore the 


EGYPT 23 


normal functioning of government, which required the 
securing of a new ministry. Interviews with leading Egyp- 
tians, singly and in groups, soon indicated a solution. On 
April 7, 1919, after consultation with the home authorities 
and with the sultan, he announced the release of Zaghlul 
and his companions and the grant to them and to other 
Egyptians of freedom of travel. This meant that Zaghlul 
would be free to go to Paris, as he did. The next day 
Rushdi Pasha and his cabinet, with only minor changes of 
personnel, were back in office. That their tenure was brief 
was due to a new turn in the nationalist agitation, especially 
in Cairo, which among other things took the form of a strike 
of government employees. 

The announcement was made in May that a commission 
headed by Lord Milner would proceed to Egypt to in- 
vestigate and report constructive measures, but not till 
December 7, 1919, did Lord Milner and his colleagues reach 
Cairo. Meanwhile Zaghlul at Paris had assumed the lead- 
ership of the nationalist movement. Internationally he met 
only rebuffs. The formal recognition of the British pro- 
tectorate by the American government, on April 22, could 
not have rendered more timely aid to the British interest had 
President Wilson deliberately planned to discomfit Zaghlul. 
Two months later article 147 of the treaty of Versailles 
gave general international recognition to the British pro- 
tectorate. On the one hand Zaghlul and his agents carried 
their campaigning even to Washington, while on the other 
they organized an Egyptian boycott of the Milner com- 
mission. 

The nationalist boycott of the commission held good 
throughout the latter’s three-month stay in Egypt and pre- 
vented consultations with the leaders of the movement, which 
might have been helpful. Still the commission accomplished 
much, even in learning at first hand the views of the Egyp- 
tians; the very circumstances of the boycott revealed much 
of conditions which they needed to understand ; the workings 
of the British administration were for the first time thor- 
oughly investigated; the views of the British and other for- 
eign communities were gathered; various sections of the 


24 THE AWAKENING EAST 


country were visited. In spite of all this it was obvious that 
without frank and open discussion with the nationalist lead- 
ers the work of the commission would fail of its chief pur- 
pose. Even Zaghlul and his friends were beginning to 
realize that they were throwing away opportunities so val- 
uable that they would sooner or later have to reckon with the 
results of their failure to utilize an obvious means of pre- 
senting their case and perhaps achieving their real if not 
their avowed ends. 

When the Milner commission left Egypt early in March, 
1920, its members had already reached the conclusion “that 
no settlement could be satisfactory which was simply imposed 
by Great Britain upon Egypt, but that it would be wiser to 
seek a solution by means of a bilateral agreement—a treaty 
—between the two countries.’ About a month later the 
commission resumed its work in England, and finally, 
through the mediation of Adli Pasha, Zaghlul and several 
of his colleagues left Paris on June 7 and joined the com- 
mission in the discussion of the problems at issue. On the 
basis of these conferences Lord Milner prepared a mem- 
orandum dated August 18, 1920, outlining the bases for a 
proposed treaty of alliance between Great Britain and 
Egypt. This memorandum was published, and four of 
Zaghlul’s colleagues were sent to Egypt to sound out public 
opinion upon the proposals. 

The results were generally favorable, and at the end of 
October Zaghlul and his colleagues returned to London for 
further conference with the commission. On November 9, 
Lord Milner brought the conferences to a close in a brief 
address appealing to all “to cultivate and strengthen by 
every means the spirit of friendship and mutual confidence 
which our conversations here have helped to engender.” 
Zaghlul replied in similar terms, but with great insistence, 
that he was still unable to give the Egyptian people definite 
assurance “that Great Britain had finally repudiated the 
protectorate.” 

The commission shortly afterward completed its report, 
which was published in a white book in February, 1921. 
In Egypt a change of ministry brought to the premiership 


EGYPT 25 


Adli Pasha, who had been so largely responsible for the 
successful conferences between the commission and the 
Zaghlul delegation. Adli, with a new delegation, returned 
to London and in July began negotiations for the proposed 
treaty which after four months ended in a rupture. The 
negotiations had been conducted in absolute secrecy and 
were presumably making favorable progress. The reason 
for the rupture was the British insistence upon free military 
use of the Egyptian soil to guarantee British imperial com- 
munications. Adii naturally denounced the proposals as 
“an occupation pure and simple which destroys all idea of 
independence, even to the extent of suppressing internal 
sovereignty.” 

Shortly after the breakdown of negotiations Lord Al- 
lenby urged upon Lord Curzon a definite program for the 
withdrawal of the protectorate. Meanwhile disorders broke 
out anew and it was deemed necessary once more to deport 
Zaghlul Pasha, this time to the Seychelles Islands. Ap- 
parently the dilatory maneuvers of Lord Curzon drew from 
Lord Allenby an ultimatum of resignation, which led to a 
request from Lord Curzon that the high commissioner re- 
turn at once to confer with the government in London. 
Throughout this period Lord Allenby had not only been 
acting in closest harmony with his British colleagues in 
Egypt but he had also been in close touch with Adli Pasha, 
Sarwat Pasha, and other representative Egyptians, and had 
undoubtedly arrived at an understanding. 

The success of Lord Allenby’s visit to London was re- 
vealed on February 28, 1922, when the prime minister, 
Lloyd George, announced in the house of commons the gov- 
ernment proposals with regard to Egypt. These proposals 
included the termination of the protectorate, the recog- 
nition of Egypt as a sovereign state, the withdrawal of 
martial law on the passage of an act of indemnity by the 
Egyptian government, and, pending negotiations on other 
important issues, the maintenance of the existing status. 
Thus, instead of securing a settlement through a bilateral 
agreement between the two countries as recommended by 
the Milner commission, the British cabinet, after squander- 


26 THE AWAKENING EAST 


ing fifteen precious months, was compelled to adopt the ob- 
viously less advantageous policy of a unilateral pronounce- 
ment of concessions on the main issues before negotiating 
the adjustment of conditions. 

On March 16, as I landed in Suez, flags were flying and 
cannon salutes were heard, which I soon learned were in 
honor of the independence of Egypt, officially proclaimed 
on that day. During the ensuing days in Cairo it was my 
fortune to witness further demonstrations connected with 
the event and to see Lord Allenby and Fuad, who inaugu- 
rated the new order by exchanging the obnoxious title of 
sultan! for the unobjectionable one of king. The demon- 
strations, however, were not marked by enthusiastic appro- 
bation; indeed, the most enthusiastic exhibitions were of 
an unfriendly sort. The students not merely went on strike 
to express their disapproval but paraded the streets shouting 
their declaration of principles: “Down with false independ- 
ence; down with the new king; down with Sarwat Pasha; 
we want Saad Pasha [Zaghlul].” That their sentiments 
might be clear even to the visitor in the city who was ig- 
norant of Arabic, a leader would give a phrase in English 
or French, which would then be vociferated by the whole 
group. The great university mosque of El Azhar was 
closed, not without bloodshed, in order to avert further dis- 
order. 

Nearly a year has passed since those apparently mo- 
mentous days, and yet, strangely, little news has leaked out 
of Egypt. Martial law continues, murderous attacks on 
British officials and soldiers persist, plans for the prepara- 
tion of a constitution are announced, but yet no constitution 
has appeared.2 Meanwhile the successes of the Angora 
Turks and the dubious policies of the British government 
in dealing with them have had a most disturbing influence 
throughout the Near East and have naturally affected Mo- 
hammedan opinion in Egypt. 

“Since 1517, the Ottoman ruler had been the caliph or ecclesiastical 
head of Islam and the title of sultan had come to be reserved for 
him alone. 

*See below, page 44. 





EGYPT a7 


The persistence of British control in Egypt through four 
decades is a phenomenon which requires some explanation. 
It has been, on the whole, beneficial not merely to the Brit- 
ish themselves, but also to both the Egyptian people and to 
all other nations with any interest in the country. British 
interests have been clearly superior to those of any other out- 
side nation. The passage of the control of the country to 
any other power would have produced a situation less ac- 
ceptable internationally. The interests of no nation in Egypt 
have suffered from any injustice that would have given basis 
for complaint that British occupation was inimical to inter- 
national welfare. It might be said that British rule contin- 
ued in Egypt in default of anything better to substitute for 
it, were it not that such a statement gives a false implication 
that British rule was devoid of merit. 

Thus far I have undertaken to outline the history of the 
three greatest developments of the past century affecting 
Egypt: the establishment and rule of the semi-independent 
dynasty of Mehemet Ali, which was of Mohammedan but 
European origin; the British occupation and administration ; 
and the rise and growth of the nationalist movement, which 
drew its inspiration mainly from western sources and was, 
therefore, to a degree difficult to determine, bound up with 
ideas of representative government and democracy. Egypt 
has reached the point where it is to enter upon the experi- 
ment of self-government following western models. It 
becomes necessary, therefore, to inquire whether the con- 
ditions of the country and its people and the developments 
toward modern ideas in other matters are such as to afford 
prospect of success. 

Egypt is the gift of the Nile; the almost unique source of 
the nation’s wealth is agriculture. The country is nearly 
devoid of mineral products. Handicrafts have never pros- 
pered greatly in the land, and even to-day the development 
of manufactures is quite negligible. Other peoples have al- 
ways traded in and through Egypt but the Egyptian himself 
has never been a trader or even a shopkeeper. The real 
Egyptians, the fellaheen, are tillers of the soil as their fore- 
bears have been since the dawn of history. 


28 THE AWAKENING EAST 


The estimated area of the kingdom is 350,000 square miles, 
but of this only 12,023 square miles (Massachusetts and 
Connecticut together have 12,859 square miles) are cultiv- 
able and constitute the inhabited area. Of this small amount 
only two thirds are actually under cultivation. This area is 
situated in the delta and, to a somewhat less extent, in a 
narrow ribbon along either bank of the river above Cairo. 
As some indication of the improvement of conditions it 
should be noted that the estimate made by the French under 
Bonaparte was 6,921 square miles of tillable land of which 
5,500 were tilled. 

The productivity of the land is absolutely dependent upon 
the inundations of the Nile or upon irrigation with Nile 
water, for which purpose works have been constructed and 
maintained ever since the beginning of history. During the 
Turkish period these works fell into neglect, but Mehemet 
Ali began their restoration and extension so as to provide 
perennial irrigation. His successors did not continue his 
wise policy, so that it was left for the British to carry his 
work to a conclusion and to add to it the colossal under- 
taking at Assuan. This great dam has provided safeguards 
against the two opposite disasters of inadequate or ex- 
cessive rise of the river; it has largely increased the cul- 
tivable area, extended perennial irrigation, and enlarged 
the possibilities for raising two and even three crops an- 
nually. This achievement alone, were there not others, 
would be a sufficient monument to the British occupation. 
One of the important results of perennial irrigation has been 
the successful development of cotton-growing, to which 
more than 1,500,000 acres are regularly devoted, thus fur- 
nishing the country’s most profitable marketable product. 

This vast benefit conferred by British effort has wrought 
remarkable improvement in the economic status of the fellah- 
een, but far greater benefits have been bestowed upon them 
at the hands of the British reformers. For the first time 
since Joseph acquired their lands from them for Pharaoh 
(Genesis 47. 20), they have been assured personal and prop- 
erty rights. Changes which date back to the reign of Me- 
hemet Ali have been breaking down what may be roughly 





EGYPT 29 


described as the mixture of feudal holding and state owner- 
ship of land established by Joseph, so that many fellaheen 
now own their land. 

At present there are over 1,700,000 native owners with 
holdings of less than five acres each, constituting over 90 
per cent of the landholders and controlling over 27 per cent 
of the cultivated area. On the other hand the evils of 
large estates in the hands of wealthy owners have not dis- 
appeared, for over 40 per cent of the tillable land is in hold- 
ings of over fifty acres each in the hands of 13,500 persons, 
less than one per cent of the total number of owners. Under 
the so-called five-feddan, that is five-acre, act of Lord 
Kitchener, only the portion of a holding in excess of five 
acres can be levied on to satisfy debts. This measure is an 
absolute safeguard against the exploitation of the fellaheen 
by money lenders and others. 

Further safeguards were thrown about the fellaheen by 
the establishment in 1902 of the agricultural bank, which 
loans to them at moderate rates. As an encouragement to 
the development of thrift among them, postal savings banks 
were established in 1900, which have proved successful, but 
the rural savings-bank service inaugurated in 1912 has not 
yet shown such satisfactory results. 

With the absolute reliance upon irrigation, the assurance 
of a fair supply of water to each landowner, however humble, 
is vital. Prior to British occupation the abuses in favor of 
the rich and of those who could use official or financial 
pressure were notorious ; now the small holder gets his share 
of water equally with the richest. In similar manner the 
British have safeguarded the fellaheen by providing for the 
weighing of cotton and the sale of seed by the government. 
The ancient quasi-feudal practice of calling out forced labor 
to clean the irrigation canals, to safeguard the Nile embank- 
ments in time of floods, and to toil on other public works, a 
practice to which the French term corvée has been applied, 
not only operated to the detriment of the normal agricul- 
tural activities of the fellaheen but was also enforced with 
rank injustice and favoritism. Under the British occupa- 
tion such forced labor has been replaced with paid labor. 


30 THE AWAKENING EAST 


Similar to the corvée was conscription for military serv- 
ice, enforced by press-gangs with all manner of corruption 
and abuse. The army is still recruited by conscription, but 
under British supervision it is carried out with absolute 
equity, and the fixed term of service, the regular pay, and 
various other improved conditions in the army have removed 
the horror fostered by the ancient practices. The use of 
torture and of flogging, the courbash, was the regular pro- 
cedure for enforcing the collection of taxes and for the ad- 
ministration of justice. It was due to Lord Dufferin that 
these methods were officially abolished in 1883 and soon 
eliminated in actual practice. Equitable assessment and 
honest collection of taxes brought further relief to the op- 
pressed fellaheen. 

Lord Cromer summed up these reforms as the three C’s, 
that is the abolition of corvée, courbash, and corruption. 
Their significance cannot be overrated and, while not parallel 
in detail, the relief secured may be compared in general to 
that obtained by the French peasantry through the Revolu- 
tionary and Napoleonic periods. For these benefits the 
fellaheen are certainly indebted to the British. It may be 
argued that the Egyptians themselves would have worked 
out the reforms, but it would be difficult to find any con- 
firmation for such an assumption. 

Modern ideas have entered Egypt through the British 
administration and achieved these far-reaching changes which 
have swept away abuses hoary with antiquity, and have for 
the first time given the fellaheen rights and decent treatment 
as human beings. Though the fellaheen may still be fabu- 
lously ignorant, modern ideas have tremendously affected 
them, and quite in spite of themselves they must henceforth 
live and move upon the basis of those ideas. The British 
have taught by practice the value of a rule of law instead of 
caprice. 

The fellaheen® are estimated to form nine tenths of the 
population of Egypt, which was shown by the census of 

*This word, the plural of fellah, strictly means plowmen, that is, 


peasants ; but it is freely used, as here, to designate the whole group 
of the indigenous population, that is, likewise, all the working classes. 


EGYED 31 


1917 to be 12,750,918, an average of 1,061 per square mile of 
cultivable area. These people are not of negro race but 
are of the same stock which has formed the basic element 
of the country’s population throughout historic times. The 
Arab conquest in the seventh century and the Turkish in 
the sixteenth brought in considerable numbers from those 
two stocks and from the other peoples of the empires which 
they represented. Since very ancient times groups of 
Syrians and Greeks have been resident in the country as 
traders, and since the Middle Ages, if not since Roman 
times, Italians have been similarly represented. More re- 
cently French and English communities have developed. 

Though forming a small minority of the population, these 
non-Egyptian racial elements are of dominant importance, 
for they constitute not merely the ruling or political class 
but also the propertied and cultured class. Until the reign 
of Mehemet Ali these non-Egyptian elements had a monop- 
oly of power, wealth, and culture to the absolute exclusion 
of the real Egyptians, the fellaheen; and in spite of the more 
beneficent influence of British control, it still remains vir- 
tually true that the non-Egyptian elements continue to enjoy 
almost exclusive authority in all matters political, economic, 
intellectual, and religious. 

Only these classes in Egypt have been able to afford the 
privileges of higher education, whether Mohammedan or 
European. ‘This fact has confirmed their control of the in- 
tellectual and religious life of the nation. The native press 
is mainly in their hands, and it voices their interests rather 
than those of the fellaheen. The present ruling dynasty, 
as has been seen, is Turkish,* not Egyptian. The ministers, 
even throughout the past forty years, have been drawn 
almost without exception from the Turkish and other non- 
Egyptian peoples of the country. The major proportion 
of nationalist leaders belong to the same classes. Self- 
government for Egypt cannot mean, for the present or for 
a long time to come, anything other than the rule of this 
non-Egyptian minority element which for centuries has had 


‘Strictly, Albanian. 


32 THE AWAKENING EAST 


nothing in common with the fellaheen except the utilization 
of their toil. Self-government for Egypt will not mean 
democracy, or rule by a majority of the whole people; it 
will mean the right of this long-privileged minority to rule 
all the people, with what aim and result may be surmised. 
Only the continuance of some genuine guidance of affairs 
by the British can prevent such an outcome. 

The commercial and financial affairs of the country, 
however, are not in the hands of the fellaheen, or to any 
considerable degree in those of the non-Egyptian Mohamme- 
dan elements just discussed; they are controlled by foreign 
communities. Of these the most numerous are, no doubt, 
the Syrians, Armenians, Jews, and Greeks, who form the 
major part of the shopkeeping class, but some of whom are 
engaged in larger enterprises. What may be called the big 
business of the country, both commercial and financial, is 
to a large extent in the control of western Europeans, Ital- 
ians, French, and British, who live and do business in Egypt 
under a special regime of law known as the capitulations. 

The Egyptian people, whether of Egyptian or non-Egyp- 
tian stock, never have controlled and do not now control 
more than a small fraction of the nation’s business affairs, 
and there is no indication of either their willingness or their 
ability to shoulder the management of these matters. It is 
a serious question how a people incompetent and unready to 
handle its private business affairs can be expected to man- 
age successfully its public business. The foreign control 
of the nation’s business is in itself a most serious obstacle 
to national self-government, unless provision is made to de- 
nationalize these foreign elements, to merge them into the 
national citizenship of Egypt, and to assure them sufficient 
voice in affairs to afford some guarantee of national finan- 
cial stability. Yet any such proposition would in its very 
nature be undemocratic, as it would give the all-important 
power of the purse to a minute fraction of the population. 

The capitulations, under whose protection these foreigners 
dwell and trade in Egypt, are concessions granted by the gov- 
ernment through treaty or otherwise, assuring the nationals 
concerned the protection of their own law, and freedom from 


a ee " 


EGYPT 33 


the operation of the local law and from such burdens as the 
payment of most forms of taxes. At present Great Britain 
and thirteen other nations enjoy such privileges for their 
subjects. 

Hitherto the beneficiary nations have resisted strenuously 
every effort to abolish the capitulations or to modify their 
application except in very minor matters. Until the capitu- 
lations are abrogated or radically modified in scope and 
application there can be no self-government in Egypt in a 
full and proper sense, for they constitute serious limitations 
on the national sovereignty. Great Britain has repeatedly 
undertaken with little, if any, success to secure such action. 
With the proclamation of independence Great Britain is 
pledged to endeavor to obtain the desired concessions from 
the powers concerned. In this there is, however, a double 
difficulty. If the powers are to abandon the capitulations, 
they must have adequate guarantees for the full protection 
of the law in both the administration of justice and in the 
freedom of trade which can at present be guaranteed only 
by Great Britain. Such an arrangement would amount to 
the abandonment by the thirteen powers of favored treat- 
ment to the good offices of the one power whose position in 
Egypt is already that of the most favored. A concession 
of such sort would hardly be made without the exaction of 
some guid pro quo at British expense. Nevertheless, Eng- 
land’s position with reference both to Egypt and to the 
powers concerned might conceivably be adjusted to the sat- 
isfaction of all on a basis similar to that of the United States 
to Cuba as provided in the Platt Amendment. It would be 
less invidious to other powers to have England’s status in 
Egypt defined by a constitutional measure rather than by 
means of an Anglo-Egyptian diplomatic alliance. 

As long as the capitulations exist there can be no thorough- 
going judicial and legal reform in the country; equitable ad- 
justment of the burden of taxation will remain impossible, 


°The origin of the capitulations may be traced to medieval trading 
arrangements. The more important existing concessions were 
granted by the Ottoman sultan with reference to Egypt as a province 
of the Turkish Empire. 


34 THE AWAKENING EAST 


and numerous other difficulties will persist. Taxation neces- 
sary for the establishment and maintenance of a suitable 
educational system which would be the most efficient agency 
in the spread of western ideas in the country is blocked by 
the capitulations ; as are also such apparently simple reforms 
as the suppression of gambling and disorderly houses and of 
quack practitioners of medicine, dentistry, and pharmacy. 

The capitulations include within their scope guaranties 
to the nationals of the several countries of freedom in the 
practice of their religion and permission for the conduct of 
missionary activities. Christianity in Egypt seems as in- 
congruous as Protestantism in Rome. Egypt is a Moham- 
medan country and has been since the tenth year after 
the Prophet’s death. Over 91 per cent of the people are 
Mohammedan. The famous university of El Azhar at Cairo, 
which dates from 972, is the intellectual and theological 
center of Islam in the country and stands preeminent in the 
Mohammedan world, with its 400 professors and 10,000 
students® drawn from every Moslem nation. Cairo is not 
only the intellectual center of Mohammedanism but also the 
literary headquarters of Arabic, the universal language of 
the Islamic world. Extraordinary significance, therefore, 
attaches to the Egyptian press in its output of both books 
and periodicals. 

The steady extension of Christian political domination 
over Moslem lands during the past century, which has been 
accentuated in recent years by the partitioning of the Otto- 
man Empire by Italy and the Balkan states and more re- 
cently by the abortive treaty of Sévres, has left only scat- 
tered patches of the former widespread empire of Islam free 
from Christian control. These alarming changes naturally 
aroused the religious zeal of pious Moslems and gave life 
to a Pan-Islamic movement. 

In Egypt, therefore, the development of an unfriendly 
attitude toward British control was inevitable even though 
the British had taken every precaution to avoid unnecessary 








“These are the figures usually given, but they are probably con- 
siderably too large. El Azhar, moreover, is an ecclesiastical institu- 
tion rather than a university in the western sense. 


EGYPT 35 


offense and had given no overt cause for complaint. The 
Mohammedan leaders have, indeed, refrained from activities 
which would bring matters of faith into political contro- 
versy. None the less the nationalist movement has enjoyed 
consistent and generally hearty support from Mohammedan 
sources, especially from the professors and students of El 
Azhar. In fact, the students of El Azhar have been in the 
forefront of most nationalist demonstrations and strikes. 
This Mohammedan-nationalist alliance is but one of the 
many paradoxes in the Egyptian situation. 

Without war or revolution certain reforms which seem 
desirable in western eyes can be effected only as the result 
of changes developing within Mohammedanism itself. It 
rests with the leaders of Islam to determine whether they 
will alter the aims and methods and scope of education and 
so direct the modern movement among their peoples, or 
whether they will adhere rigidly to the past and resist in- 
novations with every power at their disposal. If one can 
read aright what are apparently some of the signs of the 
times, the tendency toward readjustment rather than re- 
sistance is the stronger. The nationalist movement is in- 
stinct with modern or western ideas which have hitherto 
remained alien to the Moslem world. The Mohammedan- 
nationalist alliance, in the case of nationalist success, cannot 
fail to result in profound effects of the various liberalizing 
ideas identified with nationalism upon the religious institu- 
tions and life of Mohammedanism. 

Of the eight per cent of the people of Egypt who are 
Christians, about three quarters are Copts. These people 
have adhered to the Christian faith throughout all the vicis- 
situdes of Mohammedan rule in Egypt for over twelve cen- 
turies. Trying experiences have benefited neither these 
people nor their faith. Adherents of the western churches 
have recently been exercising a helpful influence among 
them, and evidences of a progressive spirit are to be found. 
The percentage of literacy among the Copts is three times 
greater than among their Mohammedan neighbors, for out 
of every thousand Mohammedans only fifty-three are able 
to read and write, whereas one hundred and seventy-one 


36 THE AWAKENING EAST 


out of every thousand Copts possess that ability. As might 
have been anticipated on general principles, the Copts, the 
oldest group in the population, have been sympathetic to 
the nationalist movement. On the other hand, the leader- 
ship of the movement by the non-Egyptian elements and 
the Mohammedan support would suggest an opposite at- 
titude as natural. Absence of such opposition is perhaps 
due, in part, to fear of incurring the disfavor of those 
powerful elements. 

There are nearly fifty thousand Protestants in Egypt and 
more than double that number of Roman Catholics. Mos- 
lem lands have been proverbially barren fields for Chris- 
tian missions. Until recent years the efforts which have 
been put forth have been among the Copts rather than 
among the Mohammedan sections of the community. Ag- 
gressive missionary enterprise by the British has for ob- 
vious reasons been inexpedient. The American Protestant 
missions are chiefly conducted by the United Presbyterians, 
who have founded a college at Assiut. More recently an 
American University has been started in Cairo. Both institu- 
tions are already doing promising educational work. It is 
probable, however, that the largest influence of these enter- 
prises will not be in effecting conversions to Christianity but 
in their helpful reactions upon Mohammedanism. 

The most serious charge which has been brought against 
the British control in Egypt has been that, in the face of its 
pronounced policy of preparing the people for self-govern- 
ment, it has made but slight advances in the extension of 
educational facilities. For elementary education there have 
long existed in Egypt rather inefficient schools called 
maktabs in which some vernacular instruction in reading, 
writing, and arithmetic is given along with religious teach- 
ing. Since 1897 efforts have been made for governmental in- 
spection and supervision of these schools, and small grants 
have been made to those which meet certain very moderate 
standards. In 1913 the responsibility in these matters was 
transferred to the provincial councils. The attendance at 
these government-aided elementary schools is not much over 
two hundred thousand. 


BRGY ERT 37 


In the matter of higher education the situation is some- 
what better. The beginnings of instruction of modern type 
as contrasted with the time-honored theological and canon- 
istic learning of El Azhar were made under Mehemet Ali 
for the purpose of training civil servants. Owing to the 
financial difficulties the British did not at first find it possi- 
ble to encourage considerable undertakings, but since 1897 
the number of schools of the higher grades under govern- 
ment control has increased from 14 to 45, the number of 
male pupils from 1,447 to 8,231, and the number of female 
pupils from 20 to 971.7 A scheme has been elaborated for 
a complete system of government elementary schools with a 
capital cost of approximately $60,000,000 and an annual 
maintenance charge of about $10,000,000, and also for a 
state university at Cairo, but as yet little progress has been 
made, and under favorable circumstances a generation would 
be necessary to carry the plan into execution. A funda- 
mental difficulty will be the provision of a proper corps of 
trained teachers, which will require the establishment of a 
system of training schools. The problem of developing 
taxation to supply the needed funds is a matter of serious 
concern. 

Egyptians of the better classes are able readily to acquire 
higher education in European institutions, as has been the 
practice since the time of Mehemet Ali. The most remark- 
able developments are the growth in the demand for educa- 
tion and the change in attitude with regard to the education 
of women. In the latter case the ancient hostile preju- 
dice has been giving place to a recognition of its value. With 
this change has come the establishment of schools for girls 
and a rapid growth in attendance upon them. The result 
is shown clearly in the statistics of literacy. In 1917 there 
were 120 literate males per thousand as compared with 85 in 
1907; the number of literate females increased from 3 per 
thousand in 1907 to 18 per thousand in 1917. With the 
extension of education there is disappearing the habit of 


"Largely due to the fifteen years’ work of the late Mr. Sidney 
Wells, who was appointed director general of technical, industrial, 
and commercial education in 1907, 


38 THE AWAKENING EAST 


regarding the acquisition of a certain amount of higher edu- 
cation as merely a qualification for a post in public employ. 
This change cannot fail to improve the tone of both educa- 
tion and the public service. 

The growth of journalism has been an important though 
scarcely a laudable adjunct to the development of the nation- 
alist movement. It is not long since the field of native journal- 
ism was regarded as the refuge of those more or less 
educated persons who failed to obtain civil service appoint- 
ment. The tone of this native journalism has been quite too 
vehement and irresponsible, denunciation, vilification, and 
scurrility being the main contents of their arsenals. The 
foreign-language press in Egypt has, unfortunately, set no 
high standard for the native press. The inferiority of these 
papers to the English papers in India affords an astounding 
contrast. Except for commercial intelligence, their level 
rarely rises to that of a small-town sheet in the United 
States. 

As regards language, in contrast with India, Egypt offers 
little difficulty, since practically the whole population, except 
the Europeans, speak Arabic. French is the most impor- 
tant European language, and, strangely enough, has never 
been displaced by English for official purposes. This 
curiously characteristic British attitude of laissez faire has 
undoubtedly been a mistaken policy in this case. 

A second charge frequently made against the British ad- 
ministration of Egypt is the failure to carry through a 
complete and consistent policy of sanitation. Quarantine 
is under the control of an international sanitary commission. 
In Cairo and some of the other larger towns the develop- 
ment of suitable water and sewage systems has recently 
been undertaken. Vaccination against smallpox has been 
widely enforced. Measures against cholera and plague have 
been carried out with a high degree of success. Some of 
the most unsanitary conditions have been abolished. Great 
advances have been made in medical service and in the 
establishment of hospitals and insane asylums. Much yet 
remains to be done, especially in the smaller towns, where 
conditions continue extremely unsatisfactory. The rate of 


BGYEPE 39 


infant mortality continues unduly high. The plague of flies 
has not abated in Egypt. It would be an oversight not to 
mention the marked diminution of ophthalmic troubles, in 
the achievement of which the work inaugurated through the 
beneficence of Sir Ernest Cassel has been of the highest 
importance. 

In the matter of legislation the British have also been 
open to criticism for failure to establish a complete and con- 
sistent system. Two almost insuperable obstacles have been 
in the way—the existence of the capitulations and the dom- 
inance of Koranic law. Still another difficulty has been the 
influence of the French codes which have molded the Egyp- 
tian conceptions of western law since the days of Mehemet 
Ali, an influence which has been strengthened by the prac- 
tice under the capitulations. Notwithstanding all these dif- 
ficulties, the British have done no small amount toward the 
systematization and improvement of law in Egypt. The 
English genius, indeed, does not operate to produce codes 
of law but to legislate for special cases. 

Whatever criticisms may be justly passed upon the Brit- 
ish in questions of education, sanitation, and legislation, 
their achievement in the development of an Egyptian ju- 
dicial system cannot fail to evoke praise. Prior to 1883, 
the country was for all practical purposes without any 
proper method of administering justice. In that year a 
system of tribunals was inaugurated, and the use of the 
courbash and of torture was abolished. Lack of sufficient 
competent judges and the unreadiness of the people to co- 
operate, especially as witnesses, made progress slow, but 
the advance has been steady and sure. The courts command 
unquestioned respect for their impartial administration, and 
to-day the sense of security of person and property under 
the reign of law is such as Egypt has not known for cen- 
turies, if ever. The existence of the consular courts and 
of the mixed tribunals to deal with cases affecting foreign- 
ers stands seriously in the way of the establishment of a 
complete and uniform system of justice. 

The unwillingness of the natives to testify, together with 
other causes, handicaps the courts in the detection and pun- 


40 THE AWAKENING EAST 


ishment of crime. It will obviously require some time to 
educate the public conscience to a proper standard for co- 
operation in the enforcement of justice according to modern 
ideas and methods. Nowhere is the watchful eye and the 
supporting arm of British authority or guidance more es- 
sential for the welfare of Egypt than in the administration 
of justice, and nowhere else would the weakening of western 
influences be more seriously felt. This is one of the most 
difficult tasks in the education of the East to western ways, 
and there are few places where their value for the East is so 
free from doubt. Probably there is no more accurate 
measure of the progress of modern ideas in eastern lands 
than that of the degree of attainment of the standard set 
forth in Magna Carta: “To no one will we sell, to no one 
will we deny or delay right or justice.” 

As in the courts of law so in the other fields of adminis- 
tration the establishment of the principle and practice of the 
honest and efficient performance of public duty, free from 
bribe or unfair influence, has been a remarkably successful 
illustration of British teaching by example. The idea is 
novel to the East but it is not unappreciated. The eastern 
idea of office as an opportunity for personal advancement 
and profit gives place with difficulty to the western concep- 
tion of office as a responsibility for the performance of public 
duty. 

Since it was the question of finance which led to the in- 
tervention in Egypt by western powers, it may well be asked 
what the achievement in that field of administration has been. 
Government expenditures have increased from £E8,757,597 
in 1882 to £E15,728,785 in 1913, and the budget estimate for 
the year 1922-23 amounted to ££ 31,440,000. In other words, 
the cost of government, which had nearly doubled in thirty 
years, has fully doubled again in the last decade. The debt 
in 1883 totaled £96,439,860 and in 1921 had been reduced to 
£92,971,740, or, allowing for the treasury surplus, to about 
£80,000,000. This achievement has been wrought at the very 
time when elsewhere public debts have been tremendously 
increased, quite apart from the burdens imposed by the 
World War. The annual charge for the debt has also been 


EGYPT 4I 


lowered by the reduction of the interest rates, which now 
vary from three to four per cent. The Egyptian pound, 
which is worth a few cents more than the pound sterling, 
has maintained its relative standing with reference to the 
English pound in international exchange in recent years. 
These favorable results have been accomplished coinci- 
dentally with the equalization and alleviation of the burden 
upon the taxpayer and the introduction of fair and just 
methods of collection. 

The increased prosperity of the country is clearly re- 
vealed by a few statistics. The census of 1882 showed a 
population of 6,831,131, and that of 1917 of 12,750,918. 
The average annual increase, which had been 1.25 per cent 
during the period between the censuses of 1846 and 1882, 
suddenly jumped under British control to 2.76 per cent in 
the next fifteen years, and ever since then has remained at 
a higher rate than previous to the British occupation. In 
1882 the exports were £11,108,262 and the imports £5,696,- 
739. The annual average for the four years 1918 to 1921 
was £E60,000,000 exports and £E64,000,000 imports. A 
partial answer to the possible question whether England 
is bleeding Egypt is shown by the British percentage of 
Egyptian trade. In 1882 Great Britain furnished 52 per 
cent of the imports, in 1921 only 30 per cent; in 1882 Great 
Britain took 65 per cent of the exports but in 1921 only 
46 per cent. In 1882 less than 1 per cent of Egyptian trade 
was with the United States; in 1921 the United States took 
18 per cent of the exports and furnished 15 per cent of 
the imports. 

Like every other country Egypt was profoundly affected 
by the World War. Whatever else may be said of the 
wisdom of British policy with reference to the country 
during the war, it must be recognized that Egypt emerged 
from the war without any increased burden of debt and with 
but trivial losses of life. Moreover, the war conditions 
brought unprecedented economic prosperity to the country, 
though not without hardship on certain classes and those 
the least able to bear the burden. This situation was, how- 
ever, not peculiar to Egypt and may be dismissed as a gen- 


42 THE AWAKENING EAST 


eral effect of the war and not one particularly chargeable to 
the conditions or situation of the country. 

Likewise the effects did not cease with the armistice, but 
prices rose even higher; labor difficulties found expression 
in strikes that were economic rather than political; and more 
or less agitation of a bolshevic sort developed. All these 
factors naturally had a direct bearing on the nationalist agi- 
tation which has already been discussed. The increased 
cost of living remains as an abiding result, and the neces- 
sary adjustments thereto have not yet been worked out fully. 
In this respect Egypt suffers an unusual difficulty owing 
to the existence of a class of large landholders with con- 
siderable numbers of fellaheen living and working upon 
their estates. 

Before concluding this consideration of England’s work 
in Egypt it is pertinent to note the foundation upon which 
it rests. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1914, the British 
army of occupation numbered 6,067 of all branches and 
ranks; since the war the number has been steadily reduced 
until, at present, it is reported as below even the prewar 
standard. Though England is holding Egypt under mar- 
tial law, it can hardly be described as grinding the country 
under the heel of military despotism. The old Egyptian 
army was disbanded immediately after Tel-el-Kebir in 1882, 
and a new army created under British officers, which now 
numbers about 17,000. Military service under conscription 
is required, but only about four per cent of those liable are 
actually called to the colors. The creation of this new army 
through training the fellaheen was proved to be a genuine 
achievement by the experience of the Sudan campaigns.8 
The story is familiar through Mr. Kipling’s “Pharaoh and 
the Sergeant” and other poems. 

The development of this native army is of distinct im- 
portance as furnishing the only perfectly clear and definite 
evidence bearing on the question whether the fellaheen are 
ready for self-government. From almost every other point 
of view the evidence seems to be cumulative on the negative 


“Mehemet Ali had earlier demonstrated the capacity of the 
fellaheen as soldiers. 


BAG era 43 


side. In the army, however, the fellaheen have been taken 
out of their oriental environment, trained in western ways, 
and given the only opportunity they have ever had to show 
what they can do when given a chance. The verdict, above 
any doubt, is that the fellaheen have made good. Of course 
the fellaheen cannot be suddenly stood on their feet and 
told that they are citizens and expected to acquit themselves 
like Thomas Jefferson or William E. Gladstone. They have 
been the servants of the nations since the curse of Canaan, 
but they are not to be dismissed as “niggers” any more than 
Kipling’s Gunga Din. They have, at least, the right to be 
given a fair chance. This discussion of Egyptian conditions 
under British control has shown that in its economic and 
administrative activities the British rule has been excellent 
and beneficial. It has proceeded conservatively but it has 
achieved remarkable progress. Few will dispute that the 
results have been far better than they would have been under 
Turkish or native control. Much has been said in praise of 
these aspects of British administration and but little criti- 
cism has been expressed other than of a merely captious sort. 

On the other hand the British have been severely criti- 
cized for their failure to promote education, to train the 
people in habits of self-government, and to develop in them 
a realization of the obligations of citizenship and a sense of 
responsibility in matters of public concern. Many Egyp- 
tians, however, have been associated with a few Englishmen 
in the regeneration of the country and have consequently 
learned the forms and something of the spirit of western 
administration. Though the British have governed Egypt 
since 1882, the Egyptians with whom they have had to deal 
had grown up under the evil rule of Ismail. The few of them 
who had obtained a modern education had received it under 
French or other continental influences. Fortunately, British 
rule has been so prolonged that the generation upon whom 
will rest the responsibilities for establishing independent 
government is one which has been trained under its en- 
lightening and progressive influence. 

Egyptians are, conceivably, prepared to give their nation 
excellent administration under the direction of an enlight- 


44 THE AWAKENING EAST 


ened and benevolent despot; but are they prepared to govern 
the country through a popularly elected legislature with a 
responsible ministry after the manner of England and other 
nations of the West? The only answer is that they are fac- 
ing that obligation with slight preparatory experience. The 
modern forms can readily be copied, but will it prove so 
easy to instil into them that spirit which gives them vitality 
in western lands? British rule has wrought laudable changes 
in Egypt, but the vital question is whether modern ideas 
have changed the Egyptians. The Sphinx awaits the answer 
to the riddle. 


RECENT EVENTS 


The prolonged delay in framing a constitution produced 
a condition of nervous tension. English soldiers and of- 
ficials were murdered, while on the other hand unduly active 
nationalists were arrested. Finally a severe crisis in the 
relations between Egypt and Great Britain was precipitated 
when it was proposed to extend the application of the new 
constitution to the Sudan. A compromise was ultimately 
reached by which the question of the Sudan was postponed 
for future negotiation, and the British government, on 
March 30, 1923, ordered the release of Zaghlul Pasha, who 
had been confined at Gibraltar, whither he had been trans- 
ferred from the Seychelles. 

The new constitution was completed on April 19, 1923, 
and received the royal signature. It established a parlia- 
mentary monarchy and provided for universal suffrage, 
compulsory free education for both sexes in public schools, 
complete religious toleration, Mohammedanism as the of- 
ficial religion, and Arabic as the official language. It re- 
served larger powers for the king and cabinet than is cus- 
tomary in similar European constitutions. In accordance 
with the understanding when independence was proclaimed, 
the completion of the constitution was soon followed by the 
termination of martial law, which had been maintained under 
British authority ever since 1914, and by the consequent 
release of the Zaghlulist sympathizers. The independence 


*See above, page 206. 


EGYPT 45 


which had been formally proclaimed in March, 1922, was 
thus practically attained in July, 1923. There still awaited 
settlement, however, certain questions which had been re- 
served for future consideration by Mr. Lloyd George when 
he announced, on February 28, 1922, the British decision to 
recognize the independence of Egypt. These postponed 
questions related to the sovereignty and administration of 
the Sudan, the public debt and other financial obligations of 
an international character, the capitulations, and the guaran- 
ties and protection for British communications through the 
Suez canal. 

Though Zaghlul Pasha had denounced the new constitu- 
tion, he and his followers took an active part in the elections 
to the first parliament. When the final results were an- 
nounced in January, 1924, they showed an overwhelming 
majority of Zaghlulists elected. It was estimated that 58 
per cent of the qualified electors voted. The existing min- 
istry at once resigned and, after prolonged negotiations, a 
new cabinet, including Zaghlul Pasha as prime minister and 
two ex-premiers, took office on January 28, 1924. Zaghlul 
notified the king that his acceptance of office did not imply 
his indorsement of preceding governmental acts against 
which he had protested. He further declared that he would 
pursue firmly his policy of independence for Egypt, includ- 
ing the Sudan, though he would accept an agreement with 
Great Britain on other matters not inconsistent therewith. 
The opening of the first session of parliament on March 15, 
1924, was marked by a cordial exchange of telegrams be- 
tween the British and Egyptian prime ministers and by other 
conciliatory gestures. 

When parliament was prorogued without having gratified 
the nationalists by a summary and satisfactory settlement 
of the deferred questions, Zaghlul was greeted with bitter 
denunciations. At the reassembling of parliament in May, 
1924, Premier Zaghlul renewed his declaration that he did 
not accept the British program of February 28, 1922, and 
that he would insist on complete independence for Egypt 
and full Egyptian control of the Sudan. The MacDonald 
ministry replied with an announcement in the British par- 


46 THE AWAKENING EAST 


liament that it would not abandon the Sudan. As a con- 
sequence, Zaghlul tendered his resignation, which King Fuad 
declined to accept. A fortnight later an attempt on the life 
of Zaghlul was made in Cairo by an irresponsible extremist. 
Fortunately the premier escaped serious injury and was able 
to embark for England on July 24 to negotiate with the 
British government over the several questions still at issue. 
All these matters are difficult and complicated, but there can 
be little doubt that the chief bar to an amicable adjustment 
is the problem of the Sudan. 

Historically, the reconquest of the Sudan, completed in 
1898, was a joint Anglo-Egyptian enterprise, and the country 
has since been under a joint administration. Geographically, 
Egypt requires control of the Sudan to protect the flow of 
the Nile waters for irrigation. A hostile government in the 
Sudan could divert the waters of the Nile to such an extent 
as to ruin Egypt. Consequently, Egypt must insist on con- 
trol of the Sudan or on irrefragable guaranties of the un- 
interrupted and undiminished enjoyment of the Nile waters. 
On the other hand, England’s interests in the Sudan are 
linked with the control of the Red Sea route to India, the 
establishment of the Cape-to-Cairo route, and the security 
of its possessions in eastern and central Africa. Racially, 
the Sudanese are entirely distinct from the Egyptians, and 
would resent domination by Egypt alone. Their absorption 
or exclusive control by the Egyptians would be as serious a 
violation of the principle of nationality as would have been 
a British refusal of independence to Egypt. 

An agreement with France was signed in London on 
December 28, 1923, fixing the boundary for about a thou- 
sand miles between the Sudan and adjacent French posses- 
sions. It is reported that satisfactory progress is being 
made on the construction of a great barrage on the Blue Nile 
at Makwar, about 170 miles above Khartum. Construction 
has also been begun on a railway from Port Sudan and 
Suakin to Kassala, near the Abyssinian frontier. Both these 
projects contemplate the development of cotton-growing in 
the Sudan, and are regarded by the Egyptians as British 
enterprises inimical to their interests. In the summer of 


EGYPT 47 


1924 some clashes occurred in the Sudan between Egyptian 
troops stationed there and the British authorities. 

The negotiations with Great Britain have been further 
complicated by Egypt’s declaration of its position on certain 
items involved in the financial readjustment necessitated by 
independence. Notice has been given that Egypt will hence- 
forth decline to make the annual payment of $750,000 to- 
ward the maintenance of British troops in the country. For 
many years a portion of the Turkish national debt has been 
secured on the annual Egyptian tribute of somewhat over 
$3,300,000. Egypt holds that the ratification of the treaty 
of Lausanne legally establishes its independence from Tur- 
key, and has announced that it will discontinue the payment 
of the tribute from the date of ratification. This action de- 
stroys the security for the Turkish bonds, which are largely 
held in France and Germany as well as in England, and 
produces a serious international complication. The Zaghlul 
administration has taken another significant step in the ap- 
pointment of an Egyptian engineer and former minister of 
public works as general manager of the state railways, a 
position heretofore filled by a European. More reassuring 
to the outside financial interests has been the refusal of the 
government to divert any part of the accumulated reserve 
fund to balance the budget for 1924. 

Among the measures connected with the establishment of 
independence has been the appointment of diplomatic and 
consular representatives, especially at Rome, Paris, London, 
and Washington, and the corresponding accrediting of for- 
eign representatives at Cairo. Independence has given added 
importance to Egypt’s relations to Mohammedan questions. 
A dispute with King Hussein of the Hedjaz over matters 
connected with the pilgrimages to Mecca arose in 1923 but 
has been satisfactorily adjusted. Since the Turkish gov- 
ernment at Angora deprived the former Ottoman sultan of 
the title of caliph, Egypt has maintained a noncommittal 
attitude on the question of succession to the caliphate. 
Though there have been rumors that King Fuad might 
assume the title, it seems unlikely that he will find it wise 
to take such action. 


48 THE AWAKENING EAST 


The report of the government finances for the year end- 
ing March 31, 1923, showed a surplus of about $37,500,000 
and that the reserve fund had been increased to $60,000,000. 
The British may well feel, at the conclusion of over forty 
years of management of the Egyptian finances, that their 
record of achievement is a satisfactory one. Recent statis- 
tics show that the total trade of Egypt increased from $296,- 
000,000 in 1913 to $416,000,000 in 1922, and that the share 
of the United States rose from $12,000,000 to $47,000,000. 
The use of the Suez canal in 1922 surpassed all records. 
The number of ships passing through the canal was 4,345, 
aggregating 20,743,245 tons. 

Though Great Britain may wisely develop, as far as 
possible, other routes of communication with India, there 
can be no concealment of the vital significance of continued 
security in its use of the Suez route. In the present inter- 
national situation and under existing imperial and commer- 
cial conditions it is inconceivable that the British can afford 
to make any concessions which would weaken them at this 
point. Other items may be compromised or yielded but 
on this one Great Britain must stand firm. Fortunately this 
problem seems capable of solution with less wounding of 
Egyptian susceptibilities than in the case of any of the other 
questions at stake. Few would contend that Egypt alone 
could be a satisfactory guardian of the canal. It is im- 
possible to conceive of any other nation replacing Great 
Britain in control of the canal with equal satisfaction to all 
its users. The day may come when international control 
will be established at both Suez and Panama, but that day 
does not seem to be at hand. Meanwhile Suez is more vital 
to Britain than Panama to the United States. 

The negotiations at London were broken off by the de- 
parture of Zaghlul Pasha on October 7, 1924, and by the 
publication on the same day of a despatch from the British 
premier, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, to the British high com- 
missioner in Egypt. The despatch recited that, in addition 
to concession on the subjects already at issue, the Egyptian 
premier had explicitly demanded the withdrawal of all 
British forces; of British financial and judicial advisers; of 


EGYPT 49 


all other control of administration, including foreign af- 
fairs; of claims to protect foreigners and minorities in 
Egypt; and of the claim to share in the defence of the Suez 
canal. Mr. MacDonald pointed out that Egyptian insist- 
ence on the last demand constituted a bar to further nego- 
tiations. The failure of Zaghlul Pasha to meet the British 
Labor premier in a more conciliatory manner and to secure 
from him the very best bargain he could is difficult to 
explain. An opportunity for so favorable a settlement may 
not soon recur. 

A report in September, 1924, of the failure of negotiations 
to fix the boundary between Egypt and the Italian colony 
of Cyrenaica has called attention to certain developments 
which have hitherto received little consideration. France 
practically withdrew from Egypt in 1882, and formally 
renounced its interests in favor of Great Britain in 1904. 
Now that the latter power is pledged to withdraw, there 
arises the question of the possibility of the intervention of 
some other power. The census of 1907 showed 34,926 
Italians resident in Egypt. It is estimated that the number 
has now doubled and exceeds that of any other European 
nationality. In ro11z Italy established itself in Tripolitania 
and Cyrenaica, so that, with its older colony of Eritrea, it 
is the nearest neighbor both to west and south and may 
claim to have a special interest in Egypt. In recent years 
there has been a considerable propaganda in Italy in favor 
of Italian domination of the Mediterranean and even of a 
revival of the glories of ancient Rome. There has, more- 
over, been definitely anti-British animus in this propaganda. 
In view of these facts it appears possible, if not probable, 
that the decline of British power in Egypt may be offset by 
a corresponding growth of Italian influence. The British 
have for some time had occasion for annoyance from Italian 
activities in Egypt and for feeling that certain matters might 
have been adjusted satisfactorily but for Italian meddling. 

In dealing with the delicate situations which have arisen 
since the proclamation of independence, King Fuad has dis- 
played tact and discretion which have strengthened his 
position and won him general esteem. The change in status 


50 THE AWAKENING EAST 


of Zaghlul Pasha from irresponsible nationalist leader to 
responsible premier has naturally lessened his popularity. 
The more extreme nationalists have resented the sobering 
effect of office upon their leader, while the premier has 
shown peculiar sensitiveness to unfriendly utterances in the 
press. Even cautious observers have expressed doubt 
whether the man who successfully led the struggle for in- 
dependence will prove equal to the task of administering 
the government. One of the most notable developments in 
recent years, especially since independence, has been the re- 
markable growth of the power of the vernacular press in 
molding public opinion. The number and circulation of 
newspapers and periodicals has greatly increased. Their 
contents, it must be remembered, reach a far larger public 
than the number of actual readers. 

The return of Zaghlul Pasha to Egypt was. soon followed 
by the defeat of the Labor party in the British elections and 
the return to power of a Conservative ministry. In the face 
of this situation and of unfavorable movements of opinion 
in Egypt Zaghlul a second time proffered his resignation to 
King Fuad, who again refused to accept it. Amid the con- 
tinued excitement in Cairo Sir Lee Stack, the governor- 
general of the Sudan and sirdar, or commander-in-chief, of 
the Egyptian army, was wounded by assassins on November 
19, 1924, and died two days later. This unfortunate event 
is not unlikely to have a sinister effect on Anglo-Egyptian 
relations. 


SUGGESTIONS FOR READING 


A fairly readable account of the recent history of Egypt will be 
found in A History of Events in Egypt from 1798 to 1914 (Lon- 
don, William Blackwood and Son, 1915), by Arthur E. P. B. Wei- 
gall. The Story of the Khediviate (New York, Charles Scribner’s 
Sons, 1902), by Edward Dicey, gives a more independent view and 
affords first-hand information for the last quarter of the nineteenth 
century. 

There are three standard books dealing with the British occupa- 
tion of Egypt, each of which is primarily valuable with reference 
to the date of its original publication. They are Viscount Milner’s 
England in Egypt (London, Edward Arnold, 1892; thirteenth 
edition, slightly revised, 1920); Earl of Cromer’s Modern Egypt 


EGYPT st 


(2 vols., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1908; frequently re- 
printed) ; and Sir Valentine Chirol’s The Egyptian Problem (Lon- 
don, Macmillan and Company, 1920; later reprinted). All three 
books are based on prolonged and intimate acquaintance with the 
country. A more popular and superficial account of journalistic 
type is Egypt in Transition (New York, The Macmillan Company, 
1914), by Sidney Low, which must be read, like the other books, 
with reference to its date of publication and not with reference to 
the present. The report of the Milner commission is printed in full 
in The Nation (New York) for April 6, 13, 20, 1921. 


CHA Rai 
INDIA 


Ecypt is a simple problem; India is a complex one. Egypt 
is a limited inhabited area with a small population generally 
homogeneous in race, language, religion, and historical de- 
velopment. India is a vast continental area inhabited by one 
fifth of mankind, diverse in race and language, variegated 
in religion and historical experience. 

India, like Egypt, is a land with an ancient history, with a 
people recently awakened to national consciousness and to 
the realization of the significance of western ideas. Like 
Egypt, too, India seeks freedom from the rule of the British, 
to whom it is chiefly indebted for initiation into western 
ways. In common with the valley of the Nile, the valleys 
of the Indus and the Ganges rank among the great source 
reservoirs of the world’s civilization. Furthermore, India, 
as well as Egypt, had experienced centuries of alien rule 
before the coming of the British. 

From the monuments and other remains, scholars have 
been able to unravel the history of Egypt with comparative 
accuracy and definiteness for more than three millenniums 
prior to the Christian era. The memorials of ancient India - 
are no less extensive and interesting but the historical in- 
vestigator is able to glean from them few definite facts for 
the establishment of even the outline of the country’s early 
annals. The curtain rises in the sixth century before Christ 
and reveals a settled society which postulates centuries of 
development. In that century occurred two epochal events: 
the great religious revolution inaugurated in the Ganges 
valley by Buddha and the appearance of the Persian armies 
on the northwest frontier, establishing the first clearly his- 
torical contact between India and the West. 

Two centuries later Alexander the Great, who had already 
brought Egypt and other lands under his sway, appeared 


52 


INDIA 53 


with his all-conquering Macedonian phalanx in the valley of 
the Indus. For at least two hundred years Greek influences 
continued to stream, or at least to trickle, into India; Greek 
visitors to India recorded their observations; regular com- 
mercial intercourse between India and the West was estab- 
lished. This cultural and commercial contact between India 
and the West, though perhaps never extensive, continued 
unbroken until the rise of Mohammedanism at the beginning 
of the seventh century of our era. Buddhism reached its 
climax in India in the third century before Christ under the 
empire of Asoka, the most extended and enlightened rule 
ever developed in India prior to the seventeenth century. 

The decline of Buddhism and the revival of Hinduism had 
already progressed far when the first Mohammedan con- 
tacts with India were established at the beginning of the 
eighth century. It was not until the beginning of the elev- 
enth century that any part of India was brought under Mo- 
hammedan sway, and not till two hundred years later was 
a distinctively Mohammedan Indian state established in the 
land with its capital at Delhi. The founder of this state, 
a Mohammedan and oriental contemporary and compeer of 
Richard the Lion-Hearted, has left as his splendid me- 
morial the highest minaret in the world, the Kutab Minar, 
which still overlooks the plain of Delhi and preserves his 
name. By this time Mohammedan faith and rule had been 
spread across northern India from the mouths of the Indus 
to the delta of the Ganges. This Mohammedan empire was 
not preserved intact, for there were soon almost as many 
Moslem kingdoms in India as there had been Hindu states 
for centuries out of mind. 

It was, therefore, a welter of petty states! ruled by Mos- 
lem shahs and Hindu rajas that made up the India of 1408. 
In that memorable year there landed on the southwestern 
coast of India a Portuguese expedition under the command 
of Vasco da Gama, whose coming was to bring India into 
far closer relations with Europe than had ever before sub- 
sisted. The extension of Mohammedan power in India had 


* Several of these states were comparable in size to the larger 
countries of western Europe. 


54 THE AWAKENING EAST 


been accompanied by a renewal of trade intercourse with 
the West. It was about 1293 that India was visited by 
Marco Polo on his way from the court of Kublai Khan back 
to Venice. His description is the first account of India by 
a Christian from western Europe. In the two centuries be- 
tween Marco Polo and Vasco da Gama various Europeans, 
both traders and Catholic friars, had visited India and 
recorded their observations and experiences. The West 
was getting acquainted with India and placing a steadily in- 
creasing value on its trade. Vasco da Gama opened an all- 
sea route, which at that date was both quicker and cheaper 
than any other between western Europe and southern Asia. 

The consequent monopoly of the rapidly expanding trade 
with the East was enjoyed by Portugal until the close of 
the sixteenth century, when the folly of Philip II, who had 
added Portugal to his Spanish dominions, provoked the 
Dutch and English into successful competition for that rich 
prize. In general, the Dutch directed their activities to 
Malaysia and the English to India. English relations with 
India became the monopoly of the English East India Com- 
pany chartered by Queen Elizabeth in 1600, which retained 
its privileges in whole until 1773, and in part till 1858. In 
the seventeenth century three centers were established— 
Madras, 1639; Bombay, 1664; Calcutta, 1689—from which 
English power in India was to develop in the eighteenth 
century.. The English came to trade; they remained to rule. 

Synchronously with the growth of European interests in 
India, there had grown up a vast Mohammedan empire, 
which for a time seemed likely to succeed in subduing the 
whole peninsula to its sway. This empire of the Great 
Mughals, founded at Delhi by Babar in 1526, reached its 
zenith under Akbar, 1556-1605, the contemporary of Queen 
Elizabeth, and under Aurangzib, 1658-1707, the contem- 
porary of Louis XIV. Under these monarchs more of In- 
dia was embraced within a single empire than at any time 
prior to British rule, except under Asoka two thousand years 
earlier. It was the break-up of the Mughal empire after 
the death of Aurangzib, and the ensuing struggle between 
Mohammedan and Hindu that opened the way for the estab- 


INDIA 55 


lishment of a new alien rule in India. In the eighteenth 
century four powers—two Asiatic, the Persians under Nadir 
Shah and the Afghans under Ahmad Shah, and two Euro- 
pean, the French led by Dupleix and the English led by 
Clive—struggled for the mastery of India. By 1763 three 
had failed; the English alone survived, and their territorial 
possessions in India amounted to less than a thousand 
square miles. 

The English had merely won a clear field; it remained 
to be determined whether they could establish political con- 
trol over the numerous heterogeneous and conflicting states. 
Beginning with Bengal in 1765, the British have added provy- 
ince to province and kingdom to kingdom, until, for the first 
time in history, a single power holds dominion over the 
whole land from Cape Comorin to the Himalayas, and all the 
borderlands as well are brought under its control. The Brit- 
ish have converted India from a geographical expression 
into an empire, from a congeries of peoples into a nation. 
Historians have been wont to speak of the unification of 
Italy and the unification of Germany as the two greatest and 
most characteristic political achievements of the nineteenth 
century, but have taken no thought of the more remarkable 
achievement of the unification of India. 

The annexation of Bengal made the English East India 
Company not merely a wealthy and powerful trading cor- 
poration but the ruler of an area and a population exceeding 
those of the British Islands. The first legislative effort to 
deal with this curious situation was Lord North’s regulating 
act of 1773. This measure provided for the exercise of ju- 
risdiction jointly by the English government and by the 
Company. The dual control, as this arrangement was called, 
subsisted, with some modifications, until 1858. The Eng- 
lish government was represented in India by a governor- 
general and council; Indian interests were represented in 
the English government by a special minister, the president 
of the board of control. The Company was deprived of its 
trade monopoly in 1813 and of all its trade privileges in 1833. 

It was not until after the Mutiny that the anomalous con- 
tinuance of the Company as a ruling power was terminated 


56 THE AWAKENING EAST 


on November 1, 1858, when the British Crown assumed full 
control of the government of India. The president of the 
board of control became secretary of state for India, and 
the governor-general became viceroy. The essential element 
in the change was the establishment of the complete and 
direct supremacy of parliament over India, with the conse- 
quent definite location of responsibility. An informed judg- 
ment on Indian affairs, if not a representation of the inter- 
ests of India, was assured to the government in London by 
the substitution for the old board of control, of a council of 
India to advise and assist the secretary for India. On this 
council a majority had to have seen service in India, and in 
practice nearly every appointee complied with that require- 
ment. 

In India the viceroy, like the governor-general previously, 
was to be advised and assisted by a council of four in ex- 
ecutive and administrative matters. Under an act of 1853 
this number was enlarged to twelve by the addition of other 
nominated members for purposes of legislation. In provin- 
cial administration, likewise, the existing status was contin- 
ued with slight modifications. The governors of Madras 
and Bombay were to be appointed by the Crown and assisted 
by councils; the other governors were appointed by the 
viceroy and acted without councils. The government was 
entirely in the hands of the British and no native was 
admitted to one of the higher offices or to the councils. 
Natives were employed only in the subordinate ranks of 
the administration. 

Hitherto there had been little consideration of British 
aims with reference to India and there was no formally 
avowed policy. The English position in India had been 
that of an exploiter. The dividends had been territory, cash, 
and mutiny. The act of 1858 passed by parliament did not 
alter the case. The Queen’s proclamation, however, in ad- 
dition to proclaiming amnesty and religious toleration, in- 
cluded the sentence: “And it is Our further will that, so far 
as may be, Our subjects, of whatever race or creed, be 
freely and impartially admitted to offices in Our service, 
the duties of which they may be qualified by their education, 


INDIA 57 


ability, and integrity duly to discharge.” Whatever this 
meant specifically, its general significance clearly indicated a 
new and more sympathetic attitude toward the government 
and people of India. 

The Indian councils act of 1861 supplemented and modi- 
fied the act of 1858 and provided the system under which 
Indian legislation was framed until 1892. The constitution 
of the governor-general’s council was modified for executive 
purposes, and for legislative purposes it was to be supple- 
mented by from six to twelve nominated members, of whom 
at least half must be nonofficials and might include natives, 
as actually became the practice. Legislative councils were 
revived in Madras and Bombay and authorized for Bengal, 
where one was established in 1862; and the governor-general 
might introduce them into other provinces as he did into the 
Northwest Provinces in 1886 and into the Punjab in 
1897. The governor-general’s council might legislate for 
all India, and provincial councils for the provinces con- 
cerned. In both cases the executive had control of the 
matters introduced and a veto on the enactments. These 
bodies were really committees to frame laws, not legislative 
bodies empowered to consider the general welfare and take 
measures freely with reference to that end. Native mem- 
bers were not introduced to represent the natives but to ac- 
quaint the British with native opinion and conditions. The 
secretary of state in presenting this measure to parliament 
explicitly disavowed the idea of a representative legislative 
body in India as absolutely impracticable. 

Municipal institutions, or, perhaps better, some forms of 
community organization, seem to have been a very ancient 
development among the peoples of the so-called Aryan race. 
Consequently, such institutions have long subsisted in India, 
but their operations have naturally been of a primitive and 
limited sort. In creating municipal organizations in India 
the British government does not seem to have built upon 
these foundations, but, rather, to have introduced schemes 
of its own invention. As early as 1850 an act permitted 
the establishment of municipal committees or councils in 
the Northwest Provinces, the Punjab, and Bombay; in 1856 


58 THE AWAKENING EAST 


there was an act for Bengal, and in 1865 for Madras. These 
measures allowed some nonofficial membership, permitted 
in principle rather than in practice choice by election, and 
sought to stimulate local interest and taxation with reference 
to a limited number of subjects. 

Lord Mayo, who became viceroy in 1869, faced a difficult 
financial situation which he sought to remedy in part by 
transferring certain matters, with the accompanying finan- 
cial burdens, to the control of local jurisdictions which 
should exercise the function of levying the necessarily in- 
creased taxes involved. Only the arrangement for Madras 
was enacted under his administration in 1871, but under his 
successor similar acts were framed for the other provinces. 
These measures emphasized the nonofficial membership, 
definitely introduced the practice of election in a limited 
way, and considerably extended the scope of jurisdiction 
to include, among other local matters, education. The plan 
was a financial expedient and was generally the subject of 
native protest because of the increased taxation. It did, 
however, involve a beginning in self-government and elec- 
tion, and it helped to educate some of the people of India 
to show interest and activity in public concerns. The 
municipal population potentially affected by the scheme 
was only one tenth of the total in the provinces concerned, 
and there remained a minority of these communities in 
which the councils were not introduced. 

Under the second Gladstone ministry, 1880-1885, Lord 
Ripon and later Lord Dufferin were appointed viceroys of 
India and signalized their administrations by further meas- 
ures for the development of the system of local councils. 
By new acts for each of the provinces in which the system 
of municipal councils had been authorized the size of the 
councils was increased; the proportion of official members 
was limited to one third; greater freedom of election was 
extended and encouraged; the choice of the chairman by 
election was permitted; the field of municipal legislation 
was enlarged; but certain reservations for executive con- 
trol were included as both negative and positive safeguards. 
These measures, with some revision, have since continued 


INDIA 59 


in force, and have worked with a reasonable degree of sat- 
isfaction, in some cases excellently, but in some cases un- 
fortunately. The number of such municipalities in 1906 
was 749, involving a population in excess of 16,000,000, or 
approximately seven per cent of the total for British India. 
These do not include the three great commercial centers, 
Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, with their large foreign 
populations, which are administered under special acts of 
more liberal character. 

The novel feature of Lord Ripon’s reforms provided for 
the creation of somewhat similar boards in rural local ju- 
risdictions and the districts throughout British India except 
Burma. This innovation called forth no little debate and, 
in the nature of things, has worked rather less satisfactorily 
than has the system of municipal councils. In 1913 there 
were 198 district boards with 5,032 members, of whom 
2,304 were elected, while the local boards numbered 536 with 
a membership of 8,005, of whom 3,711 were elected. At 
the same date the number of municipalities was 712, con- 
sisting of 9,718 members, of whom 5,005 were elected. It 
will be seen, then, that there was a total of nearly 25,000 
members of these various sorts of councils, of which num- 
ber over 11,000 were elected; by far the larger proportion 
of the members were natives. These figures are significant 
for the evidence they give of the extension of the practice 
of self-government, thus fulfilling Lord Ripon’s declaration 
that his plan was ‘“‘chiefly desirable as an instrument of 
political and popular education.” 

The creation of the municipal and local councils was, how- 
ever, part of a plan of administrative decentralization to re- 
lieve the paid officials from various duties and some responsi- 
bility and to lessen the financial burdens of the central and 
provincial governments, especially in matters which were 
of local interest but which involved increasing expenditure. 
The British officials were, in many cases, more anxious to 
secure information from competent natives which would 
assist them in administration than to afford the natives free 
debate and full responsibility in the matters concerned. 
British opinion, both at home and in India, revealed serious 


60 THE AWAKENING EAST 


doubt of the wisdom of the measures, and even strong dis- 
approval of them. 

Indian opinion was little more friendly because of the 
increased taxation and because of the restrictions upon the 
independence and responsibility of the councils. By failing 
to attend sessions and by unreadiness to participate in a 
spirit of independence coupled with cooperation, the native 
members often failed to get from the new institutions the 
full benefits which were available or to convince the British 
officials that the system was sufficiently worth while to 
justify more hearty efforts for its success. Notwithstanding 
the difficulties, the indifference, and the opposition, the 
latest reports available, those for 1920, show that the sys- 
tem is expanding; that native participation and elections are 
both on the increase; and, perhaps more interesting still, 
that in a considerable number of cases women may vote, 
and in some cases are eligible for the council. 

While Lord Ripon’s reforms of 1883 and 1884 established 
district and local rural councils with Indian members and 
with elective privileges, in the United Kingdom itself it was 
not until 1888 that the local-government act established 
elective county councils, and not until 1894 that the elective 
parish councils were created. It may also be noted that 
while the reform acts of 1832, 1867, and 1884 made succes- 
sive extensions of the franchise, it was not till 1918 that a 
considerable portion of the male population of the United 
Kingdom received the right to vote, at the same time that 
the parliamentary franchise was extended to women. These 
facts need to be taken into consideration in passing judg- 
ment on the British policy in India. 

Returning, then, to the subject of the major councils, we 
find that there was a growing demand for the revision of 
the act of 1861. This was accomplished by the Indian 
councils act of 1892. The measure provided for the increase 
of the number of nonofficial, and hence of native, members 
in the legislative council of the governor-general and in the 
provincial councils; the election of such members was per- 
mitted by a clumsily worded and indirect provision; and the 
privileges of debating the budget and of interpellation were 


INDIA 61 


accorded. While in 1861 there had been deliberate avowal 
of the purpose not to create “a petty parliament,” this meas- 
ure involved more important steps in that direction, but the 
intimation that it anticipated the introduction of the repre- 
sentative system was promptly denied and reasons were ad- 
duced why the idea was impractical for India. 

The act of 1892 was destined to remain in force only 
half as long as its predecessor before demand for still more 
liberal privileges made its revision necessary. It was crit- 
icized because the Mohammedans, the landowners, and the 
commercial classes, did not receive adequate representation, 
whereas thirty-six per cent of the nonofficial members of 
the councils belonged to the legal profession, this percentage 
being much larger in the elective portion of the membership. 
Whatever faults there may have been, the act of 1892 was 
a step in advance which led logically to further steps ef- 
fected by the Indian councils act of 1909. Before consid- 
ering that measure, it will be desirable to go back and take 
into account other developments which were contributory 
to this result. 

In India there was the demand for participation not 
merely in the legislative but also in the administrative work 
of government. In the subordinate posts numerous natives 
had long been employed, but there was a natural resentment 
that all, or nearly all, the higher posts were reserved for 
Englishmen. After fruitless minor efforts at adjustment 
and after investigation and report by a special commission, 
several reforms were introduced in or about 1892, that is 
at about the date of the Indian councils act just discussed. 
These changes included the definite division into the Indian 
civil service, the provincial service, and the subordinate 
service. The two latter were almost wholly reserved for 
natives, and the terms of competition for appointment in the 
first were modified so as to give Indian candidates a reason- 
able chance. In addition there are certain small special 
services, such as forests, engineering, and public works, for 
which practically all the appointees are necessarily British. 

The situation in the three principal services in 1904 was 
that, of 1,370 posts paying above £800, 1,263 were held by 


62 THE AWAKENING EAST 


Europeans, 15 by Eurasians, and 92 by natives; while of 
26,908 posts paying under £800, Europeans held only 5,205, 
while Eurasians held 5,420, and natives 16,383. Though 
these figures do not show a marked change in favor of the 
natives, they do indicate that the trend was clearly in that 
direction. The training of natives in the practical tasks and 
responsibilities of administration must necessarily be ac- 
counted one of the important items in preparation for self- 
government. 

While some recognition of the importance of education 
had been given by the British in India at earlier dates, the 
system really rests upon two fundamental documents, a 
minute drafted by Lord Macaulay in 1835 and the despatch 
of Sir Charles Wood in 1854 with the accompanying orders. 
These documents laid down the principle of education in 
English and placed the emphasis almost exclusively upon 
higher education. Since then there has been extensive 
development of secondary and collegiate schools and the 
numbers who have received training in them have been ample 
—indeed, in excess of the opportunities for corresponding 
employment. Serious criticisms have been made against the 
system at almost every point, but in two particulars which 
must be noted. In the first place, few of the institutions 
aside from those under mission control give attention 
to supplementing literary instruction with any form of 
character training. The other important objection is to the 
failure to provide scientific, technical, and vocational train- 
ing which would fit the beneficiaries for employment and 
service in varied fields and make them participants in the 
development of the nation’s economic life. 

In contrast to the disproportionate attention to the de- 
velopment of higher education has been the neglect or, at 
best, unsystematic and slight consideration and support ac- 
corded to elementary education. Illiteracy in India is appal- 
ling, and as late as 1907 less than two per cent of the 
population was in attendance upon any form of elementary 
schools, most of which were of very inferior character. 
The government felt that it was inexpedient, if not im- 
possible, to increase taxation to provide the necessary means 


INDIA 63 


for an adequate educational system, and did not see its way 
to secure the funds by retrenchment of expenditures for 
other matters. Furthermore, it must be remembered that 
the three great measures regulating education in Great 
Britain itself bear such recent dates as 1870, 1902, and 1918. 

To no small degree is the growth of unrest in India di- 
rectly traceable to the faults of the educational system. The 
former and actual students of the high schools and colleges 
have furnished the most numerous and aggressive element 
in the several forms of agitation and outbursts of discon- 
tent. The great gulf between the highly educated few and 
the ignorant masses is a calamity of incalculable proportions 
and significance. 

While the problem of education has been handled consid- 
erably better in India than in Egypt, the success of the British 
in dealing with questions of assessment and taxation in 
Egypt has not been duplicated in India. The permanent 
settlement of the revenue, that is, the establishment of a 
permanent assessment, effected in Bengal in 1793 under the 
administration of Lord Cornwallis, has won praises from 
the most bitter critics of the British, but the reason is that 
the permanence of the assessment has made impossible any 
readjustment upward so as to increase the revenue to meet 
changes in values and in needs. The settlements or assess- 
ments of the land revenue in other parts of India have been 
vigorously attacked because they are for fixed periods and 
do permit changes in the assessment. Such changes have 
been made and rates increased from time to time. These 
have led to complaints both of injustice in fixing the rates 
and of overtaxation. Successive administrations have 
steadily endeavored to mitigate the causes of complaint 
wherever the justice of the methods employed was ques- 
tioned. 

Under the rule both of the Company and later of the 
Crown there have been English civil servants in India who 
have displayed remarkable ability to enter into the life of 
the country and to labor sympathetically for the welfare of 
the people. British and Indians alike unite in honoring the 
memory of men like Sir Thomas Munro and James 


64 THE AWAKENING EAST 


Thomason. Several governors-general and viceroys, like- 
wise, have exhibited a keen interest in measures for the 
welfare of the Indian peoples and sought to carry out re- 
forms of benevolent character and of deep significance. The 
name of Lord William Bentinck will always be honorably 
remembered for the suppression of sati, or widow-burning, 
and of thagi, an evil which permeated the life of the country 
and has given. us the word thug. That he was able suc- 
cessfully to brave the deep-seated prejudices of the people? 
in these matters is reasonable evidence that reforms of 
even more far-reaching importance might have been worked 
out by others laboring with equal courage, devotion, and 
sympathy. <A later viceroy whose name is remembered with 
similar respect was the Marquess of Ripon, whose reforms 
in the matter of local councils have already been considered. 

Just as in Egypt, the British in India have been accused of 
neglecting the development of sanitation, and even more of 
failure to take adequate measures against the chronic evil 
of India, famines. These criticisms do not mean that the 
British have not done a vast amount of work to remedy evils 
and to provide against plague and famine, but that they have 
not accomplished the desired ends. Anyone who has read 
Mr. Kipling’s stories William the Conqueror and The Tomb 
of His Ancestors has vivid pictures in mind of the splendid 
work done. Even so it is an obvious excuse for criticism that 
after more than a century of British rule, there should be 
possible such frightful ravages as have resulted from both 
plague and famine in the past quarter century, not to men- 
tion the disgustingly unsanitary conditions which are still 
tolerated even in the largest and most Europeanized cities. 
No doubt ignorance and superstition, religion and caste have 
been obstacles to radical measures, but one may question 
whether all these would not have yielded to firm but sym- 
pathetic pressure had such measures as those of Lord Wil- 
liam Bentinck been followed up consistently through the 
three generations since he left India. 

Accusations made by vehement nationalists like Lajpat 


*There were, however, Indian reformers who advocated the 
abolition of sati, 


INDIA 65 


Rai, or by somewhat more moderate writers such as Romesh 
Chunder Dutt, that England has preferred revenue from 
India to reform for India are certainly exaggerated. Even 
though one dismisses as by-gones, which these Indians do 
not, the rapacity and greed under the Company in the 
eighteenth century on which Burke poured forth the vials 
of his indignation, or conditions far less objectionable dur- 
ing the later Company days in the early nineteenth century, 
there remains to be considered the situation under the gov- 
ernment of the Crown. Great Britain has taken no govern- 
mental tribute from the people of India, but it has charged 
to the Indian exchequer expenses which the Indians allege 
are imperial, not Indian, and, in some cases, the British have 
considered the point sufficiently well taken to cause them 
to transfer certain items. 

The chief accusation, however, is what the Indian 
economists and agitators describe as the economic drain, 
which they attribute to the suppression of native industry, 
the manipulation of trade, and interest charges on railroad 
bonds and other capital investments. The charge cuts 
deeper, however, for it goes beyond the mere economic 
drain to allege either serious errors in policy, such as pre- 
ferring railway construction to canal and irrigation works, 
or deliberate sacrifice of Indian welfare to English economic 
advantage, as in yielding to the protests of the Lancashire 
cotton spinners against certain tariff duties. It would seem 
that there is too much smoke to preclude the existence of 
some fire. 

The correspondence of the directors of the East India 
Company with their officials and agents in India affords 
plentiful evidence of their loyal devotion to dividends, and 
their opposition to measures either of imperial or of reform 
character which might appear in any way to endanger the 
size of the annual net income. None the less the agents 
of the Company did carry forward almost unremittingly a 
policy of conquest and of territorial absorption within India, 
which reached its climax in the extensive annexations ef- 
fected by the great Marquess of Dalhousie, who was gover- 
nor-general from 1848 to 1856. Dalhousie was a devout, 


66 THE AWAKENING EAST 


indomitable Scotchman who was intensely convinced that 
he was engaged in a great humanitarian undertaking—a 
conviction which an impartial reader will be inclined to 
share—but his too masterly policy overreached itself. The 
great Mutiny of 1857 was the result. Since then Great 
Britain has abandoned the policy of annexations within India 
and has been content to allow the native princes to govern, 
under its supervision, the considerable portions of the coun- 
try which had not already been incorporated into British 
India. 

Since the Mutiny, British policy with reference to India 
has been in the control of the secretary of state for India, 
a member of the British cabinet, responsible to parliament. 
His vision of India has been obtained from the point of view 
of the United Kingdom and of imperial interests. Down 
to the Anglo-Russian agreement in 1907 British imperial 
policy was dominated by fear of Russia, sedulously culti- 
vated by returned civilians and military men from India. 
As a consequence of this situation, the British in India 
turned their activities from annexations within India to a 
policy of annexations along the frontiers and of building 
up buffer states under British influence for protection 
against the Russian bear’s “irresistible advance into India.” 
Imperialism in India had given place to imperialism in Asia. 

As the old policy attained its climax under Lord Dalhousie, 
so this new policy finally overreached itself in the too 
masterly activities of Lord Curzon of Kedleston as viceroy 
from 1899 to 1905. He carried out annexations on the 
northwest frontier which he organized into the Northwest 
Frontier Province, and he sent the Younghusband mission 
to Tibet in 1904 and Sir Louis Dane to Afghanistan in 1905. 
These measures include the latest annexations of territory 
to the Indian Empire and the latest extensions of the British 
sphere of influence in territories adjacent to India. The 
horrid contrast of this splendid and expensive imperialism 
with the misery of plague and famine in the land could not 
fail to produce a reaction. It is a tribute to the development 
of the Indian peoples under British rule in the intervening 
half century that instead of Mutiny there was Unrest. 


INDIA 67 


The half century had been marked by the development of 
the councils, national, provincial, and local; by great ma- 
terial development in the construction of railways, tele- 
graphs, canals, and irrigation works; by famine relief and 
measures against disease; by improved financial arrange- 
ments; by civil service reforms; and by the spread of edu- 
cation—all which have been discussed; and by many minor 
measures of amelioration. What had been the reaction of 
all these on the Indian mind? What, moreover, is the 
character of Indian mentality? 

It has been the fashion, as exemplified by Mr. Kipling, 
to consider the Indian mentality and western thinking as in- 
commensurate. The Indians, not merely the Hindus, but 
also the Mohammedans, emphasize their spiritual-minded- 
ness as contrasted with the material-mindedness of the occi- 
dentals. The Hindu has been exalted for his ability for 
abstruse and lofty thought. While there is perhaps some 
truth in all these notions, yet much is certainly to be found 
in the intellectual life of India to-day which is compa- 
rable with the mysticism and scholastic philosophy of the 
European Middle Ages, rather than with the present-day 
traits of western peoples. 

Generalizations, always dangerous, are nowhere so likely 
to lead to false conclusions as in India. Its diversities of 
conditions really forbid generalization. Over against the 
abysmal ignorance of the vast masses there stand experi- 
mental scientists with broad philosophic vision like Sir J. C. 
Bose, and liberal-minded, well-balanced statesmen like Lord 
Sinha. The leadership of large sections of Indian opinion 
and action to-day has, however, been assumed by men of a 
different stamp. These belong to the higher castes, many 
of them Brahmins, who have received western education 
in the schools and colleges. That education has unfor- 
tunately been of the sort that passes examinations but not 
of the kind that trains the mind to grapple with problems 
and face situations involving hard facts. It has taught 
the student to memorize many facts, whether he under- 
stands and accepts them or not, in order to satisfy the ex- 
aminer. It has, on the other hand, given him the ability to 


68 THE AWAKENING EAST 


read, outside the curriculum, books of advanced, if not in- 
cendiary thought. This reading, without the check of the 
careful analysis and searching criticism of the classroom, 
results in uncontrolled thinking, loose reasoning, and often 
irrational, even dangerous, conclusions. 

In talking with men of this class one is frequently sur- 
prised at their adolescent evasion of facts, inability or un- 
willingness to reason logically, and imaginative zeal to ar- 
rive at conclusions in realities as well as in ideas regardless 
of intervening obstacles. The British problem is to find the 
needed supply of wise and sympathetic mentors for this 
group of men, mostly young, who are leading India they 
know not whither. They are as sheep without a shepherd. 
India needs good scout-masters skilled not in the craft of the 
forest or in jungle lore but in the lore and craft of politics, 
economics, sociology, and religion. The British civil, edu- 
cational, and other services have provided not a few such 
excellent scout-masters, and the mission schools and col- 
leges have furnished more. The supply of these men is 
woefully inadequate and in recent years has been decreasing 
not only relatively but absolutely. The real problem of 
the future of India is to increase greatly the supply of such 
wise and tactful guides. Force has been the stern school- 
master of India for centuries, and has failed; the warm 
heart and the sympathetic hand are yielding the desired 
results where they have a chance. 

This, however, is getting ahead of the story, for we have 
been trying to collect and collate the data necessary for un- 
derstanding the situation in India after Lord Curzon gave 
place to the Earl of Minto in 1905. Two items still remain 
for consideration, the attempts of the leaders of India to 
organize for the promotion of their aims and the external 
influences which may have been operating to stimulate their 
thought and action. 

Since its organization in 1885 the Indian National Con- 
gress, an entirely unofficial and voluntary organization, 
chiefly but not exclusively Hindu, and largely Brahmin, has 


*It will be observed that this statement does not refer to the 
whole group of nationalists. 


INDIA 69 


been the most widely recognized and influential spokesman 
of Indian opinion. The original platform of the congress 
did not present immoderate demands, but did contend for 
much more than the British authorities have yet been pre- 
pared to concede. 

In the earlier years, and even as late as 1915, both the 
government and the congress recognized the desirability of 
maintaining some contacts. Several English people, in- 
cluding some prominent retired civil servants, have given 
their sympathy to the congress. Five times in the first 
thirty years, the presidency of the congress :was held by 
Englishmen. Three times a Parsi, Mr. Dadabai Naoroji, 
was chosen to preside, and on three other occasions Mo- 
hammedans were selected for the presidency, which has 
at other times been held by Hindus. The registered at- 
tendance during this period averaged 775 annually. It 
reached 440 the second year and did not fall so low again 
until 1909, while it reached the maximum in the Calcutta 
meeting of 1906 due to the efforts to protest against the 
partition of Bengal. Radicalism grew steadily in the con- 
gress until it reached a climax in the stormy session at 
Surat in 1907, after which followed a period of milder 
councils. During the first twenty years, then, the congress 
movement had been gaining steadily in momentum. Not 
unfriendly relations had subsisted between it and the gov- 
ernment, but as the years passed without producing any 
particular impression upon the government, the more rad- 
ical elements gained strength. 

Meanwhile external events were wielding an increasing 
influence upon Indian thought. It was the unwritten law 
of the British, never honored in the breach, not to permit 
any military reverse to pass without being promptly 
avenged. The consequent occidental prestige for invinci- 
bility remained unshattered until the crushing and unre- 
trieved defeat of the Italians by the Abyssinians at Adowa 
in 1896. The success of the Boers in South Africa in with- 
standing for three years the greatest military effort which 
the British Empire had ever yet put forth was expensive to 
British prestige in Indian eyes, and was not redeemed by 


70 THE AWAKENING EAST 


the concession of responsible government to the two Boer 
states five years later, in 1906. A more convincing blow to 
European prestige was the defeat of Russia by Japan, an 
Asiatic nation, smaller, less populous, and poorer than India, 
and, unlike India, but recently emerged from its medieval 
seclusion, 

Russia, furthermore, was that nation in awe of which 
Great Britain had held its breath and maneuvered its im- 
perial policy for two generations. With such a convincing 
demonstration, why should. India continue to cower before 
the British? India had been taught and believed that Eng- 
land must be tolerated to save India from the worse evil of 
Russian despotism. Whatever remained of that danger was 
removed by the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, which 
followed upon British success in out-maneuvering Russia 
in Tibet and Afghanistan in 1904 and 1905. Freed from 
the Russian menace, there remained no foe against whom 
India needed British protection; India was free to deal with 
Great Britain on the merits of the question. The situation 
was not unlike that which arose in North America after the 
French menace had been removed from England’s conti- 
nental colonies by the treaty of 1763. 

Within the British Empire, India had not received 
equitable treatment. It was true that the British monarch 
now plumed himself with the splendid title of Emperor of 
India and that Edward VII had recently been proclaimed at 
a magnificent darbar at Delhi in 1903. In the imperial 
conferences, however, which had been held occasionally 
since the Queen’s jubilee in 1887, India had been accorded 
no part. India was good for show but not for counsel. In 
various ways India had contributed to the British success 
in South Africa, but the British government failed to assure 
Indian laborers and others in South Africa fair treatment 
after the war, and had left them to win their own battle as 
best they might. Then, too, Australia and Canada, other 
self-governing dominions, had contemptuously shown their 
unwillingness to accord the Indian equal treatment with the 
white citizens of the empire, but, rather, sought to exclude 
him as undesirable. Such denial of equitable treatment not 


INDIA 71 


only hurt the Indian pride, but it sapped the Indian confi- 
dence in British fair-mindedness and justice. 

In India itself things had not been going well. The finan- 
cial crisis which affected the United States and other coun- 
tries in the ‘nineties of the last century hit India even more 
severely. Before that crisis had passed came famines more 
widespread than any in the modern history of the country. 
In 1900 the famine area was three and one-half times greater 
than the United Kingdom, with a population two and one 
third times as great. At one time the numbers gathered 
in relief camps equaled the population of Greater London. 
Then came the bubonic plague, which first appeared in 
India in 1896 and has become endemic. In 1904 it caused 
more than 1,000,000 deaths, and in the last twenty years 
10,000,000 deaths. Against this dark background, in lurid 
contrast, stood out the bustling and expensive imperialism 
of Lord Curzon. Finally he, quite unwittingly, threw the 
lighted match into the tinder by proclaiming the partition 
of Bengal in 1905. 

The division of this province, which exceeded the area of 
the United Kingdom by twenty-five per cent and the popu- 
lation by seventy-five per cent, was an obvious administrative 
necessity and was arranged on lines which were apparently 
expedient politically since they recognized the predominantly 
Mohammedan population of the sections which were sepa- 
rated to form a new province. This was denounced as British 
favoritism to the Mohammedans,‘ since in the original prov- 
ince the Hindus had constituted the majority. The action was 
interpreted as a departure from the avowed British policy 
of not interfering in religious matters. In race and lan- 
guage there was no differentiation between the districts 
incorporated in the new province and the portions of Bengal 
left in the old province. It was easy to raise the cry that 
the British had cut in pieces “Mother Bengal,’ and that 
they had done so for their own evil purposes. Agitation 
ran rife; acts of violence occurred; the Indian national 
congress assembled in Calcutta in 1906 with unrivaled 


“Some Mohammedans, however, opposed the partition. 


72 THE AWAKENING EAST 


attendance and joined in denunciation of the outrage; and 
the swadeshi boycott of English goods was initiated. Never 
was such pressure brought to bear on the British govern- 
ment to reverse one of its policies in India. When Lord 
Curzon’s quarrel with Lord Kitchener resulted in the 
former’s resignation in 1905, it was confidently hoped that 
the change of administration would be accompanied by a 
reversal of the act, especially as the Liberal party had re- 
cently come into power in England. Mr. John Morley, the 
new secretary of state for India, however, declared the mat- 
ter a chose jugée and adhered strictly to that policy. 

Mr. Morley, and the new viceroy, the Earl of Minto, 
undertook to divert attention by liberal reforms of the na- 
tional and provincial legislative councils. Progress was slow, 
for the reforms which were first outlined in a minute by 
Lord Minto in 1906 were not embodied into law until the 
passage of the Indian councils act of 1909, though Mr. 
Morley had called to the council of India in 1907 two In- 
dians, one a Hindu and one a Mohammedan, and in 1909 
an Indian was for the first time admitted to the viceroy’s 
executive council; he was a Hindu, Mr., later Lord, Sinha. 

The new councils act included provisions for enlarging 
the provincial legislative councils and giving them non- 
official majorities ; for enlarging the legislative council of the 
viceroy, but retaining an official majority with a veto over 
the provincial councils; for representation of the Moham- 
medan minority; for the election of a proportion of the 
members of both the viceregal and provincial councils, with 
an arrangement of electoral constituencies; for increased 
privileges of budget discussion and interpellation; for the 
right to introduce resolutions; and for the later extension of 
executive and legislative councils to other provinces. 

Comparison with the act of 1892 shows that the increase 
of privileges was both liberal and genuine. The Indians 
were given much larger opportunities for acquiring experi- 
ence in the handling of important public questions and for 
exercising very considerable influence upon government 
policy. The presence of the official majority in the vice- 
roy’s council was a definite but reasonable restriction upon 


INDIA 73 


complete native control and responsibility. It was justi- 
fiable as an intermediate step and also because the councils 
were only in the slightest degree representative of the peo- 
ples of India; they merely represented certain interests. 
In other respects the measure was disappointing to the re- 
formers in the congress party and open to reasonable crit- 
icism, but it was a long step forward and a genuine one. 
Experience of its actual working, on the whole, quite thor- 
oughly justified the wisdom both of going so far, and of not 
going further. These Morley-Minto reforms were not bril- 
liant or epoch-making achievements, but they proved to be 
good solid statesmanship, constructive and progressive. In 
all fairness, they must be judged as an effort to establish 
not a permanent but a temporary system. The period of 
unrest which had started with the partition of Bengal was 
practically terminated by the reforms of 1909. 

The councils act of 1861 had remained in force thirty-one 
years; the councils act of 1892, seventeen years; the Morley- 
Minto reforms of I909 were destined to only a decade 
of life before being superseded. The immediate result of 
the reforms was favorable. Lord Minto left India amid 
approving plaudits in 1910, and his successor, Lord 
Hardinge, was welcomed in a similar spirit. The visit of 
King George V and Queen Mary for the proclamation of 
their accession at a great darbar at Delhi in 1911 was the 
first event of its kind and evoked great enthusiasm. The 
announcement on this occasion of the transfer of the capital 
from Calcutta to Delhi was perhaps a clever move, but the 
revision of the partition of Bengal which gratified Hindu 
sentiment was bound to give offense to the Mohammedans 
who had profited from the previous arrangement. 

The Mohammedans of India had been much slower than 
the Hindus to avail themselves of the privileges of western 
education, but with the opening of the twentieth century 
this situation had begun to change. Furthermore, the Mo- 
hammedans had held aloof, as a rule, from the Indian na- 
tional congress movement and had been inclined to find 
their interest in supporting British rule rather than in sym- 
pathizing with the Hindu reformers. Even when the All- 


74 THE AWAKENING EAST 


India Moslem League was formed in 1905 this attitude 
persisted. Education and events in other parts of the Mos- 
lem world were already modifying their views, when the 
revision of the Bengal settlement gave added incentive to 
change, which was still further accentuated by other events 
outside India. 

In 1904 the Anglo-French agreement confirmed the Eng- 
lish position in Egypt and the French hold on Morocco; the 
Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 practically brought Persia 
under the sway of the two-contracting powers; Italy seized 
Tripoli and Rhodes in 1911; and the Balkan wars of 1912-13 
stripped the Ottoman Empire of most of its European lands. 
The Christian powers were apparently banded in an un- 
holy league for the destruction of the political power of 
Islam, which could only be interpreted as precursing the sub- 
version of the faith as well. The consequent growth of the 
Pan-Islamic movement did not fail to attract followers in 
India. The success of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 
caused the more restless Moslem spirits in India to link up 
with its leaders and to draw inspiration from them. This 
tendency became pronounced at the time of the Balkan 
wars, when the Moslems of India bore their gifts to their 
sorely tried Ottoman brethren. The Indian Mohammedans 
were drifting rapidly into the same dubious position as the 
Hindus with reference to the British government. 

Then came the World War. With surprising unanimity 
the Indian peoples, as well as the Indian princes, rallied to 
the support of the British Empire against the Germans. 
There seemed to be a sudden realization that, whatever its 
faults, British rule was preferable to German. The services 
of Indian troops on the western front in France in 1914-15 
were of indispensable importance. Indian troops, often 
Mohammedans, did valiant service also in Mesopotamia, 
Palestine, and East Africa against Mohammedan coreligion- 
ists. The viceroy’s legislative council passed important war 
measures not dissimilar to those enacted in England itself, 
voted unanimously a gift from the Indian government of 
£100,000,000 for the imperial war expenses, and later ap- 
proved a loan for an additional £100,000,000 which was 


INDIA 75 


promptly subscribed. Whether these acts were spontaneous 
and disinterested or not, India had clearly earned the right 
to have its affairs regarded by the British government in 
the future from “a new angle of vision,’ as Premier Asquith 
expressed it. The first evidence of such a change came when 
a native prince of India and a former Hindu member of the 
Indian legislative council were seated with the representa- 
tives from the self-governing dominions in the first Imperial 
war conference. 

Recognition as a partner with the self-governing domin- 
ions in the empire suggested a larger measure of self-gov- 
ernment for India. The first steps to this end were taken 
by Lord Hardinge before the close of his administration in 
1916. His successor, Lord Chelmsford, later in the same 
year submitted to the government in London his project for 
reforms, but there were destined to be long delays before 
the British ministry and parliament could find time free to 
devote to Indian constitutional questions. The delay made 
the extremists in India increasingly impatient—a marked 
contrast to the patience of the Egyptian nationalists until 
after the armistice. The congress and the Moslem league 
drew closer together with the growing power of the radical 
element in each. Both met at Lucknow in 1916 and adopted 
resolutions embodying radical and insistent demands for 
the largest measure of self-government and for other 
reforms. It was on this occasion that the theosophical Mrs. 
Besant began the exercise of her remarkable and inflam- 
matory influence upon the congress movement. Thus be- 
gan a second period of unrest which apparently reached its 
culmination in the arrest of Mr. Gandhi in 1922. 

The year 1917 saw an adjustment of the long-standing 
grievance over the cotton duties, the appointment of the 
Sadler commission to inquire into educational questions in 
India and of the Holland committee to study the industrial 
situation, the termination of indenturing Indians to work in 
the Fiji and West Indian islands, and other reforms. To- 
ward the end of the year Mr. Montagu, who had been Mr. 
Morley’s under-secretary, became secretary of state, for 
India and arrived in India to confer upon the question of 


76 THE AWAKENING EAST 


governmental reforms in accordance with an announcement 
that the policy would be not only “the increasing association 
of Indians in every branch of the administration, but also the 
greatest development of self-governing institutions with a 
view to the progressive realization of responsible govern- 
ment in India as an integral part of the British Empire.” 
Though the announcement was carefully safeguarded with 
cautionary restrictions it marked a long step in advance since 
Mr. Morley had accompanied his reforms with a vigorous 
denial that he contemplated the ultimate bestowal of par- 
liamentary institutions upon India. 

Mr. Montagu completed his inquiries and conferences in 
India by signing in April, 1918, with Lord Chelmsford, the 
viceroy, a report which was presented to parliament in July. 
Long delays still ensued, which, indeed, contributed some- 
what to the value of the result, before the measure was 
finally passed in December, 1919. 

This government of India act of 1919 created a council 
of state of not more than sixty members, of whom not more 
than one third may be officials. This is an entirely new 
body and forms the upper house of the national legislature. 
The former legislative council has become the lower house, 
with the name of legislative assembly. It is composed of 
one hundred and forty-four members, of whom one hun- 
dred and three are elected and, of the remainder, only 
twenty-six may be officials. The term of the council of 
state is five years, and of the assembly, three years. In cases 
of disagreement the two bodies may sit in joint session to 
determine their differences. The reserve power which had 
been invested in the national legislature prior to this act of 
1919 had, with this creation of a native majority, to be 
transferred to the viceroy, who, in certain cases, is granted 
power to “certify” measures as vital to the peace, safety, 
and welfare of India. The viceroy’s executive council, 
which now numbers eight, has charge of the various de- 
partments of administration. 

The reforms in the national government of India are 
paralleled on a somewhat more liberal scale by changes in 
the provincial government. In the eight more important 


INDIA 77 


provinces (Burma has since been included) not only were 
there important changes made in the legislative councils and 
their powers and in the extension of the franchise, but a 
reform of vital significance was introduced in the character 
and powers of the provincial executive. These administra-~ 
tive powers are divided into two classes, one dealing with 
the “reserved” subjects, and one dealing with the “trans- 
ferred” subjects. The “reserved” subjects are those which 
involve imperial interests, and remain in the charge of the 
governor-in-council. The “transferred” subjects, which 
deal with purely provincial matters, such as education, are 
under the charge of the governor assisted by ministers who 
are intended to be responsible to the legislative council of 
the province. 

This novel constitutional scheme, which its inventors have 
called dyarchy, involves certain obvious limitations upon the 
freedom of action of the legislative chambers. This scheme 
was devised for the explicit purpose of transferring power 
and responsibility for certain matters of provincial, as con- 
trasted with imperial, interest, to the people of India. It 
is confessedly an awkward arrangement, and its real justi- 
fication is that it has been created to meet a peculiar neces- 
sity. It can scarcely be regarded as other than a temporary 
expedient, and as a step toward the gradual transfer of the 
direction of other departments of administration and legisla- 
tion to native control, as rapidly as experience appears to 
justify such action. 

It was recognized that these important changes in the gov- 
ernment of British India would have an inevitable reaction 
upon the government of the numerous native states. Ac- 
cordingly, provision was included for the establishment of 
a chamber of princes, in which the rulers of these states 
might meet for conference and action upon matters of gen- 
eral concern. Another important provision of the act recog- 
nized its provisional character, and required that once in 
ten years there should be a parliamentary commission of 
inquiry into the workings of the government, the progress 
of the people, and proposals for further changes in the form 
of government. This provision, which is, to all intents and 


78 THE AWAKENING EAST 


purposes, a scheme for the consideration of constitutional 
amendments, is of the highest importance, since it definitely 
commits the British government to a policy of progressive 
bestowal of self-government, and no longer leaves the ques- 
tion either to chance or to spasmodic adjustment. 

The act obviously falls short of conferring upon India 
full dominion status, as the most advanced leaders in India 
had desired, and even demanded, as the necessary minimum. 
On the other hand, moderate opinion in India recognized 
the remarkable generosity of the new measure in the amount 
of self-government conferred, as contrasted with the meas- 
ure of 1909. There was no longer any disavowal, by the 
statesmen of England, of the development of a genuine 
legislature, or of representative institutions, or even of a 
preliminary stage of responsible government. The measure 
did actually create a legislature based in large measure upon 
elections in accordance with the representative principle, 
and it contained also definite provision for the development 
of ministerial responsibility. 

Naturally, British opinion, both in India and at home, was 
sharply divided upon the expediency of the measure. In 
both cases a large majority recognized the necessity, if not 
the wisdom, of the act, but in both groups there were numer- 
ous outspoken opponents who denounced the new gov- 
ernmental scheme as fraught with ruinous consequences. 
They declared that the people of India were not fitted for 
such responsibility, that the new legislatures and ministers 
could not be trusted to work with the best interests of the 
whole of the Indian people in mind, and especially did 
they denounce the surrender of British imperial interests. 

Before the new acts were placed upon the statute book 
two events occurred which radically altered the situation 
in India. The first of these was the passage of the so-called 
Rowlatt acts. The other was the killing of nearly four 
hundred Indians and the wounding of about three times as 
many more by the orders of General Dyer at Jallianwala 
Bagh, at Amritsar, on April 13, 1919. 

With the close of the war it was felt that the lapse of the 
special powers conferred by the defense of India act, cor- 


INDIA 70 


responding to the British defense of the realm act, would 
deprive the government of the necessary powers for the pre- 
vention or suppression of sedition. To meet this situation 
two measures were framed by a committee under the presi- 
dency of Mr. Justice Rowlatt of the high court. In the 
legislative council, these proposals were denounced in the 
most vigorous terms by the native members, and the govern- 
ment was fully warned not merely of the inexpediency but 
of the danger of enacting these proposals. They were, 
however, passed by the votes of the official bloc in the coun- 
cil. In fact, the acts remained inoperative, and the only 
result of their passage was to inflame public opinion. The 
measures were not unreasonable or harsh as compared with 
similar laws in western countries, but the government would 
have been wise not to have pressed the measures prior to 
the establishment of the new legislative chambers under the 
Montagu-Chelmsford act which was soon to become a law. 

Of the second matter, the unfortunate and ghastly affair 
at Amritsar, in the Punjab, it is sufficient to quote from the 
despatch of the British government: “The principle which 
has consistently governed the policy of His Majesty’s Gov- 
ernment in directing the methods to be employed where mili- 
tary action in support of civil authority is required, may 
be broadly stated as using the minimum force necessary. ... 
It must regretfully, without possibility of doubt, be con- 
cluded that Brigadier-General Dyer’s action at Jallianwala 
Bagh was in complete violation of this principle.’ The 
only charitable view is that in ordering a body of soldiers 
to fire without warning upon a defenseless mob General 
Dyer lost his head. 

The British government was slow in appointing the so- 
called Hunter commission to investigate the affair, and it 
was more than a year after the tragedy before the commis- 
sion’s report appeared. These delays gave added weight to 
the fiery denunciations of the affair by the agitators through- 
out India. Though the report unqualifiedly condemned 
General Dyer’s action, and both the government of India 
and the British government at home disavowed the affair, 
General Dyer was let off with mere dismissal from the 


80 THE AWAKENING EAST 


service, and other officers in the Punjab who were more or 
less implicated in this and other measures for the suppres- 
sion of disturbances in that province not merely escaped 
without any penalty but like Sir Michael O’Dwyer, lieuten- 
ant-governor of the Punjab, were retired on pensions charge- 
able to the Indian revenues. 

It was these two affairs which turned Mr. Gandhi into a 
thoroughgoing opponent of the British government, which 
he rightly claimed he had hitherto loyally supported, and 
made him the greatest leader that the people of India have 
produced. There is no more striking or interesting per- 
sonality in the world to-day than this prophet, this holy man, 
who suddenly rose to the leadership of the people of India. 
He was a man of fifty, educated in the British schools in 
India, at London University, and at the Inner Temple, 
where he read for the bar. The major part of his mature 
life had been spent in South Africa, where he had acquired 
renown as the champion of the rights of his fellow Indians. 
Mr. Gandhi’s power rested primarily upon his personality. 
His saintly character, his ascetic life, and his lofty spiritual 
principles have won universal admiration, and it is little 
wonder that the highly religious and mystical natives of 
India have revered him as a holy man and have, in spite of 
his own behest, insisted upon calling him Mahatma5 Gandhi, 
that is, the prophet Gandhi. It would be difficult to find any 
western parallel for the intense devotion to a man which 
the people of India have given to Mahatma Gandhi. Only 
in the Middle Ages of Europe may one find a counterpart to 
the mysticism, asceticism, and sanctity of Mr. Gandhi, but 
not even St. Francis of Assisi is an adequate parallel, nor 
does even the crusading zeal and enthusiasm aroused at the 
council of Clermont afford a comparison to the passionate 
devotion of the natives of India to their prophet. 

In entering the field of political agitation in India, Mr. 
Gandhi was attempting a far more difficult role than he had 
practiced on the smaller stage of South Africa. Likewise, 
in attempting to preach for the three hundred millions of 





*The word literally means “great soul.” 


INDIA 81 


people of India ideals similar to those of a religious ascetic, 
he was attempting, as no other character in history has done, 
to carry his ideals to their logical conclusion in the sphere 
of government. Even Jesus of Nazareth had declared that 
his kingdom was not of this world, and had enjoined his 
followers to “render to Cesar the things that are Cesar’s.” 
In proclaiming his doctrine of swaraj, Mr. Gandhi con- 
fused the idea of personal swaraj, or self-control, with na- 
tional swaraj, or self-government. He insisted that the 
principles, which all religions teach, of the development of 
self-control as the way of righteousness and salvation, were 
equally applicable in the larger sphere of the regulation of 
masses of peoples in social and political affairs. One cannot 
but be astounded into admiration for the boldness and mag- 
nificence of his idealism, and one feels almost a sense of 
horror at applying cold reason to his great program. Even 
he himself seemed at times to waver in the face of the 
frightful evidence of the impracticability of his teachings. 
The doctrine of swaraj in political matters was not original 
with Mr. Gandhi. It had long been the ideal of the 
educated classes in India. It was only in his lofty spiritual 
interpretation of the doctrine that he was an innovator. The 
other elements of his practical program were likewise bor- 
rowed, but also more or less spiritualized by his idealism. 
The idea of swadeshi, that is, home industries, had been 
one of the essential factors in the disturbances of 1906, but 
Mr. Gandhi declared not merely foreign goods, but all the 
material inventions, machines, and enterprises of the West, 
satanic, and bade his followers turn from them and return 
to the use of the distaff, the spinning wheel, the plow, and 
the flail, which had been the implements of Indian industry 
for thousands of years. The western civilizations of Persia 
and Greece and Rome and the empires of the foreign con- 
querors from Alexander to the Great Mughals had all passed 
away, but India alone stood firm after four thousand years, 
with the same religion and culture, the same economic and 
social system. The salvation of India obviously lay in 
rigorously throwing aside the material evils of the moribund 
civilization of the West and in disowning the British gov- 


82 THE AWAKENING EAST 


ernment, which his logic led him to denounce as satanic. 
He called upon the people to return to the eternal verities of 
the spiritual life of India embodied in the Mahabharata and 
the Bhagavadgita. To emphasize this teaching, he not only 
enjoined but practiced the use of the old-fashioned spinning 
wheel, the charka, for the making of the rough home-spun 
cloth in which he clad himself, and which he exhorted his 
followers to make and wear. 

The third great ideal which he preached was that of broth- 
erhood of the peoples of India. No one has ever struck 
so tremendous a blow at the system of caste as has Mr. 
Gandhi, both by precept and example. He has endeavored to 
persuade the Brahmin to overcome his scruples, and even 
to sit at table with “untouchables,” that is, persons of the 
lower castes. One cannot doubt that the future historians 
of India will record that one of the greatest forces in the 
molding of unity of the peoples of India has been the work 
of Mahatma Gandhi in his labor to unite them all, regard- 
less of caste or race or creed, into one great brotherhood of 
Indian people. 

To the logic of this exalted ideal Mahatma Gandhi was 
not unfaithful. He recognized that in this great brotherhood 
not only must all the castes of Hinduism be merged but that 
Hindu and Mohammedan must be brought into affiliation. 
This led to the adoption of the fourth, and in some respects 
the most serious, item in his program, the acceptance of the 
caliphate doctrine and agitation current among the Moham- 
medan leaders under the inspiration of the hot-headed Ali 
brothers. 

The caliphate movement owed its origin in the first place 
to the Pan-Islamic agitation and later to the movement led 
by the Young Turks, which resulted in the revolution of 
1908 in the Ottoman Empire, but it received still greater 
stimulus from the steady breakdown by Christian European 
powers of the independence of Mohammedan states in the 
early years of the twentieth century. The World War wit- 
nessed the further disintegration of Turkish power, and 
the abortive treaty of Sévres confirmed the results by 
stripping the Ottoman Empire of still more provinces, leav- 


INDIA 83 


ing to it little more than a fragment of Asia Minor. The 
war had also witnessed an attempt to deprive the Ottoman 
sultan of the caliphate. 

The dissatisfaction of the Mohammedans of India over 
certain internal matters, and the alarm at the steady decline 
in the extent of independent Mohammedan states had, how- 
ever, not resulted in any serious manifestations in India 
until the treaty of Sevres. The Mohammedans of India 
had first organized themselves for political purposes in 1905 
in the All-India Moslem League, which was in general sym- 
pathetic to British rule and antagonistic to the congress 
movement. This original attitude had been slowly shifting 
until 1916, when the league took action in identical terms 
with the congress in demanding self-government for India. 
The caliphate question had no proper relation to political 
questions in India, but the Ali brothers, who had long been 
in sympathetic relations with the Young Turks, seized upon 
the treaty of Sevres as a convenient political weapon to 
arouse Mohammedan sentiment in India to the danger of 
Christian aggression against Islam, and to the special menace 
of British rule in India to the interests of that country in 
general and of its Mohammedans in particular. The ac- 
ceptance by Mr. Gandhi of the caliphate issue was a per- 
fectly natural political agreement to clinch the codperation 
of Hindu and Mohammedan in the struggle for national 
self-government. 

The immediate purpose of the noncodperation program 
was to withdraw support from the British government in 
India, and particularly to refuse any participation in the 
inauguration of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms. Mr. 
Gandhi and his followers believed that it was possible, by 
maintaining a policy of nonresistance, to render the reforms 
ineffective and the British administration helpless. He did 
not contemplate the use of violence, but consistently de- 
nounced it. None the less, sporadic outbreaks of violence 
continually occurred. 

As a consequence, the moderate element among the In- 
dian population decided to accept the measure, and to cooper- 
ate in inaugurating the new legislative assemblies. This 


84 THE AWAKENING EAST 


was the first blow to the success of the Gandhi program. 
A second blow came from the Moplah affair in the western 
part of the Madras presidency. This was an attack by a 
fanatical group of Mohammedans upon their peaceful Hindu 
neighbors to convert them forcibly to Mohammedanism. 
The result was a grim scene of violence and bloodshed, 
which brought home to the Hindu population with great 
vividness that the much-heralded brotherhood of Hindu and 
Moslem might not result in an equal partnership, but in 
domination by the more vigorous and strenuous Moham- 
medans. 

‘Meanwhile the Duke of Connaught, the last surviving son 
of Queen Victoria, came to India in 1921 as a personal rep- 
resentative of George V to inaugurate the new legislative 
assemblies, the assembly of the princes, and the more im- 
portant provincial assemblies. In his various addresses he 
endeavored to allay the bitterness of race feeling, and to win 
for the new reforms a favorable trial. Later in the same 
year the government in London decided that the Prince of 
Wales should make an extensive tour of the Indian Empire. 
In many respects the occasion seemed to be highly un- 
propitious. His arrival in Bombay was the signal for se- 
rious rioting, and at Madras, Calcutta, and Allahabad, the 
hartal, or boycott, and other forms of unfriendly demonstra- 
tion were disagreeably successful. As time went on, how- 
ever, sentiment began to change, and the reception accorded 
to the prince from city to city became less hostile and more 
friendly. His reception in the native states was not merely 
friendly but highly gratifying. The closing weeks of his 
visit were spent at Delhi and in the Punjab, where he even 
visited Amritsar without any serious unpleasantness. Mean- 
while the successful introduction of the reform measures 
and operation of the new legislatures were counteracting 
the efforts of the agitators. 

Shortly after the inauguration of the new assemblies, 
Lord Chelmsford completed his term as viceroy, and was 
replaced by Lord Reading. Upon his arrival in India the 
new viceroy held extensive conferences with Mr. Gandhi and 
through him even communicated with the Ali brothers. 


INDIA 8x 


Efforts to establish an understanding between the govern- 
ment and the various agitating elements went to the length 
of a proposal, at the close of 1921, for a round-table con- 
ference. It did not require much consideration, however, 
to show that such a proposal was inexpedient, if not entirely 
impracticable. This was made particularly clear by the con- 
tinued irresponsibility of the Ali brothers, who were finally 
arrested and given jail sentences. The Indian national con- 
gress in December, 1921, met at Ahmedabad, the home of 
Mr. Gandhi. The question of putting into full force the 
noncooperation program was discussed with approval, but 
the determination of the time for action was left to Mr. 
Gandhi, who was practically intrusted with dictatorial 
powers by the congress. 

As Mr. Gandhi confronted the immediate possibility of 
inaugurating his plan, he seems to have realized that the 
various acts of violence which have just been mentioned 
made it clear that noncodperation might be proclaimed as a 
measure of passive resistance, but that, in spite of his first 
intentions, it would result in worse violence and more blood- 
shed. While he was in this frame of mind there occurred 
at Chauri Chaura in the United Provinces a mob attack 
which resulted in the burning of a police station with about 
twenty native policemen, early in February, 1922. Mr. 
Gandhi promptly denounced the affair, and declared that 
he would fast for several days as his personal expiation for 
the outrage. His indecision and hesitation grew more ob- 
vious, though the extremists were doing their best to spur 
him to action. 

During this period, the question of Mr. Gandhi’s arrest 
was a subject of general discussion. The natives declared 
that the British government did not dare touch him, and 
charged the authorities with injustice in their arrest of 
minor agents. The decision of the matter was precipitated 
in a way that could scarcely have been anticipated. Mr. 
Montagu, the secretary of state for India, who had been 
responsible for the reform policy and who was considered 
as being too lenient in dealing with the Indian situation, had 
evidently been for some time the object of attack by his 


86 THE AWAKENING EAST 


more conservative colleagues in the ministry. The publica- 
tion by him of a despatch from Lord Reading dealing with 
the Mohammedan issue, without the customary consultation 
with the prime minister and his colleagues, led to his dis- 
missal on March 9, 1922. 

The following day Mr. Gandhi was placed under arrest, 
promptly tried, and sentenced to jail for six years without 
labor. The coincidence had a noteworthy effect upon Indian 
opinion, and since that time the government of India has 
followed a strong and consistent policy of enforcing law 
and order and has impressed upon the popular mind the 
genuineness of British power by sending bodies of troops on 
long marches through the country, simply as a matter of 
demonstration. 

The new legislative councils have, under the circum- 
stances, been working even more satisfactorily than might 
have been expected, and this fact has had a beneficial in- 
fluence. It is, of course, easy to bring criticisms against 
them, either from the British or from the Indian point of 
view, with reference to lack of adequate representative basis, 
to personnel, to procedure in debate, to ability and readiness 
to assume responsibility along with privilege, and in other 
matters, but it must be remembered that things are in the 
experimental stage, and perfection cannot be expected at 
once, especially as it has not been attained in western lands. 

The most serious problem, however, is that of financial 
deficits, which have appeared in each of the budgets handled 
by the assemblies. In face of the spirit of unwillingness to 
increase taxation the only recourse lies in economies. As 
a consequence the demand for a large decrease in the British 
army in the country, and even of the native portion of the 
army, has been greatly intensified. The saving in expense 
would be prompt and obvious, and it would be consonant 
with the desire for native self-rule, as opposed to British 
control. If looked at merely by themselves, the figures for 
the size of the army and for military expenditures are large, 
but if considered relatively with the population of the coun- 
try, they are quite small. 

The number of British troops in India is about one to 


INDIA 87 


4,500 of the population, and the number of native troops 
about one to 1,800, or a total army of one to every 1,300 of 
the population. The annual cost is approximately one dollar 
per capita for the population. It will be seen, therefore, 
that the military establishment can hardly be regarded as 
excessive in size or cost. Its necessity has been shown con- 
stantly in the past four or five years by the serious troubles 
ot. the northwestern frontier, which have been almost con- 
tinuous, as well as in the serious Afghan war of 1910. 

A more reasoned and scientific undertaking to deal with 
the financial situation was the request for the creation of a 
commission of inquiry into expenditures. This commission, 
similar to the Geddes commission in England, is now at 
work under the presidency of Lord Inchcape, and may be 
expected to offer useful recommendations. - 

Since the arrest of Mr. Gandhi, the influence of the na- 
tional congress has steadily declined. It is reported that the 
number of registered supporters is now only 25 per cent 
of what it was in 1921, and that the financial support has 
suffered a similar decline. Moreover, serious divisions have 
appeared in the congress party. One part, under the leader- 
ship of Mr. C. R. Das, who has recently been released from 
prison, advocates participation in the elections which will 
occur some months hence, in order to achieve their aims 
either by direct action in the councils or by pursuing a 
wrecking policy. This party, however, was defeated at the 
meeting of the national congress held at Gaya, in December, 
1922, by the faction which proposed to adhere strictly to 
the extremist noncodperation policy.® 

Though the outlook for the successful application of an 
added measure of self-government under the Montagu- 
Chelmsford reforms is hopeful, it is not certain. The prob- 
lems are tremendous, the difficulties enormous; the bulk of 
the people is illiterate ; the extension of education progresses 
slowly; the economic and financial questions offer serious 
perplexities. To overcome these obstacles India’s greatest 
asset is the will to win in the establishment of self-govern- 


*See below, pages 105-108. 


88 THE AWAKENING EAST 


ment and to prove to the world its equality with the pro- 
gressive nations of the West. 

Having studied the program of the political movement 
in India down to the present moment, it is now desirable to 
survey the more important factors in the Indian situation, 
in order to understand the problems to be faced in the de- 
velopment of a system of self-government by the Indian 
peoples. In the first place, the Indian Empire comprises 
an area somewhat in excess of 1,800,000 square miles, that 
is, somewhat more than the-area of the United States east 
of the Rocky Mountains. 

About 700,000 square miles of this area are contained in 
native states, ruled by their own princes, with their own 
administration and laws in each case. Over these native 
states the British government exercises a certain benevolent 
supervision. In some of them the administration is highly 
progressive, and the conditions are better than in British 
India itself. This is apparently, however, the exception 
rather than the rule. Administration through native states, 
from the point of view of the British control, is a simple 
procedure, and has thus far afforded the imperial govern- 
ment a minimum of anxiety. Partly owing to this cir- 
cumstance and partly owing to other reasons some persons 
have recently seriously proposed the breaking up of British 
India into a suitable number of small states, and placing 
them under native rulers. It would seem to be apparent 
that such a suggestion is both reactionary and impracticable, 
and that it would also fail to prove a solution of the problem 
of self-government acceptable to the people of India.7 The 
population of the native states, by the census of 1921, was 
71,936,730. 

The remainder of the Indian Empire, customarily spoken 
of as British India, has an area of about 1,100,000 square 
miles, and its population in 1921 was 247,138,396. This 
territory is divided into fifteen provincial units, of which 


"Some nationalists, indeed, frankly express regret that all the 
native states were not wiped out and British India made coextensive 
with the Indian Empire, for they feel that the native states hamper 
the nationalist and reform movements. 


INDIA 89 


nine have a population varying from 7,500,000 to 46,000,000, 
and areas varying from 53,000 square miles to 230,000 
square miles. The remaining provinces are much smaller 
in area and in population, and the separate existence of each 
is due to some peculiarity in geography, race, or history. 
The nine principal provinces mentioned are Assam, Bengal, 
Bihar and Orissa, Bombay, Burma, Central Provinces and 
Berar, Madras, the Punjab, and the United Provinces. The 
history of the administration of these provinces has been 
already fully discussed.8 

The major portion of the population of India belongs to 
the Indo-European or Aryan stock, but in southern India 
a large proportion of the population belongs to the Dravidian 
family. Besides these two main groups, ethnologists recog- 
nize at least five other distinct racial stocks among the peo- 
ples of India. 

The diversity of languages is even greater. It is estimated 
that considerably more than one hundred different distinc- 
tive languages are spoken within the Indian Empire. Eleven 
languages are spoken by more than 10,000,000 persons each. 
Twelve others are spoken by more than 1,000,000 each, 
and ten others are spoken by more than 300,000 each, the 
last figure representing approximately the number to whom 
the English language is the native speech. 

The peoples of India are indebted to the British and to 
their educational system for the gift of a common tongue 
in which to carry forward their nationalist propaganda. 
This somewhat humiliating fact has led to various sug- 
gestions of developing one of the more common native lan- 
guages as the national speech. All suggestions to this end 
have hitherto met with such serious objection as to render 
any successful outcome unlikely, though Hindustani most 
nearly meets the requirements. 

While, as has been seen, only about two thirds of India 
are directly under British rule, and more than one third re- 
mains under the control of a large number of petty native 
princes, yet British rule has given a definite unity to the 


*See above, pages 57-60, 72-73, 76-77. 


go THE AWAKENING EAST 


Indian Empire, such as has never existed before. It has 
also established and maintained absolute peace throughout 
the country ever since the Mutiny of 1857 and, despite the 
sporadic outbreaks of violence during the recent period of 
unrest, has maintained throughout the empire the rule of 
law and order, and enforced a civilized system of administer- 
ing justice. These blessings were absolutely unknown to 
India prior to British rule. The existence of the vast num- 
ber of petty states with the confusion of race and language 
and religion, involving innumerable and incessant wars, 
formerly prevented any possibility of the establishment of 
law and order. The prevalence of dacoity and thagi, in 
other words, of brigandage and organized pillage and mur- 
der, has been eliminated only as the result of the establish- 
ment of British sovereignty. 

The principal religion in India is Hinduism, which num- 
bers approximately 218,000,000 followers. Next in order 
come the Mohammedans, numbering nearly 70,000,000. 
Buddhism has become almost nonexistent in India proper; 
nearly all its 11,000,000 adherents within the empire are 
to be found in Burma. About an equal number practice 
some form of animistic religion. The Sikhs include about 
3,000,000. The number of Christians is at present about 
5,500,000, an increase within the past decade of over 40 
per cent. Indeed, ‘Christianity is the only one of the reli- 
gions in India which has made progress out of proportion 
to the increase in population. It may be observed that its 
converts have come in major part from the lower classes. 
About 500,000 of the Christians are so-called Syrians, that 
is, represent a form of Christianity introduced into India 
many centuries ago, traditionally, by the apostle, St. Thomas. 
The Roman Catholics number about 2,000,000, and the 
Anglicans somewhat over 500,000. Christians, Mohamme- 
dans, Buddhists, and Sikhs do not recognize caste. 

Caste is an institution associated with Hinduism. The 
question of how far caste is a religious institution and how 
far it is social, economic, or political, is one upon which 
experts are not agreed. At any rate, religion is only one 
factor in the case, and, to a certain extent, a caste is a sort 


INDIA gI 


of professional, trade, or labor guild. The spread of mod- 
ern ideas, especially the extension of rapid means of trans- 
portation and communication, and the growing complica- 
tions in the provision of food supplies, have had a powerful 
effect in breaking down certain of the religious formalities 
and restrictions associated with caste. There have not 
been wanting, in recent years, advocates within Hinduism 
itself of the removal of many of these forms. Mr. Gandhi’s 
attitude on the question of the “untouchables” is the most im- 
portant illustration of the case. 

The aggressive activities of the Brahmins as leaders in 
the nationalist movement and in other respects during the 
past two decades have produced as a reaction the develop- 
ment of a vigorous non-Brahmin movement. This has ac- 
quired such headway in the Madras presidency that the 
elections of the present assemblies resulted in a non-Brah- 
min majority, and, consequently, in the selection of non- 
Brahmin ministers. These circumstances have naturally 
tended to emphasize the economic, political, and social as- 
pects of caste, as questions of debatable character. 

These facts, taken together with the consequent breakdown 
of the rigid restrictions of religious formalism, have led to 
an increased emphasis upon the purely religious or spiritual 
aspect, perhaps one should say of Hinduism rather than of 
caste. The existence of the large number of castes with the 
hitherto rigid separations cutting across the economic, so- 
cial, and political structures, has been a serious factor in 
the disintegrative character of Indian society in all its as- 
pects. The growth of an Indian nationalist movement, 
therefore, will, of necessity, involve the softening of caste 
distinctions in many respects. 

The peoples of India have not been dwellers in cities, but 
in small villages and hamlets. In 1881 there were no cities 
in India with 1,000,000 population, and but five with more 
than 200,000. The census of 1921 showed two cities with 
more than 1,000,000, and ten others in excess of 200,000. 
The number of cities of more than 50,000 increased during 
the forty years from sixty to seventy-five. The total urban 
population at the present time amounts to less than five per 


Q2 THE AWAKENING EAST 


cent of the population. The percentage of urban population 
in the United States by the census of 1920 was 51.4. 

Agriculture, then, is the occupation of the major portion 
of the population. The annual area under crops in British 
India approximates very closely one acre per capita. Of 
this area, about 20 per cent is supplied with irrigation. There 
exist large areas of cultivable lands which are not adequately 
utilized, while other areas, particularly in the Ganges valley, 
suffer badly from overcrowding. It is a difficult problem to 
overcome the inertia of the natives sufficiently to secure 
their migration from the overcrowded districts to the re- 
gions where land is more readily available. There has, how- 
ever, been considerable progress in the extension of the 
actually cultivated area, the increase amounting to not less 
than 20 per cent in the past twenty years. 

In addition to rice and wheat, the more important crops 
include cotton, jute, and tea. The development of irrigation 
has, of course, been undertaken by the government, and con- 
siderable success has been attained in securing the stabiliza- 
tion of crops in spite of fluctuations in the rainfall. The 
amount of works for this purpose already constructed has 
been very large, and the process of extension is still going on. 
The British administration has also undertaken extensive 
work in the supervision and care of the forests. India has 
a considerably varied supply of minerals, but the size of the 
output remains comparatively small, including as its main 
items coal, petroleum, salt, gold, and manganese ore. 

The manufacturing industries of most importance are 
those of cotton and jute. The number of mills working 
these materials increased from 237 with 295,000 employees 
in 1903 to 359 with 546,000 workers in 1921. While 
various efforts have been made to establish factories of the 
modern type under native management, they have not 
usually been attended with success, and most of the com- 
panies are under European management. One notable 
example of native management is that of the group of iron- 
working enterprises controlled by the Tata Sons Cor- 
poration, but even they have relied, to some extent at least, 
upon the services of Europeans. There is no doubt a large 


INDIA 03 


field for the development of manufacturing enterprises in 
India, and it will be an important step in advancement when 
the Indian people learn to invest their money instead of 
hoarding it. It ought not to require a large amount of advice 
and assistance by western experts to give success to such 
undertakings. 

The failure to secure the investment of native capital 
has been particularly notable in the construction of irriga- 
tion works, of railways, telegraph lines, and highways. 
Money for these purposes has had to be borrowed chiefly in 
England, though there is no doubt adequate wealth was lying 
idle in India, which might have been enlisted for these pur- 
poses, and so have retained the interest payments within the 
country. The development of the railway system, as well 
as of irrigation, has been one of the important safeguards 
against famine, though the two have not been similarly ap- 
preciated by the people. The total mileage of railways in 
operation in 1921 was slightly in excess of 37,000, largely 
state owned and partly state operated. They are, unfor- 
tunately, however, built upon three different gauges, which 
prevents interchange of equipment, and makes necessary 
frequent transfer both for passengers and for freight. 
There were in 1920 over 88,000 miles of telegraph lines, 
and the postal service is widely extended and efficient. 

In the matter of external communication the British have 
resisted every suggestion of developing railway communica- 
tion from India to outside countries. There can be little 
doubt that England will soon find it absolutely essential to 
reverse this policy, and to link up her railways from Burma 
to other parts of the Indo-China peninsula and to China 
itself, while, to the northwest, the time can scarcely be long 
delayed when connections will be established with the Rus- 
sian Trans-Caspian line and, through Persia, with the Bag- 
dad railway. Practically all Indian foreign trade and 
intercourse is carried on by sea, as it has been ever since the 
arrival of the Portuguese. This trade is mainly handled 
through a few ports, Karachi, Bombay, Colombo in Ceylon, 
Madras, Calcutta, and Rangoon, and to a slight extent 
through some minor ports. 


94 THE AWAKENING EAST 


The extension of the trade of India has been remarkable. 
The figures for 1921 represent a growth of forty-sevenfold 
over those for 1834, the first year after the abolition of the 
trading privileges of the East India Company. The absolute 
growth, however, has been vastly greater in the past sixty 
years, during which period the increase has been sixfold. 
The total foreign trade of India in 1921 amounted to ap- 
proximately $1,800,000,000. In the same year the United 
States with one third the population had a foreign trade three 
times that of India. For many years the amount of exports 
has considerably exceeded the imports of merchandise, but in 
1921 the figures were sharply reversed. On the other hand, 
the imports of treasure, that is, of gold and silver, have 
regularly been enormously in excess of the exports. This 
may be taken as an evidence to some extent of hoarding, but 
it is also explained in part by use for ornaments. The stock 
of jewelry worn on the person is the Indian woman’s say- 
ings bank deposit. These figures do not seem to confirm 
the theory of economic drain of India by England, which 
has been referred to previously. 

The total of imperial and provincial revenues of India 
has increased from less than £60,000,000 in 1892 to over 
£135,000,000 in 1920, a gain of about 128 per cent. Whereas 
25 per cent of the expenditures in 1892 was payable in Great 
Britain, in 1920 only 18 per cent was so payable. Though 
the absolute amount had grown from £15,000,000 to £27,- 
000,000, the increase was not commensurate with the rise 
in prices. It would appear, therefore, that the government 
is endeavoring to lessen the causes for complaint with regard 
to these expenditures. In this connection it is pertinent to 
note that in the same period the railway mileage was in- 
creased from 17,000 to 37,000, the mileage of telegraph lines 
doubled, and vast outlays made for irrigation works which, 
incidentally, include at present more than 3,000 miles of 
navigable canals. The funds for these capital expenditures 
have had to be obtained, in large part, from Great Britain, 
so that corresponding interest payments must flow from 
India to Great Britain. 

As in the case of Egypt, so with India, England has been 


INDIA 95 


charged with a failure to develop properly sanitation and 
education. That England has done a large amount in the 
way of sanitation and of public health measures cannot be 
denied, but anyone who has walked the streets of even Cal- 
cutta and Bombay cannot have helped being impressed that 
certain obvious measures for public health have not been 
taken. The most distressing of these is the failure to segre- 
gate the lepers. One, of course, recognizes that the enforce- 
ment of sanitary measures affords peculiar difficulty because 
of the embarrassments created by the existence of caste. 
The teachings of most of the religions of India, especially 
of Mohammedanism and only to a less degree of Hinduism, 
inculcate temperance, with special reference to the use of 
intoxicating drinks. Consequently, another charge brought 
against the English has been the spread of the drink traffic. 
This was one of the points on which Mr. Gandhi laid con- 
siderable stress. It fitted into his program both with ref- 
erence to exaltation of traditional native principles and 
of boycotting the English government, because the manu- 
facture and sale of drinks are carried on under government 
licenses and pay a considerable revenue to the government. 
This created a sort of native anti-saloon movement which 
was promptly seized upon by a well-known American pro- 
hibition campaigner, popularly known as “Pussyfoot” John- 
son, who pursued his activities in India for some months. 
The development of public education in India has already 
been discussed. The recent report of the Sadler commission 
will undoubtedly remove some of the worst evils, and is 
already clearly resulting in some marked improvements. 
The most essential is the emphasis which is being placed 
upon the development of residential colleges. The superior- 
ity in this respect of the church colleges has been convincing, 
and it is anticipated that emulation of their example will 
yield improved results in the institutions under the control 
of other faiths or under public management. More notable 
improvements are being introduced in secondary education, 
which has, until recently, received inadequate consideration. 
The serious criticism with regard to both these fields is 
that attention has been too largely devoted to literature, 


96 THE AWAKENING EAST 


rather than to professional, technical, or vocational educa- 
tion, which would prepare the graduates for definite careers 
of usefulness. Recently, however, there has been a distinct 
change for the better in this direction. One of the most 
essential types of special schools is that for the training of 
teachers, and particular attention is being given at present 
to the development of normal schools as an indispensable 
preliminary to the extension of primary education. 

The growth of primary education under provincial super- 
vision in recent years has been rapid. The number of 
primary schools for males grew from 114,000 with 4,400,000 
pupils in 1913 to 133,500 with 4,950,000 in 1920, while the 
number of primary schools for females in the same period 
grew from 13,700 with 830,000 pupils to 21,700 with 1,175,- 
000 pupils. The total number of educational institutions has 
increased from 148,500 in 1902 to 202,900 in 1920. While 
the number of male students increased during this period 
from 4,083,000 to 6,829,000, the number of female pupils 
grew from 446,000 to 1,377,000. This evidence of the rapid 
extension of female education is one of the most significant 
factors in the case, for in India, as in Egypt, the breakdown 
of the social barriers which have kept women in seclusion 
and ignorance must be regarded as prerequisite to the de- 
velopment of society to anything corresponding substan- 
tially to western standards. In the development of primary 
education and of the education of women, the influence and 
actual contribution of Christian missions have been of the 
greatest importance. 

Western influences are, of course, responsible for the de- 
velopment of journalism in India. There are not only a 
considerable number of newspapers in English and other 
European languages for the benefit of western residents, 
but there are also numerous periodicals published in each 
one of the more widely used native languages. Some of 
them are published in two or more languages. As in the 
case of Egypt, it is to be regretted that the character and 
tone of the native press are not very high, though there are 
notable exceptions. An excellent example is set by the 
English-language press in India, which is, on the whole, con- 


INDIA 97 


ducted on a very high level. Such a paper as the Pioneer, 
of Allahabad, would be a credit to any city. 

The use of the printing press, together with the growth 
of education and of nationalist ideals, has led to something 
like a literary revival. At any rate, the output of maga- 
zines and books in native languages has become extensive, 
and coincides with a deliberate effort not merely to exalt the 
glories of the country’s ancient literature, but also to emulate 
them. There has been a great deal of investigation and pub- 
lication with reference to the history, literature, religion, 
and philosophy of ancient India. A considerable portion 
of these works has been published in English. India has 
not failed to produce some scientists of high ability, and 
it is reasonable to anticipate that such worthy examples as 
that of Sir J. C. Bose will not lack for emulation. 

Very naturally, native journalism in India is closely asso- 
ciated with the nationalist movement, and tends to express 
in extreme rather than moderate manner its aims and in- 
terests. The vehement, even violent, nature of its propa- 
ganda has brought the native press into considerable con- 
flict with the government. Since the anti-British feeling 
has produced in these papers expressions which are not 
merely critical of the government but absolutely subversive 
to it, it has been deemed necessary, as a matter of self-pres- 
ervation, for the government to intervene by the enactment 
and the enforcement of penal statutes. 

It is natural, in every reform or revolutionary movement, 
that there should appear those radicals and extremists who 
carry their activities beyond legal or even reasonable limits. 
Consequently, when they fall under the penalty of the law, 
they endeavor to arouse, usually with considerable success, 
sympathy for themselves and added hostility to the govern- 
ment they seek to subvert. 

This situation is peculiarly unfortunate in India, because 
of the temper of the people, who, less readily than in most 
countries, can adopt an attitude of moderation or of sus- 
pension of judgment until all the pertinent facts in a case 
can be reasonably weighed. It is, indeed, this peculiar men- 
tal characteristic, which is apparently more clearly marked 


08 THE AWAKENING EAST 


among the Hindus than among the Mohammedans, that 
makes western observers of India doubtful of the ability of 
these peoples successfully to develop and operate a system 
of self-government. 

Representative self-governing institutions, as they exist in 
western countries, have measured their success by the de- 
gree in which the people concerned have been able to ap- 
proach public questions in a judicial spirit and with a sense 
of fair play. The western observer fails to find in India 
what seems to him adequate evidence of the ability and 
readiness of its peoples to approach political problems in 
such a frame of mind. The people of India are able to see 
with great acuteness the arguments in favor of their own 
views and those which are disadvantageous to the other 
party, but they seem to lack the ability to see how these same 
arguments may look from the other side, or to consider 
other elements relevant to the case. 

As has already been said, generalizations are always dan- 
gerous, and particularly so with reference to India, and 
when one makes such general statements as the preceding, 
one must, of course, recognize that there are brilliant excep- 
tions to them. One must also recognize that the develop- 
ment of political-mindedness is, after all, a matter of slow 
growth, and comes with the practice of self-government. 
Fortunately, England has accorded to the peoples of India, 
in progressive measure, the privileges of constitutional gov- 
ernment, and has been affording them the opportunity of 
political self-education. 

To estimate the value of the result is extremely difficult. 
It is easy to point out certain obvious arguments both for 
the success and for the failure of the experiment. While 
one may conclude that the results have been as satisfactory 
as could have been expected, none the less, it is difficult 
to refrain from the conclusion that the results have been 
distinctly less satisfactory than is desirable. 

Political-mindedness, in the western sense, requires a 
peculiar combination of independence and individualism 
with the spirit of codperation. This may perhaps best be 
phrased by saying that in the matter of thinking and of co- 


INDIA 99 


Operating in political life the individual must enjoy full 
freedom. He must be able to arrive at his own conclusions 
from the facts before him, without fear or favor, and he 
must be equally free to join with those whose conclusions 
are similar, in seeking the political attainment of his ends. 

Whenever institutions of a religious or social character, 
or conditions of an economic nature exist, which seriously 
interfere with this freedom of the individual, either in his 
thinking or in his action in political matters, self-governing 
institutions have not operated satisfactorily. The peoples 
of India are subject in unusual degree to such constraints 
upon thought and action. The differences of race, of his- 
torical experience, of religion, and especially the existence 
of caste with its far-reaching social and economic sig- 
nificance, operate both to direct the character of the thinking 
and to restrict the freedom of action of the individual. 

If the people of India are to attain in satisfactory measure 
to representative self-government, they must develop ability 
to rise above these age-long restraints of race, religion, and 
social and economic order upon the freedom of the indi- 
vidual. Each must be able to arrive at his own conclusions 
upon consideration of the facts and to combine freely, re- 
gardless of these old orders, with those of any class, race, or 
creed, who arrive at similar conclusions and seek aims cor- 
responding with his own. 

If India is to develop as a nation and is to establish for 
itself a system of representative self-government, it must do 
so not as a utopian project, regardless of the past, but it 
must definitely rear the new structure upon the foundations 
of its history and of its present circumstances. India proper 
and, to a much higher degree, the territory which now forms 
the Indian Empire, owe whatever unity they possess to the 
establishment and maintenance of British rule. Never prior 
to the nineteenth century were all the provinces of India 
itself united under one single government. 

There had always been many petty kingdoms and states, 
almost incessantly at war with one another; and the country 
owes absolutely to the establishment of British control the 
creation within its borders of a state of freedom from war, 


100 THE AWAKENING EAST 


of internal peace and security, and of law and order. Of 
the Indian borderlands, which have been brought within the 
empire chiefly since the Mutiny, only a small portion had 
ever been under the rule of an Indian state. Their presence 
within the empire is distinctly a novelty for which the British 
are entirely responsible. 

If the people of India, therefore, are to establish for them- 
selves in India proper and much more in the empire as a 
whole, including the borderlands, a unified Indian nation- 
ality, they must build very carefully upon the foundations 
of unity which have been established under British authority. 
Haste would result not merely in the falling away from 
the empire of some, if not all, of the borderlands, but would 
almost inevitably result in disintegration within India itself. 
For this reason, the success of the Indian experiment is de- 
pendent for a long period to come, until the welding together 
of races and the growth of identity of interests have pro- 
gressed far, upon the persistence of a considerable degree of 
British control. 

This necessity for British control arises, moreover, not 
only from the internal situation of India, but likewise from 
the necessity of safeguarding India against aggressions from 
without. It is unlikely at the present time, though it cer- 
tainly was not true prior to the close of the World War, 
that there is danger that any European power would seek to 
replace England in India, but the situation upon the north- 
west frontier, as evidenced in a high degree during the past 
five years, shows that, even within Asia itself, India needs 
the protection of England’s strong arm and the skill of its 
diplomacy. 

To no less degree must the people of India take into ac- 
count, in the creation of their nationality, the necessity of 
laying the foundations upon the control exercised by the 
British in more or less of the country for a century and a 
half. They must also recognize that it is solely from the 
British that they have derived the ideals both of nationality 
and representative self-government. It is the British who 
have not merely created an Indian nationality as a fact upon 
the map, but who have been responsible for the development 


INDIA IOI 


of the idea as a mental and moral fact. India must confess, 
as does every country on the continent of Europe or any- 
where else which at the present day enjoys or is endeavor- 
ing to establish representative institutions, that the whole 
system, with the ideal involved and the method concerned, 
was developed by England, and has been by them borrowed 
for their several uses. 

It would be absolute madness for the people of India to 
overlook the fact that they have enjoyed the rare privilege 
of public training in these matters by the inventors and great 
masters of the art, or for them to reject that guidance until 
they shall have erected the new superstructure upon the 
foundations already laid. Nowhere so truly as in India does 
the old adage apply, that the more haste, the less speed. 

There is the other side of the case, and that is the obli- 
gation upon England with reference to its future conduct. 
England must fully and heartily recognize the aims and 
desires of the people of India. England can lose India irre- 
trievably by endeavoring too strenuously to maintain its 
hold. The preachings of the hide-bound Tories and of the 
reactionary Die-Hards, that England must save itself in 
India, can have no other result than the complete alienation 
of India. 

Generous and sympathetic treatment of India, on the 
other hand, can result in the establishment of unbreakable 
ties of friendship, which will yield to the British Empire 
far more valuable results when measured in terms of po- 
litical profit or of trade or of financial investment or of 
intellectual and spiritual usefulness, than can possibly accrue 
from any policy of forcible maintenance of authority. It is 
entirely possible for England to follow such a generous 
policy as might result in the loss completely of political 
control over India, and yet of conserving to England a re- 
lationship with that country and its peoples of infinitely 
greater value than has yet accrued. This great truth has 
already been demonstrated in the case of Canada and the 
other dominions. 

These facts have a pertinent relation to an immediate 
problem. The Indian nationalist leaders, even of the more 


102 THE AWAKENING EAST 


moderate sort, are demanding the prompt and thorough, 
though not necessarily complete, Indianization of both the 
army and the civil service. It may be readily conceded that 
a greater degree of Indianization of both is desirable, but the 
Indian people will seriously injure their own cause by undue 
insistence upon either of these policies, particularly the latter. 

The nationalist agitation has seriously damaged the morale 
of the British civil service in India, and has almost com- 
pletely arrested the recruiting of that service. The interests 
of both India and England require the continuance in India 
of at least as many English appointees, in both the civil 
service and the related services, as at present, and require 
that that personnel shall be of the highest quality. Any 
action, whether in India or in England, that interferes with 
such a result will be unfortunate to both parties. It is not 
necessary that the present distribution of the English civil 
servants and other officials in India shall continue, or that 
the powers exercised by them shall remain the same, but 
their presence as guides and councilors, as expert advisers 
and assistants is essential for a multitude of reasons. 

One of these reasons is that India cannot become a nation 
unto itself. It must become a nation as a partner in the 
great society of nations; and if it is to do so, it must com- 
mand the confidence of the other partners in the society. 
It may be humiliating to the pride of the Indian peoples, 
but it is a fact which must be reckoned with, that the con- 
tinuance of such a group of British officials in India will be 
the most valuable contribution toward the creation and de- 
velopment of that confidence. The practice of Japan affords 
a clear example on this point. 

The British, on their side, should take care to select only 
officials who will represent the best traditions of the service 
in tact and consideration for the peoples of India and who 
will conform to the growing demand for recognition of their 
political and social equality. There have been unfortunate 
examples of the harm that the acts and utterances of a tact- 
less official can do. Objections have been frequently raised 
to the pensions paid from Indian revenues to British civil 
servants who almost invariably retire to England after the 


INDIA 103 


completion of their stated period of service. If instead they 
should continue to reside in India after retirement, the drain 
of funds to England would cease and they might continue to 
contribute from their experience and wisdom to Indian na- 
tional progress and welfare. 

It is perhaps worth while to add a few words with regard 
to the relation of the United States to this situation. It does 
not occur to most Americans that there is any such relation, 
but in the minds of the people of India the relation is 
extremely obvious. The very existence of the United States 
is a notable argument in support of their case. The States 
were once colonies of England. They declared their inde- 
pendence, successfully maintained it, and have grown great 
and powerful. 

It is extremely easy for the Indian nationalist to draw 
comparisons from the American conflict with England in the 
eighteenth century, and he arrives without any difficulty at 
all at the conclusion that the separation of the United States 
from England affords an absolute parallel and a perfectly 
decisive argument for the freedom of India. It can, there- 
fore, be understood that the Indian people naturally look to 
the United States for friendship and encouragement as well 
as example. Their feeling is that they are trying to do what 
the Americans successfully accomplished and that the Amer- 
icans ought, therefore, to be friendly disposed toward the 
aims of India and ready not merely to sympathize but to 
assist in the achieving of those aims. 

The American in India cannot fail to be impressed with 
the alertness of the people to detect an American, and the 
eagerness to enter into conversation with him, which 
promptly turns in the political direction, nor can he have 
failed to note the sudden change of attitude upon the part 
of an Indian the moment he discovers an individual is an 
American and not a British citizen. It becomes almost 
amusing, therefore, when one raises the question as to what 
would be the attitude if the United States should be sub- 
stituted for Great Britain in relation to India, to find them 
answering with alacrity, “We would feel just the same to- 
ward you then as we do toward them now.” 


104 THE AWAKENING EAST 


It would be unfair to omit one further point. There is, 
after all, a limit to the self-confidence of the Indians in their 
ability to succeed unaided in the achievement of their na- 
tionalist aims. When brought fairly to face the ultimate 
situation, they will almost invariably acknowledge that the 
continuance of British authority in India in some form and 
to some degree will be indispensable to them for a consider- 
able time to come. Even Mr. Gandhi himself seems never 
to have been able entirely to free himself from such a con- 
clusion. 

The future of India, therefore, would seem to lie in the 
steady growth of self-government under British protection 
and guidance. The safety of the future depends not upon 
listening to the rabid doctrines of the British Tory or of 
the Bengali Brahmin extremist, but in the development of 
ever-deepening sympathy and ever-widening cooperation. 
As the unification of India under British rule was the great- 
est achievement of its sort in the nineteenth century, so 
the successful establishment of Indian self-government 
under British leadership may be the greatest fact of its sort 
in the twentieth century, and prove one of the most impor- 
tant steps toward preparing the world for an effective broth- 
erhood of nations. 


RECENT EVENTS 


In Bombay, which may be taken as an illustration of pro- 
gressive provincial administration, during the five years 
ending in 1923, compulsory primary education was inaug- 
urated, model tenement houses were constructed, improve- 
ments in sanitation were carried out, and work was started 
on an immense irrigation scheme at Sukkur in the Indus 
valley which is planned to open up for agriculture new 
land more extensive than the whole cultivated area in Egypt. 
An important labor reform affecting mining operations 
throughout India restricts the employment of women and 
children and limits the hours of work for men. 

The commission headed by Lord Inchcape on the re- 
trenchment of expenditures? made its report in March, 1923, 


*See above, page 87. 


INDIA 105 


recommending a reduction of the estimates for annual gen- 
eral expenditures of £105,000,000 by £12,500,000. The gov- 
ernment has proceeded with measures for a greater degree 
of Indianization of the army, and for the reduction of mili- 
tary expenditures. The decision to concentrate the govern- 
ment offices at Simla has been made with a view to further 
economies. Since the establishment of the new legislature 
under the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, there has been a 
failure each year to balance the budget. The government 
motion for doubling the salt tax made in order to attain 
that end was rejected by the assembly in March, 1923, on 
the ground that this tax would fall heavily on those least 
able to bear it. Lord Reading then exercised his prerogative 
as viceroy by “certifying” the salt tax. This procedure was 
the subject of serious denunciation, and in July the assembly 
passed a resolution favoring the restriction of the viceregal 
power of certification. 

In the earlier part of 1923 there seems to have been a sub- 
sidence of unrest. There were a few sporadic disturbances 
and some bolshevist agents were arrested. The adjustment 
of difficulties in the Crown colony of Kenya in East Africa 
proposed by the British government was unfavorable to the 
claims of the Indian immigrants to that region. The Indian 
people regarded the arrangement as a measure of unfair 
discrimination within the empire and denounced it with re- 
markable unanimity. In August, 1923, serious disturbances 
between the Hindus and Mohammedans, and between the 
Sunnite and Shiite Mohammedans began to occur and have 
since continued. In August also the Ali brothers, Lajpat 
Rai, and other important political prisoners were released. 
Finally on September 12 the viceroy announced the disso- 
lution of the legislative assembly. 

These circumstances were promptly followed by a 
special meeting of the Indian national congress at Delhi. 
The primary purpose was to allay the religious strife, and 
committees were appointed to investigate and report on the 
subject. With the approval of Mr. Gandhi it was agreed 
that the nationalists might stand as candidates at the ap- 
proaching elections to the legislative assembly. Contrary to 


106 THE AWAKENING EAST 


the advice of Mr. Gandhi a boycott of British goods was 
proclaimed in protest against the Kenya arrangements. A 
proposal to extend the boycott to American goods, because 
of a decision of the United States supreme court that 
Hindus could not become citizens, failed. A resolution de- 
claring complete independence the goal of the nationalist 
movement was defeated by a large majority, but plans were 
approved for organized civil disobedience. 

At the end of December the regular meeting of the na- 
tional congress assembled at Cocanada under the presidency 
of Mohammed Ali, whose utterances were criticized as un- 
duly Mohammedan in tone. The actions of the congress 
were practically limited to affirmation of the decisions 
reached at Delhi in September, but friction over religious 
matters and between the different factions of the nationalists 
was ill-concealed. Mr. Das and his followers held a con- 
ference at Lucknow and issued an ultimatum that they would 
refuse to cooperate in the work of the legislative assemblies 
to which they had been elected unless the British government 
announced the concession of full responsible government. 
Some nationalists declined to follow this-course. The pro- 
ceedings of the caliphate congress which met under the 
presidency of Shevket Ali displayed an ultra-~Mohammedan 
spirit. On February 4, 1924, Mr. Gandhi, owing to his ill 
health, was released by the Bombay government uncon- 
ditionally. The wisdom of this act has been generally com- 
mended. 

In the elections to the legislative assembly the nationalists 
obtained 50 of the 105 elective seats in the house of 145 
members. In the provincial elections they won an over- 
whelming majority in the Central Provinces, but nowhere 
else did they secure a majority, though in Bengal they ob- 
tained 49 of the 113 elective members in a house of 139. 
In the Bombay presidency they secured less than a third of 
the elective members, and in Madras less than a tenth. In 
Bengal the governor, Lord Lytton, asked Mr. Das, the na- 
tionalist leader, to form a ministry, but he declined on the 
ground that it would be contrary to the policy of his party 
to undertake to conduct the government under the Montagu- 


INDIA 107 


Chelmsford plan of dyarchy which it considers impracti- 
cable,?° instead of attempting to defeat its operation as a step 
toward securing genuine responsible government. 

In February, 1924, the newly elected legislative assembly 
adopted a resolution in favor of a round-table discussion of 
the working of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms and their 
possible revision. This drew forth a statement from the 
MacDonald ministry in the British parliament disapproving 
hasty action in Indian affairs. Two months later the situa- 
tion in India became a subject of extended debate in the 
British house of commons. The MacDonald ministry re- 
jected a proposal for a parliamentary commission to inves- 
tigate the operation of the Montagu-Chelmsford reforms 
but it announced that ministerial investigations were in 
progress and matters were the subject of discussion with 
responsible Indian politicians. The secretary of state for 
India created a commission of eight members including 
Indians and British residents in India under the chairman- 
ship of Sir Alexander Muddiman, with the purpose of in- 
vestigating the details of the operation of the Montagu- 
Chelmsford act, but not with the purpose of undertaking a 
general revision of the measure. This commission began 
work in April. At the same time announcement was made 
of the establishment of a national convention at Allahabad 
to unify the workers for Indian home rule. The definitely 


Considerable evidence has been presented before the Muddiman 
commission to sustain the indictment of dyarchy by Mr. Das. It 
has been shown that ministers for transferred subjects are at a 
disadvantage both under the existing financial system and with 
regard to influencing budget proposals for their departments, that 
they are subject to constant government intervention in their ad- 
ministration of their departments, and that the conditions are such 
that they are practically powerless to give proper effect to such im- 
portant measures as those for compulsory primary education. If this 
evidence is generally confirmed it will seem to justify the unwilling- 
ness of the nationalists to codperate in administering the government 
under the Montagu-Chelmsford act as an intermediary step to secur- 
ing a fuller installment of self-government at the expiration of the 
ten-year period provided in the act. In any case it explains the 
present demand for prompt revision of that act. 


108 THE AWAKENING EAST 


avowed purpose of this convention was announced to be the 
securing of authority from Great Britain to summon an 
independent or nonofficial convention to frame a constitu- 
tion for India as a dominion. This proceeding is an ob- 
vious rejoinder to the appointment of the Muddiman com- 
mission, an official creation with a circumscribed sphere of 
action. 

Meanwhile, the nationalists in the newly elected legislative 
assembly had mustered enough votes in March, 1924, to 
defeat the annual budget, which has since been “certified” 
by the viceroy. On May 27, the executive committee of 
the Indian national congress met in Ahmedabad, the home 
of Mr. Gandhi. In the opening discussions Mr. Gandhi 
was able to command a majority in opposition to Mr. Das. 
The intransigeant behavior of the latter, however, led Mr. 
Gandhi to make concessions in order to avoid an open split. 
This weakness on the part of Mr. Gandhi resulted in an 
actual success for Mr. Das and his followers who, in con- 
trast with Mr. Gandhi’s teaching of nonresistance and 
noncooperation, favor aggressive, though not violent, po- 
litical activity, including participation in elections and 
accepting membership in the legislative councils but not 
cooperation in government until full responsible govern- 
ment shall be granted. Nevertheless, conditions seemed to 
improve and even in the legislative assembly the moderate 
swarajists or nationalists cooperated with the administration 
and proceedings were carried on satisfactorily. 

More recently there have been some untoward occur- 
rences which have accentuated existing causes for bitter- 
ness. A royal commission headed by Lord Lee of Fare- 
ham has been investigating the question of civil service. It 
appears that the compensation and other conditions are such 
that few satisfactory British candidates are now attracted 
and the possible effects are considered unfortunate. The 
recommendations of the commission have been the subject 
of severe criticism by the nationalists and have been rejected 
by the national legislative assembly, but it is anticipated that 
they will be “certified.” The assembly has constituted a 
commission with extensive powers to inquire into the tax- 


INDIA 109 


able capacity of the people and the distribution of the 
burden of taxation. 

Religious conflicts between Mohammedans" and Hindus 
persisted, notably in Delhi, and disturbances were still rife 
on the northwestern frontier. On September 18, 1924, in 
spite of his weakened health, Mr. Gandhi announced his 
intention to fast for twenty-one days as penance for the 
religious strife. He declared: 


“The recent events have proved unbearable for me. My 
hopelessness is still more unbearable. My religion teaches 
me that whenever one is very distressed which one cannot 
remove, one must fast and pray. I have done so in con- 
nection with my dearest ones. Nothing evidently that I say 
or write can bring the two communities together. I am 
therefore imposing on myself a fast. ... As a penance I 
need not have taken the public into confidence, but publish 
the fast as, let me hope, an effective prayer both to the 
Hindus and the Mussalmans who have hitherto worked in 
unison, not to commit suicide. I respectfully invite the 
heads of all the communities, including the Englishmen, to 
meet and end this quarrel which is a disgrace to religion 
and humanity. It seems as if God has been dethroned. Let 
us reinstate him in our hearts.” 


In pursuance of this appeal representatives of the sev- 
eral religions, including Christianity, have been organized 
into a committee of fifteen, with Mr. Gandhi as chairman, to 
arbitrate all religious disputes. 


SUGGESTIONS FOR READING 


The Oxford History of India from the Earliest Times to the End 
of mo1r (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1920), by Vincent A. 
Smith, a former member of the Indian civil service, replaces all 
earlier works of the sort. The materials are presented in abridged 
form by the same author in The Oxford Student’s History of 
India (8th ed., Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1919). On the 
government of India, there is a good monograph study by Cecil 


“The action of the government of the Turks at Angora in de- 
posing the caliph has occurred too recently to make it possible to 
determine the effect upon Mohammedan sentiment in India. 


110 THE AWAKENING EAST 


M. P. Cross entitled The Development of Self-Government in India, 
1858-1914 (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1922), and for the 
more recent developments there is The Political System of British 
India with Special Reference to the Recent Constitutional Changes 
(New York, Oxford University Press, 1923), by Professor E. A. 
Horne of the University of Patna. 

The best analysis of the recent political movements in India will 
be found in Indian Unrest (London, Macmillan and Company, 
1910) and in India Old and New (London, Macmillan and Com- 
pany, 1921), both by Sir Valentine Chirol of the London Times. 
These may now be supplemented by India in Ferment (New York, 
D. Appleton & Company, 1923), by Professor Claude H. Van Tyne, 
of the University of Michigan, who visited India in 1922. A Review 
of the Gandhi Movement im India (Political Science Quarterly, vol. 
38, pp. 227-248, June, 1923), by W. H. Roberts, is an excellent 
summary by a competent observer. The radical nationalist views 
are set forth by Lajpat Rai in Young India, an Interpretation and 
a History of the Nationalist Movement from Within (New York, 
B. W. Huebsch, 1916), and in The Political Future of India (New 
York, B. W. Huebsch, 1919). The situation is presented from 
another angle in India’s Silent Revolution (New York, The Mac- 
millan Company, 1920), by Fred B. Fisher, Bishop of the Methodist 
Episcopal Church, resident at Calcutta. A valuable account of the 
religious conditions and tendencies is given by John N. Farquhar, 
who has spent many years in India as a student of the situation, 
in Modern Religious Movements in India (New York, The Macmil- 
lan Company, 1915). 

The Indian Empire, its Peoples, History, and Products (3rd ed., 
London, Smith, Elder & Co., 1893), by Sir William W. Hunter, was 
long the authoritative descriptive work on India. The plan of ‘this 
work has been retained but the materials have been entirely rewritten 
and revised to date in vols. 1-4 of the third edition of The Imperial 
Gageteer of India (Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1907-09). An 
account of the several races and of castes will be found in The 
People of India (2nd ed., revised by W. Crooke, London, W. 
Thacker & Co., 1915), by Sir Herbert H. Risley, the late ethno- 
graphical expert to the Indian census. 

The Economic History of British India (4th ed., London, K. 
Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co., Ltd., 1916) and its supplement, The 
Economic History of India in the Victorian Age (4th ed., London, 
K. Paul, Trench, Triibner & Co., Ltd., 1916), by Romesh C. Dutt, 
former member of the Bengal legislative council, are useful presen- 
tations of important information, but must be used with caution 
because of the excessively critical attitude toward British policy. 
The current economic problems are presented from opposite points 
of view in The Economic Transition iw India (London, J. Murray, 
I9g1l1), by Sir Theodore Morison, and in The Foundations of 


INDIA Iil 


Indian Economics (London, Longmans, Green & Co., 1916) by 
Radhakamal Mukerjee. 

The annual reports published by the Government of India on the 
moral and material progress of India, of which the latest is India 
in 1922-23 (Calcutta, 1923), edited by L. F. Rushbrook Williams, are 
rich in useful materials arranged in clear narrative form. 


GHA PE Ra EL 
CHINA 


In dealing with India the problem presented was that of 
the relations between a single western ruling power and mul- 
titudes of subject native peoples who had previously fallen 
victims to division and despotic misgovernment. The Indian 
peoples are, in major part, members of the same racial stock 
as those of western Europe. India, moreover, has not only 
been under British control for a century and a half, but has 
also been in extensive and unbroken intercourse with west- 
ern Europe throughout the past four centuries. The devel- 
opment of western ideas among the peoples of India, from 
a political point of view, has consisted in the achievement of 
union and progress in the establishment of self-government 
under the guidance of the western ruling power. Regard- 
less of whether British rule has favored or opposed the 
spread in India of any form of western ideas, it remains true 
that, in every detail, the progress of modern ideas in India 
has been inseparably linked with the existence of British 
rule since the third quarter of the eighteenth century. 

On turning to China one discovers a radically different 
situation. Racially the people of China are absolutely un- 
related to the nations of western Europe. Though there has 
been a slight acquaintance between China and Europe for 
many centuries, the establishment of any considerable 
amount of intercourse between the Celestial Empire and the 
West dates from so recent a time as 1842. In that year 
England secured from the Chinese government the treaty 
of Nanking, which was soon followed by similar treaties 
negotiated by the United States and France. For many 
centuries, even millenniums, before that date China, unlike 
India, had enjoyed a degree of imperial unity seldom sur- 
passed in other lands. China has never known anything but 
national independence. Even though the country has at 

12 


CHINA 113 


times been ruled by foreign dynasties, the seat of govern- 
ment has always been in China and the character of the 
government has always been essentially and fundamentally 
Chinese. 

During the past century, in contrast with India, China has 
continued, in spite of all difficulties, to maintain the inde- 
pendence of its government and its national integrity. No 
matter what the attitude of the Chinese government, at any 
moment or in any case, has been toward modern ideas, the 
progress of those ideas in China has been absolutely con- 
ditioned by the continued maintenance of the national in- 
dependence and integrity. In so far as China has acquired 
western forms of political organization and administration, 
it has not been the result of western compulsion but of the 
deliberate action of the Chinese themselves working under 
the authority of their own government and guarding jeal- 
ously their sovereign independence and unity. The growth 
of modern ideas in China has, therefore, been entirely the 
intrusion of alien influence into territory and among peoples 
under independent rule, and the relations involved have been 
primarily diplomatic, though at times military, whereas the 
problem in India has been essentially political. 

In the case of China, moreover, the various forms of mod- 
ern ideas have had to win their way by definite struggle on 
every line and at every point. There has been no western 
power in the country, such as the British in India, to carry 
things through with a strong hand. For many and obvious 
reasons there is only a narrow range within which inter- 
national pressure can be successfully applied to an inde- 
pendent nation to enforce the adoption of foreign ways. 
Even the Chinese government itself, unlike the Japanese, 
has made no effort to promote consistently the introduction 
and spread of approved modern ideas. Practically every- 
thing has been left to individual inclination and initiative. 
Almost every idea and every practice of western origin has 
had to win its own way in China. In no other country is 
the relation between the oriental people and the western 
ways so largely a matter of individual concern. 

The reasons for the slowness to accept modern ideas, or 


114 THE AWAKENING EAST 


perhaps even for antagonism to them, are not to be found 
in the obtuseness of the Chinese or in the fact that they are 
of a racial stock different from the Europeans instead of one 
similar to them, as are the people of India. The Chinese, 
indeed, are perhaps somewhat more stolid than the natives 
of India, and perhaps a little more inclined to consider the 
loss of time as a matter of no consequence. The fact is 
that the Chinese have had an unbroken imperial history of 
four thousand years during which they have developed their 
political, economic, social, and religious institutions and 
their culture to a high degree. They have, therefore, quite 
naturally been inclined to value that which they have and to 
underrate the new ideas brought by the upstart nations of 
the West. A decade or even a century looms small in their 
historical perspective. Another factor which has made the 
Chinese very chary in the development of their intercourse 
with the western nations has been their knowledge of the 
aggressive policy of the European nations, especially that 
of England as displayed in the creation of its Indian Empire. 
There has been a real fear in China, not merely in recent 
years, but ever since the beginning of European contacts, 
of the aggression of Europeans. From the outset, the 
westerner has been to the Chinese a foreign devil—a con- 
ception which, it must be observed, still persists. A third 
factor explanatory of China’s slowness in progress is the 
very bulk of the nation. Comparison, on this point, with 
Japan is illuminating. 

The eighteen provinces of China proper have an area esti- 
mated at more than 1,500,000 square miles, about one sixth 
less than that of the Indian Empire. The population, at the 
lowest estimate, is somewhat over 300,000,000, or about the 
same as that of the Indian Empire, but other estimates in- 
crease this figure as much as forty per cent. If the out- 
lying provinces, Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, and Chinese 
Turkestan are included, about 2,500,000 square miles must 
be added to the area and about 20,000,000 to the population. 
These enormous outlying regions are, of course, of great 
political significance. Whether considered with reference 
to the future of China or of the neighboring nations or of 


CHINA 1I5 


Asia as a whole, their present sparsity of population is cer- 
tainly not to be taken as any safe measure of their value. 
Each of these four areas presents a peculiar problem only 
incidentally related to the problem of China proper. Con- 
sequently, this- discussion will be devoted primarily to the 
China of the eighteen provinces, with its population number- 
ing probably one fifth of the total for the world. 

Like Egypt and India, China is a land of ancient civiliza- 
tion. The valley of the Yang-tse, like the valleys of the 
Nile and of the Ganges, has been one of the cradles of the 
human race and one of the great sources from which civil- 
ization has been diffused. In more recent years scholars 
have been overcoming their skepticism with regard to the 
early annals of China and are now ready to concede that its 
history may, with little uncertainty, be traced into the third 
millennium before the Christian era and possibly farther. 
It is not necessary to concern ourselves with the succession 
of dynasties ; it will suffice to note a few outstanding facts. 

China has had intercourse overland with India and the 
countries farther west in Asia since an indefinitely early 
time. As evidence of these western contacts there may be 
enumerated some factors which persist in the life of China 
at the present day. Buddhism was brought from India about 
the first century of the Christian era. Both Judaism and 
Christianity came in at a somewhat later date and have left 
their traces. In due season Mohammedanism likewise spread 
into China, where it still numbers several millions of ad- 
herents. Travelers to Canton, for instance, will recall visit- 
ing an ancient mosque of peculiar type in the heart of that 
city. 

China, like India, was brought clearly to the knowledge 
of western Europe at the close of the thirteenth century by 
Marco Polo, who spent nearly a score of years at the court 
of Kublai Khan, the Mongol conqueror of China and a 
grandson of Genghis Khan. Almost at the time that Marco 
Polo left ‘China there arrived a Franciscan friar, John of 
Montecorvino, who established himself at Peking, where 
he was followed by other Franciscans. The Mongol khans, 
sprung from a small central Asian tribe unconnected with 


116 THE AWAKENING EAST 


any of the great religions, were quite tolerant and open- 
minded toward Christianity as well as toward the other 
faiths. This Christian connection continued until the 
overthrow of the Mongols and the establishment in 1368 
of the native Ming dynasty. During the next century and 
a half there was almost no recorded contact between China 
and western Europe. 

Direct and uninterrupted intercourse between western 
Europe and China began in 1517. In that year the Portu- 
guese, who had reached India by sea in 1498, appeared at 
Canton under the command of Andrade. They soon estab- 
lished themselves at Macao, which they still control, and oc- 
casionally were able to trade at other points on the coast of 
China. Contacts with the Spanish began with the arrival 
of the latter in the Philippines, where the Chinese were 
already established in considerable numbers. Dutch and 
English traders commenced to appear in the course of the 
seventeenth century. Down to 1842 their trade was almost 
exclusively conducted through Canton, with constant reli- 
ance upon the Portuguese base at Macao. The activity of 
the French and of other Europeans in the trade with China 
prior to 1842 was occasional and inconsiderable, but begin- 
ning in 1784 the Americans became regular and important 
participants. 

Under the Portuguese protection the Christian contact 
with China was renewed by the great Jesuit missionary, 
St. Francis Xavier, who died near Macao in 1552 shortly 
after his arrival. Within a half century one of his succes- 
sors, Ricci, had established himself at Peking. From that 
time forward the Society of Jesus continued to be an active 
and influential agency for the propagation of the Christian 
faith in China, until it was superseded by the Lazarists in 
the eighteenth century. The history of Protestant missions 
in China does not begin until the arrival at ‘Canton of the 
Englishman, Robert Morrison, in 1807 and of the Amer- 
ican, Dr. Elijah Bridgman, in 1829. 

It is necessary to record but one other fact in the earlier 
history of China, and that is the displacement of the native 
Ming dynasty by the foreign Manchu dynasty in 1644. It 


CHINA 117 


was in the reign of Tao-kwang, the sixth emperor of this 
dynasty, that the events occurred which opened relations on 
a larger scale between China and the nations of the West, 
and that the second epoch in their intercourse began. 

The abolition by act of the British parliament in 1833 
of the monopoly of the East India Company in the trade 
with Canton led to certain difficulties with the Chinese. To 
these were soon added problems arising out of the trade in 
opium and the Chinese effort to suppress it. The ensuing 
hostilities are known by the English as the First China War, 
but are more often referred to as the Opium War. This 
conflict was terminated by the treaty of Nanking in 1842, 
by which the British obtained the cession of the island of 
Hong Kong, the right of trading at Canton, Amoy, Foochow, 
Ningpo, and Shanghai, known as the five treaty ports, and 
other privileges. 

The United States took prompt notice of the situation and 
commissioned as its first diplomatic representative to China 
Caleb Cushing, who negotiated in 1844 the first treaty be- 
tween the two countries. By this agreement the United States 
obtained, in addition to the privileges already granted to 
the English, the right of extra-territoriality, which may be 
considered the American equivalent for the cession of Hong 
Kong to the English.1 The principle thus established has 
since prevailed with reference to the nationals of all western 
treaty powers in China and is comparable to the system of 
capitulations in Egypt.2 The treaty also obtained several 
privileges in addition to those embodied in the English treaty, 
and included a so-called most favored nation clause guaran- 
teeing to the United States equal enjoyment of privileges 
granted by China to other nations. The British had re- 
cently embodied such a provision in a supplementary treaty, 
and the French treaty, also signed in 1844, included a simi- 


* The treaties of 1842 and 1843 did not secure to the English the 
right of extra-territoriality, but the supplementary regulations em- 
bodied the principle. 

*In treaties negotiated since the World War, such as those with 
Germany and Russia, China has secured the abandonment of the 
privilege by some nations. 


118 THE AWAKENING EAST 


lar clause. Consequently the concessions accorded to each 
were shared by the other two powers. The French pleni- 
potentiary also persuaded the Chinese government to grant 
toleration to the Roman Catholic faith and protection to its 
missionaries, for whom France henceforth posed as the 
guardian. These privileges were shortly afterward ex- 
tended to other Christians. 

These arrangements mark the real opening of China to 
intercourse with the western world. Henceforth European 
and American traders and Christian missionaries, though 
within narrowly defined limits, could live and prosecute 
their enterprises in China under full guaranties of security. 
In negotiating these original treaties no one of the countries 
had in view a policy of colonial expansion at Chinese ex- 
pense; the prime motive in each case was the development 
of trade. Even the British acquisition of Hong Kong was 
not political in character, but commercial, comparable to 
its establishment of factories, such as Bombay, in India, in 
the seventeenth century. The American treaty was framed 
to secure equivalent results without the cession of territory. 
The American policy developed in the negotiations and in 
the treaty provisions assumed equality and cooperation with 
other trading nations in dealing with China. To this policy 
the United States has generally adhered; it is known, under 
the altered circumstances of recent times, as the open-door 
policy. Though the American theory was apparently that 
China was to be treated as an international equal, the treaty 
with the United States introduced the principle of extra- 
territoriality which has been ever since a serious infringe- 
ment of Chinese sovereignty, and it copied the British prece- 
dent in establishing a conventional tariff which has likewise 
persisted till the present as a vexatious limitation on the 
national sovereignty of China. 

It was during the Taiping rebellion in the next decade that 
the United States definitely developed its second fundamental 
policy in Far Eastern matters—the responsibility and ter- 
ritorial integrity of the Asiatic sovereign power as essential 
to the safeguard of treaty rights. The Taiping rebellion, 
which seems to have owed its origin, in some part, to the 


CHINA 11g 


teachings of Christian missionaries, was in considerable 
measure directed against the foreign Manchu dynasty. Its 
success would, no doubt, have resulted in the disruption /of 
China. Humphrey Marshall, the American representative 
in China, was the first to grasp this fact, and he laid down 
the principle that it was to the interest of the United States 
for the assurance of its treaty rights to support the integrity 
of the political authority with which the treaty had been 
made. This was in contrast to the generally friendly atti- 
tude at first maintained by the other trading powers toward 
the Taiping rebels, but the correctness of the principle soon 
found acceptance with the other diplomatic representatives. 
It was at least with the sympathy of these representatives 
of the foreign powers that the imperial government em- 
ployed the services first of Frederick Ward, of Salem, later 
of Burgevine, another American, and finally of Major 
Charles George Gordon, a British officer, who thus won 
the name by which he is commonly known—Chinese Gor- 
don. The creation and direction of the Ever-Victorious 
Army by these officers resulted, in time, in the suppression 
of the rebellion and the restoration of imperial authority. 
Out of one incident of the Taiping rebellion, the seizure 
of Shanghai by a rebel force, came the establishment of the 
Imperial Maritime Customs Service, which still administers 
the collection of tariff duties. The service is an agency of 
the Chinese government, but its efhciency is dependent upon 
its foreign staff recruited from the treaty nations. One of 
its earliest members was Robert Hart, an Englishman, who 
came to be for a long period of years the head of the service 
and the most influential foreign personage in China. 
Provisions in the original treaties permitted their re- 
vision after twelve years. Accordingly, the several powers 
engaged in negotiations to secure additional privileges and 
larger facilities for trade. The new treaties, after many 
delays, were signed in 1858. The circumstances connected 
with their negotiation had emphasized the disadvantageous 
conditions under which diplomatic intercourse had to be 
carried on and led to a determination that, in the future, 
negotiations should be conducted directly with the imperial 


120 THE AWAKENING EAST 


authorities at Peking and not through subordinates at a 
distance from the central government. To this end, it was 
decided that the ratifications must be exchanged at Peking. 

The effort to achieve this result led to a new conflict 
which the English call the Second China War, but which is 
also known as the Anglo-French War with China. The 
Americans maintained an independent position except for 
the entirely unauthorized intervention of the naval officer, 
Commodore Tatnall, in one of the engagements in which he 
used the famous phrase, “Blood is thicker than water.” 
Though it is difficult to find justification for all the actions 
of the British and French, the important fact was that the 
ratifications were exchanged and that the way for diplomatic 
intercourse at Peking was permanently opened. To meet 
this new situation the Chinese created, in 1860, the Tsung-li 
Yamen, or foreign office, the most important modification 
of their government effected in the nineteenth century. 
This achievement closed the second important epoch in the 
development of intercourse between the western nations 
and China. 

It was at this time that the Russians acquired control of 
the provinces in the Amur valley over which ‘China had here- 
tofore claimed sovereignty. Russia also established its first 
regular diplomatic representation at Peking instead of de- 
pending upon the agency of priests of the Orthodox Church, 
who had been established there ever since the original treaty 
between Russia and China as far back as 1689. Russia was 
thus added to the group of leading western powers directly 
concerned in relations with China. 

In 1861 President Lincoln nominated as the American 
minister at Peking, Anson Burlingame. He was a Harvard 
graduate and thoroughly in sympathy with the ideas repre- 
sented in American politics by Charles Sumner. With such 
principles it was not unnatural that he should enter into 
far more intimate and sympathetic relations with the Chinese 
than had any previous foreign representative in the country. 
So completely did he win the confidence of the Chinese that 
in 1867 he resigned his post as American minister and ac- 
cepted an appointment from the Chinese government as 


CHINA 12! 


plenipotentiary to all the western powers with which China 
had treaty relations. 

Burlingame, with a company of about thirty Chinese of- 
ficials, landed at San Francisco and visited many of the 
principal cities of the United States, arousing remarkable 
enthusiasm, interest, and sympathy for China. Finally, as 
head of the mission, he visited Washington and negotiated 
a supplementary treaty with Secretary Seward upon very 
liberal terms. Later he and the mission visited London, 
where they had satisfactory conversations with Lord Claren- 
don, the foreign secretary. Then they went on to Paris, 
Berlin, and St. Petersburg, where the activities of the mis- 
sion came to an untimely end because of the death of 
Burlingame from pneumonia. 

The services of Burlingame to both the United States and 
China will always be memorable as highly creditable to both 
nations. The mission which he headed to the western powers 
marks the third epoch in the development of the relations of 
the Celestial Empire with the western nations, since this was 
the first occasion on which China sent its envoys to the West 
and was followed by the establishment of regular Chinese 
diplomatic representation at western capitals. With this 
exception the generation following the treaties of 1858-1860 
witnessed few changes of importance affecting the relations 
of China with the western powers and only minor ones af- 
fecting matters of trade. The outstanding events were the 
adoption by the United States of a policy of restricting 
Chinese immigration under a treaty negotiated in 1880; 
the settlement in 1881 with Russia of the question of Chi- 
nese Turkestan on terms favorable to China; and the less 
fortunate dealings with France relative to Indo-China. 

China had for centuries exercised sovereignty over a 
large portion of the peninsula of Further India or Indo- 
China. The French had begun to establish themselves there 
about 1860 and had gradually extended their activities, 
which resulted in a war between France and China. At the 
termination of this war, in 1885, the latter was compelled 
to renounce its sovereignty over the Indo-China territories 
in favor of France. In the adjustment of this dispute China 


122 THE AWAKENING EAST 


was largely indebted to the good offices of the American 
minister, John Russell Young, and of Mr. Robert Hart. In 
1886 China was constrained to recognize the establishment 
of British, instead of its own, sovereignty over Burma. 

In the course of the period various other nations entered 
into treaty relations with China, so that the number of treaty 
powers was increased to nearly a score. The establishment 
of oceanic steam navigation, of improved postal communi- 
cations, and of submarine cable service brought China into 
quicker and closer relations with all these nations. The 
growth of commerce in the period was considerable but not 
remarkable. Imports increased in far greater proportion 
than exports, a fact which showed that the Chinese were 
failing to awaken to proper utilization of their opportunities. 
This failure or indifference appears most clearly in the case 
of the tea trade, which reached its height in 1886 and then 
decreased rapidly. One circumstance highly unfavorable 
to China was the steady decline in exchange of silver, the 
medium of trade. 

Prior to 1894 China, with trifling exceptions, managed 
to avoid contracting foreign loans or granting foreign con- 
cessions for railway, mining, or industrial development. 
Only in telegraph construction had China yielded, to any 
serious extent, to the pressure to introduce modern inven- 
tions and methods. There persisted the strongest disin- 
clination for any action which might give the foreigner added 
grasp upon the resources of the nation or influence upon its 
government. The conclusion seems to be indisputable that 
the generation ending in 1894 was for China one of decline 
and of neglected opportunities. The contrast with Japan 
is illuminating. It was in 1854, a decade after the first group 
of treaties with China, that Commodore Perry, on behalf 
of the United States, negotiated the first treaty between 
Japan and a western nation. Beginning with the changes 
known as the Restoration, in 1868, the year of the Bur- 
lingame mission, Japan entered upon a regular policy of 
adjustment to modern and western ways. The dissimilar 
behavior of the two countries came to the test of war in 1894. 

The fourth epoch in the relations between China and the 


CHINA 123 


western nations included the important series of events 
beginning with the outbreak of war between China and 
Japan in 1894 and closing with the settlement with the 
western nations in 1901 after the Boxer rebellion. The 
defeat of China by Japan cost the empire its claim to the 
suzerainty over Korea and its possession of the island of 
Formosa. Only the intervention of Germany, Russia, and 
France prevented Japan from exacting even more severe 
terms, which would have included the possession of Port 
Arthur and the occupation of Wei-hai-wei pending the pay- 
ment of an indemnity. How disinterested this intervention 
was appeared soon after, when Germany occupied Kiao- 
chao in 1897, Russia obtained Port Arthur, and France ac- 
quired Kwangchow-wan, both in 1898. To offset these, 
Great Britain prompily negotiated leases of Wei-hai- -wel 
and the Kowloon peninsula. 

The occupation of these valuable strategic points was the 
culmination of a series of measures by which these four 
European powers and Japan had acquired numerous con- 
cessions in China for railway, mining, and other enterprises, 
and by which they had entered into agreements marking 
out their respective spheres of influence. The result of 
these various proceedings was to assure to the powers con- 
cerned the control directly or potentially of every Chinese 
port of any value and a practical monopoly of concessions 
in China. The humiliation suffered by China at the hands 
of these powers in the brief space of five years is without 
historical parallel. It was the penalty for neglect of the 
opportunities for the adoption of western ideas and for ad- 
justment to modern conditions. 

Only one power with large interests in China was not a 
party to the proceedings. Not only was the attention of the 
United States diverted by the Spanish War, but the ag- 
gressive acts of the powers were directly contrary to the 
American policy of maintaining the territorial integrity of 
China, of seeking nothing more than equality with any and 
every other power under the most favored nation clause, 
and of cooperating with all the treaty powers in commercial 
relations with China. The establishment of the United 


124 THE AWAKENING EAST 


States on the Pacific coast by the settlement of the Oregon 
boundary question in 1846 and by the annexation of Cali- 
fornia in 1848 had given the American people a larger 
direct concern than any other western power in Pacific 
Ocean and Far Eastern questions. The completion of the 
transcontinental railroad to San Francisco in 1869 had also 
brought the United States into quicker, easier, and cheaper 
communication with eastern Asia and all Pacific lands, in 
spite of the opening of the Suez canal in the same year. 

Notwithstanding these facts, since the treaties of 1858, 
America’s share in the trade with China had failed to keep 
pace with that of other countries. This was largely ex- 
plicable by the conditions in the United States itself, which 
afforded more than abundant scope for American financial 
enterprise in the great period of railway construction and of 
agricultural and industrial development. The preoccupation 
of the United States government with numerous other in- 
terests nearer home had led to neglect to promote, or even 
to safeguard properly, American interests in the Far East, 
where in general the relations with Japan, rather than those 
with China, were receiving chief attention. This indiffer- 
ence to Pacific and Far Eastern affairs, which developed 
after the retirement in 1869 of Seward as secretary of 
state, had become practically a settled policy under the 
second administration of President Cleveland from 1893 
to 1897. 

Though the dispute with Spain had distracted the atten- 
tion of the United States from China at the critical period 
of the European infringements upon that nation’s terri- 
torial integrity, a lucky chance afforded by the Spanish War 
enabled the Americans to establish themselves in the Philip- 
pine Islands. This advantage offset the gains of the Euro- 
pean powers without antagonizing either China or Japan. 
The further annexations of Hawaii and Guam gave a 
strategic line of communications, and clinched the position 
of the United States as the most important power in the 
northern Pacific. Henceforth the United States was irre- 
vocably committed to a policy of active participation in the 
affairs of eastern Asia. 


CHINA 125 


In 1899, the United States was free to turn its attention 
to the changed situation in China in order to protect its 
treaty rights and commercial interests from infringement 
arising from the recent aggressions, by the several great 
powers, upon Chinese territory and sovereignty, and to 
prevent the repetition of such acts. Through the ambas- 
sadors of the United States at the courts of the powers con- 
cerned, request was made for adherence to certain principles 
with regard to relations with China. The several powers 
obviously did not view these proposals with uniformly warm 
approbation, but each felt constrained to reply that it would 
assent provided all the others did. Acting upon the basis 
of these answers from all the powers, the United States 
announced that the principles laid down had been accepted 
by all parties interested. 

This was the American diplomatic achievement of estab- 
lishing the doctrine of the open door in China. In this 
action the United States was not inaugurating a new policy, 
but it was, under seriously altered conditions, reasserting 
two fundamental principles upon which American relations 
in the Far East have been based from the outset. It was 
taking action to maintain the integrity of China against 
further infringement of its territory and sovereignty by as- 
serting the principle of equality of opportunity in trade. 
Furthermore, this action was based upon the principle of 
cooperation or concurrent action of the powers concerned. 
Whatever may be the real interest of any other power, there 
can be no doubt whatsoever that it is most consistent with 
the other aspects of American policy, as well as with the 
selfish interests of the United States, that the independence 
and integrity of the nations of the Far East should be main- 
tained, and that in matters of trade and of other economic 
concerns there should be equality of opportunity among the 
nations such as was asserted by the United States and the 
other powers in their original treaties with ‘China by the in- 
clusion of the most favored nation clause. The United 
States soon had an opportunity to uphold these principles 
under entirely new conditions. 

In 1898 the young Chinese emperor, inspired by the pro- 


126 THE AWAKENING EAST 


gressive scholar, Kang Yu-wei, undertook to assume the 
personal direction of the government and to inaugurate a 
policy of reform and of introduction of modern ideas. 
After a few weeks this presumptuous procedure was ar- 
rested by the vigorous empress dowager, who placed the 
young emperor in seclusion for the remainder of his days 
and took direct charge of the government. Ever since 
the Taiping rebellion, at least, the control of the Manchu 
dynasty over China had been obviously precarious. The 
foreign aggressions, beginning with the war with Japan 
and culminating in the European occupation of Chinese 
ports, had severely injured the prestige of the dynasty as 
well as menaced the integrity of the empire. These and 
other factors produced a sudden outburst of anti-Manchu 
feeling in many parts of the country. The empress dowager 
shrewdly seized the situation to strengthen the position of 
the dynasty by directing the movement against the western 
powers and their citizens and against all things western and 
Christian in general. The serious and widespread disturb- 
ances which ensued, known as the Boxer movement, cul- 
minated in the siege of the foreign legations in Peking in 
the summer of 1900. 

The United States joined with the other powers in the 
military and other measures for the relief of the legations 
and later for the restoration of settled conditions and rela- 
tions. ‘The arrangements imposed by the western nations 
upon China in 1901 involved not merely punishments for 
outrages committed upon foreigners and payment of an in- 
demnity, but also extension of privileges for foreigners in 
China. In these negotiations, the United States adhered to 
the policy of concurrent action of the powers, on the one 
hand, while on the other hand, it governed its procedure 
upon the basis of upholding the integrity of China and the 
authority of its government. At the time it was hard to 
understand why the empress dowager was permitted to re- 
main in power, but when the policy involved is made clear 
the reasons are obvious and convincing. Scarcely any other 
action that might conceivably have been taken could have 
prevented the break up of China. Such a contingency could 


CHINA 127 


not have resulted otherwise than disadvantageously for the 
United States, unless the American people were prepared 
to enter upon a policy of annexation of Asiatic territory 
with all the complications and difficulties involved. 

This fourth epoch in the history of the relations of China 
to the western powers, which began with the opening of the 
war with Japan, had witnessed serious infringements upon 
the sovereignty of China and a consequent anti-foreign out- 
break. This in turn had resulted in a general foreign inter- 
vention which had ended in breaking down, to a far greater 
extent than ever before, the barriers of Chinese seclusion 
and in throwing the country practically wide open to the 
influx of modern ideas and to the activities of the treaty 
powers. 

The part which the United States had taken in recent 
events gave it a stronger position in the Far East than ever 
before. The justice of its attitude in the dealings with 
China created a favorable impression in that country which 
was greatly strengthened by the action of the United States, 
in 1907, in foregoing the balance of the indemnity money. 
Ever since then the Chinese have usually regarded the 
Americans as their best friends among the nations of the 
world. The opposite was true in the case of Russia which, 
in the years immediately following the Boxer rebellion, con- 
tinued to pursue in Manchuria the same aggressive policy 
as in the years immediately preceding. The behavior of 
Russia aroused the indignation and fear not only of the 
Chinese but also of the treaty powers, especially Japan, 
which felt its own interests vitally imperiled. The first out- 
come of this situation was the formation in 1902 of the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance; the second was the declaration of 
war by Japan against Russia in 1904. 

The victory of Japan over Russia in the war, which was 
fought in the very homeland of the Manchu dynasty while 
China looked on powerlessly, revealed clearly to the (Chinese 
the advantages acquired by Japan through the adoption of 
modern ways. The achievement of Japan, a country much 
smaller than China, with less population and fewer resources, 
and with a civilization which the Chinese regarded as pri- 


128 THE AWAKENING EAST 


marily borrowed from their own, afforded emphatic proof 
that it was the effective utilization of western civilization 
which had enabled the Asiatic island empire to check the 
overwhelming power of European Russia. 

The suppression of the Boxer movement by the joint ac- 
tion of the powers had secured the opening of China more 
widely to the activities of those powers, but it had by no 
means convinced the Chinese of the merits of modern ways. 
Since then China had been rather sullenly permitting the 
western powers to go ahead in the pursuit of their inter- 
ests. After the Russo-Japanese War, the Chinese promptly 
adopted a more cordial attitude toward things occidental 
and sought in a much fuller measure than ever before the 
counsel of western advisers. The development of railways, 
telegraphs, and other improvements which had been in- 
itiated after the war with Japan began to go rapidly forward. 
This is shown by the following figures: in 1898 the number 
of miles of railroad in operation in the Chinese Empire was 
250; in I9OI, 950; in 1903, 2,800; in 1905, 3,700; in 19090, 
4,730; in 1913, 5,960; and in 1920, 6,813. 

A much more notable effect of Japan’s defeat of Russia 
was the abolition of the time-honored examination system 
for the selection of provincial and national officials, and the 
determination to introduce, in place of the old Chinese classi- 
cal education, training upon modern lines as a basis of quali- 
fication for public employment. This action was taken in 
1905, a few weeks after the signing of the treaty which 
closed the war. While many influences contributed to this 
decision one of the most important was undoubtedly the 
work done in the schools and colleges maintained in China 
by the Protestant missions, a majority of which were under 
American management. 

The government of China, as well as its culture, had been 
based upon education, of which an indigenous system had 
been in wide operation for centuries. This system, because 
of the examination method for selecting public officials, had 
developed a highly competitive character that was obviously 
individualistic in its effects. There were also sharply 
marked gradations of rank and privilege which gave a closely 


CHINA 129 


bound corporate character to the scholarly class. China did 
not need western influence or missionary activities to teach 
it the value of education, but it had to learn from them the 
utility of western education with its greater flexibility and 
freedom as compared with its own traditional classical 
learning. 

The introduction of modern education had immediate and 
extensive practical results in the establishment of numerous 
schools for training in fields of applied science, such as 
medicine, engineering, and agriculture. It emphasized the 
necessity for schools to train teachers in western methods, 
and consequently numerous normal and higher normal 
schools were created. At Peking and elsewhere under na- 
tional, provincial, and private enterprise, universities, col- 
leges, and lower schools of the western type began to spring 
up. When the United States remitted the indemnity money, 
it was with the understanding that it should be applied to 
the promotion of education, and China decided to use the 
funds for educating selected youth in the schools and uni- 
versities of America. 

In all these developments the influence of the missionary 
example, if not more direct assistance, was potent. China 
was brought into illuminating contact not merely with mod- 
ern science and its useful applications but also with western 
political ideas, especially those of the United States. In 
this particular the influence of the American mission schools 
and colleges was without doubt of extraordinary signifi- 
cance. This does not mean that the missionaries had de- 
liberately disseminated propaganda in favor of American 
political institutions. They had unconsciously and inevitably 
exemplified liberal and republican conceptions to their pupils 
in a multitude of ways, and these pupils had not been slow 
to study American history and constitutional development. 

In 1908, within a few days of each other, occurred the 
deaths of the emperor and of the empress dowager. Under 
the established rule of succession, a child was placed on the 
throne. The regency was intrusted to the child’s father, 
Prince Chun, a brother of the late emperor, who had visited 
Europe after the Boxer affair to offer the apologies of China 


130 THE AWAKENING EAST 


at Berlin. In her last years the empress dowager had been 
shrewd enough to recognize the changing situation and had 
sanctioned various catttious measures of reform, had yielded 
to the pressure of circumstances in other cases, and had 
authorized still other acts which might appear outwardly 
as concessions to progressive demands but were in reality 
intended to ward off genuine governmental reform. ‘These 
measures included a reorganization of the ministries in 1906, 
and decrees in 1907 providing for provincial assemblies and 
a national assembly, which did actually meet in 1909 and 
IQIo respectively. Finally, in 1908, a few weeks before the 
death of the dowager empress, there was issued a program 
for constitutional reform to extend over nine years and to 
culminate in the meeting of an elected parliament. 

Ever since the outbreak of war with Japan in 1894 there 
had been a steady cumulation of events which discredited 
the foreign Manchu dynasty. The policy of foreign loans 
for railway construction as well as for governmental pur- 
poses added to the general discontent. To face this situa- 
tion the dynasty was represented by an infant monarch with 
a regent whose career could not inspire national pride or 
confidence. Neither among the other representatives of 
the dynasty nor among the Manchus was there to be found 
a single possible leader. The helplessness of the dynasty 
became even more apparent in May, 1911, when the old 
governmental councils were abolished and replaced by a 
cabinet and privy council with Prince Ching as prime min- 
ister. This individual was a septuagenarian whose inability 
and corrupt petty politics had long been as much the subject 
of jest in Peking as had been the similar characteristics of 
the Duke of Newcastle in London in the middle of the eigh- 
teenth century. 

Since the suppression of the Taiping rebellion in 1864 
there had been sporadic outbreaks at frequent intervals in 
many parts of the empire. Numerous secret societies of 
revolutionary tendencies had sprung up, while other organ- 
izations supported less extensive demands for reforms. 
Leadership in these movements was taken chiefly by for- 
eign-trained students. The large number of these who had 


CHINA 131 


studied in Japan since 1895 was considered to form the 
more radical group. A small number had been trained in 
the United States and in European countries. These to- 
gether with the former students of the mission colleges seem 
to have been equally earnest in the desire for reform but 
to have advocated more moderate policies. 

Outbreaks, apparently of the usual sporadic sort, occurred 
in the province of Sze-chuan in July, 1911, and at Hankow 
in October. Since it did not, however, prove possible to 
suppress them, the revolutionary movement spread, espe- 
cially in the more southerly provinces. A single official, 
a Chinese not a Manchu, Yuan Shih-kai, had a record 
which marked him out as possibly able to save the country 
and the dynasty in the crisis. Though intrusted by the 
Manchus with all necessary powers, he soon discovered the 
impossibility of preserving either the dynasty or the mon- 
archy. Accordingly, he decided that the welfare of the 
country required that he should come to terms with the 
revolutionary party. As a consequence, on February 12, 
I9gI2, it was announced that the emperor had abdicated, 
leaving authority in the hands of Yuan Shih-kai. At the 
same time Doctor Sun Yat-sen, the revolutionary leader, who 
had a few weeks earlier been elected provisional president 
of the republic, resigned. The revolutionary assembly 
promptly elected Yuan Shih-kai provisional president, and 
one of the revolutionary generals, Li Yuan-hung, vice-presi- 
dent. A republican document was proclaimed as the pro- 
visional constitution. These events, which are usually 
spoken of as the Revolution, constituted, as time has shown, 
the first phase of the revolutionary period. They also 
brought to a close the fifth epoch in the relations with western 
nations, which had been characterized by the Russo-Japanese 
War and its effects. 

The firm establishment of the new government and the 
restoration of order throughout the country proved a slow 
and difficult process. The revolution had wrecked the in- 
ternal financial system and left the new government prac- 
tically without funds. It became necessary, therefore, to 
seek another foreign loan to tide over the period of recon- 


132 THE AWAKENING EAST 


struction. The negotiations were not completed till April, 
1913, when Great Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and 
Japan agreed to furnish the so-called reorganization loan. 
One of the earliest acts of President Wilson’s administra- 
tion was to insist on the withdrawal of the American bank- 
ers from the arrangement on the ground that the conditions 
attached to the loan were infringements upon the admin- 
istrative independence of China. The first parliament of 
the republic met just as the loan negotiations were being 
completed. The majority in the parliament represented the 
revolutionary party and had already become antagonistic 
to the president because of his conservative, if not reaction- 
ary, policy. In spite of the parliamentary attacks and re- 
fusal to sanction the loan, Yuan Shih-kai concluded the 
agreement which supplied him with funds adequate to carry 
out his prograin of reconstruction. A southern revolt in 
protest, supported by Sun Yat-sen, was soon suppressed, 
and Doctor Sun took refuge in Japan. 

In October, 1913, Yuan Shih-kai was elected president 
for a regular term of five years. Soon afterward he ex- 
pelled his opponents from the parliament, and in January 
proclaimed a dissolution. Later the provincial councils were 
also dismissed. A special body was promptly nominated to 
revise the constitution, and in May, 1914, the changes were 
proclaimed. At this point the outbreak of the World War 
seriously modified the conditions under which the recon- 
struction of China was to proceed. Since the close of the 
Russo-Japanese War the movement of international events 
had not seriously affected China, but the drift of things had 
tended to strengthen Japan and to increase its interests and 
influence in China. The situation created by the World War 
gave Japan practically a free hand in the Far East. In 
November, 1914, it seized the German concession of Kiao- 
chao and assumed succession to German interests in Shan- 
tung. The famous “twenty-one demands” of Japan were 
presented in the following January, and in May, 1915, China 
was forced to accede to the major part of them. 

Inconsistency and sudden shifts seem to mark the career 
of Yuan Shih-kai, but careful consideration reveals steadfast 


CHINA 133 


adherence to a policy of seeking the reorganization of the 
country by means of the strongest and most centralized 
government procurable. For this reason he had endeay- 
ored to substitute the republican government for the imperial 
rule with as little break as possible; and later he had dis- 
solved the unruly parliament and eliminated revolutionary 
leaders from power. The movement of internal events had 
transformed his position into a dictatorship; the interven- 
tion of Japan seemed convincing evidence that China needed 
a still stronger government, and Yuan began to plan for a 
restoration of the empire with himself as sovereign. Had 
this plan succeeded, it would have been a reasonably close 
parallel to the circumstances of the establishment of the 
Ming dynasty over five centuries earlier. | 

In November, 1915, a vote was secured naming Yuan as 
emperor, and a month later the revival of the monarchy was 
proclaimed. Thus far the Napoleonic methods worked ad- 
mirably, but at this point the outbreak of widespread revolt 
rendered the plan abortive. Yuan was constrained to an- 
nounce the abandonment of his ambitious plan and to revoke 
all the preliminary edicts which had been issued. He con- 
tinued to cling to power until June, 1916, when he died a 
broken man. For four years Yuan’s rule had held China 
together and maintained internal order, though it had not 
been able to resist the intervention of Japan. This was the 
second phase of the revolutionary era. 

After Yuan’s death the vice-president, Li Yuan-hung, at 
once assumed the presidency, and, true to his original revo- 
lutionary principles, recalled the parliament which had been 
dissolved a year and a half previously. The strong man in 
the administration, however, was the premier, Tuan Chi-jui, 
an adherent of Yuan Shih-kai, whose policies he tried to 
maintain through the changing situations of the ensuing four 
years. For a year events drifted steadily toward a rupture 
between the president, relying upon the support of the revo- 
lutionary element in parliament, and the premier, depend- 
ing upon the aid of the military governors of the provinces. 
The power of the central government at Peking declined 
rapidly and the country came to be more and more at the 


134 THE AWAKENING EAST 


mercy of the provincial military governors, now called 
tuchuns, and of the troops under their commands. 

Again the situation was complicated by the World War. 
In the winter of 1917, when the United States broke off 
diplomatic relations with Germany, pressure was placed 
upon China to follow suit. This it did in March. As soon 
as the United States declared war in April, China was urged 
to take the further step. The prime minister, supported by 
the military governors, was eager for war, as he hoped to 
secure a suspension of the Boxer indemnity. China would 
also be assured a seat at the peace conference and so be 
entitled to present its case with reference to the foreign in- 
fringements of the nation’s sovereignty. The president and 
the parliamentary party wished at least to defer action, for 
they feared that war would afford the military governors 
opportunity to increase their power and defeat the cause of 
parliamentary government. The issues were sharply drawn. 
The president and his followers were accused of yielding to 
German influence, while the premier was charged with de- 
pending upon Japanese support. The rupture came in May, 
1917, when the president refused to yield to the demands 
of Tuan Chi-jui and the tuchuns and dismissed the premier. 
Three troubled and critical months followed. 

Tuan and the tuchuns formed a provisional government at 
Tientsin and began to concentrate troops about Peking. The 
president turned for assistance to an illiterate swashbuckler, 
General Chang Hsun. On reaching Peking the general 
ordered the president to dissolve parliament. On July 1 he 
proclaimed the restoration of the Manchu boy emperor, as 
a cloak for his own dictatorial ambitions. Within three 
weeks Tuan 'Chi-jui, with the support of the tuchuns, over- 
whelmed the impossible Chang Hsun, sent the young em- 
peror back into seclusion, installed the vice-president, Feng 
Kuo-chang, as acting president instead of Li Yuan-hung, 
and resumed the premiership. A month later Premier Tuan 
was able to carry out his purpose of declaring war on Ger- 
many. Following the dissolution of parliament, a consid- 
erable group of the members installed themselves at Canton 
and claimed that they were the only representatives of con- 


CHINA 135 


stitutional authority in the country. This crisis, with the 
establishment of a rival government at Canton and the en- 
trance into the World War, brought to a close the third 
phase of the revolutionary movement. 

The question of the policy to be pursued with reference 
to the revolt in the South promptly produced a breach be- 
tween the acting president and the premier. The former 
favored a policy of conciliation; the latter, as was his habit, 
preferred stronger measures. The premier again forced the 
issue by resigning and appealing to the support of the 
tuchuns. General Chang Tso-lin, a former bandit chief 
who had become super-tuchun of Manchuria, intervened to 
restore Premier Tuan and to support his policy, which the 
acting president was constrained to accept. In order to give a 
color of constitutionality to his proceedings, Tuan Chi-jui, 
following the precedent established by his exemplar, Yuan 
Shih-kai, created a new body to revise the constitution again. 
The consequent changes were proclaimed in February, 1918, 
a new parliament was chosen, and a new president, Hsu 
Shih-chang, elected, who was installed on the anniversary 
of the revolution, October 10, 1918. The new administra- 
tion took a conciliatory attitude toward the southern revolt, 
arranged an armistice, and carried on prolonged but futile 
negotiations for reunification of the nation. 

When China declared war on Germany the Allied powers 
suspended payments due them on the Boxer indemnity and 
made promises of other measures advantageous to the Chi- 
nese. The action of the United States, in November, 1917, 
in entering into the Lansing-Ishii agreement with Japan, 
ostensibly guaranteed the open-door policy but actually 
recognized Japan’s special interest in China. It was to prove 
the forerunner of President Wilson’s ultimate concession 
to Japan on the Shantung question at the peace conference. 

China’s participation in the World War involved no direct 
military action, but thousands of coolies were sent to France, 
where their work behind the lines was of valuable assistance. 
To meet the situation in Asia created by the seizure of the 
control of the Russian government by the bolshevists in 
November, 1917, Japan entered into a secret agreement with 


136 THE AWAKENING EAST 


the Peking government in the following March which was 
renewed a year later. This agreement furnished a basis for 
charges of pro-Japanese attitude brought against the admin- 
istration of President Hsu and Premier Tuan. It was also 
alleged that large sums of Japanese money were expended 
in China to promote the continuance of unsettled conditions 
and so permit the strengthening of Japanese hold on the 
country. In any case there was at this time a remarkable 
increase of Japanese activities in China and its outlying 
provinces. 

Whatever may have been the actual sympathies or pur- 
poses of the Peking government, public opinion in the coun- 
try, so far as it existed, looked to the peace conference at 
Paris to secure relief from all impairments of the national 
sovereignty and recognition of full equality in the society 
of nations, This was considered the logical outcome from 
the principle of the self-determination of peoples. When it 
became apparent that the treaty would recognize Japan’s 
position in Kiao-chao and Shantung there swept over China 
a tremendous wave of strikes and boycotts directed against 
the Japanese and their goods. So vehement was this protest 
that the Peking government was constrained to refuse to 
permit its representatives to sign the treaty of Versailles 
in June, 1919. Positive action in protection of national in- 
terests was prevented by the conflict between North and 
South, by the general administrative disintegration, and by 
the actual strength of Japan’s position in the country. 

Over a year elapsed after the signature of the treaty of 
Versailles without any significant change in the domestic 
or international situation of China. Dissatisfaction with 
Premier Tuan Chi-jui and his supporters known as the 
Anhwei party? increased and denunciations of them as sub- 
servient to Japan constantly grew louder. Finally in July, 
1920, the northern tuchuns felt constrained to permit Gen- 
eral Wu Pei-fu, one of the few high military officials ac- 
ceptable to the reform party, to drive Premier Tuan and 
his Anhwei adherents from office. The triumph of the 


*Also known as the An-fu (Anhwei-Fukien) party. 


CHINA 137 


anti-Japanese movement in the expulsion of Tuan Chi-jui, 
who had been’ the most important personage in the govern- 
ment since the death of Yuan Shih-kai, closed another 
phase, the fourth, of the revolutionary period. 

General Wu Pei-fu and the reformers were not yet 
destined to acquire control. The northern tuchuns, Chang 
Tso-lin of Manchuria and Tsao Kun of Chi-li, the province 
around Peking, did not relax their grip upon the situation. 
President Hsu, with a new cabinet, continued in office, but 
his tenure was at the discretion of the tuchuns. The gov- 
ernment took two actions of international importance in 
the ensuing year. China now gave its adhesion to the League 
of Nations, and in December, 1920, was elected to the coun- 
cil of the League. In May, 1921, a separate treaty of peace 
with Germany was signed. This included one notable ad- 
vantage for China, as Germany renounced its claim to the 
privilege of extra-territoriality in return for a guarantee of 
trial for any of its subjects in accordance with modern law 
in courts of modern type. The main occupations of the 
government, however, were fruitless negotiations over for- 
eign loans, the funding, in February, 1921, of numerous 
domestic obligations by an internal loan guaranteed on the 
proceeds of the wine and tobacco taxes, and the relations 
with the rival southern government at Canton. 

The revolutionary party, which had maintained some pre- 
tense of a government at Canton since 1916, formally pro- 
claimed it the only legitimate government of the republic 
of China and elected. Doctor Sun Yat-sen as president. 
Doctor Sun was born in 1867 of a Christian father and re- 
ceived his degree in medicine from the college in Hong 
Kong. While practicing his profession in Canton in 1895 
he took part in a revolutionary plot and was forced to flee 
the country. He resided for varying periods in Hawaii, 
the United States, England, and Japan, but everywhere de- 
voted himself to his revolutionary policies. When the revo- 
lution broke out in 1911 he hurried back to China and was 
promptly elected provisional president of the republic. He 
retired in favor of Yuan Shih-kai, with whom he codperated 
for a time, especially promoting an elaborate project for a 


138 THE AWAKENING EAST 


national railway system. In 1913 he was identified with the 
abortive revolt and took refuge in Japan, but in 1916 became 
the leading figure in the establishment of the revolutionary 
government at Canton. Whatever other judgment may be 
passed upon his career at Canton, it must be recognized 
that the city has profited greatly from the extensive ma- 
terial improvements and the administrative reorganization 
which he inaugurated. 

It can hardly be doubted that Doctor Sun is absolutely 
sincere in his republicanism,.his liberal ideas, and his loyalty 
to the national interests of China. His behavior has often 
appeared, rightly or wrongly, as equivocal, especially his 
attitude toward Japan and other powers. Most observers 
consider him an idealist with no gifts as an administrator 
or statesman. His career bears some analogy to that of 
Samuel Adams, though the points of similarity between the 
two are extremely few. It is perhaps a fair judgment to 
say that he holds unwaveringly to his main principles, but 
in order to gain success for them he is ready to try many 
shifts. His actual experience in governmental responsibility 
has not been large enough to afford a fair basis for judg- 
ment. Events have repeatedly shown his inability to con- 
trol the military situation in the South; indeed it has more 
than once been turned to his disadvantage, as in his expul- 
sion from Canton in the summer of 1922. In spite of all 
that may be said to his disadvantage, it seems clear that far 
beyond any other individual he commands the admiration 
and the confidence of loyal and intelligent Chinese through- 
out the country. 

The relations between the Peking and Canton govern- 
ments must not be thought of as at all comparable to the 
relations of rigorous hostility and unremitting warfare be- 
tween the North and the South in the United States during 
the Civil War. The North and the South in China represent 
respectively the solidly conservative and the distinctly lib- 
eral party types, but in revolutionary China it is the fashion 
to utilize retainers armed with rifles to support political 
policies. Each party type is prevalent but not dominant in 
its respective section. There are no sharply drawn lines, 


CHINA 139 


geographical, political, or military. Military activities, in- 
deed, are often so perfunctory as to suggest marionette 
maneuvers; sometimes they degenerate into banditry; again 
they attain to the dignity of political processions. The war 
in China is not so much a civil war as a fronde—a sling-shot 
war. In the autumn of 1921 the continuance of the Peking 
government seemed due to inertia rather than to any active 
support. It still enjoyed exclusive recognition by the for- 
eign powers, in accordance with their policy dating from 
the time of the Taiping rebellion. Such support as the 
Canton government received was due to the active interest 
of the liberal element in the nation. On both sides were 
to be found many whose chief aims were money and office. 

Such was the situation when it became known that a con- 
ference which would consider Pacific and Far Eastern ques- 
tions was to meet in Washington in November, 1921, and 
that China was to be among the participating powers. The 
Peking government realized its responsibility for represent- 
ing the interests of China as a whole regardless of partisan 
warfare, and set itself to secure the fullest possible presen- 
tation of China’s case and to seek to remove every impair- 
ment of the nation’s sovereignty. The outlook for success 
was far from bright, but the results were surprisingly ad- 
vantageous. 

The strictly conference actions gave treaty sanction in 
the most specific terms to the policy of the open door and 
provided for moderate readjustment of the tariff duties, for 
the abolition of the likin or provincial duties to be replaced 
by a customs surtax, and for periodical revision of the tariff 
duties. The conference also adopted resolutions providing 
for the discontinuance of the foreign post offices in China, 
for the elimination of foreign radio stations, for the with- 
drawal of foreign troops stationed in China, and for the 
creation of a commission to study the question of the 
abolition of the privilege of extra-territoriality, which it 
was recognized should take place as soon as Chinese laws 
and tribunals were qualified to handle cases of foreigners 
satisfactorily. 

The question of Japan’s position in Kiao-chao and Shan- 


140 THE AWAKENING EAST 


tung became the subject of direct negotiations between the 
two countries under the friendly offices of the United States 
and Great Britain. The result was a treaty providing 
for the complete withdrawal of Japan from political, mili- 
tary, and railway interests* in Shantung and for the surren- 
der of the leasehold of Kiao-chao. This action was accom- 
panied by declarations from Great Britain and France that 
they would, under certain conditions, surrender their leases 
to Wei-hai-wei and Kwangchow-wan. 

The conference arrangements did not affect the status 
of the outlying provinces of Manchuria, Mongolia, Chinese 
Turkestan, and Tibet, but they promised to free all territory 
of China proper from actual foreign control, except Macao 
under Portuguese jurisdiction, Hong Kong including Kow- 
loon under British authority, and the foreign concessions 
in Shanghai and certain other ports.5 The action of the con- 
ference terminated the period in which the carving out of 
spheres of influence or even the partition of China by for- 
eign powers had been impending. The continuance of the 
conventional tariff and of the port concessions and the 
failure to secure the prompt and definite termination of 
extra-territoriality were serious disappointments to China, 
as they were felt to be not merely impairments of the na- 
tional sovereignty but also marks of the inferiority of China 
to other powers. On the other hand the conditions prevail- 
ing in China were abundant justification for the refusal of 
the foreign powers to make concession on these matters at 
the time. It is even doubtful whether it would have been 
a kindness to China if the powers had yielded to these 
demands. 

The more important of these agreements arrived at in 
Washington have already been carried out, but some await 
the ratification of the treaties. It must be acknowledged 
that the events and conditions in China since the adjourn- 


“The transfer of the railway is subject to complicated provisions 
concerning financial compensations and control of operation. 

*The French conditions with regard to Kwangchow-wan, how- 
ever, were such that there is little likelihood of its restoration to 
China in the near future. 


CHINA 141 


ment of the Washington conference have thrown doubt 
upon the wisdom of the concessions accorded and have of- 
fered no encouragement for further consideration. Nothing 
was accomplished at the conference or has been done since 
to straighten out the financial situation aside from the pro- 
visions for tariff adjustments. China stands as a defaulter 
of both principal and interest on certain loans, and yet re- 
fuses to make any new loan agreement on terms acceptable 
to foreign bankers because it is feared that the terms would 
infringe the national independence. 

Ever since Russia had acquired the Amur provinces from 
China in 1858, the activities of that nation in the outlying 
provinces of the empire had given serious concern not 
merely to China but also to other powers. This situation be- 
came even more annoying after the bolshevists came into 
power in 1917 and was further complicated by the establish- 
ment of the Far Eastern Republic in eastern Siberia. While 
it is impossible to give a precise narrative of the situation 
in each area, it is clear that in Chinese Turkestan, in Mon- 
golia—especially outer or western Mongolia, and in north- 
ern Manchuria, Russia has been very active and has se- 
riously weakened such control as China has claimed to 
exercise in these regions. In southern Manchuria and in 
inner or eastern Mongolia, Japanese penetration has been 
at least equally serious. The outlying provinces are mainly 
inhabited by Mongolian peoples of different nationalities 
from the Chinese but related to them. These sparsely set- 
tled and undeveloped areas are the natural field for the ex- 
pansion of the crowded population of China proper. Bol- 
shevist intrigue has also extended into China proper. At 
one time Doctor Sun Yat-sen was said to have made terms 
with the bolshevists on behalf of his Canton government, 
and it is certain that one of the most active bolshevist 
agents, Adolf Joffe, was in Peking in 1922. 

At the close of 1921, while the Washington conference 
was in session, General Chang Tso-lin, super-tuchun of Man- 
churia, finally made bold to enter Peking and to exert more 
direct influence upon the government. A new cabinet under 
the premiership of a prominent financier, Liang Shih-yi, 


142 THE AWAKENING EAST 


was installed. Apparently this move was taken in anticipa- 
tion of pecuniary as well as political advantages from the 
Washington conference. Another motive may have been 
to head off new activities of the reforming element, though 
one rumor at the time was to the contrary effect—that there 
was a rapprochement between General Chang and Doctor 
Sun. In any case, General Wu Pei-fu, who had become 
practically master of the Yang-tse valley and who was 
looked upon by the reforming party as the military leader 
most sympathetic with their aims, was not slow in respond- 
ing to the challenge and marched toward Peking. After 
some months of political and military maneuvering, the 
crisis culminated in severe fighting near Peking. General 
Chang was signally defeated and forced to withdraw into 
Manchuria, where he has since attempted to maintain a 
more or less independent attitude. As a result of his vic- 
tory, General Wu, in June, 1922, forced President Hsu 
Shih-chang into retirement and recalled ex-President Li 
Yuan-hung to office. With the successful conclusion of 
the Washington conference and the triumph of General Wu 
Pei-fu, the supporter of constitutional union, there ended 
the fifth phase of the revolutionary epoch. This date 
also closed the sixth period in the international relations of 
China, which had been characterized by the World War and 
the activities of Japan. 

General Wu was anxious to put into effect his policy of 
establishing a constitutional regime and reuniting the coun- 
try. Doctor Sun, who had already been in friendly com- 
munication with General ‘Wu, was at this juncture in the 
summer of 1922 driven from Canton by one of his own 
generals. Nevertheless the Peking government continued 
to seek his cooperation. Through his influence those mem- 
bers of parliament who had withdrawn to Canton six years 
before returned to Peking and resumed sessions with the 
other members of the original parliament, who were like- 
wise recalled. The opportunity was propitious for the es- 
tablishment of a real parliamentary government, but the 
members showed that, since their original meeting, they had 
acquired no added sense of their political responsibilities. 


CHINA 143 


With a soldier’s instinct, General Wu desired to establish 
a strongly centralized administration as the best means of 
restoring unity and peace to the country. President Li, 
however, who viewed the situation rather as a politician, 
favored a federated system. To the failure of parliament 
to rise above petty politics and to the disagreement between 
the president and his Warwick there was added a third mis- 
fortune. The western-trained Chinese of the younger gen- 
eration, especially those who had been educated in America, 
had looked to General Wu as the prospective national re- 
deemer. Quite naturally several of these men were soon 
appointed to cabinet office, where they promptly became the 
targets for bitter attacks from all the conservative and re- 
actionary elements. 

The first attack was directed against the finance minister, 
Lo Wen-kan, who had effected a revision of a pre-war loan 
with German bankers on terms that were apparently dis- 
tinctly advantageous to China and had applied the savings 
to the handling of certain railway bonds. Another indis- 
cretion was the publication of a report on the financial situa- 
tion in the matter both of debt and of current budget, which 
was, in character and effect, quite comparable to Necker’s 
famous Compte Rendu. On trial the minister was acquitted, 
but he had been forced out of office. The premier, Wang 
Chung-hui, who had studied at Yale University, and the 
foreign minister, Wellington Koo, a graduate of Columbia 
University, were next driven from office and prosecuted. 
The factious nature of the opposition was made even 
clearer a little later when parliament confirmed all the new 
cabinet nominations except that of Dr. Alfred Sze to be 
minister of foreign affairs. Sze was a graduate of Cornell 
University and had rendered to his country no less distin- 
guished services than his junior, Dr. Koo. The action of 
parliament in these cases is said to have been managed by 
members under the influence of Tsao Kun, the tuchun of 
Chi-li, in opposition to General Wu. 

Thus far, however, General Wu continues to dominate 
the military situation and Peking is still garrisoned by his 
subordinate, the famous Christian general, Feng Yu-hsiang, 


144 THE AWAKENING EAST 


with his troops, which have been compared to Cromwell’s 
Ironsides.6 This comparison is only one of many that may 
be made between the situation in England during the period 
from the execution of Charles I in 1649 to the restoration 
of Charles II in 1660, and affairs in China since the over- 
throw of the Manchu dynasty in 1911. Other comparisons 
may be made with conditions and events in the French Revo- 
lution, and still others in the American Revolution, espe- 
cially in the period between the close of the war with Eng- 
land and the adoption of the constitution. 

Having traced the history of western intercourse with 
China and its effect upon the nation, especially in political 
matters, we must next inquire to what extent the western 
developments known as the industrial revolution have af- 
fected the economic conditions of the Chinese. Even as late 
as a century ago a careful observer would have noted no 
marked difference between the material progress of China 
and that of the nations of continental Europe. The tre- 
mendous transformation wrought by the industrial revolu- 
tion had then measurably affected no country except Eng- 
land. For three quarters of a century China deliberately 
remained stationary while western nations forged ahead. 
It is only within the last quarter century that China has, to 
any considerable degree, yielded to the introduction of mod- 
ern inventions and the consequent changes in the methods 
of life and work. 

China has always been and is still primarily an agricul- 
tural nation, for its first attention must be given to feeding 
its teeming millions. Such an enormous population could 
exist only in a land with an extensive fertile area. Until 
very recently the agricultural output has been almost ex- 
clusively food products intended for consumption within 
the country. The two articles of primary importance have 
long been rice and tea. ‘Cattle have been scarce except as 
work animals. The people have therefore had little meat 
except pork for food, but have depended instead upon fowl 
and fish. Tea was eagerly sought by the early traders from 
the West, but since about 1885 the exports have fallen off 


*For later developments, see below, pages 164, 166. 


CHINA 145 


rapidly as the Chinese have failed to meet the requirements 
of western trade, which has come to depend mainly upon the 
teas of India and Ceylon. In the last decade beans, bean 
products, and eggs have become important items in China’s 
export trade. Though the importation of opium and the 
cultivation of the poppy had been almost suppressed a dozen 
years ago, both the importation and the cultivation have 
again attained serious proportions. 

Silk culture probably originated in China and is still one 
of the most important industries of the country. The ex- 
port trade in silk seemed likely to suffer, as had that of 
tea, because of failure to maintain the quality of the output, 
but within the last few years there has been a distinct change 
for the better. The agricultural departments of two mission 
institutions, the University of Nanking and Canton Christian 
College, have undertaken to furnish eggs free from disease 
for silkworm culture, and to aid in other ways to improve 
the quality of the silk produced. The cultivation of cotton 
has been extended so that China has become, next to the 
United States and India, the greatest cotton-growing 
country. 

No country has suffered more from the destruction of its 
forests. Reforestation and the systematic employment of 
scientific forestry are among the greatest needs of the coun- 
try. The vast coastal plain of eastern China has long been 
subject to floods that work havoc both to life and to the soil. 
Reforestation would undoubtedly prove an important 
method of flood-prevention. On the other hand, other 
areas suffer from occasional or perennial drought, and so 
require the development of irrigation. 

Owing either to flood or drought or to blight, crop failures, 
with consequent famine, are of almost constant occurrence 
in larger or smaller areas. Occasionally the disaster ts wide- 
spread and affects millions of the population, as in the case 
of a large part of Shantung and portions of adjacent prov- 
inces in 1920-21, when the cause was flood. Though the 
Chinese have always struggled with the problem, the Shan- 
tung famine furnished the first illustration of the extensive 
application of modern scientific methods both to famine 


146 THE AWAKENING EAST 


relief and to measures of prevention. It has been estimated 
that a complete system of engineering works for the control 
of the rivers of China would not only solve the problems of 
flood-prevention and of irrigation but would also result in 
the reclamation of sufficient waste land to pay for the enor- 
mous cost of the undertaking. Probably no other single 
enterprise is more essential to the future welfare of China. 
Disastrous experiences through the centuries have shown 
that the lives of the people are absolutely dependent upon it. 

China is a land of vast mineral wealth which has been 
only slightly exploited. It is believed that easily available 
supplies of coal, iron, and copper are adequate for the fullest 
industrial development of the country for generations. 
Though some of the mines have probably been worked 
continuously for a longer period than any others in the 
world, mining operations by modern methods are only in 
their beginnings and the output is still inconsiderable. China 
is, however, the chief source for antimony and is also one 
of the largest producers of tin. Some oil fields are being 
developed. 

Chinese artisans have displayed remarkable skill in many 
sorts of manufacturing under the old-time domestic system. 
The implements or machines used are few and simple. 
The hand-loom is still employed in the chief industry, silk- 
weaving. In Shanghai and some other places there are 
filatures operated with power machinery and factories where 
silk-weaving is done with power-looms. Cotton goods, 
especially towels and coarser fabrics, are being manufactured 
in Canton and in several towns around Shanghai. There 
are match factories at Canton and elsewhere ; glass works are 
to be found in many places; and flour-milling is perhaps 
the most rapidly developing industry. At Hanyang, near 
Hankow, iron works are in successful operation. These 
developments of manufacturing by power-driven machinery 
have meant the introduction of the factory system with 
capitalism and wage-working. In most cases the capital 
and management is foreign’; the labor is native, largely 


"Since the World War, however, native capital and management 
have been increasingly responsible for the extension of factories. 


CHINA 147 


women and children. Many of the evils which have cus- 
tomarily accompanied the beginnings of the factory system 
are unfortunately to be found in China, but efforts are be- 
ing made to prevent serious abuses, and some of the fac- 
tories are admirably constructed and managed. 

Next to a system of river control, already discussed, 
China’s greatest need is for adequate means of transporta- 
tion and communication. At the beginning of the nine- 
teenth century conditions in China were certainly not in- 
ferior to those of Europe. In one particular China was in 
advance of Europe, for it had a more extensive system of 
canals. The vast number of native junks engaged in coast- 
wise shipping has been supplemented by a steadily increasing 
steamer service, which was, until recently, entirely under 
foreign ownership and management. Navigable rivers, 
lakes, and canals afford satisfactory service to considerable 
sections of the country, and on these the introduction of 
steamboats has begun. 

Good roads have been scarce, but recently metaled roads 
of modern type have been constructed near some of the 
chief ports. In these ports many streets have been widened 
and paved with asphalt. These improvements have been co- 
incident with the introduction of trolley cars, auto-buses, 
and private automobiles. In these and other municipal im- 
provements the lead has naturally been taken by Canton, 
Shanghai and Tientsin. The use of the jinrikisha, it must 
be remembered, is almost a novelty, having been introduced 
in most cases since 1900, and in some cases only within a 
few years. 

The most obvious improvement in means of transporta- 
tion is the construction of railways, effected mainly since 
1900. In China proper there are now approximately five 
thousand miles of railroad. If the mileage bore the same 
proportion to area as in the United States, China would re- 
quire at least one hundred and twenty-five thousand miles. 
Most of the lines have been constructed with more or less 
foreign aid, but they are now under government control. 
The construction has usually been well done and the roads 
have, at least until recently, been well operated. The line 


148 THE AWAKENING EAST 


from Peking to Kalgan was built by a Chinese engineer and 
is an excellent piece of work. 

China needs a great extension of its railways as an im- 
portant safeguard against famine, as a means of transport- 
ing the output of the mines, as a means to the development 
of every form of commerce, and most of all as a means to- 
ward solving the political problem. National unity is de- 
pendent upon quick, cheap, and easy communication between 
the peoples of all sections of the country. The efficiency 
of the central government. is dependent upon its means of 
communication with all parts of the country both that its 
action may be based on information and that its will may be 
enforced. 

A comprehensive plan for a civil aviation service through- 
out the country is under consideration, and some beginnings 
have been made. An imperial postal service conducted with 
modern methods was inaugurated in 1897 in connection with 
the maritime customs service. Since 1911 it has been under 
direct government management through the ministry of com- 
munications, and in 1914 China became a member of the 
Universal Postal Union. The postal service has been ex- 
tended throughout the empire and already operates more 
than ten thousand offices; it is well managed and the use 
of its facilities is increasing rapidly. The telegraph system 
is also under the ministry of communications and main- 
tains over fifty thousand miles of lines connecting all the 
principal cities. It is being supplemented by wireless service, 
which is to be extended even to the outlying provinces. Tele- 
phones are in use in the chief cities, and plans are being 
made to install long distance service. 

The conduct of both public and private business is largely 
dependent upon a satisfactory medium of exchange. Though 
much study has been given to the problem by the Chinese 
assisted by western experts, the country still lacks a prop- 
erly standardized monetary system and a uniform cur- 
rency, either metallic or paper. Such currency as exists is 
on a silver basis. For over a half century fluctuations in 
the value of silver have disturbed the monetary systems of 
the world. China did not follow other nations in the 


CHINA 149 


adoption of the gold standard as a remedy, and since the 
close of the World War has consequently suffered severely 
from the wide and sudden fluctuations in exchange. Such 
uncertainty in values added to unsettled political conditions 
has been a serious damper on the development of new eco- 
nomic enterprises of any sort in China in recent years. 

A sound and uniform banking system is another essential 
to the proper conduct of a nation’s business. China con- 
tinues largely dependent upon foreign banking institutions, 
though there are the Bank of China and the Bank of Com- 
munications, in which the government is a partner, and nu- 
merous private banks. Since 1918 there has been a great 
increase in the number of Chinese private banking cor- 
porations, partly due to the extraordinary opportunity of- 
fered by the fluctuations in exchange for the indulgence of 
the gambling instinct. Of better omen has been the intro- 
duction within the same period of savings banks and of a 
postal savings system. 

It can hardly be doubted that China is actually as well 
as potentially a country of great wealth. Its business meth- 
ods have not yet, however, become adjusted to the corporate 
form, such as joint-stock companies, for the conduct of 
business enterprises on the large scale necessary in modern 
mining, manufacturing, railroading, and other commercial 
activities. The progress in banking affairs may be regarded 
as preparatory to fuller participation of the Chinese them- 
selves in the organization and conduct of their large business 
undertakings. 

Because of the wide fluctuations in exchange and other 
unusual conditions it is impossible to furnish statistics of 
the commerce of China in the last decade from which any 
conclusions may safely be deduced. It seems clear, however, 
that there has been no considerable increase in imports but 
a distinct increase in exports. In view of the disturbed 
political and financial conditions, this expansion of trade is 
obviously gratifying. That imports have not increased is 
in part due to the decline in the importation of articles, such 
as cotton goods, flour, and matches, which China has begun 
to manufacture. The increase in exports is in agricultural 


150 THE AWAKENING EAST 


products, especially beans and bean products and eggs. The 
largest items on the import list are cotton goods, metals, 
petroleum products, cigarettes, and tobacco. Silk and silk 
goods head the list of exports, followed by beans and bean 
products, tea, tin, and various agricultural products. Owing 
to the extensive trade through Hong Kong, really accurate 
figures on the nation’s trade cannot be obtained, but in 1920 it 
is estimated that 28 per cent of the trade of China was with 
Japan, 18 per cent with the British Empire, and 16 per cent 
with the United States. In the same year 2% per cent of 
the trade of the United States was with China. 

The financial administration of the empire was broken 
down by the revolution in 1911, and since the death of Yuan 
Shih-kai, in 1916, the conditions have become increasingly 
chaotic. The receipts from the maritime customs and from 
the gabelle, or salt tax, are pledged for meeting the charges 
on foreign loans. Similarly the receipts from the wine and 
tobacco taxes are allocated for the charges on the recently 
consolidated internal loan. Only the surplus income from 
these sources is available to the central government for gen- 
eral expenses. The same is true of the receipts from the 
government railway, telegraph, and postal services. In ad- 
dition there should accrue to the central government the 
receipts from a land tax, from stamp taxes, from the likin 
or provincial customs, and from minor duties. In recent 
years, the military governors have appropriated to their 
own purposes, especially the maintenance of their troops, 
a large part of the revenues collected in the provinces which 
should accrue to the national treasury. 

The central government has consequently been reduced 
to serious financial straits, so much so that it has not even 
been able to meet the engagements connected with the for- 
eign loans or to pay the salaries of government employees. 
The framing of a budget seems to have been abandoned as 
futile since 1919, when the estimates totaled less than 500,- 
000,000 dollars Mexican, which is roughly equivalent to 
$300,000,000 gold—or less than one dollar per capita. It is 
even impossible to get authoritative figures for the amount of 
the national debt, but, accepting the highest estimate, it is less 


CHINA ISI 


than $1,200,000,000 gold.8 The per capita debt is therefore 
less than four dollars and possibly as low as three dollars, 
which compares with a burden of fifteen dollars per capita 
carried by the United States at the beginning of Washing- 
ton’s administration and of over $200 at present. 

There is no suggestion that China is unable to bear the 
burden of its debt and of the current needs of its govern- 
ment. Neither is there serious question of the ability of 
the Chinese to handle their own finances. The difficulties 
are two: the powerlessness of the central government and 
the deep-seated practice of “squeeze.” In public and private 
business alike it is the custom for each individual who is 
a party to a transaction to compensate himself with a cer- 
tain percentage of the amount involved. The practice is 
entirely comprehensible and not inherently dishonest, but 
it is a bad system and is open to flagrant corruption. Its 
elimination is absolutely prerequisite to the sound organ- 
ization and healthy conduct of government business. The 
Chinese can be honest, efficient, and disinterested, but they 
need to learn that no other conduct is tolerable in public 
office. 

Perhaps nowhere have the Chinese officials appeared to 
better advantage than in the modernization of the legal and 
judicial systems. The beginning was made in the closing 
years of Manchu rule, and in 1912 one of the first acts of 
the republic was the proclamation of the new criminal 
code. This has since been revised; codes of criminal pro- 
cedure and of civil procedure have also been drafted; and 
civil and commercial codes are in preparation. The French 
codes have furnished the model for the work, though the 
substance is essentially Chinese. 

Torture and other evils have been abolished. There is 
a supreme court which sits in six divisions—four civil and 
two criminal—and there is a system of inferior courts. In 
view of the disturbed political state of the country the 
progress in legal and judicial reform has been gratifying. 
~ * The official computation of the public debt at 2,355,570,840 dollars 


silver, given out in April, 1924, shows the substantial accuracy of 
this estimate. 


152 THE AWAKENING EAST 


Courts have been permitted to function, as in Canton, un- 
disturbed by civic and military turmoil and overturns. 
Prison reform has also been undertaken, and there are 
already a fair number of modern prisons. 

Confucianism remains under the republic, as it had been 
for twenty-five centuries, the ethical and moral system of the 
nation. Twice under the republic propositions to declare 
Confucianism the state religion have failed to secure ap- 
proval. It has no priesthood. Its spirit is distinctly na- 
tional and conservative, and intellectual rather than spiritual. 
There are two other great religions in China, Taoism, which 
is indigenous, and Buddhism, which was brought from India 
in the first century of the Christian era. These are both 
ritualistic and each has its priesthood. ‘With the Chinese 
these three religions are not mutually exclusive, but mu- 
tually complementary and regularly professed and practiced 
alike by most of the population. The essential element in 
Chinese religion is the pious performance of the family rites, 
or ancestor worship, as it is called. Mohammedans and 
Christians each number a few millions, and they are both 
to be found in almost every section of the country. The 
progress of Christianity, especially of the Protestant mis- 
sions, has been very rapid since 1900. The number of 
Protestant communicants has been trebled within a score 
of years. Religious toleration is guaranteed under the con- 
stitution of the republic. 

Education has always had a prominent place in the life 
of China, and for centuries government officials have been 
systematically drawn from the educated class. Neverthe- 
less the mass of the people of China has remained illiterate. 
The situation has been revolutionized by the introduction 
of the western type of education. The beginnings were due 
to mission schools and to a small number of Chinese edu- 
cated in ‘Christian lands. Less than thirty years ago the 
earliest efforts outside the mission schools were made to 
establish educational institutions in China to teach the mod- 
ern subjects in accordance with western methods; for in- 
stance, the beginnings of the National University in Peking 
date from 1898. The decree of 1905 abolishing the old 


CHINA 153 


system of examinations for public office gave tremendous 
impetus to the introduction of modern learning. 

With the establishment of the republic in 1912 immediate 
measures were taken by the government to give the nation 
a fully organized modern educational system. Since that 
date schools of every grade and type have been established 
with remarkable rapidity in every part of the country. The 
disturbed political situation has prevented the completion of 
the plan as rapidly as had been proposed. Progress has 
been largely determined by local conditions, so that some 
provinces are still very backward while others, like Shansi 
which, under the rule of General Yen Hsi-shan, is consid- 
ered a model province in this and other respects, have 
achieved most gratifying results. 

At the head stand several national and private universities, 
then come the middle schools, the higher: primary and the 
lower primary schools. There are numerous normal and 
higher normal schools, professional, technical, and vocational 
schools. The attendance is at the limit of capacity and the 
standards of work are well maintained. The latest statistics 
indicate a total of one hundred and thirty-four thousand 
schools of all grades with an attendance of four million five 
hundred thousand pupils. This is a satisfactory beginning, 
but it represents less than ten per cent of a national 
system proportionate to the situation in the United States. 
It is gratifying to observe the practical character of the 
movement. Suitable attention is being given to the estab- 
lishment of normal schools to train teachers, law schools to 
prepare judicial officers, technical schools for engineers, 
medical schools for physicians, and also commercial and ag- 
ricultural schools. Thus the Chinese are endeavoring to 
provide for their nation properly trained men for all the 
professions and occupations necessary to meet the demands 
of modern life. 

The mission colleges and schools are continuing to in- 
crease in number and efficiency, and exercise a potent influ- 
ence on the whole educational development. One field is pe- 
culiarly their own—the training for Christian leadership. 
Of immense significance is the radical change of attitude 


154 THE AWAKENING EAST 


with regard to the education of women. Under the new sys- 
tem they are allowed equal opportunities with the men, and 
they are showing remarkable readiness and ability to avail 
themselves of the privileges. Excepting the spread of Chris- 
tianity, there is no single movement destined to have so 
far-reaching effects in the national life as the education of 
the women. Western education has also involved the intro- 
duction of athletics, which have a healthy influence not 
merely in cultivating physical well-being but also in creat- 
ing a sense of good sportsmanship. 

The growth of nationalism and the promotion of a general 
system of education have directed attention to the question 
of language. It is recognized that national unity practically 
requires that the diversity of dialects shall be replaced by 
one form of the spoken language used and understood by 
everyone throughout the nation. Naturally the tendency is 
to promote the general use of mandarin, which is already 
most widely spoken and has a sort of official standing. The 
process of adjustment will necessarily be slow and will de- 
pend largely upon the spread of education and the extension 
of the means of communication. 

The question of the literary or written form of the lan- 
guage is even more difficult. For ordinary use three thou- 
sand to four thousand characters are said to be necessary, 
and for scholarly purposes the number of characters re- 
quired is estimated at more than twenty-five thousand. 
These facts constitute an almost insuperable barrier to the 
education of the masses. Much study has consequently 
been given to the problem of simplification of the written 
language. In 1913 a phonetic system of thirty-nine letters 
was devised, which has since received official approval. It 
is expected that this alphabet will aid in unifying the spoken 
dialects, in the study of the regular characters, and in the 
education of the masses. There is also a strong movement 
for the use of the vernacular as a literary vehicle instead of 
the classical form of the language. Though this reform was 
launched only a few years ago its steady progress has al- 
ready stamped it as one of the most characteristic and 
potentially influential manifestations of the time. 


CHINA 155 


The growth of the Chinese periodical press has been one 
of the most significant facts under the republic. Prior to 
the revolution in 1911 there were about two hundred period- 
icals published in Chinese, now the number exceeds one thou- 
sand. Daily papers are published in every important city. 
Shanghai is said to have more than eighty newspapers, and 
Peking and Tientsin together more than a hundred. The 
publication of books and pamphlets is also conducted on an 
extensive scale. The reading public is increasing rapidly, 
but it must be borne in mind that the public reached by the 
content of the printed page is very considerably greater 
than the number of actual readers. Naturally the western- 
trained Chinese control a disproportionate share of the 
periodical press; the press is distinctly the instrument of the 
younger and progressive generation. The newspapers pub- 
lished in English, French, and Japanese for the foreign com- 
munities are numerous and in general of fairly high stand- 
ard, so that they exercise a wholesome influence. 

The educational movement is expressing itself not only 
through the press but also in various practical measures for 
the material, social, and political welfare. In addition to 
such matters as municipal improvements and new methods 
in agriculture which have already been noted, attention is 
given to questions of sanitation and public health. It is true 
that there are no such obvious results as those obtained by 
the wholesale measures enforced by the British in Egypt 
and India or even more fully by the Americans in the Philip- 
pines. None the less, foreign precept and example are 
making an impression, for the development of medical edu- 
cation and the remarkable extension of hospitals and clinics 
are evidences of a better day. The work done by the Red 
Cross in China has resulted not merely in the direct saving 
of many lives, but also in exerting a widespread and whole- 
some influence. 

Social reforms are accomplished slowly. The tyranny of 
superstition and of custom is difficult to overcome. The 
Chinese are apparently more conservative than either the 
Indians or the Japanese; for instance, they much less readily 
adopt western dress. Considering the circumstances, the 


156 THE AWAKENING EAST 


progress toward the abolition of the queue, of foot-binding, 
and of opium-smoking has been remarkable. Less notice- 
able, perhaps, but no less genuine and distinctly more im- 
portant, have been the improvements in the status of women, 
greater attention to child welfare, and modifications in the 
marriage customs and in the family life. Probably the most 
fundamental difference between the East and the West is 
in the status of women. Whether one attributes that differ- 
ence to Christianity or to democracy or to individualism or 
to all three, there will be general agreement that improve- 
ment in the position and condition of women is the truest 
test of modernization in the Fast. 

It remains to inquire what is the real nature of the transi- 
tion through which China is passing, and what the probable 
outcome is to be. The student of Chinese history naturally 
compares the situation with the previous overturns of dynas- 
ties, of which there have been more than twenty in the four 
thousand years of the nation’s history, and argues that the 
country will sooner or later come safely through this time as 
it has before. This case, however, is different, for it is not 
a substitution of one dynasty for another, it is the replacing 
of the monarchy by a new form of government. Almost 
every observer familiar with the situation, regardless of per- 
sonal belief or sympathy, recognizes that the monarchy is 
gone beyond any hope of restoration. That is proved by 
the failures of Yuan Shih-kai and of Chang Hsun. Only a 
republic of some form is now considered possible as the 
government of China for the future. The question is, shall 
it be of the French centralized type or the American fed- 
erated kind? The latter sort is undoubtedly more consonant 
with the nation’s past, but present conditions and future 
needs seem to point to the other solution. 

The student of western history logically seeks for com- 
parisons in the English revolution of the seventeenth cen- 
tury, the American and French revolutions of the eighteenth 
century, and the Russian revolution of the twentieth cen- 
tury, and finds many similarities. In each case there is the 
transition from strict monarchical government to one more 
representative and liberal. Each of the four western cases 


CHINA 157 


differs sharply from the others, and the Chinese revolution 
has elements radically unlike any of them. The western 
revolutions were primarily political and secondarily, in vary- 
ing degrees, economic. The Chinese revolution is both po- 
litical and economic, but it is also, and primarily, intellectual 
and social; it is more than a revolution, it is a renaissance. 
No previous dynastic overturn in China has involved, in any 
considerable degree, the introduction of new intellectual 
concepts or of changes in the social order; this revolution is 
working fundamental changes in the national life. 

The casual observer notes that the revolution has resulted 
in the breakdown of the administration, national disintegra- 
tion and bankruptcy, subjection to the will of corrupt, op- 
pressive, military chieftains, and, in short, chaos and an- 
archy. If these are the real results or the only ones, the 
condition of the nation is indeed desperate. Fortunately 
these conditions are apparent rather than real, and they are 
not the only results. Since 1911 China has made important 
readjustments in its material conditions, it has maintained 
economic prosperity, it has developed a strong sense of na- 
tionality, it has conducted a successful foreign policy, it 
has enjoyed an extraordinary diffusion of liberal ideas, and 
the spirit of the nation has continued steadfastly hopeful. 

What, then, are the real facts with regard to the ap- 
parently evil results of the revolution? They may be con- 
sidered as the logical and necessary outcome of the ancient 
order which is in process of readjustment at the very points 
where the evils appear. Because of its vast size and the 
lack of convenient means of communication the Chinese 
Empire was never able to establish and maintain effective 
national administration of the provinces. Though China 
has passed through experiences suggestive of the feudalism 
of medieval Europe, it is necessary to go as far back as the 
ancient Persian Empire to find a fairly accurate parallel for 
the system of provincial administration. 

In each case it was necessary for the central government, 
the emperor, to intrust each province to a governor with 
but slightly limited powers, who was held absolutely respon- 
sible for the satisfactory administration of the territory and 


158 THE AWAKENING EAST 


people concerned. The governor himself had to depend 
under similar conditions on subordinates for the districts, 
and so on down to the smallest governmental unit. Each 
provincial or district governor was a petty despot, a sub- 
emperor, over his territory. Loyalty, the maintenance of 
order, the levying of troops, and the regular transmission 
of the revenue were the principal requirements laid upon 
him. Removal of an unsatisfactory official was usually 
effected by deceit, assassination, or military force. Under 
normal conditions the imperial government had but slight 
contact with the people. 

To the great mass of the people of China the government 
with which they were concerned was that of the village com- 
munity. Whether in Persia or China, the ultimate unit of 
government was something more enduring than dynasties 
and probably something even older than the empire itself. 
Nothing has been so little changed in the cycles of Cathay 
as the life and organization of the rural village. To the 
present day its character has continued patriarchal, and the 
family, not the individual, has remained the social unit. 
Even the growth of cities has affected but slightly the 
family organization of society. The solidarity of the fam- 
ily in China may to some extent be understood by Europeans, 
but it is quite beyond the conception of an American. The 
patriarchal, not the paternalistic, spirit permeates the life 
of China. 

The town life in ‘China long ago developed an important 
modification of the patriarchal system, the guilds. These 
have been as far-reaching in their effects as were the various 
town guilds of medieval Europe in contrast with the feudal 
system. Prolonged experience with this type of social and 
economic organization has enabled the Chinese readily to 
adapt to their uses the more modern methods of organiza- 
tion, such as chambers of commerce, for the promotion of 
business and municipal interests. This same experience 
ought, in time, to result in successful civic undertakings for 
improved municipal administration. Indeed, instances of 
this sort may already be cited. Perhaps the most significant 
fact, however, about the Chinese guilds has been their dem- 


= SYS 


CHINA 159 


ocratic character. As a consequence democratic ideas and 
practices are by no means novelties to the Chinese. 

With the establishment of the republic, there came no re- 
construction of the local government. For each province 
the central government continued to assign a civil governor 
and a military governor. As had often been the case during 
the last century under Manchu rule, but now more fre- 
quently, the military governor dominated the situation. To 
maintain his position he had to rely upon troops; to main- 
tain them he appropriated the revenues instead of transmit- 
ting them to the national treasury. The national government 
was thus left without funds, so without troops, and conse- 
quently without power. The administrative collapse and 
bankruptcy of the central government, and, on the other 
hand, the rise of the military chieftains, the existence of 
great armed forces, and the apparent chaos and anarchy, be- 
come easily explicable. Over against this superficial situa- 
tion is the fact that the great mass of the people of China 
have continued unconcernedly at their customary tasks and 
remained law-abiding. Local and municipal governments 
have continued to function. At bottom the peace and order 
of China have been little disturbed; indeed, conditions in 
the last dozen years have been no worse than those existing 
at various times in the preceding century under the Manchus. 

While both for evil and for good the institutions and tra- 
ditions of the empire have seemed to determine the form 
and manifestations of the revolution, the real revolution 
has been the development of new concepts radically affecting 
the whole ancient patriarchal system from the family to 
the empire. These new ideas, which are effecting the ulti- 
mate revolution, are individualism, social consciousness, na- 
tional consciousness, and the sense of the obligation of the 
individual to society and to the nation. There is for- 
tunately no suggestion of throwing the family into the dis- 
card; it is being transformed and perhaps ennobled. Neither 
is there much consideration for the communistic ideas which 
would substitute paternalism for patriarchal traditions. 

The dangers confronting revolutionary China are both 
obvious and serious. At home there is the anarchy due to 


160 THE AWAKENING EAST 


the military governors and their armies; from abroad there 
is the danger of foreign intervention, direct or insidious; 
from both sides there is lack of confidence in the govern- 
ment because of its corruptibility due to the scramble for 
office and for wealth and to the deep-rooted system of 
“squeeze.” To remove the first danger, it is necessary for 
the national government to deprive the military governors, 
or tuchuns, of their power to defy or ignore it. That means 
that there must be but one army exclusively under the con- 
trol of the central government, which must in turn have the 
means of paying it and of returning all other soldiers to 
civil life. The problem is apparently one of money, and 
might be met by a loan either foreign or domestic; but the 
former alternative is open to serious objections and the 
latter seems impracticable. In this dilemma matters have 
remained for several years. 

Another solution would be for the government to utilize 
one general and his army to disarm all the rest. General 
Wu Pei-fu has been in a position for months to do this but 
finds it beyond his powers. It is a case of fighting the hydra 
and would tend to produce universal brigandage. The su- 
perfluous soldiers must either be massacred or else assisted 
to sufficiently remunerative employment in civil life. Doctor 
Sun Yat-sen has made the proposal that the government 
begin at once a far-reaching scheme of public works on 
which the soldiers should be employed and paid. The idea 
is excellent but encounters the original difficulty of procuring 
funds, though such a wholesome result and such a productive 
investment might together appeal to public spirit and desire 
for gain combined. 

Indeed, the whole question narrows down to the creation 
of a public spirit which will refuse to tolerate the present 
evil and which will be ready to carry out the necessary 
measures for relief. The business community can solve the 
problem when it realizes that it has not only a great public 
service to perform but also that it will be to its own interest 
to do it. In Canton, beginning in 1922, there has been 
evidence of the necessary awakening in the organization of 
a merchants’ volunteer corps for the protection of their 


CHINA 161 


business and property. China can rid itself of tuchuns, 
armies, and bandits whenever the Chinese decide to abate 
the nuisances; that is, whenever they develop the necessary 
social consciousness and sense of civic duty. 

It was such a demonstration of the national will in the 
spring of 1919 that nullified the detested provisions of the 
treaty of Versailles and terminated the more obvious forms 
of Japanese intervention in China. That lesson was suf- 
ficient to end any idea of the partition of China by foreign 
powers or of their serious intermeddling in the nation’s 
concerns. The treaties and agreements arranged at the 
Washington conference constitute international recognition 
of the integrity of China territorially and of the necessity of 
reasonably prompt removal of the other impairments of 
the nation’s sovereignty by outside powers. It is true that 
Japan’s “twenty-one demands” have not all been specifically 
disavowed, but, as far as China proper is concerned, they 
can hardly be considered worth the paper upon which they 
are written. They are a liability rather than an asset to 
Japan in its relations to China. At present Russia is the 
only power from which ‘China has reason to fear serious 
difficulty, and in this case the other powers would probably 
support China.9 

In the face of bankruptcy China has for several years 
refused to sanction any new foreign loan which involves 
any condition in the slightest measure restrictive of the full 
and free sovereignty of the nation. Foreign intervention 
except by joint or concurrent action of the powers party to 
the Washington conference is almost inconceivable, and the 
difficulties in the way of such action are so serious as to ren- 
der it extremely unlikely. It would be the one thing most 
likely to produce a “rising tide of color,” to make the fiction 
of the “yellow peril’ a reality. Much water has flowed by 
the mill since 1900, and another expedition to Peking would 
produce results too serious to contemplate. China will ap- 
preciate the sympathy of the nations, but it will not tolerate 
any assistance which it does not freely and voluntarily invite. 


* See below, pages 168-169. 


162 THE AWAKENING EAST 


The danger from “squeeze” and the attendant evils can 
be met only in one way. China will have a government 
which will inspire respect and confidence at home and abroad 
only when the national consciousness asserts itself suf- 
ficiently to insist on the incorruptibility of public officials. It 
is perhaps wise to recall that two score years have not 
elapsed since President Cleveland found it necessary in the 
United States to preach and enforce the idea that “public 
office is a public trust.” The elimination of “squeeze” is no 
less necessary in private than in public life; it is the greatest 
foe to industrial and commercial development. 

The redemption and reconstruction of China can no more 
be wrought by a dictator, or “man on horseback,” or “strong 
man” than by a monarch. The work cannot be done from 
the top down; it must begin at the bottom. When the intel- 
ligent people in China determine that things shall be done 
rightly and set themselves to the task, the work can be done; 
but not until then. The revolution will continue until in- 
dividualism, social consciousness, and national consciousness 
have developed among the thinking people of China the sense 
of personal responsibility and obligation; or, in other words, 
until there has developed an enlightened and effective public 
opinion. That end may be attained suddenly but not quickly. 
This, it may be repeated, is more than a revolution; it is a 
renaissance. It is not the westernizing of China; it is the 
self-modernization of China. 

The change must be wrought from the bottom upward, 
and at bottom China is essentially sound. Just as the Chi- 
nese are physically healthy though living in unsanitary 
surroundings, so despite many evils in their environment 
the Chinese are really a moral people. With those who 
know them intimately their honesty, industry, business abil- 
ity, capacity for scholarship, thrift, and cheerfulness are 
proverbial. Probably no other people command more fully 
the respect of foreigners long resident among them. 
Strangers visiting the country frequently hear from the 
“old timers” the phrase “You will love the Chinese,” and 
it usually proves true if one stays long enough to get 
acquainted. 


CHINA 163 


Unlike India, China is free from caste. Though there is 
much that is more or less feudal in the social order, Chi- 
nese society is not feudalized into rigidly fixed compartments. 
There is something essentially democratic in the life of the 
people. Just as in the Christian Church the lad of humblest 
birth may become a priest or perchance a bishop, or even 
rise to the chair of Saint Peter, so in China no boy is too 
humble in origin to become a scholar, and a‘scholar may rise 
to the highest station in the government. 

The scholars have been the nation’s reliance in the past; 
they are its hope to-day. It was the students of 1919, the 
scholars of to-morrow, who aroused the national conscience 
against Japan. It has been the student class who have ven- 
tured forth into every land on missions of discovery and 
have brought home rich treasures, “more to be desired than 
gold,” to be added to their nation’s store of knowledge and 
to be utilized for its upbuilding. It is the students who are 
directly and indirectly diffusing the new learning into every 
section and among every class, and creating a national pub- 
lic opinion. 

The European students of the fifteenth century with their 
new learning produced the Renaissance which gave Europe 
its new national states, its broadened culture, and its new 
religious life, and thereby its domination of the world. The 
Chinese students of the twentieth century are giving their 
country a new learning, a broader culture, a national con- 
sciousness, a religious reformation. It is not the work of 
a year or of a decade. Europe took more than a century 
for its renaissance; perhaps China will not be so slow. Time 
is necessary, however, for the old generation to pass from the 
stage before the new generation—the new-born—can play 
its part freely. The generation of ‘China’s renaissance faces 
the future with lofty purpose and high hope, with cheerful- 
ness and confidence. 

The students of to-day are no doubt the custodians of 
China’s future, and education is their panacea for the na- 
tion’s ills. In a large majority of cases it will be found that 
back of these students stands the missionary. The mission- 
ary and the mission school have directly trained him, aided 


164 THE AWAKENING EAST 


him, or given him his inspiration. The new learning which 
these students are bringing to their people is made up in no 
small measure of those things in the world’s culture which 
are essentially Christian or the creation of Christian nations. 
The institutions and the learning of Christianity are lifeless 
without the spirit of the Christ. One dare not say that 
China needs the Christianity of the West as the life-giving 
element for its renaissance; it does need the spirit of the 
Christ. There are undoubtedly more Protestant ‘Christians 
in China to-day than there.were Christians in the world a 
century after the crucifixion and the resurrection. Even 
more than the students of China, the Christians of China 
are the leaven that will impart the new life to the nation. 

Five years have elapsed since the close of the World War. 
In these years since the armistice, which has been the prey 
to armies, to anarchy and chaos the more, continental 
Europe or 'China? Which is in the healthier and more hope- 
ful state to-day? In which are national differences being 
accentuated? In which is disintegration increasing? In 
which is the greater homogeneity? In which is the spirit 
of unity developing? Is it still true, “Better fifty years of 
Europe than a cycle of Cathay”? If so, how much longer 
will it be true? 

What will happen if one fifth of the people of the world, 
using one language, joined in one nation, take the lead from 
Europe? Is it not of vital importance with what spirit 
they assume that leadership? Does it all matter to Europe? 
In any case it concerns the United States more vitally than 
any other nation except Japan. At the outset it was as- 
serted that the problem of China, as contrasted with India 
or Egypt, has been primarily diplomatic. If this is still 
true, it is, without cavil, of the utmost importance what the 
diplomatic policy of the western powers is to be henceforth. 
Americans may flatter themselves that the open door is a 
good policy; the Golden Rule is the best policy. 


RECENT EVENTS 


‘At the Chinese New Year in February, 1923, the govern- 
ment was unable to comply with the traditional custom of 


CHINA 165 


effecting an adjustment of its financial obligations.1° 
Shortly before that date the representatives of several of 
the foreign powers had sent an address to the Peking gov- 
ernment admonishing it of the importance and nature of the 
desirable financial reforms. Finally, in October, it was an- 
nounced that a commission had been created under the 
chairmanship of W. W. Yen for the readjustment of the 
finances. The commission included representatives of the 
foreign interests and was authorized to make recommenda- 
tions not only with regard to international financial questions 
at issue, but also for the rehabilitation of the internal finances 
of the nation. The report of this commission, which was 
presented in April, 1924, revealed that the national expendi- 
tures were not excessive considering the size, popula- 
tion, and wealth of the nation. On the other hand, the 
revenues were proven seriously inadequate, and it was 
shown that only a portion of the collections actually reached 
Peking. 

In March, 1923, the British government gave notice that 
it would comply with the promises of the Allied powers in 
1917 to remit the balance due on account of the Boxer in- 
demnity. More recently the United States has agreed to do 
likewise with the understanding that the amount involved 
should be used for the promotion of technical education in 
China. In contrast, France has insisted that China should 
continue payments, making them in gold rather than at the 
current rate of exchange, as China maintains it is entitled 
to do. One of the reasons adduced for the French failure 
to ratify the nine-power pact negotiated at the Washington 
conference has been the attitude of China in this matter. 
Japan has also made a proposal in some respects similar 
to that of the United States, concerning the portion of the 
indemnity due it. 

A demand from the Peking government that Japan abro- 
gate the treaty of 1915, which contained the “twenty-one 
demands,” was rejected by the Japanese government in 
March, 1923. A revival of the anti-Japanese boycott and 


* See above, pages 143-144. 


166 THE AWAKENING EAST 


rioting, which was most serious at Changsha in the Yang- 
tse valley, drew forth a vigorous exchange of notes between 
Peking and Tokyo. While Japan has carried out the ar- 
rangements entered into at the time of the Washington con- 
ference for withdrawal from Shantung and from the port 
of Kiao-chao, the negotiations with Great Britain over with- 
drawal from Wei-hai-wei have not yet been completed, and 
the French have failed to make any move to surrender 
Kwangchow-wan. It must be admitted that the administra- 
tion of Kiao-chao by the Chinese was not satisfactory at 
the beginning, as it was managed by and for militarist 
elements. 

Early in May a large number of foreign passengers were 
captured at Lincheng, near Stchow, from the Tientsin- 
Pukow express. In spite of the earnest efforts of the diplo- 
matic corps at Peking several weeks elapsed before they 
were all released. Since then bandit outrages have been 
frequent in various parts of the country and piratical depre- 
dations have occurred at several points along the coast, es- 
pecially near Canton. The foreign legations in Peking 
united in presenting a note to the Chinese government de- 
manding that adequate measures be taken to suppress brig- 
andage and to insure security to foreigners. Proposals 
were also made for a system of policing the railways under 
international supervision. After a considerable interchange 
of notes the Chinese authorities, in October, practically ac- 
ceded to the demands. The Chinese resented the arrange- 
ment for international policing of the railways as an 
infringement of the national sovereignty, and have failed 
to take adequate steps to this end or to pay the promised 
indemnity. 

Conditions, which had been growing steadily worse, cul- 
minated at the middle of June, 1923, in the expulsion of 
President Li Yuan-hung from Peking by the Christian gen- 
eral, Feng Yu-hsiang.11_ For weeks there was no regular act- 
ing president or premier. General Feng defended his action 
on the ground that the payment for his troops was in arrears 


“General Feng has disclaimed responsibility for the act and has 
assigned it to the chief of police of Peking. 


CHINA 167 


and that following the president’s flight he was able to make 
the necessary payments. The action of General Feng, how- 
ever, received vigorous condemnation from Chinese Chris- 
tians. General Tsao Kun, the tuchun of Chihli, who had 
been closely associated with Yuan Shih-kai and Tuan 
Chi-jui, was regularly elected president by parliament on 
October 5, 1923. It was reported that the election was ef- 
fected through wholesale corruption. In connection with 
the inauguration of Tsao Kun as president on the anniver- 
sary of the revolution, October 10, the new constitution, to 
replace the provisional document of 1912, was formally 
proclaimed. This constitution’? consists of one hundred 
and forty-one articles and provides for a system of pro- 
vincial decentralization. As yet there is little evidence that 
it is being put into operation. On October 15, when the 
new government made known its willingness to meet the 
Lincheng demands, the diplomatic corps offered formal 
congratulations to the new president. Though it was hoped 
that at least thirteen provinces would acknowledge the new 
Peking government, its authority was actually recognized 
in only the eight more northerly provinces, over which 
General Wu Pei-fu and two other generals were installed, 
in November, as high military inspecting commissioners. 
A new cabinet was not organized until January, 1924, when 
parliament at last chose Sun Pao-chi as premier. Doctor 
Wellington Koo, who had been recalled to office some 
months earlier, was continued as foreign minister. 

The former president, Li Yuan-hung, endeavored for 
some months to cling to office but finally withdrew to Japan. 
In the South, Doctor Sun Yat-sen was able to return to 
Canton in February, 1923, and since then has been carrying 
on an extensive but doubtful warfare in the vicinity. It is 
believed that the forces opposed to him have received support 
from General Wu Pei-fu on behalf of the Peking govern- 
ment. In August and September, 1923, efforts were made to 
arrange a round-table conference at which Doctor Sun and 
the various northern leaders should undertake to reunite 


*” A translation will be found in Current History, vol. 19, pp. 660- 
665, January, 1924. 


168 THE AWAKENING EAST 


the nation. After the failure of this proposal and the in- 
auguration of President Tsao Kun, Doctor Sun issued a 
vigorous denunciation of the new president and of the 
government in Peking and demanded that the diplomatic 
representatives of other nations should withhold recognition. 
Later Doctor Sun, who was apparently in serious financial 
straits, announced his intention of seizing the customs house 
at Canton and appropriating a portion of the revenues. The 
foreign powers took prompt measures for the protection of 
the customs service, because the revenues are pledged for 
the payment of the foreign loans. 

In the early months of 1924, the Peking government ob- 
tained a considerable extension of its influence through the 
capture of Foochow and Chengtu. On May 22, shortly after 
a false report of his death, Doctor Sun issued a pronounce- 
ment demanding neutrality on the part of the powers as 
between the Peking and Canton governments, and insisting 
that the policy of recognizing the de facto government in 
Peking rendered unfair assistance to General Wu and the 
northern interests as a whole. During the summer further 
difficulties occurred at Canton, especially affecting the 
Anglo-French concession on the island of Shameen, on 
which most of the foreign population lived. The troubles 
involved strikes by the domestic and office employees of the 
foreign residents and, in the end, resulted in various con- 
cessions to the Chinese demands. On July 2, 1924, the 
premier, Sun Pao-chi, resigned and Doctor Koo became act- 
ing premier. In September W. W. Yen, a graduate of the 
University of Virginia, became premier. 

Negotiations with representatives of soviet Russia, which 
had been in progress for many months, culminated in 
the signature of a provisional agreement on May 31 by Doc- 
tor Koo, the foreign minister, and by Mr. Karakhan, the 
soviet envoy. China unconditionally recognized the soviet 
government, and both parties agreed not to engage in 
propaganda subversive to the political and social systems of 
the other. Not only were the preceding treaties between the 
two countries abrogated but also provisions in the treaties 
of either with a third power affecting their mutual interests 


CHINA 169 


were likewise annulled. The two parties arrogated to them- 
selves the exclusive right to determine the future of the 
Chinese Eastern railway, and provision was made for the 
sale to China of the Russian interests in the road. The 
treaty also provided for the arrangement of new tariff sched- 
ules and in general for reciprocal relations between the two 
countries. Russia relinquished its claim to the balance of 
the Boxer indemnity, to extra-territoriality, and to all its 
concessions in China. Russia also renewed an earlier prom- 
ise of the soviet government to withdraw from Chinese 
territories, including outer Mongolia. The signature of this 
treaty has radically changed the diplomatic situation in the 
Far East and its effects are difficult to forecast. Already 
Russia has named Mr. Karakhan ambassador at Peking, 
thus making him the head of the diplomatic corps at that 
capital. Furthermore, Russian negotiations with Japan, 
which had long been hanging fire, have been promptly re- 
newed. Japan apparently realizes that its interests will re- 
quire that it come to terms with both Russia and China on 
Far Eastern matters, under conditions no less advantageous 
to each of those powers than they have arranged with one 
another in the treaty of May 31. On the other hand, the 
advantages for China from the treaty with Russia have not 
as yet been realized. Apparently Russia has not been a dis- 
interested spectator of the recent conflicts and changes in 
China. 

China has felt seriously aggrieved because of its failure 
to receive reélection to the council of the League of Nations 
at the sessions both of 1923 and of 1924, and has even 
threatened to withdraw from the League. China, moreover, 
has failed to pay its annual quotas for the League’s ex- 
penses, and has protested against the proportion assessed, 
apparently with some reason. An agreement with Germany 
in the spring of 1924 supplemented the peace treaty and 
adjusted the question of German private property in China 
which had been sequestered during the war, together with 
certain related questions. For some time the Germans have 
been renewing their trading enterprises in China. Among 
their activities is a scheme to develop the extensive coal 


170 THE AWAKENING EAST 


deposits near Pukow on the Yang-tse opposite Nanking, 
under the management of a Stinnes corporation. 

In spite of the troubled conditions there are various evi- 
dences of progress, especially in certain provinces such as 
Shansi. The question of improving the conditions of the 
working classes has been receiving fruitful consideration. 
In March, 1923, the Peking government issued regulations 
governing the employment of industrial workers and of 
miners. A committee on child labor appointed by the mu- 
nicipal council of Shanghai -effected an agreement with the 
owners of the cotton mills in and near that city by which 
. they discontinued on September I, 1923, the employment of 
children under twelve years of age. Though the equipment and 
operation of the railways have suffered considerably from 
the military disturbances, projects for the extension of the 
system are under way. In January, 1924, preliminary agree- 
ments were made with a British firm for the construction of 
three new lines, and in July a group of Belgian and Chinese 
bankers contracted to finance the building of a railway from 
Chenchow in Honan to Sianfu in Shensi. Statistics for 
the total trade of the country in 1923 show a slight increase 
over the preceding year, but a remarkable increase of twenty- 
six per cent in the American share of that trade. Floods 
in several parts of the country in the summer of 1924 have 
wrought serious devastation and necessitated relief meas- 
ures to feed and otherwise assist several million people. 

Ever since 1920, General Lu Yung-hsiang had maintained 
his position as tuchun of the province of Chekiang in defi- 
ance of the Peking government and had even been able to 
extend his influence over the neighboring district around 
Shanghai in the province of Kiangsu which theoretically 
belonged under the jurisdiction of the super-tuchun, General 
Chi Hsieh-yuan, whose headquarters are at Nanking and 
who was a close ally of General Wu Pei-fu. Commercial in- 
terests and other influences succeeded in preventing open 
conflict between the two rivals until the end of August, 1924. 
Actual civil war began on September 3, which was imme- 
diately complicated by the intervention of General Wu's 
defeated rival, General Chang Tso-lin of Manchuria, who 


CHINA 171 


had long been preparing to square accounts. Fighting en- 
sued near Shanghai and in the vicinity of the great wall on 
the Manchurian border. Owing to his position geographi- 
cally, it was alleged that General Chang was in more inti- 
mate relations with the Japanese and also with soviet Russia 
than were the Peking government and General Wu, and 
therefore possessed a special advantage. 

Though General Chi soon succeeded in defeating his rival 
from Chekiang, General Wu made little headway against 
his Manchurian opponent who had more effectively used 
the two years since his previous defeat in preparing for the 
renewal of the struggle. In October impatience with Gen- 
eral Wu for his incompetence and his failure to justify 
the hopes centered in him for political reconstruction burst 
forth in the revolt of the Christian general, Feng Yu-hsiang. 
He occupied Peking, forced the retirement of Tsao Kun 
from the presidency, and then turned his forces against 
General Wu. It is reported that this maneuver has once 
more made Tuan Chi-jui the foremost political personage in 
China. General Feng has avowed his purpose to bring the 
military conflict to an end and to secure the codperation of 
the best minds in the nation for the establishment of a set- 
tled political order throughout the country. 

In the period since the Washington conference the re- 
lations with the countries party to that conference have not 
grown more friendly. The feeling of irritation at their 
refusal to abandon the privileges of extra-territoriality and 
to make some other desired concessions has been accentu- 
ated by various episodes of international intercourse, such 
as the demands with regard to policing made in connection 
with the Lincheng affair, and -the intervention over the 
customs question at Canton. On the contrary, China has 
turned in a more friendly spirit to Germany, Russia, and 
other nations which have consented to the abrogation of 
extra-territoriality and other special privileges. The nation- 
als of these latter countries in general receive more favor- 
able treatment in commercial and other relations than do 
the nationals of the powers which participated in the Wash- 
ington conference, toward whom Chinese public sentiment 


172 THE AWAKENING EAST 


has grown distinctly less friendly. The anticipated im- 
provements in the administration of justice in China have 
not yet warranted the general abandonment of extra-terri- 
toriality, especially in the matter of criminal jurisdiction, 
but it seems not unlikely that these powers will soon be 
obliged, singly or collectively, to make concessions to China 
on most other points in which China feels aggrieved. The 
continuance of military activities of rival generals, the fail- 
ure to suppress banditry and piracy, and the prolonged in- 
ability of the Peking government to bring several practically 
independent sections of the country under its control, have 
not prevented this growth of the insistence upon the rights 
of Chinese as against other nations. Furthermore, there 
have been many evidences of a steady drift toward a situa- 
tion in which the better elements will codperate to replace 
turmoil and chaos with a unified and stable government. 


SUGGESTIONS FOR READING 


An introduction to the history and civilization of China may be 
obtained from The Development of China (3rd ed., Boston, Hough- 
ton Mifflin Company, 1924), by Professor K. S. Latourette, formerly 
of the College of Yale in China, now of Yale University, or from 
The Civilization of China (Home University Library, New York, 
Henry Holt & Company, 1911), by Professor H. A. Giles, of the 
University of Cambridge, formerly of the British consular service 
in China. Recent movements are described in Contemporary Poli- 
tics in the Far East (New York, D. Appleton & Company, 1916), 
by S. K. Hornbeck, formerly a college teacher in China, later in 
the United States department of state; and in Modern Constitu- 
tional Development in China (Princeton, Princeton University 
Press, 1920), by Professor Harold M. Vinacke of Miami University. 
The diplomatic history is admirably recorded in the magisterial 
work, The International Relations of the Chinese Empire (3 vol- 
umes, New York, Longmans, Green & Company, 1910-1918), by 
Hosea B. Morse, an American formerly in the Chinese maritime 
customs service; in The Americans in Eastern Asia (New York, 
The Macmillan Company, 1922), by Tyler Dennett, who has lived 
in China and who has utilized the archives of the United States 
department of state; and in China at the Conference, A Report 
(Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1922), by Professor Westel 
W. Willoughby, of Johns Hopkins University, formerly legal ad- 
viser to the Chinese government and technical expert to the Chinese 
delegation at the Washington conference. 


CHINA 173 


Chinese Characteristics (New York, Fleming H. Revell Company, 
1894), by Arthur H. Smith, for many years a missionary in China, is 
a classic. The Changing Chinese (New York, The Century Company, 
1911), by Professor Edward A. Ross, of the University of Wiscon- 
sin, is an excellent survey by a competent observer. China: An 
Interpretation (New York, The Abingdon Press, 1916), by the late 
James W. Bashford, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church 
Resident in China, is in somewhat less popular style, but rich in 
information and sound in judgment. China’s Place in the Sun 
(New York, The Macmillan Company, 1922), by Stanley High, an 
American traveler recently in China, is a good readable survey 
with some late information, though in the main confessedly de- 
pendent on works already mentioned. China Yesterday and To- 
day (New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1923), by Professor 
Edward T. Williams, of the University of California, combines an 
historical survey with numerous topical articles. The best compen- 
dium of information on Christian missions in China is The Chris- 
tion Occupation of China, a General Survey ... Made by the 
Special Committee on Survey and Occupation,. China Continuation 
Committee, 1918-1921 (Shanghai, 1922), edited by Milton T. Stauffer. 

The China Year Book (New York, E. P. Dutton & Company) is 
an annual of nearly a thousand pages replete with the latest infor- 
mation and statistics. It includes a Who’s Who section. 


CHAPTER IV 
JAPAN 


JAPAN presents radical contrasts with the three countries 
already studied. In the first place, it is an island country of 
limited size, and not a vast continental area like India or 
China. Nor is it, on the other hand, comparable to Egypt 
with its small area of fertile lands hemmed in by vast 
stretches of desert. As continental areas, all three of the 
countries previously considered have been subject to re- 
peated foreign invasion and conquest, whereas no successful 
attack has been made upon Japan in the thirty centuries of 
its history. 

Furthermore, Egypt and India have been westernized or 
modernized primarily through British agency, while mod- 
ernization has likewise been forced upon China, in consid- 
erable measure, by the activity of foreign powers interested 
in the nation’s trade. Though Japan, on the other hand, 
was practically compelled by the United States and other 
powers to open its doors to their trade and to concede for 
a time the principle of extra-territoriality, the nation has 
never in any other way submitted to foreign dictation. The 
Japanese have acted as free agents in all the modernization 
or westernization which has been effected in their country 
in the last two generations. The story of Japan’s develop- 
ment has been that of the deliberate effort of a people to 
carry out for themselves an industrial revolution and a re- 
adjustment of their political system to accord with new con- 
ditions. 

The Japanese Empire to-day has an area of approximately 
260,000 square miles, with a population somewhat over 
77,000,000. This empire includes, in addition to Korea on 
the continent of Asia, a chain of islands extending from 20° 
north latitude to 50° north latitude; that is, 1f compared with 
America, from the southern coast of Cuba to the mouth of 


174 


JAPAN 175 


the St. Lawrence. If the islands lying to the north and to 
the south of the main group and Korea, which have all 
been brought under Japanese control within about a half 
century, are excluded, Japan proper consists of four main 
islands with the immediately adjacent smaller islands, form- 
ing an area of about 148,000 square miles, and having a 
population of over 56,000,000. ‘The situation of these four 
islands corresponds in latitude to the stretch from Jackson- 
ville, Florida, to Eastport, Maine. Prior to 1870 the most 
northerly island, Hokkaido, was but thinly populated and 
of negligible importance in the nation’s affairs. If, there- 
fore, its area of 30,000 square miles be further deducted, 
the territory which formed the historic Japan prior to a half 
century ago amounted to about 110,000 square miles, and 
extended only as far north, approximately, as the latitude 
of New York City. Tokyo and Kyoto, the two great centers 
of Japan’s national life, are in the latitude of Raleigh, North 
Carolina, and of Tangier in Morocco. In longitude, Japan 
is located exactly on the opposite side of the world from the 
middle of the Atlantic Ocean. 

The situation of Japan adjacent to the eastern coast of 
Asia has often been compared to that of Britain adjacent to 
the western coast of Europe. Japan exceeds the British 
Islands, both in area and in population, by approximately 
20 per cent. The growth of population has been consider- 
ably more rapid in Japan, as a half century ago its popula- 
tion was almost exactly the same as that of the British 
Islands. There are, however, marked differences as well as 
similarities to be observed. The British Islands, in their 
entirety, lie farther north than any part of the Japanese 
Empire, and much farther north than the main group of 
four islands. 

In the second place, the distance across the Straits of 
Dover is but a little over twenty miles. The shortest dis- 
tance from Japan to Korea across the Straits of Tsushima 
is over one hundred and twenty miles. This additional hun- 
dred miles of distance from the continent in the case of 
Japan has been of very great significance. The British 
Islands have been in unbroken intercourse with the adjacent 


176 THE AWAKENING EAST 


parts of the European continent ever since the beginning of 
history, and have been subject to repeated invasion and 
several conquests by European peoples. Japan, on the other 
hand, has frequently shut itself off from all intercourse with 
the neighboring continent, and in the thirty centuries of its 
history has rarely been attacked and never successfully in- 
vaded. 

The British Islands have also been open to the steady pene- 
tration of cultural influences from the adjacent continent, 
and while the British, because of their insular position, have 
been able to give a national character to their culture, con- 
ditions have never permitted them to quarantine themselves 
against further alien infusions. The Japanese have likewise 
drawn their culture, in large measure at least, from the 
adjacent continent, but their distance from that continent 
has enabled them more than once to establish a rigid block- 
ade against the influx of further influences, with the result 
that there are long periods of Japanese history when its 
culture has been so thoroughly insular and nationalized as 
to become practically static. The last such period came to 
an end with the intervention of the American Commodore 
Perry in 1853. It is only since that date that the Japanese 
people have set themselves to the task of catching up with 
the progress and civilization of the rest of the world. 

Political and military activities on the continent of Europe 
have formed an important part of British history. For cen- 
turies considerable portions of the European continent ‘were 
subject to English domination. In a similar fashion Japan 
has occasionally been engaged in political and military ac- 
tivities on the Asiatic continent, and more than once has 
claimed control of part or all of Korea, and momentarily 
even of other regions. In recent centuries British interests 
have tended to turn away from the European continent, 
and there has been built up since 1600 an enormous British 
empire, spreading into every quarter of the globe. Through- 
out most of this period the British have controlled a major 
part of the commerce upon the high seas. Only within the 
last half century has Japan in any measure emulated this 
phase of British development. The consequent extension 





JAPAN 177 


of its island empire both to the north and to the south, and, 
more important still, the rapid growth of its commercial 
and shipping enterprises are remarkable. 

As is well known, the British population is made up of 
various racial stocks, roughly divided into Celtic and Teu- 
tonic groups, which have never become fully amalgamated. 
In Japan there are likewise different racial stocks but, though 
they were originally more diverse in character than the 
peoples who settled in the British Islands, they have become, 
perhaps because of the long periods of national isolation, 
much more thoroughly amalgamated. There are in the 
Japanese population apparently two main elements, the Mon- 
golian and the Malay. The latter type is obviously more 
prevalent in the south, as would naturally be expected, a 
fact that would seem to indicate that it had reached Japan 
by following northward from the East. Indies along the 
almost unbroken chain of islands. It is of the greatest sig- 
nificance that the racial blending in Japan has become so 
complete as to have produced a peculiarly strong sense of 
national unity and solidarity, and that the whole population 
uses but a single language. 

Since the Norman conquest, so intimate have been the 
relations between England and the continent that the steady 
influx of new cultural influence has been habitual, and at no 
time has there been manifested a clear national conscious- 
ness of cultural borrowing or of the intrusion of alien in- 
fluences. On the other hand, no steady cultural stream has 
flowed from the Asiatic continent or elsewhere into Japan. 
The occasions when foreign cultural influences have entered 
Japan have been sharply marked, and the people have been 
keenly conscious of the process of cultural modification. 
These changes have come to Japan purely as cultural move- 
ments, as Christianity was brought to England in the sixth 
and seventh centuries, and not as the result of foreign in- 
vasion or military pressure, as in the case of the Norman 
conquest. 

The Japanese people have been free to receive or reject 
the new ideas. The adoption of anything novel in political, 
economic, social, literary, or artistic institutions and life has 


178 THE AWAKENING EAST 


come as the result of careful consideration and deliberate 
determination. This attitude or spirit, displayed on earlier 
occasions, reveals itself constantly in the changes which 
have come in the last threescore years. The Japanese have 
often been accused of being imitative, of being borrowers 
rather than originators or creators. While this allegation 
may to some extent be true, it is also true that the Japanese 
people have not passively submitted to cultural change, but 
that they have actively studied new ideas and methods, and 
have rejected or adopted them in accordance with their own 
free will and judgment. 

The historical conditions under which the intensely na- 
tional character of the Japanese has developed must be 
studied in order to understand the radical differences from 
the nations already considered, in the country’s attitude to- 
ward the adoption of modern culture and in its relations 
with the great powers of the West. Japan proudly lists its 
present emperor as the one hundred twenty-second in un- 
broken hereditary succession from their first emperor, whose 
date is customarily placed at 660 B. c. Originally the po- 
litical, as well as the religious and social, organization was 
largely patriarchal. Comparisons might in some ways, though 
by no means in all, be made with the earliest history of Ire- 
land and of the Celtic portions of Britain. Clan and local 
traditions were strong, and the power of the emperor was 
probably rarely exerted to any serious degree much beyond 
the immediate locality in which he and the imperial family 
lived. There seems to have been little in the way of a gen- 
uinely national system of administration. There was not 
even a capital or fixed seat of government. 

In the course of time, however, two important develop- 
ments occurred. The imperial power became strengthened 
and concentrated to such a degree that Japan was able to 
conquer, and for a considerable period to hold in subjection, 
a large part of Korea, over which its suzerainty was recog- 
nized down to 668 a. p. The other development, which was 
of far greater significance for the national history, was the 
establishment of intercourse with the continent and the con- 
sequent influx of Chinese ideas, which came, no doubt, 


JAPAN 179 


largely through Korea, but probably also, to some extent, 
directly. As early as the third century A. p., Confucianism 
spread into Japan, and about the middle of the sixth century 
Buddhism began to come in and grew rapidly in influence. 
While Buddhism never replaced entirely the original re- 
ligion of the people, which was primarily a form of ancestor 
worship, it has been, until recent years, the most active reli- 
gious force in the nation’s life and development. 

Just as the year 1868 is the great critical date in the mod- 
ern history of Japan, so the year 645 A. D., which began the 
Daika era, or great reformation, is the central date in its 
earlier history. Beginning with that year there occurred a 
period of reform marked by the adoption of political ideas 
and methods of organization from China. Instead of the 
chief importance in the nation’s affairs belonging to the 
hereditary heads of clans or families under the old patri- 
archal system, the emperor was henceforth surrounded by 
a group of ministers and subordinate officials whose positions 
were not hereditary but appointive. There also seems to 
have been an attempt at a complete economic reorganization. 
All lands were declared to be the property of the emperor, 
and were carefully assigned out on a regular system in pro- 
portion to population. Landholding thus became a personal 
matter on a sort of feudal tenure basis. The taxes or rents 
were payable in rice and other produce, and in labor in a 
way somewhat similar to the European corvée. 

The influx of new ideas from China continued, and nu- 
merous new departures in Japanese culture are to be dated 
from the latter part of the seventh century and from the 
eighth. At the beginning of the eighth century the govern- 
ment became definitely settled at Nara, which for nearly a 
hundred years was the imperial residence and the national 
capital. The accompanying growth of Buddhism and spread 
of learning have left a permanent impress on the national 
life. The great bronze Buddha at Nara and numerous tem- 
ples were erected, and the earliest pieces of Japanese litera- 
ture were reduced to writing. At about this time scholars 
who had studied in China, where they had also come under 
the influence of Sanskrit learning, introduced a phonetic 


180 THE AWAKENING EAST 


script, known as the kana, which still remains in use.! It 
employs about fifty syllabic signs modified from Chinese 
characters. At the close of the eighth century the capital 
was transferred to Kyoto, which was destined to be the im- 
perial residence until 1869. 

Important and far-reaching as the reforms were, they 
could not seriously alter the patriarchal character of the na- 
tional life. The wealth or power acquired by certain families 
gave them an influence which could not be overlooked for 
long. There was also a natural tendency for ministers and 
other great officials to endeavor to transmit their powers and 
honors in their own families. In time there came emperors 
who lacked the ability and will to exert strong authority, 
and ministers who were less loyal and disinterested. Con- 
sequently the decline in imperial power gave opportunity for 
the development of an hereditary official and propertied class. 
This change in Japan corresponds, at least superficially, to 
the contemporaneous decline of the Carolingian Empire in 
western Europe. Just as feudalism developed in medieval 
Europe, so in a somewhat similar fashion it grew up in 
Japan, where it continued to hold sway until the latter half 
of the nineteenth century. Feudal chieftains or counts, 
called daimyo, with their knights, or samurai, made them- 
selves practically absolute masters of the different sections 
of the islands. 

The height of the feudal period was marked by the su- 
premacy of the Fujiwara family in civil affairs, and by the 
rivalries of the two great military families of Taira and 
Minamoto, which ended in the triumph of the Minamoto 
under Yoritomo and the extinction of the Taira in 1185. 
The result of this struggle was the practical annihilation of 
the authority of the emperor and the assumption of real 
power by the feudal lords, or daimyo, at the head of whom 
stood Yoritomo, who consequently wielded the real power 
of government. In 1192 he had the emperor confer upon 
him the title of shogun, or commander-in-chief. From that 
date until 1867 the shoguns were customarily the actual 
rulers of Japan. 


* There are, in fact, two systems of kana, 





JAPAN 181 


Titular emperors continued to succeed one another, or, 
rather, were set up and pulled down by the shoguns at will. 
The nominal emperor was regularly kept in carefully 
guarded seclusion at Kyoto, and was little more than a 
figurehead, adorned with a sort of halo of sanctity as the 
living representative of the ancient imperial family. The 
government of the shoguns, which lasted for nearly seven 
hundred years, was characterized by the continuance, with 
little change, of the feudal conditions, and the shogun him- 
self was merely the greatest of the feudal lords. This pro- 
tracted existence of feudalism until a date only a little more 
than a half century ago has left a deep impress upon the 
national character, and has given to the Japanese the unique 
code of chivalry known as bushido. 

The military caste, that is the daimyo and the samurai, 
was the sole one of recognized importance. The agricul- 
tural, artisan, and trading classes remained until the very 
end of this period submerged to a low level quite outside the 
workings of the code of honor. Still further down in the 
social scale was yet another group, though not a large one, 
known as the eta class, composed of those engaged in cer- 
tain occupations which were regarded as peculiarly hu- 
miliating. 

Though feudalism was officially abolished in 1871, the 
persistence of its influence is shown by the continuance of 
political power almost exclusively in the hands of former 
members of the feudal aristocracy of the old clans, or of 
their descendants. The same persistence of the old tra- 
ditional class distinctions also appears at the lower end of 
the scale. Though the invidious discriminations against 
the eta class were legally abolished some time ago, the dif- 
ferentiations have continued to prevail in practice and are at 
the present moment the subject of agitation. 

About a century after Yoritomo’s establishment of the 
shogunate occurred the most serious efforts at invasion 
which Japan has ever had to resist. These attempts were 
undertaken at the direction of the great Mongol emperor of 
China, Kublai Khan. The repulse of the final and most 
serious of these attacks in 1281 has sometimes been com- 


182 THE AWAKENING EAST 


pared to the destruction of the Spanish Armada in Engiish 
history. Another importance, however, attaches to this 
episode, for at this time there was resident at the court of 
Kublai Khan the Venetian traveler, Marco Polo, who 
gleaned such information as he could with regard to the 
island empire. This information, recorded in his famous 
book of travels, gave western Europe its first knowledge of 
Japan. 

Not long after this great event, the shogunate passed in 
1336 into the hands of a member of the Ashikaga family, 
whose descendants continued to fill the office until 1573. 
Near the close of this period, in 1542, Japan was for the 
first time visited by Europeans, a small boatload of Portu- 
guese who happened upon the coast. Very shortly afterward 
the great Jesuit missionary, St. Francis Xavier, arrived and 
began successfully Christian missionary work. The Euro- 
pean relations were almost exclusively with the southern 
island, Kiushiu, which had been in closer contact with the 
Asiatic continent than the other islands, and which had 
earlier been the object of the Mongol attack. The Europeans 
were welcomed perhaps even more for their firearms than for 
their Christianity or trade. The feudal lords of Kiushiu 
were very quick to recognize the advantage which firearms 
would give them in their rivalries with the feudal lords far- 
ther north. For nearly a century the westerners were hos- 
pitably received in Kiushiu, and many of the natives, 
including some of high rank, accepted Christianity. 

The importance of this era of the close of the sixteenth 
century and the beginning of the seventeenth in Japan is to 
be found, not in the earliest contacts with Europeans, but in 
the careers of a group of the most able warriors and states- 
men that Japan has ever produced. It was, in a sense, the 
heroic period of the nation’s history, and its foremost figure 
was the famous Hideyoshi, who undertook, after the lapse 
of nearly a thousand years, to restore Japanese sway in 
Korea. Shortly after the death of Hideyoshi, which oc- 
curred in 1598, his most able and trusted subordinate, Iye- 
yasu, of the Tokugawa family, succeeded in defeating his 
rivals and assuming, in 1603, the shogunate, which contin- 


JAPAN 183 


ued in his family until 1867. Two acts of Iyeyasu are of 
significance. He removed the capital of the shoguns, which 
had been at Kamakura ever since the time of Yoritomo, to 
Yedo, the modern Tokyo. 

Iyeyasu also sent an agent to Europe to study ‘Christianity 
and other matters. The unfavorable report led to the con- 
tinuation of the anti-Christian policy of Hideyoshi, which 
culminated, in 1637, under one of his successors, Iyemitsu, 
in the complete extirpation of Christianity and the closing 
of the island empire. The termination of western inter- 
course and the adoption of the policy of isolation seems a 
curious and somewhat impotent close for the heroic period. 
This change has often been interpreted as the result of an 
anti-Christian policy. It is true that the Christian mission- 
aries were driven out and that the native Christians were 
compelled to renounce their faith or suffer martyrdom. 

The Christian missionaries to Japan, however, were Ro- 
man Catholics, mostly Jesuits, and politically they were iden- 
tified with Spain, which under Philip IT had, in 1580, seized 
Portugal and succeeded to the Portuguese interests in the 
Far East. Furthermore, the missionaries often reached 
Japan by way of the Philippine Islands, where they had been 
zealous agents in the recent establishment of Spanish con- 
trol. The Japanese were undoubtedly familiar with the 
importance of Spain in European affairs and also aware of 
the aggressive character of the activities of both Portuguese 
and Spaniards in Asia and the East Indies. The policy of 
the Japanese shoguns may, therefore, be interpreted as one 
of rigorous determination to prevent the aggressive and 
domineering Europeans from acquiring any foothold what- 
soever in their country. Furthermore, the establishment of 
the shogunate in the Tokugawa family, with its capital at 
Yedo, or Tokyo, represented the triumph of the northern 
clans and the definite subjection of the clans of the southern 
island, who had been most involved in intercourse with the 
Europeans. 

The policy of isolation and of prohibition of outside in- 
tercourse, initiated in 1637, was rigorously maintained until 
the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853. Throughout these 


184 THE AWAKENING EAST 


two centuries the shoguns shrewdly permitted one little chink 
‘ to remain open through which they might obtain some infor- 
mation of the movement of events in the outer world. This 
was done by permitting the Protestant Dutch, who cleverly 
made known their hostility to the Roman Catholic Spaniards, 
to carry on a limited amount of trade on the little island of 
Deshima in the harbor of Nagasaki. Far to the north there 
were some other contacts of even less significance, where 
the Japanese found themselves confronted by the extension 
of the imperialistic activities of the Russians to Saghalien 
and the Kurile Islands. 

Toward the middle of the nineteenth century Americans 
and others began to push whaling, fishing, and trading ac- 
tivities into the northern Pacific. Even though it was known 
that Japan was a forbidden land, these enterprises were 
bound to result in a certain number of contacts due to ship- 
wreck, stress of weather, and other accidents. It was di- 
rectly out of such occurrences that there developed a situa- 
tion which led the government of the United States to send 
the expedition under Commodore Perry to Japan to insist 
upon the establishment of satisfactory relations. 

Even had Japan not been opened from without by Perry’s 
expedition, forces were already at work within Japan which 
would, before long, have broken down the policy of isola- 
tion. In the first place, Japanese scholars were turning their 
attention to a study of ancient Japan prior to the intrusion 
of Chinese influences which had resulted in the great govern- 
mental change of 645 A. D. Such studies meant the revival 
of certain ideas and customs which had been current in the 
centuries before Buddhism and feudalism had become estab- 
lished in the islands. Especially did they suggest the restora- 
tion of the ancient patriarchal authority of the emperor as 
the real ruler of the nation, instead of his continuing a mere 
figurehead, as had been the case for so many centuries. 

In the second place, certain Japanese scholars, although 
it was unlawful, managed to obtain books from the Dutch 
which opened up vistas of ideas quite new to the nation. 
One case was of peculiar interest. A certain book obtained 
from the Dutch set forth some facts directly contrary to the 


JAPAN 185 


accepted teachings derived from the Chinese sources. It 
was determined to make a test to discover which was correct. 
The result of the experiment afforded convincing proof of 
the fallaciousness of the Chinese teachings and gave corre- 
sponding prestige to the ideas derived from the West. 

Still other forces were at work. The power of the sho- 
guns was obviously declining in the face of increasing rival- 
ries among the clans. For two centuries not only had there 
been no intercourse, either friendly or hostile, with foreign 
nations, but practically complete peace had been maintained 
within the empire. After this long suspension of military 
operations the repressed desires for vigorous activity once 
more began to appear. The study of the earlier period of 
the nation’s history had revealed the ability of the Japanese 
to subdue and rule other peoples. Consequently, the motive 
of extending the national power was added to the other in- 
fluences making in favor of change from the old policy of 
isolation. There were thus forces operating within the coun- 
try as well as from without which were preparing the way 
for startling changes in the nation’s life. 

Commodore Perry’s first visit to Japan in 1853 produced 
no immediate result, but in the ensuing year the shogun con- 
sented to enter into the first treaty made by Japan with an 
outside power. This treaty with the United States was re- 
vised in 1858, through negotiations conducted by the consul- 
general of the United States to Japan, Townsend Harris. 
Other treaties were made at about the same time with the 
British, Dutch, and Russians. As in the first treaties with 
China, in the preceding decade, these agreements provided 
for extra-territoriality, conventional tariffs, and the most- 
favored-nation treatment. All these negotiations were 
peaceably conducted, except for Perry’s display of force; 
thus the establishment of western intercourse with Japan 
was marked by no such untoward event as the Opium War 
in the case of China. 

In these negotiations the shogun found it necessary to pose 
as the emperor. This presumption, together with the inev- 
itable identification of the shogunate with the intrusion of 
the suspected if not hated foreigners, when taken together 


186 THE AWAKENING EAST 


with the operation of the internal forces already described, 
made the termination of the shogunate merely a question of 
time. It was in the closing weeks of 1867 that the last of 
the Tokugawa shoguns wisely recognized the situation and 
honorably resigned his authority. Huis abdication was fol- 
lowed in the opening days of 1868 by the proclamation of 
the emperor, Mutsuhito, who had recently succeeded to the 
title, as the sole and actual ruler of the nation. 

This radical change very naturally rendered uncertain the 
status of the treaties recently negotiated with the western 
nations and placed the small group of foreign residents in 
a highly critical position. The atmosphere was promptly 
cleared by a proclamation of the emperor guaranteeing ob- 
servance of the treaties and protection to the foreigners. 
The first stages of the revolution had been entirely peaceful, 
but it was not destined to be fully accomplished without 
bloodshed, for certain internal complications produced a 
short period of civil war which ended in the complete tri- 
umph of the emperor. 

The overthrow of the Tokugawa shogunate was in large 
measure due to the activity of the western and southern 
clans, which had been excluded from power when the 
Tokugawa had assumed control of the government two cen- 
turies and a half before. The emperor found himself, if 
not under the control of these clans, at least dependent upon 
them for the maintenance of his position and the conduct of 
his government. They appropriated to themselves the con- 
trol of the army and navy, and to this day a large proportion 
of the higher officials in the army are members of the Choshu 
clan and in the navy of the Satsuma clan. It was not im- 
possible that the fall of the Tokugawa might have been fol- 
lowed, as on earlier occasions, by the establishment of a 
new dynasty of shoguns representative of one of these clans. 
The movement of events, in no small measure due to the 
rapid influx of modern influences, soon rendered any such 
contingency impossible. 

The earliest results of the revolution with regard to the 
conduct of the government were somewhat parallel to the 
changes in 645, but in inverse direction. In matters of re- 


JAPAN 187 


ligion there was a distinct attempt to separate the indigenous 
worship known as Shinto from the Buddhist influences 
which had overlaid it for so many centuries. The spirit of 
the new order was embodied in an early proclamation of 
the emperor known as the imperial oath, or the charter oath. 
This promised that henceforth government measures should 
be decided by impartial discussion; that the civil and mili- 
tary powers should be concentrated in a single whole, thus 
maintaining the national unity and assuring the rights of 
all; that uncivilized customs should be done away and that 
justice should rule; and finally, that “intellect and learning 
shall be sought for throughout the world in order to estab- 
lish the foundations of the empire.” 

It was obvious that if there was to be unity of national 
authority, many of the practices of feudalism would need 
to be abolished, so that the local administration might be 
brought fully under the imperial control. The problem of 
abolishing feudalism, therefore, became of primary impor- 
tance. In 1869 the daimyo of the southern and western 
clans offered to surrender to the emperor their feudal rights. 
This action was speedily followed by practically all the 
other daimyo, and in 1871 an imperial edict finally pro- 
nounced the formal abolition of feudalism. 

Some arrangement was necessary to compensate the 
daimyo and the samurai for the renunciation of their rights, 
which had included the surrender of important sources of 
income. This was managed by a system of pensions, which 
were, however, calculated on a scale too liberal for the na- 
tional resources. ‘Consequently, in 1873, a plan was initiated 
for commuting the pensions for certain payments in cash 
and government bonds. This reduction of the compensation, 
which was at first voluntary, was widely accepted, and 
finally, in 1876, was made compulsory. Thus Japan was 
freed from feudalism and the privileged status of the mili- 
tary class was brought to an end. 

These measures by which the ancient feudal system was, 
in the course of a half-dozen years, wiped out of existence 
involved a wide range of destructive consequences. They 
practically swept away both the military and financial 


188 THE AWAKENING EAST 


systems of the nation. It was obviously necessary that 
corresponding constructive efforts should be made syn- 
chronously. The first constructive measure was under- 
taken in 1870, very shortly after the beginning of the volun- 
tary surrenders of feudal privileges. It was decreed that, 
henceforth, the army should be recruited by a system of 
universal conscription. This single act created a general 
citizen army to replace the samurai as the sole military class 
of the nation. A few years later followed the final blow at 
the pride of the samurai, which deprived them henceforth 
of the distinctive honor of carrying swords. 

The second important constructive measure was the in- 
troduction, in 1872, of a general land tax payable in money. 
This gave the government a regular revenue in currency, 
assured it financial stability and independence from any 
intervention of the feudal nobility, and assured freedom 
from the uncertainties of fluctuating values and other in- 
conveniences inherent in the old system of payments in rice 
and other produce. At about the same time an imperial 
mint was established and the emission of a standard coinage 
was begun. These reforms, taken together, placed the new 
government in a position of great strategic advantage as 
against any class or local opposition or any effort for rever- 
sion to the old order. 

The abolition of feudal rights, privileges, and tenures, in 
spite of the original financial adjustment, meant a serious 
monetary loss to the old privileged classes. This loss was 
greatly increased by the final readjustments of the compen- 
sation arrangements. The creation of the land-tax system, 
at least at first, inevitably worked to their disadvantage in 
comparison with the popular classes. It also provided the 
government with the necessary financial resources to over- 
awe them in case of necessity. The abrogation of the mili- 
tary privileges of the samurai and the establishment of a 
military system based upon universal conscription, at a 
single stroke, deprived the feudal nobility of their traditional 
position in the national society and took from them the 
means which they had always enjoyed of enforcing their 
will. On the other hand, it gave the government an army 


JAPAN 189 


to maintain its authority, which was absolutely independent 
of both class and local interests. 

When it is considered how radical a revolution had thus 
been wrought in the social, economic, military, and political 
order, it arouses wonder that the reform had been effected 
with so little manifest opposition. It could, however, hardly 
have been expected that the change would pass entirely with- 
out protest or revolt. The insurrection came in 1877 after 
the changes had all been worked out, but also after plans 
had been well laid to make the protest effective. The revolt, 
though it undoubtedly had a much wider sympathy in its 
favor, was actually limited almost exclusively to one clan— 
Satsuma, in Kiushiu, the southern island. Indeed, it largely 
centered around a single person, one of the heads of that 
clan, Saigo, a member of the original group of reformers 
who had effected the overthrow of the shogunate. There 
can be little doubt that personal ambition and clan interests 
were actually more important factors than the great reform 
measures in producing this revolt. 

The struggle was fought with tremendous bitterness. 
The military forces engaged on both sides probably num- 
bered about one hundred thousand and over one third of 
these fell in the struggle. All the leaders in the revolt either 
were slain in battle or took their own lives. This Satsuma 
rebellion or Saigo insurrection, which occupied a few months 
in 1877, has been the only civil conflict in the nation’s history 
since the restoration of 1868, and it served to prove to the 
whole nation that the new order was irrevocably established. 

The changes which have thus far been recorded represent 
but a small proportion of the great program of reform which 
was launched at the restoration. It had been obvious that 
among the internal forces which were working for the de- 
struction of the shogunate was a revival of imperial am- 
bitions in the nation. Another force which had operated 
against the shogunate had been the unpopularity of the for- 
eign treaties and of the intrusion of the foreigners. Nat- 
urally, therefore, the new government, although it had 
promptly accepted the foreign treaties and given to the 
foreigners their desired guaranties, felt compelled to heed 


190 THE AWAKENING EAST 


the popular feeling. Diplomatic missions were accordingly 
sent abroad to the several treaty nations for the purpose of 
securing a revision of the treaties which should eliminate 
some of the most objectionable provisions. The earlier ef- 
forts proved entirely futile. 

Out of the movement in favor of reviving the ancient 
imperialistic policy arose disagreements with China, espe- 
cially with reference to Korea, toward which country these 
ambitions were naturally directed. Other questions arose 
over the island of Formosa and the chain of intervening 
islands known as Liu Chiu. In the north there were disputes 
with Russia over Saghalien and the Kurile Islands. The 
chauvinistic elements were eager to uphold the national pride 
and make war, especially over the Korean affair. The failure 
of the government to secure a revision of the foreign treaties 
added fuel to the fire. On the other hand, those who had 
been involved in the abortive diplomatic missions had 
learned wisdom, and were insistent in counseling peaceful 
measures. The genuine reformers also realized that war 
would delay rather than advance the policies which they 
had at heart. The consequent decision in favor of a peace- 
ful settlement of the several questions mentioned was, 
therefore, highly significant. This was, incidentally, an- 
other factor in the discontent which culminated in the 
Satsuma rebellion. 

The measures to which the reformers had set themselves 
at the restoration in 1868, and to the achievement of which 
they had thus far successfully insisted that the government 
must attend as its first duty, involved an almost sweeping 
introduction of modern western institutions, inventions, and 
methods. These, in turn, were calculated to produce fur- 
ther radical changes in the government and to alter the 
outward forms if not the inherent character of the economic 
and social order. Traditional restrictions against change of 
occupation and residence are disappearing; provincial and 
local differences are vanishing; class distinctions are stead- 
ily yielding to the demand for equality; the dominance of 
the family is being greatly modified by the growth of in- 
dividualism. In short, the old feudal regime of fixed status 


JAPAN 191 
is giving place to a new social order which is increasingly 
flexible and mobile. ‘Changes in dress and in many social 
customs have been, in part, revivals of earlier usages, as 
well as, in part, adaptations from the West. 

In accordance with the declaration of the imperial oath 
in favor of seeking “intellect and learning” throughout the 
world, experts in many matters were welcomed from Amer- 
ica, England, France, Germany, and other countries. They 
assisted in planning the new form of local government, in 
developing the new army and navy, in revising the legal 
system, and in other reforms of an institutional and admin- 
istrative character. They cooperated in the establishment of 
a system of education on modern lines, in teaching medical 
science, in the improvement of agriculture, and in starting 
a great enterprise for the colonization of the almost unoc- 
cupied northern island of Hokkaido. They helped to plan 
a commercial code, to develop a merchant marine, to erect 
lighthouses, and to create systems of railway, telegraph, and 
postal communications. Even the esthetic temperament of 
the nation expressed itself by calling in persons capable of 
instructing in the achievements of the western nations in 
the various fine arts. It is impossible to measure precisely 
the progress made within a given period in all these lines. 
A few illustrations must suffice. The first railway was 
opened in 1875, and by 1883, over 200 miles had been con- 
structed. By the same date there were already in operation 
nearly 5,000 miles of telegraph lines, and over 5,000 post 
offices were rendering service. 

Many of these foreign experts were men of remarkable 
force of character, who left a deep personal impress upon 
the groups of young men with whom they came in contact. 
A notable illustration was President Clark, of Amherst Agri- 
cultural College, who spent some months in Japan in 1876- 
1877 in organizing the Imperial ‘College of Agriculture at 
Sapporo, in the northern island. His memory, like that of 
several others, is still held in high honor by the eastern 
people whom he served. Peculiar interest attaches to the 
visit made to Japan, in the summer of 1879, by General 
Grant while on the tour around the world, which he made 


192 THE AWAKENING EAST 


following his retirement from the presidency. No occidental 
of eminence had previously visited Japan, nor has one of 
equal distinction done so since. He was the recipient of 
even more attention in Japan than in India or China, and 
his judgments were sought with great deference. 

While it was not an item in the program of reform it 
was inevitable that Christian missions should again appear 
in Japan. The Roman Catholics returned and, curiously, 
discovered in the vicinity of Nagasaki a small group of peo- 
ple who had, for more than two centuries, preserved the 
traditions of Christianity, which had been introduced at the 
close of the sixteenth century but had been rigidly under the 
ban since 1637. From Russia also came representatives of 
the Greek Orthodox Church. Even more important, how- 
ever, was the arrival of representatives of the leading Prot- 
estant denominations, of whom several had established their 
work as early as 1875. The foremost Japanese Christians 
of to-day were young men who were numbered among the 
earliest converts. 

While Japan was applying “intellect and learning” 
brought from the outside world, it was not failing to bear 
in mind the first proposition in the imperial oath, that “ail 
measures shall be decided by impartial discussion.” It is 
quite unnecessary to follow in detail the various changes 
effected in the organization of the central government be- 
tween the restoration in 1868 and the proclamation of the 
constitution in 1889. Various temporary expedients were 
utilized and several experiments were made. As early as 
1874, a demand was publicly voiced for a national parlia- 
ment, and from 1877, the year of the Satsuma rebellion, 
onward, several prominent members of the group of reform- 
ers and various political societies maintained an agitation 
for the establishment of representative institutions. From 
the beginning, though constrained to refuse to introduce a 
parliament prematurely, the government felt it necessary 
to make gestures of concession. In 1875 the governors of 
the kens, or prefectures, were summoned in a national as- 
sembly for consultation. This was merely an administrative 
device and in no way a form of representation. 


JAPAN 193 


In 1878 the first step toward genuine representative insti- 
tutions was undertaken, by a provision for representative 
assemblies in the prefectures. Two years later lesser local 
assemblies were also authorized. The introduction of sim- 
ilar institutions, on a somewhat more liberal pattern, by the 
British in India, as already described, extended over the 
generation from 1850 to 1885. ‘These institutions in Japan 
were elective and representative, but they had very nar- 
rowly limited functions. Their chief activity was in fixing 
the rates of taxation but, even in this their decision was 
subject to review by the higher administrative officers. At 
the same time the system of local administration in the pre- 
fectures and lesser districts, under the direction and control 
of the central government, was being worked out. There 
was developing throughout the country a local bureaucracy, 
largely composed of former samurai, working under the 
supervision of the national department of home affairs. 

In 1881 Mr., later Count, Okuma, who had rendered bril- 
liant service as minister of finance in the final adjustment of 
compensations to the feudal nobility, left the government 
and placed himself at the head of a progressive group (the 
predecessor of the later Kokuminto party) in favor of a 
national parliament. The government met this move by an 
imperial proclamation, promising that a national diet should 
be summoned in 1890, and that meanwhile the government 
would engage in the necessary study and preparation for 
the new departure. To one of the younger members of the 
group of reformers fell the main responsibility in this mat- 
ter. He was Mr., later Prince, Ito. 

In 1882 and 1883 Ito, with an extensive suite of experts 
and secretaries, spent some months in Europe and the 
United States acquainting himself with western institutions. 
Not unnaturally he fell under the spell of the dominant per- 
sonality of the time, Prince Bismarck, and found in the lat- 
ter’s constitution of the new German Empire many ideas 
which seemed to him suitable to appropriate, though he was 
planning a constitution for a unified and centralized state and 
not for a federated empire. While holding various offices 
at different times during the nine years, Ito was the most 


194 THE AWAKENING EAST 


important figure in the central administration, and was stead- 
ily adjusting the system in the manner necessary to effect 
the transition to parliamentary institutions with as little 
break as possible. Among the transitional measures was 
the creation, in 1884, of a new nobility in five orders, quite 
unrelated to the old feudal nobility, though a large propor- 
tion of the newly created nobles were members of the old 
feudal noble families. In 1885 a cabinet of the German 
type, with Ito himself as minister-president, was installed; 
in 1888 a privy council was created, and in 1889 a com- 
petitive civil service was inaugurated. The new constitu- 
tion, which seems to have been as fully the work of Ito 
as the German constitution of 1867 was the creation of Bis- 
marck, was finally proclaimed on February 11, 1880, the 
two thousand five hundred and forty-ninth anniversary of 
the accession of the first emperor, and the first meeting of 
the imperial diet assembled a year later. 

The constitution of Japan is not a fundamental law created 
by the people in their sovereign legislative capacity acting 
through some form of constitutional convention. It was 
proclaimed by the emperor in his sovereign capacity as a 
statement of the plan by which he proposed to conduct the 
government, and as a grant by the hereditary and hitherto 
autocratic sovereign to his people. The constitution care- 
fully conserves in theory and form the complete powers of 
the sovereign. 

The essential change effected by the constitution was the 
establishment of a national legislature, called the imperial 
diet. The consent of this body is requisite to every act of 
lawmaking. The initiation of laws may be exercised by the 
emperor or his ministers, or by the legislature itself. The 
powers of proroguing or dissolving the diet, which have 
been exercised on various occasions, reserve to the emperor 
an important degree of control over its proceedings. The 
diet is composed of two chambers, the house of peers and 
the house of representatives. Originally it was planned 
that each house should consist of three hundred members, 
but the number was not definitely fixed and, under laws sup- 
plementary to the constitution itself, the membership of each 


JAPAN 195 


body has been considerably enlarged, so that at present the 
house of peers consists of three hundred and seventy-three 
members, and the house of representatives of four hundred 
and sixty-three members. The emperor is advised and assisted 
in the conduct of the government by a ministry responsible 
to himself and not to the diet. The several ministers are 
heads of departments, and are responsible individually, as 
was the case under the German imperial constitution, not 
collectively, as is the case in England. The emperor also 
has two other bodies of advisers, the privy council, and the 
genro, or elder statesmen. The original members of the 
latter group were the more important survivors of the co- 
workers in the restoration. ‘While the powers of this body 
are not clearly defined, its influence has frequently been 
far-reaching and decisive and has, in general, been conserva- 
tive. Its attitude has usually been considered imperialistic 
and militaristic. 

This constitution was the first ever proclaimed in any na- 
tion not of European origin, and it established the first rep- 
resentative body as a national legislature among people of 
non-European stock. The Japanese have also claimed that 
it is the only constitution ever freely granted by a monarch 
to his subjects. This claim is true in the letter, perhaps, but 
certainly not in spirit, for in promising to grant the consti- 
tution the emperor had obviously yielded to political agita- 
tion. On the other hand, there is no doubt that the 
constitution permitted the determination of governmental 
policies by discussion in a way far in advance of what was 
anticipated some twenty years before in the first clause of 
the imperial oath. 

The provisions of the constitution, however, were not 
sufficiently liberal to satisfy those who had been agitating in 
favor of the establishment of constitutional government. 
These men were particularly disappointed at the provision 
for ministerial responsibility to the emperor rather than 
to parliament. This point became the center of political 
attack for many years. The ministers selected by the em- 
peror were denounced not merely as bureaucrats but as 
agents of clan government. These charges were substantially 


196 THE AWAKENING EAST 


true. Nearly all the ministers were chosen from two of the 
southern and western clans, Choshu and Satsuma. ‘The re- 
striction of the tenancy of the war and navy ministries to 
high officers in the respective services, imposed in 1895, 
placed these two departments almost inevitably under the 
control of these two clans respectively, laid the government 
open to the charge of being militaristic, and effectively 
blocked efforts to render the cabinet responsible to the diet. 
Though the new constitution had been established partly 
as the result of political agitation, many observers doubted 
whether the people of Japan were prepared to operate a rep- 
resentative government. The new educational system had 
certainly not yet been in operation a sufficient time to create 
a body of literate citizens of any considerable size. Neither 
had the Japanese people enjoyed the privilege of experience 
in the exercise of the elective franchise or in the operation 
of representative institutions, except in some local matters 
for less than fifteen years. These reasons certainly justified 
a very narrow limitation of the franchise at the initiation of 
constitutional government. These limitations naturally fur- 
nished a further cause for agitation. Though some ex- 
tension of the suffrage has since been granted, the right to 
vote still remains closely restricted. Meanwhile, the rapid 
development of the educational system has been fitting the 
whole mass of the Japanese people for political privileges. 
Though the constitution was criticized from the outset 
for its failure to permit party government, there really ex- 
isted no political parties in a proper sense upon which such 
institutions might have been based. Prior to the meeting 
of the first session of the diet there were small followings 
of a few prominent politicians. These groups were based 
upon personal loyalty rather than upon political principles. 
In the earlier sessions of the diet this situation was perpetu- 
ated, but with a growth in the size and importance of the 
followings of some of the leaders. The resulting political 
system is entirely dissimilar to either American or British 
experience. Despite the constitutional differences, the con- 
ditions may perhaps best be compared with the contem- 
poraneous political situation in France, with the same rapid 


JAPAN 197 


rise and fall of cabinets due to the constant shiftings in the 
combination of small party groups which were frequently 
personal followings. In both cases the tendency was to 
center interest on men rather than on principles. This com- 
parison with France is of some significance because it shows 
that the ensuing situation in Japan was due, not necessarily 
to the constitution, but certainly in some measure to the 
experience with political groups rather than with a two- 
party system. Survivals of clan relations, interests, and 
spirit are also definite, if not easily measurable, factors re- 
sponsible for group rather than party organization and 
politics. 

Unfortunately circumstances gave color to charges, which 
were freely bandied about on more than one occasion, that 
the votes of members of parliament were controlled by 
patronage and corruption. In like manner the conduct of 
elections aroused serious criticism. In the earlier elections 
violence, even resulting in death, was not an infrequent oc- 
currence. Though voting was later conducted somewhat 
more peacefully, campaigning methods gave rise to serious 
complaint and to repeated allegations of bribery. 

These circumstances tended to discredit seriously the de- 
mand for party government, and even the conduct of repre- 
sentative institutions themselves. Throughout the first four 
years the proceedings of the diet were distracted by the 
filibustering activities of the advocates of a parliamentary 
ministry and of revision of the treaties with western na- 
tions. It was only the use of the emperor’s power of pro- 
roguing and dissolving the diet and the consistent opposition 
of the house of peers to parties and party cabinets that saved 
the nation from political disaster. These unfortunate con- 
ditions were temporarily interrupted and somewhat modi- 
fied by the outbreak of the war with China in 1894. As long 
as the war endured, all party strife was laid aside. 

Count Ito, who had again become prime minister in 1892, 
recognized the unsatisfactory character of the experiences 
in trying to establish constitutional government and the im- 
possibility of reconciling the demand that ministers should 
be responsible to the diet with the constitutional provision 


198 THE AWAKENING EAST 


for their responsibility to the emperor. He seems to have 
deliberately welcomed the pretext for war furnished by 
China as a means of distracting public attention both at 
home and abroad from these facts. He has been charged 
with abandoning policies of internal reform in order to con- 
ceal the failure of his constitution by the glories of a for- 
eign war. 

By a treaty of 1885 Japan and China had recognized a 
sort of joint interest in Korea and had agreed on a plan of 
common action in case it should be necessary to intervene in 
that nation’s affairs. In 1894 China accepted an invitation 
to intervene in Korea, evidently reckoning the party dispute 
in Japan as serious enough to prevent its protesting ef- 
fectively. On the contrary, domestic discord was stilled, and 
both by land and sea Japan was uniformly successful. Vic- 
tories whetted the nation’s appetite for military glory, and 
consequently “On to Peking” became the watchword. The 
extension of the war from Manchuria into China proper 
was prevented by China’s suing for peace. The terms were 
inadequate to gratify public opinion. The failure to march 
on Peking and to exact more rigorous terms from China 
was promptly followed by another event which bitterly en- 
raged Japanese sentiment. Russia, Germany, and France 
intervened to compel Japan to relinquish the Liao-tung pen- 
insula in return for a slight increase in the war indemnity to 
be paid by China. These humiliations undermined the 
popularity of Count Ito. Nevertheless Japan did emerge 
from the war with China as the first nation in Asia to win 
substantial consideration from European powers. 

Japan had made rapid strides. Its constitution had been 
proclaimed in 1889. Parliamentary institutions had been 
in operation for five years and were working about as well 
as those of France, while Russia had not yet undertaken 
such liberal measures. The war with China had been a 
complete success. The acquisition of Formosa and the 
Pescadores extended Japanese control over the whole chain 
of islands from Kamchatka southward to the Philippines. 
Furthermore, ‘China was compelled to withdraw its claims 
over Korea and to recognize instead Japan’s interest in that 


JAPAN 199 


country. The Japanese imperialistic program may be com- 
pared with the policy of the English sovereigns in the thir- 
teenth and fourteenth centuries, when they were intent upon 
extending English domination throughout the British Islands 
and on controlling extensive territories in France. There 
was, however, a much more recent model before Japanese 
eyes in the achievements of Bismarck in the aggrandizement 
of Prussia between 1863 and 1871. Count Ito’s admiration 
for Bismarck and emulation of his policies appear here as 
well as in his constitution-making. 

Furthermore, two weeks before the outbreak of the war, 
Japanese diplomacy had won a brilliant triumph in securing 
a treaty with England providing for the abolition of extra- 
territoriality after five years. This stroke, perhaps no less 
than the war, was of peculiar importance to the Ito min- 
istry in discrediting the opposition in the diet. The intense 
desire of the Japanese people to free themselves from the 
stigma of national inferiority involved in the existing treaty 
provisions conferring upon the western powers the privileges 
of extra-territoriality had exercised a dominant influence 
in the establishment of constitutional government and in the 
political activities under that constitution. While the Japa- 
nese were indulging in further violent anti-foreign agitation 
after the collapse of negotiations in Tokyo with the repre- 
sentatives of all the treaty powers, Count Ito secretly trans- 
ferred the negotiations to London and soon obtained the 
distinctly favorable treaty, which was signed in 1894. Great 
Britain assented to the termination of the privilege of extra- 
territoriality after the expiration of five years, provided the 
Japanese government should have given one year’s previous 
notice that it was prepared to undertake the consequent re- 
sponsibilities. This delay was cleverly planned by the 
Japanese to afford adequate time for the framing of a new 
legal code and the adjusting of the judicial system, while 
the provision for one year’s notice was to give Japan the 
appearance of exercising the initiative instead of redrafting 
its laws in compliance with the foreign demand. 

The treaty did not, however, put an end to the conven- 
tional tariff. On the contrary, new tariff concessions were 


200 THE AWAKENING EAST 


the price paid by Japan for British assent to the abolition 
of extra-territoriality. The conventional tariff, henceforth, 
was limited to certain articles which constituted the bulk of 
British trade with the country, but it was provided that for 
all other articles Japan might establish a statutory tariff and 
that the conventional tariff should expire at the end of 
seventeen years, that is, in IQII. 

The ice having been broken, the other powers could 
scarcely refuse to enter into similar arrangements. By 1899 
all the other powers had consented to the necessary treaty 
revision, and on June 30 of that year Japan celebrated the 
restoration of the integrity of its national sovereignty. The 
only discordant note came from the foreign populations in 
the old treaty ports of Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagasaki, 
whose acrid criticism of Japanese laws and administration 
revealed their fears for their persons and property under 
the new order. With wise generosity the Japanese over- 
looked the criticisms and took extraordinary pains to avoid 
the difficulties which the foreign element had anticipated. 

The diplomatic situation at the close of the war with 
China, as already noted, made the position of the prime min- 
ister, now Marquis Ito, unpopular and difficult. Though the 
indemnity considerably exceeded the actual cost of the war, 
the resulting imperialistic policy of greater armaments neces- 
sitated a serious increase in the burden of taxation. Owing 
to the war and to the receipt of the indemnity money there 
was a sudden and distressing rise in prices which produced 
a momentary but unhealthy prosperity followed by sharp 
financial reverses. These circumstances increased the dif- 
ficulties confronting the government. The war also pro- 
duced an effect upon the constitutional and political situation. 
The governorship of Formosa and other appointments were 
promptly appropriated by the clan oligarchy. The military 
and naval interests associated with the Choshu and Satsuma 
clans tremendously strengthened their influence in the gov- 
ernment by legislation insuring their control of the war 
and navy departments. 

Thus, in the face of hostile opinion in the diet and in the 
nation, Marquis Ito had to frame his new budget. He met 


JAPAN 201 


the situation by proposing to supplement the annual budget 
by a special budget for a seven-year period which would 
spread over a series of years the anticipated heavy extraor- 
dinary expenditures for military and naval purposes and 
for internal improvements. Another post-war problem was 
the administration of the territories brought under Japanese 
control as a result of the war. Both in Formosa, where po- 
litical corruption and incompetence were rife, and in Korea, 
where the queen was murdered, apparently with Japanese 
connivance, the beginnings were exceedingly unfortunate. 
The government, however, took prompt measures to remedy 
the worst evils, so that a satisfactory administration was 
soon operating in Formosa and the supervision of Korea 
was exercised more reasonably. 

Though party strife had been laid aside during the war 
and though it did not again revert to the same bitter and 
violent form that had characterized the early days of con- 
stitutional government, the fundamental problems remained 
unsolved. Throughout the interval between the war with 
China and the war with Russia partisan strife continued 
acrimonious, and both in the elections and in the diet con- 
ditions still existed which seemed to justify charges of cor- 
ruption and of unfair political manipulation. The question 
of ministerial responsibility may be said to have remained 
in abeyance. The immediate issue was over imperialism and 
militarism. This was due not entirely to conditions within 
the country, but partly to the highly disturbed situation in 
eastern Asia. 

As far as the internal situation was concerned, the political 
struggle reached a climax from 1896 to 1898, after which 
the control of the militarists was steadily strengthened. A 
progressive party, the Shimpoto, after 1911 known as the 
Kokuminto, under the leadership of Count Okuma endeav- 
ored to enforce the principle of collective ministerial respon- 
sibility to the lower house of the diet. On the other hand, 
the militarist element led by the genro, or elder statesmen, 
sought to obtain higher taxes in order to insure more liberal 
appropriations for the army and navy. At first Count 
Okuma was able to secure a portfolio in a ministry headed 


202 THE AWAKENING EAST 


by Count Matsukata, with the understanding that the prin- 
ciple of ministerial responsibility would be accepted. This 
arrangement failed in 1897, but not until the administration 
had made itself memorable by the establishment of the 
Japanese currency on the gold standard. A new ministry 
of colorless character, under Marquis Ito, came into power, 
and secured the acceptance of the new legal code which was 
necessary to procure the abolition of extra-territoriality in 
1899 as provided by the treaties. 

A radical realignment of party groups and a new election 
resulted in a large majority in the new diet for the progres- 
sive party headed by Count Okuma and his allies. Marquis 
Ito resigned and recommended the selection of Okuma as 
prime minister, while he himself undertook a mission to 
China to investigate the acute situation there. This Okuma 
ministry was the first one whose choice was determined with 
direct reference to the majority in the lower house, but the 
dominant party was utterly unprepared to assume responsi- 
bility for the government and so failed miserably. 

A new cabinet, formed by Marquis Yamagata in Novem- 
ber, 1898, represented the triumph of the partisans of mil- 
itarism and clan politics. Though Yamagata, who was one 
of the highest officers in the army, disdained all parties, he 
found it necessary to effect arrangements for party support 
in order to get the diet to pass his measures for an enlarged 
military budget and for increased taxes. Nevertheless, his 
hostility to parties led him to discredit the very factions 
upon which he had relied and then to resign office. Yama- 
gata’s measures were purchased at the expense of an im- 
portant reform enacted in 1900 which increased the mem- 
bership of the lower house to three hundred and eighty-one, 
provided for a more equitable distribution of representation, 
reduced the property qualification for the franchise, abol- 
ished the requirement for signing ballots, and made election 
districts coterminous with the prefectures. Marquis Ito, 
who was intensely opposed to the militaristic policies of 
Marquis Yamagata, had labored zealously to secure his 
overthrow, and made that event the occasion for the creation 
of a new party, the Seiyukai, which has since played a highly 


JAPAN 203 


important part in Japanese politics. Ito, like Yamagata, 
was one of the elder statesmen, like him supported the 
imperial prerogative in the question of responsibility and ap- 
pointment of ministers, and also like him was a believer in 
oligarchical rather than popular government. The essential 
difference between the two men was that Yamagata was a 
militarist while Ito had become the advocate of a program 
for the material and intellectual advancement of the nation. 

Though Marquis Ito succeeded to the prime ministership, 
his triumph was short-lived. Only his personal control over 
his new party enabled him to secure the adoption of his 
budget proposals in the lower house. When these came be- 
fore the house of peers, they were promptly rejected, but 
an imperial rescript compelled the peers to pass the measure. 
This utilization of the imperial prerogative was not only 
extraordinary but dangerous. Indeed, it is doubtful whether 
Ito himself was responsible for the action. It was so much 
to his disadvantage that it is possible that it was suggested 
by his militarist opponents. In any case, Ito was soon forced 
to resign. 

A prolonged ministerial crisis ensued, in which the various 
party leaders, and Ito himself, were discomfited and dis- 
credited, owing to the machinations of Yamagata, who ulti- 
mately secured the organization of a ministry under the 
presidency of Count Katsura. This was the first ministry 
which did not contain any of the elder statesmen. It was 
frankly militaristic in character and professedly neutral with 
regard to parties. Once more the budget question produced 
strained relations between the two houses. By means of a 
political deal and some concessions in the terms of the 
measure, Katsura secured the adoption of his budget in the 
lower house, only to have it rejected by the peers. He then 
took up his original budget and secured its enactment by both 
houses. Thus on two occasions the political and constitu- 
tional struggle had brought the two houses of the diet into 
sharp antagonism. Only the support of the militarist ele- 
ment among the elder statesmen and the acrimony of party 
strife enabled Katsura to continue in office. He was able, 
however, to score an important success in the signing of the 


204 THE AWAKENING EAST 


Anglo-Japanese alliance in January, 1902, before the new 
elections to the diet took place. 

The election in 1902 was the first under the reformed elec- 
tion laws and resulted in returning an increased number of 
the Seiyukai. The new house promptly defeated Count 
Katsura’s budget proposals for a new land tax and a pro- 
gram of military development. Katsura at once dissolved 
the new diet and, in accordance with the constitution, ex- 
tended the previous budget for another year. This action 
was deliberately punitive,.as it required members to stand 
the expense of a second election within a year. The preva- 
lent corruption involved such heavy expenditure by the 
candidates that it was estimated that at least four years’ 
salary was necessary to recoup them. The new election in 
1903 resulted in no substantial change in the membership of 
the diet, but this time the budget was approved, because 
Marquis Ito, who foresaw the approaching conflict with 
Russia, dragooned his followers to its support. This action 
ended Ito’s career in politics. The leadership of the Seiyukai 
passed to Marquis Saionji, and Ito was named by the em- 
peror to the privy council. 

The last political maneuver before the outbreak of war 
with Russia was the dramatic personal act of Mr. Kono, 
the president of the lower house, at the opening of the new 
session in December, 1903, when, instead of the customary 
formal address to the emperor, he proposed an address de- 
nouncing the weak policy of the ministers, which was 
adopted without dissent. This extraordinary action resulted 
in the immediate dissolution of the house. There can be 
little doubt, however, that Kono’s purpose was an entirely 
patriotic desire to forewarn the country of the approaching 
struggle with Russia, which began in the following February. 
The war promptly hushed party strife and the new elections 
to the diet in March still remain memorable for freedom 
from bitter contests and corruption. In spite of these facts, 
Katsura, unlike Ito, does not seem to have sought foreign 
war as a balm for party dissension but to have pursued a de- 
liberate and definite militarist plan for a war of conquest. 

Only a few words can be devoted to the international re- 


JAPAN 205 


lations of Japan following the close of the war with China 
or during the war with Russia. Japan had been compelled 
in 1898 to watch with almost impotent wrath the seizure of 
Port Arthur by Russia, and of other ports in ‘China by other 
European powers. The only response that Japan could 
make to this situation at the time was the creation of the 
supreme advisory military council composed of Marquis 
Yamagata and his supporters. In 1900 Japan eagerly seized 
the opportunity to participate in the expedition to relieve 
the foreign legations in Peking from the siege by the Boxer 
rebels. 

Events during the preceding decade had convinced Japa- 
nese statesmen that they could not look for support to any 
power on the European continent. The sympathies of those 
governments for obvious reasons would be with Russia, 
whose activities in the Far East were becoming yearly more 
menacing to Japan. The United States had long been dis- 
tinctly friendly to Japan, but could not be looked to as an 
ally in view of its traditional policy. Under these circum- 
stances the Japanese had for some years been considering 
the possibilities of an alliance with England. English in- 
terests in Asia were no less than those of Russia, and the 
Russian policy appeared even more menacing to the British 
in India than to the Japanese. It was not unnatural, there- 
fore, in spite of the surprise of the western powers, that 
the Anglo-Japanese alliance should be formed in January, 
1902—the first alliance of a European with an Asiatic power 
on terms of national equality. 

It is possible that, in 1904, the Russians, like the Chinese 
in 1894, mistook the political strife in Japan for national 
weakness and unpreparedness. At any rate, Russian ag- 
gressions were conducted in Manchuria with insolent defi- 
ance of the rights and interests of all peoples in eastern 
Asia, and to the intense indignation of most European 
powers. After fruitless attempts to bring Russia peacefully 
to terms, Japan declared war in February, 1904. This strug- 
gle was regarded as a war of national defense and once more 
domestic differences were laid aside and the nation entered 
whole-heartedly into the struggle. The initial success of 


206 THE AWAKENING EAST 


Japan revived the imperialistic program, and “On to Baikal” 
became the watchword. Russia was to be defeated and 
driven out of all eastern Asia, which was to be brought under 
Japanese control as far west as Lake Baikal. Though China 
remained helplessly neutral, Japan anticipated extending its 
sphere of influence over Manchuria and Mongolia if not 
over other parts of the Chinese Empire, as it had done over 
Korea at the close of the previous war. 

As the war progressed, however, it became clear to the 
military authorities that the anticipated success was not be- 
ing obtained, for the retreating Russians were not being 
effectively defeated. Indeed, the Japanese government be- 
came convinced of the practical impossibility of administer- 
ing a crushing blow to Russia or of acquiring any consid- 
erable part of Russia’s territory in eastern Asia. They also 
realized that without an overwhelming defeat of the Rus- 
sians a war indemnity could not be exacted from them. 
Under these circumstances the government was prepared 
to accept the good offices extended by President Roosevelt, 
and in the end came to terms with Russia at Portsmouth in 
August, 1905. Asa result Japanese suzerainty over Korea 
was assured and Japan replaced Russia in the control of 
southern Manchuria and in the ownership of southern Sag- 
halien. The bitter disappointment to the Japanese people 
at the failure to obtain more extensive territory and an in- 
demnity found expression in serious riots and was disastrous 
to the popularity of the ministers and diplomats concerned. 
The popular indignation was intensified by the vast increase 
of the national debt and by the sudden addition to the burden 
of taxation. The war and the treaty had, none the less, re- 
sulted in genuine advantages to Japan. The militarist and 
clan statesmen might well feel satisfied with the degree of 
success achieved. 

The decade following the war was to witness no inter- 
mission in the prosecution of militarist policies. The na- 
tional position was strengthened by the renewal in 1905 of 
the alliance with England in stronger terms and with a wider 
scope. Furthermore, synchronously with the Anglo-Russian 
entente of 1907, Japan entered into agreements with Russia 


JAPAN 207 


and France based upon the maintenance of the existing 
status in the Far East. Nevertheless, the policy pursued by 
Japan after 1905 with Korea, Manchuria, and China can 
with difficulty be differentiated in character from that of 
Russia prior to the war. The behavior of Japan did not 
improve the feeling of the European powers toward her, 
lost her the sympathy of the United States, and even re- 
sulted in a weakening of the provisions of the alliance with 
England when it was again renewed in 1911. The only off- 
set, strangely enough, was to be found in the relations with 
Russia, which began to take on a more friendly aspect and 
to contemplate cooperation of the two countries in dealing 
with the affairs of eastern Asia. It was especially the 
Japanese administration in Korea and ultimately the an- 
nexation of that country in 1910 which cost Japan the 
friendly attitude of other powers and the favorable judg- 
ment of the world at large. 

As was the case at the close of the war with China, the 
months immediately following the termination of the war 
with Russia were marked by violent fluctuations in the eco- 
nomic and financial affairs of Japan. The government, with 
some difficulty, carried through a general program of finan- 
cial readjustment, and in addition undertook the national 
purchase of all the principal railways of the country. This 
procedure was possibly unconstitutional, certainly arbitrary, 
as regards the rights of the owners of the railways. It was, 
however, equally culpable on the other side because of the 
excessive liberality of the compensation allowed. In private 
business, the period witnessed the organization of many new 
corporations and unrestrained speculation in their shares. 
Prices rose rapidly to extraordinary heights and fell even 
more quickly and sharply. The resulting depression was 
not entirely overcome until the outbreak of the World War, 
though the period was not without a certain amount of de- 
velopment in industrial enterprise at home and in com- 
mercial operations abroad. 

Count Katsura, who had remained in power throughout 
the war, was compelled by the popular clamor against the 
terms of peace to yield the prime ministership to Marquis 


208 THE AWAKENING EAST 


Saionji. In 1908, however, Katsura was able to regain of- 
fice, to set aside Prince Ito, who had been intrusted with 
the administration of Korea, and ultimately, in 1910, to 
carry through the annexation of that country. His chief 
agent was General Terauchi, who had been minister of war 
since 1902 and who was now despatched to take charge of 
affairs in Korea. 

The second Katsura ministry is notable not merely for 
its handling of the Korean problem and for the renewal of 
the alliance with England, but also for its domestic policy. 
The budgets were arranged to provide for the annual pay- 
ment of fifty million yen on the foreign debt and for the 
refunding of the domestic debt at four per cent. The latter 
procedure was arbitrary in view of the state of the money 
market, and was regarded as more or less confiscatory be- 
cause of the sharp reduction of the interest rate, the conse- 
quent decline in the market value of the bonds, and the re- 
newal of the government policy of buying bonds in the open 
market for redemption rather than in purchasing them by 
lot at par, as had for some time been the custom. Though 
Count Katsura had replaced Marquis Saionji, the leader of 
the Seiyukai, in office, he was able to rely upon the support 
of that party because of its general principles, and because, 
it was alleged, of the use of bribes and patronage. One un- 
toward incident of the administration was the so-called sugar 
scandal, which involved the punishment for bribery of sev- 
eral members of the diet who were concerned in the wreck- 
ing of a sugar company which had sought to secure special 
advantages from favoring legislation. 

It also fell to the lot of the Katsura ministry to revise the 
tariff and commercial treaties in accordance with the earlier 
treaty agreements. Important changes were made in the 
statutory tariff, but a blunder of the foreign minister, Count 
Komura, prevented the negotiation of new treaties on as 
favorable terms as had been desired. Finally a measure for 
universal manhood suffrage, which had been passed by the 
the lower house, was thrown out by the house of peers with 
vehement denunciations of the measure as contrary to the 
spirit of the constitution. 


JAPAN 209 


In August, 1911, Count Katsura voluntarily gave place 
to Marquis Saionji, during whose ministry the emperor, 
Mutsuhito, posthumously known as the Meiji Tenno, died 
on July 30, 1912, after a memorable reign of forty-five years, 
and was succeeded by his only son, Yoshihito. Soon after 
this event occurred the fall of the Saionji ministry under 
peculiar conditions. The demand of the war minister for 
two additional army divisions for service in Korea was 
negatived and the minister resigned. The refusal of the 
army to provide another high officer as minister necessarily 
involved the resignation of the cabinet. It was apparently 
the purpose of Prince Yamagata and the clan statesmen to 
force the issue to their own advantage. 

Prince Katsura, who had apparently broken with Yama- 
gata, after some unusual measures, managed to take office 
for a third time. His action was, however, in defiance of 
public opinion, which did not seem to grasp the import of 
the situation. After launching a new political party in his 
own support, Katsura had to confess defeat and resign early 
in 1913, and before the year was out he died. This crisis is 
particularly notable for the influence exercised by public 
opinion and by the mob in Tokyo. Katsura had undertaken 
to duplicate the maneuvers of Ito eleven years earlier to defy 
the elder statesmen, but had failed even more miserably. 

Since the Choshu clan could furnish no satisfactory can- 
didate for the premiership, the choice of the genro fell upon 
Admiral Count Yamamoto, of the Satsuma clan. This min- 
istry, and the triumph of the genro, however, were short- 
lived, owing to a scandal involving the trial of high officials 
in the navy, charged with bribery in connection with the 
building of a warship. In April, 1914, the prime minister- 
ship passed to Count Okuma, the leader of the Kokuminto 
party which, under changing names, had long opposed both 
the genro and the Seiyukai. The Okuma ministry was as- 
sociated with Japan’s entrance into the World War, the 
capture of the German possessions in the Far East and in 
the Pacific, and the enforcement of the so-called “twenty- 
one demands” upon China. 

The years preceding the outbreak of the World War, as 


210 THE AWAKENING EAST 


has been seen, had witnessed the steady embitterment of 
Japanese politics. The situation had reached a crisis in the 
naval scandal on the eve of the war. The formation of the 
Okuma ministry was a triumph for the elements which had 
been opposing the demands for increased military and naval 
expenditures. The ministry entered office with a program 
denouncing corruption, opposing militaristic expenditure, 
and favoring measures for economic and social welfare. It 
was a strange irony, therefore, that this ministry was called 
upon to face the situation created by the outbreak of the 
World War. 

In August, 1914, in accordance with the requirements of 
the alliance with England, Japan declared war, and a few 
days later began the attack upon the German leasehold of 
Kiao-chao on the China coast. This territory was surren- 
dered to Japan in November, while the Caroline, Mariana, 
and Marshall islands, the north Pacific insular colonies of 
Germany, had been occupied by the Japanese forces in the 
preceding month. 

On the assembly of the diet at the end of the year the 
ministry asked unanimous approval for a greatly enlarged 
naval and military budget for the ensuing year. The diet 
refused to lay aside its partisanship as it had done in the 
case of the wars with China and Russia, and the budget 
proposals were rejected in both houses. In face of such 
opposition the only practicable measure was dissolution of 
the diet and appeal to the electorate. The results were 
favorable to Count Okuma and his ministry, though it was 
alleged that the elections were marked, to an unusual degree, 
by corruption and official pressure in favor of ministerial 
candidates. The new diet promptly granted the army and 
navy increases, including various demands of this sort which 
dated back to the cabinet crisis of 1912. 

On the eve of the assembly of the new diet in May, 1915, 
it was announced that China had yielded to the Japanese 
ultimatum in the matter known as “the twenty-one de- 
mands.” Though the new diet approved the increased 
budget, vigorous attacks were made upon this aggressive 
Chinese policy of Count Okuma, and also charges were 


JAPAN 211 


pressed against one of the ministers in another matter. A 
cabinet crisis ensued which permitted Count Okuma to re- 
organize his ministry with new nominees in place of the 
foreign minister and his colleague against whom the attacks 
had been directed. 

After the seizure of the German possessions in the Far 
East there was naturally question about the part which 
Japan should henceforth play in the World War. While 
it was decided not to send troops to the western front in 
Europe, Japan undertook to contribute to the supply of 
munitions for the Allies, and in October became a party to 
the Allied agreement known as the pact of London. This 
was followed in 1916 by an agreement with Russia on mat- 
ters of Asiatic policy. Of Count Okuma’s original platform 
of economic and social reform only two details of sig- 
nificance were embodied in law. These were provisions 
against child labor and in favor of accident compensation 
to workingmen. 

The advanced age and failing health of Count Okuma 
made him unwilling to continue to face the persistent at- 
tacks in the diet, and so in October, 1916, he retired and 
a new ministry with Count Terauchi at the head was formed. 
This new ministry did not command a majority in the diet 
and was at once denounced as ultra-militaristic. Of par- 
ticular vehemence were the attacks made upon the foreign 
policy of the government, especially with regard to China. 
Terauchi accordingly secured the dissolution of the diet 
and in the new elections in April, 1917, won a victory, 
thanks to the support of the Seiyukai. The year 1917 was 
marked by an acute rise in prices in Japan which resulted 
in numerous strikes by the workingmen. In most cases 
these disturbances were short-lived, and resulted in the con- 
cession of greatly increased wages. 

The victory of the Terauchi ministry in the spring of 
1917 occurred shortly after the declaration of war against 
Germany by the United States and the outbreak of the revo- 
lution in Russia. These two circumstances soon involved 
new developments in Japanese policy. While the country 
continued to contribute to the Allied supply of munitions 


21a THE AWAKENING EAST 


and to extend its trade rapidly, especially in fields once 
almost monopolized by the British, its aggressive policy to- 
ward China received surprising confirmation from the 
United States, in the Lansing-Ishii agreement of November, 
1917. Later, in 1918, owing to the progress of the Russian 
revolution and its. possible bearing upon the World War, 
Japan, if not at the suggestion of the United States, at least 
with its codperation, undertook intervention in Siberia. With 
the progress of the war, however, Count Terauchi seems to 
have been losing confidence in the Allied cause, and to have 
convinced himself of the probability of German success. It 
is said that he was actually on the point of reversing Japa- 
nese policy in July, 1918, when the tide of the war suddenly 
and decisively changed in favor of the Allies. Furthermore, 
his administration incurred serious unpopularity for its 
failure to alleviate the economic distress caused by the ex- 
traordinary rise of prices. 

In September Count Terauchi’s ministry had to give 
place to one under Mr. Hara, the leader of the Seiyukai, 
the first Japanese commoner to attain the premiership. 
Though the new cabinet represented less militaristic and 
more liberal views than its predecessor, it conducted the 
peace negotiations at Versailles in accordance with the 
vigorous chauvinistic policy which had prevailed since the 
accession to office of CCount Okuma. The insistence upon 
securing for Japan a position in Shantung distinctly superior 
to that held by Germany before the war was so flagrant as 
to produce a revulsion of feeling-against Japan not merely 
in China but practically throughout the civilized world. 

During the war Japan had enjoyed abnormal industrial 
and commercial prosperity. It had at the same time wit- 
nessed the evils of profiteering both in the production of 
inferior goods and in the exaction of excessive prices. 
These facts, taken together with the policy affecting China, 
seriously discredited Japan throughout the East. The crisis 
came in 1920 when the balance of trade was suddenly re- 
versed, and runs on the banks occurred. The reaction was 
felt most severely in the newly developing industrial centers 
where abnormally high wages suddenly gave place to unem- 


JAPAN 213 
ployment and strikes. Fortunately for the country the min- 
istry took prompt measures to secure a satisfactory adjust- 
ment of domestic affairs through the enactment of various 
laws dealing with economic matters and local administration. 

Though concessions adopted in 1918 increased the size of 
the electorate from two and one half per cent to five per 
cent of the population, the agitation in favor of a more 
liberal suffrage law—indeed, of universal manhood suffrage 
—continued to develop in persistence and force. The disso- 
lution of the diet in 1920 was ascribed, in part, to a purpose 
of defeating these demands. As had been the case in the 
two previous instances, the new elections were vehemently 
contested but resulted in favor of the Seiyukai and the 
ministry in power. Intimately bound up with the agitation 
for a more liberal franchise was the demand for better edu- 
cational facilities, which proved scarcely less futile. These 
proposed reforms were also closely associated with op- 
position to the militaristic policy of the government and in- 
cluded demands for diminished expenditure on naval and 
military affairs, for the modification of the conscription plan 
of military service, and for withdrawal from the aggressive 
and unsuccessful policies in China and Siberia. 

Still another difficulty which confronted the government 
was the matter of relations with the United States, which 
had been growing steadily more unsatisfactory. The prob- 
lems involved included the education, land, and immigration 
questions, which arose mainly from the action of the state 
of California, but they also included the effects of a possible 
renewal of the Anglo-Japanese alliance and of the continua- 
tion of the aggressive Japanese policy in China and Siberia. 
There was, in general, an American suspicion of Japanese 
militarism, which, it must be confessed, was somewhat off- 
set by a Japanese suspicion of American militarism, espe- 
cially in view of the continued increase of the United States 
navy after the war. The policy of the Japanese government 
in dealing with the current situation had long been the sub- 
ject of unfavorable comment in the United States and in 
other countries. This suspicion of Japan’s disingenuousness 
was confirmed by the protracted delay in fulfilling Premier 


214 THE AWAKENING EAST 


Hara’s promise of September, 1920, to withdraw from Si- 
beria. The disturbances which developed in Korea in 1919 
and the consequent Japanese measures of repression aroused 
extraordinary disapproval, which was but slowly allayed 
by the more politic administration of the new governor- 
general, Baron Saito. The immediate subject at issue was 
the seemingly insignificant question of Yap. It involved, 
however, the fundamental principle of the rights of the 
United States in territories placed under mandate by the 
treaty of Versailles and the important practical matter of 
the security of American telegraphic communications with 
the Philippines and other Far Eastern countries. 

While it must not be assumed that all the complaints rep- 
resented an intelligent knowledge of facts or a fair and im- 
partial judgment upon them, there is no question of the sig- 
nificance of their effect upon public opinion in Japan, in 
China, in the United States, and in other countries. There 
can be little doubt that the situation in the year 192I was 
highly critical. Fortunately the attitude of the new Amer- 
ican administration under President Harding opened the 
way to a vast improvement, through the planning of the 
Washington conference and through the negotiations which 
were there brought to a conclusion.? 

The year 192I was also marked by the journey of the 
crown prince to visit the Allied countries in Europe. This 
action was of extraordinary significance, because it was the 
first occasion on which a prince in the imperial succession 
had ever left Japan. The journey was undertaken in spite 
of serious opposition, and its successful conclusion was re- 
garded as a triumph for the liberal cause. Shortly after 
the return of the crown prince he was named regent owing 
to the long-continued ill-health of the emperor. 

Just at the moment of the meeting of the Washington 
conference, Premier Hara was assassinated. In his stead 
Baron Takahashi became prime minister, but in June, 1922, 
shortly after the return of the mission from Washington, 
its head, Baron Kato, succeeded to the premiership. This 


See above, pages 139-141. The question of Yap was settled to 
the satisfaction of the United States. 


JAPAN 215 


change of ministry was of great significance not merely be- 
cause it carried approval of the Washington conference but 
also because Baron Kato accepted office on specific condition 
of a policy of army and navy reduction and of the evacua- 
tion of Siberia. This was the first case in which a premier 
was chosen under conditions that enabled him to bring the 
clan statesmen to terms in the selection of the army and 
navy ministers. Baron Kato was not only able to defy long- 
established traditions in entering upon office but he has also 
been able to continue in power despite the direct censure of 
his administration by the privy council with especial refer- 
ence to the policy concerning China. 

The trend of events during the year following the Wash- 
ington conference has been away from militarism and toward 
liberalism. It has also revealed a marked alleviation of con- 
ditions in Japan, even though there has been little in the 
way of reform legislation. The international relations and 
reputation of Japan have been greatly improved, owing to 
the wisdom and sincerity displayed by its representatives in 
the agreements made at Washington and in their execution. 
The continued validity of these agreements, it must be ob- 
served, will be dependent on the accession of Russia to them 
whenever that country is readmitted to international comity. 
Contrary action by Russia would once more embroil the 
whole Far Eastern situation and drive Japan back to mil- 
itarism.3 

In retrospect, from the opening of the country to foreign 
intercourse in 1854 till 1894, Japan officially adhered to a 
policy of internal development and of nonintervention in 
foreign affairs. Advocates of a vigorous foreign policy 
appeared throughout the period, and at least once, in 1873, 
nearly brought the country into war. From 1894, when re- 
vision of the treaties was secured and war was declared 
against China, until the treaty of Versailles in 1919, Japanese 
policy was, in varying degrees, militaristic and chauvinistic. 
The high tides of aggressive or imperialistic spirit were un- 
doubtedly in the years 1895, 1905, and 1919, which re- 


*For later developments, see below, pages 231ff. 


216 THE AWAKENING EAST 


spectively marked the close of the three great wars to which 
the nation was a party. Yet each of these dates also wit- 
nessed the sharp disappointment of the national ambition. 
In 1895 foreign intervention robbed Japan of the fruits of 
victory ; in 1905 popular indignation was vented on the ad- 
ministration which had wisely recognized that the resources 
of the nation were inadequate to win more than a partial 
victory over Russia; in 1919 the treaty provisions secured 
to Japan a fuller concession of its demands than was ob- 
tained by any other party to the peace, but the nation had 
to learn that terms guaranteed on paper were impracticable 
of realization. It is greatly to the credit of the Japanese 
government and people that they seem to have been able to 
take to heart the last unpleasant lesson as well as the former 
ones. The policy of Baron Kato apparently represents a 
reversion to the principles of the first quarter century of 
the Meiji era—progress at home, peace with honor abroad. 
It would seem that Baron Kato is actually succeeding with 
the program for which Marquis Ito in 1902 and Prince Kat- 
sura in 1912 struggled in vain. 

The trend of internal political developments is far less 
easy to discern and explain. The movement of events from 
year to year has already been recorded; it is now necessary 
to undertake to determine their significance. The restora- 
tion of 1868 replaced the emperor in autocratic control of 
the government. In theory that autocratic, almost theocratic, 
power remains supreme: practically, by the grant of the 
constitution in 1889, the emperor has not divested himself 
of his prerogatives but has given them legal definition and 
established the principles and methods through which they 
shall operate. Vastly more divinity appertains to the Japa- 
nese emperor than hedges the British sovereign. Every 
one from the premier down still bows in alert obedience 
to the imperial behest. That finality still attaches to the 
expressed will of the emperor is, no doubt, due to the re- 
markable discretion which has characterized imperial inter- 
vention in political matters. 

From the restoration to the grant of the constitution 
progress was administrative rather than political. Reforms 


JAPAN 217 


were wrought by imperial mandate, but the work was done 
by advisers and ministers drawn almost entirely from the 
four southern and western clans, mainly from Choshu and 
Satsuma. This was not unnatural, as the services of these 
clans had achieved the restoration and as these clans were 
those which the circumstances of the establishment of west- 
ern intercourse had made most progressive. Political agita- 
tion in this period was confined to small groups and aimed 
at parliamentary government and treaty revision. With the 
election of the first diet these groups developed into po- 
litical parties, and during the next four years their advocacy 
of these two causes was far more vehement than discreet. 
Though there have probably been more stormy sessions of 
the diet in later days, the attitude assumed on constitutional 
questions has never again been so violent. 

The periods of the wars with China and Russia were times 
of political truce or quiescence. With the close of each 
war political strife revived. The question of parliamentary 
government came to be treated as a matter of political ex- 
pediency rather than as a constitutional issue. The emphasis 
was upon men rather than measures. Though both Ito and 
Katsura were originally identified with highly imperialistic 
policies, the responsibilities and experience of office seem, in 
the end, to have convinced each that internal progress was 
more essential than expansion abroad. Both fell victims 
to the peculiar power wielded by those leaders of the mil- 
itary clans known as the elder statesmen. It is not unfair 
to assume that behind the elder statesmen was a very power- 
ful body of public opinion, and that the tactics of the earlier 
parliamentary politicians had not been of the kind to com- 
mand popular support. 

The entrance of Japan into the World War in 1914 did 
not set a period to partisan strife as had been the case in 
1894 and 1904. Politics seemed, on the contrary, to grow 
more corrupt and acrimonious, and members of the diet 
more violent and irresponsible. The Okuma ministry, 
which entered office in 1914 on a liberal platform, out- 
Heroded its precedessors in imperialism, militarism, and 
corruption. The succeeding ministry under Terauchi per- 


218 THE AWAKENING EAST 


petuated the evil tradition. These conditions brought their 
own Nemesis. The prolonged indifference to the popular 
needs had permitted the cumulation of evils crying for re- 
form. The economic effects of the war contributed to the 
crisis which forced the Terauchi cabinet from power in 
1918. Meanwhile the operation of the educational system 
had produced what did not exist when the constitution was 
proclaimed in 1889, namely, a literate citizenry which was 
rapidly growing in intelligence and interest in public affairs. 
These people cared little for the rivalries of politicians ; 
they wanted increased educational facilities, better working 
conditions, lower prices, and the right to vote; they opposed 
military conscription, excessive taxation, increased arma- 
ments, and a foreign policy fraught with opprobium and 
economic ruin. Premier Hara began to discern the signs 
of the times; Premier Kato seems fully awake to them. 

Sympathetic understanding of modern tendencies seems 
also to characterize the recently proclaimed prince regent. 
Born in the twentieth century, this young sovereign is 
already showing an inclination to emulate western monarchs 
in manner and policy rather than to imitate the patriarchal 
attitude of his illustrious and revered grandsire. With the 
deaths, in 1922, of Prince Yamagata and Marquis Okuma, 
the genro, the elder statesmen, who were the mainstay of 
the benevolent despotism of the Meiji era, have practically 
passed from the stage. Even the men of the second gen- 
eration who still utilize the house of peers as a stronghold 
of conservatism are giving place to younger blood. Few 
members are now sitting in the lower house whose terms of 
service antedate the war with Russia. The positions of 
power, influence, and responsibility are rapidly being filled 
by men of the younger generation, trained in modern schools, 
to whom the old Japan is but a hazy tradition. 

Many circumstances indicate that the nation, after a gen- 
eration of experience with representative institutions and 
limited suffrage under the constitution of 1880, is prepared 
to take another step forward. Liberal extension of the 
franchise alone will not suffice. Conditions now seem to 
require and justify closer correlation of the administration 


JAPAN 219 


with the diet, if not its responsibility thereto; further de- 
velopment of the educational system, and improved condi- 
tions for the working classes. These reforms are demanded 
by a growing public opinion, which sums up its desires in 
the word “democracy.” This democracy, however, is not 
republican ; it is sanely combined with a deep sense of loyalty 
to the ancient ruling house. 

The popular currency of democratic ideas, derived chiefly 
from England and the United States, is doubtless due to 
familiarity with the English language, which is regularly 
taught in all schools above elementary grade. The Japanese 
are a nation of readers. On the trains, for instance, greater 
numbers of both men and women may be seen reading books 
and periodicals than in any other country except the United 
States. Public libraries have been multiplied in recent years 
on a scale far surpassing any other eastern nation. In the 
publication of books, the press of Japan rivals the pro- 
gressive nations of the West. The number of periodicals 
published has risen from about one thousand in 1900 to 
about thirty-five hundred at the present time. The various 
types of weeklies and monthlies familiar in England and 
America have their counterparts in Japan. Daily news- 
papers, which date from 1871, are numerous and as varied 
in character and color as in the United States. Some of them 
claim a circulation of a quarter of a million. The censor- 
ship restrictions, which were formerly reminiscent of Ger- 
man procedure, have been considerably relaxed in recent 
years. The foreign-language papers, which in some cases 
antedate the Japanese, are mostly of high grade, as exempli- 
fied by the admirable Japan Advertiser, edited by a native 
of the United States. These developments certify to the 
steady growth of an informed and alert public opinion. To- 
day the Japanese people are educated for a more liberal gov- 
ernment. 

The constitution of 1889 probably provided as large a de- 
gree of self-government as the people were then competent 
to exercise. In so far as it followed any western examples 
it was built upon continental European models, for only 
there could be found constitutional governments of a mon- 


_ 220 THE AWAKENING EAST 


archical type. It would have been not only almost incom- 
prehensible but also extremely unwise had the Japanese 
suddenly broken with their venerable monarchical past and 
launched out, as China attempted to do at a later date, on 
an entirely new experiment in governmental forms and 
methods. It was perhaps wise also that they proceeded with 
deliberation in the extension of political privileges instead 
of adopting universal suffrage as Bismarck had done in 
Germany. The failure to follow another German precedent, 
that of federation, and the adherence instead to the native 
traditions of centralization; somewhat improved by study 
of the French system and methods, illustrates clearly the 
difference of the Japanese situation from that of the Chinese. 

The wisdom which dictated the conservative character of 
the constitution in 1889 should now dictate its liberalization. 
The changes should be natural outgrowths of the nation’s 
past and not mere alien grafts upon the ancient stock. On 
the other hand, to refuse or long delay the grant of certain 
reforms, for which there 1s widespread popular demand and 
for which the nation is clearly prepared, would be to court 
revolution. Chauvinism and militarism have thus far post- 
poned concession to the demands for constitutional progress, 
and they may again be called into use to secure further 
delay. 

Chattvinism seems to run in the Japanese blood as it does 
in the French; each of the last three decades has seen a 
notable manifestation of it, and clearly the danger of re- 
currence is not entirely imaginary. Japan overestimates its 
primacy in the Far East and its progressiveness, just as the 
French have been wont to do in Europe ever since the revo- 
lution of 1789. This spirit of international knight-errantry 
is, however, in some degree, offset by a stability in the in- 
ternal political life which is comparable to the solidity of 
British constitutional development rather than to the fickle- 
ness of French political experimentation. For the imme- 
diate future the fortunes of Japan are in the hands of the 
generation which has been trained under the constitution of 
1889, but also under the regime of militarism. It is too 
soon to determine whether its dominant desire will be for 


JAPAN 221 


political progress or for military achievement. Happily, 
present indications point to the former alternative. 

The spirit of the new Japan certainly insists on a fuller 
measure of social and political equality in the national life. 
Internationally it expresses itself unequivocally, though not 
in a militarist manner, in the demand for racial equality. 
The mass of the Japanese people apparently desires peace 
and prosperity, which it would promote by a policy, advo- 
cated by such progressive leaders as the veteran parlia- 
mentarian, Mr. Ozaki, of disarmament by international 
agreement. The aims and achievements of the Washington 
conference found a hearty response throughout the nation. 
The lessening of the burdens of universal military service 
and of public expenditures for army and navy is considered 
prerequisite to the undertaking of an extensive new program 
of economic and social improvement. 7 

The national budget for 1922-1923, it is estimated, will 
balance at $730,000,000. The public debt at the close of 
1920 amounted to $843,000,000 in internal loans and $714,- 
000,000 in foreign loans, a total of $1,557,000,000. The 
loans are at rates bearing from four to five per cent interest. 
The annual expenditure is $13 per capita and the debt 
amounts to $27.80 per capita. These rates are surprisingly 
low in comparison with various western nations, but they 
are felt in Japan to be excessive. The country is on a sound 
financial basis, having adopted the gold standard, and it has 
an extensive banking system which dates from 1872. There 
are numerous private banking corporations and over six 
hundred savings banks, with a considerable number of agri- 
cultural and industrial banks in addition to a postal savings 
system. 

Japan has made good progress in the development of in- 
ternal communications. The total mileage of railways in 
operation in 1880 was 73; in 1900, 3,038; in 1920, 8,207. 
Most of the lines were unfortunately constructed on a nar- 
row gauge. As far back as 1906 Japan had undertaken a 
policy of nationalization of its railroads, at least of all the 
important lines. At the outbreak of the war in 1914 a 
policy of railroad development to extend over a period of 


222 THE AWAKENING EAST 


ten years had already been entered upon. Considerable 
progress was made even during the period of the war, and 
at its close further extensions of the policy, including a 
scheme of electrification and plans for the adoption of a 
standard gauge, were sanctioned. These undertakings are 
scheduled for completion in twenty years. There are electric 
tramways in the more important cities, amounting to 732 
miles in 1918. The jinrikisha, now widely used throughout 
the Far East, was devised by a missionary in Japan. Tele- 
graph lines amounted to 28,000 miles in 1921, and telephone 
systems are in operation in the more important cities. There 
are about 8,000 post offices. 

It was noted at the outset that the area of Japan proper is 
about 148,000 square miles, and that its population in 1920 
was over 56,000,000, that is, about 380 persons to the square 
mile. Uniil the opening of Japan to intercourse with west- 
ern nations in 1853 the population had necessarily to support 
itself from the country. Since then, however, the population 
has increased with tremendous rapidity. As late as 1880 
Japan had approximately only 36,000,000 inhabitants. In 
the five years 1917-1921 inclusive the average annual in- 
crement has been 550,000. This increase in population has 
naturally produced a problem of securing the necessary sus- 
tenance. If the whole area of Japan, or even one half of it, 
were cultivable land, the problem would not be an impossible 
one. Only 14 per cent of this area, however, is re- 
ported to be under tillage. Some persons contend that much 
of the rest is entirely unfitted for agricultural purposes, and 
that the remainder could be adapted to cultivation only with 
great effort and without assurance of a satisfactorily com- 
pensating return in productivity. On the other hand, it is 
alleged that the cultivated area could easily be increased by 
at least one third. Trade statistics do not show that Japan 
falls much short of self-sufficiency in food supply. In 1919 
only 16 per cent of its imports were articles of food, while 
7 per cent of the exports were food products, leaving the 
net importation less than Io per cent of the total trade. 

Until very recently, Japan was primarily an agricultural 
country, like the other eastern lands which have been con- 


JAPAN 223 


sidered. So long as the nation is compelled to be self-sup- 
porting or makes it a policy to depend upon its own food 
supply, and so long as the population remains almost ex- 
clusively agricultural in occupation, the difficulty of the 
problem is obvious. There are three possible solutions. The 
first of these is the extension of the cultivated area, together 
with increased productivity of the lands under tillage by the 
application of scientific methods. Some advance is being 
made in both these directions. 

The second solution is in a national policy of expansion, 
either political and economic, or merely economic. The last 
half century has seen important efforts made in these ways. 
The first of these was within Japan itself by the policy of 
colonization in the northern island, Hokkaido. That island 
contains a considerable area capable of cultivation; but the 
climatic and soil conditions are both considerably different 
from those of the rest of the country. The Japanese have 
not yet proved their ability to adapt themselves and their 
modes of life to the more severe climate, nor have they 
readily adjusted themselves to the necessary changes in 
agricultural methods. The slowness in the growth of the 
population of the island is sufficient evidence on this point. 

In the next place, Japan looked to two other areas near at 
hand but not under its jurisdiction. One was Formosa, 
an island possession of China, which was acquired as one 
of the results of the war with that nation in 1895. The 
other was Korea, in which Japan had a traditional interest. 
This country had its own monarchical government and owed 
to China a certain amount of allegiance, which was likewise 
eliminated by the war in 1895. Just as Hokkaido is too cold, 
so Formosa is too warm, and the Japanese have not taken 
any more kindly to its climate. In Formosa also the agri- 
cultural conditions differ, and while the Japanese have made 
a remarkable showing in many respects in their administra- 
tion of the island and its development, they have failed, as 
the figures of population show, to make it a new Japanese 
homeland. 

In Korea, Japan steadily improved its political position 
until it formally annexed the country in 1910. From 


224 THE AWAKENING EAST 


1895 onward, and increasingly since 1910, Japan has under- 
taken in various ways not merely the exploitation but 
also the colonization of Korea. The difference in climatic 
conditions is perhaps a little less serious in this case, and the 
same is more or less true with regard to the conditions for 
agriculture. Apparently the Japanese effort has broken 
down in this case because Korea was a country with a na- 
tional history as long as that of Japan itself and with a 
population more or less proportional to the area and its 
productivity. Furthermore, the Koreans were accustomed 
to a narrower margin of existence and a cheaper rate of 
living, which has rendered Japanese competition rather im- 
practicable. This too is said with all recognition of the re- 
markable achievements of Japan in the material improve- 
ment of Korea. It has proved to be, in fact, a development 
of Korea by the Japanese which is working out economically 
to the advantage of the Koreans rather than of Japan. 
Looking at it from a somewhat different angle, and speaking 
in mining phraseology, Korea is a low-grade proposition, 
and the Japanese lack the necessary qualities to make it pay. 
After the war with Russia, and more especially after the 
outbreak of the World War in 1914, the Japanese began to 
consider much more ambitious and far-reaching enterprises. 
First and most naturally, they interested themselves in Man- 
churia, where it had seemed there was ample opportunity 
for expansion with the possibilities of acquiring political 
control. Again the Japanese have not shown ability, in any 
considerable measure, to adapt themselves to the awkward 
conditions of life and work. Then, too, they encountered 
rivals with whom they could not compete. Manchuria is 
more accessible to China than to Japan. It is a natural field 
for Chinese expansion and, quite apart from any question of 
political control, Chinese migration has been rapidly pouring 
into this country in recent years. The Chinese readily adapt 
themselves to the new situation and, when placed on an 
equal basis with the Japanese, are certain winners in the 
economic competition. Japanese activities extended even 
as far afield as inner Mongolia, but what is true of Man- 
churia is of even greater force in the case of Mongolia. 


JAPAN 225 


In the next place, Japan seized the German port of Kiao- 
chao and claimed to supersede the Germans in control in 
the Chinese province of Shantung as a sphere of influence. 
While census statistics are not available, it seems probable 
that this province is even more densely populated than Japan 
itself. Quite apart from the diplomatic and political ques- 
tions involved, Japan seems to have discovered that any no- 
tion of considering Shantung as a field for Japanese coloni- 
zation or agricultural exploitation was impracticable. At any 
rate, Japan offered remarkably little objection, in negotia- 
tions conducted in connection with the Washington confer- 
ence, to withdrawing from the position which it had 
undertaken to assume therein. In still another Chinese 
province, during the period of the World War, Japan took 
steps toward creating a sphere of influence. But in this 
province, Fukien, which was of interest to Japan because of 
its proximity to Formosa, they made less progress than 
anywhere else. 

The one country where the Japanese seems to find himself 
readily at home, aside from the small Hawaiian group, is 
California.4 The reasons against Japanese activities in either 
of these places are, however, so overwhelming as to require 
no mention beyond the acceptance by Japan, in the “gentle- 
men’s agreement” of 1907, of the restriction of immigration 
into the United States. It seems, in conclusion, that Japan 
has made some progress, but not to a satisfactory degree, 
in its effort to couple political and economic expansion, as 
shown in the cases of Formosa and Korea. It has, thus far, 
fared little better in its efforts at purely economic exploita- 
tion of a colonizing and agricultural type. This series of 
experiences has revealed a lack of ability on the part of the 
Japanese to adapt themselves easily or quickly to new physi- 
cal surroundings. It has also shown that they possess too 
little imagination, tact, and sense of humor to enable them 
to govern successfully other peoples such as the Koreans, 

“Probably Australia would have proved equally alluring had it 
not been for the inflexible exclusion of all Asiatics from that con- 


tinent. Canada is less desirable for the Japanese and its policy 
has been but slightly more hospitable. 


226 THE AWAKENING EAST 


or to win the confidence of the Chinese. Though the partial 
failure in Korea may possibly be dismissed as negligible, 
it is absolutely essential to the political peace and the eco- 
nomic prosperity of Japan that the blunders and shortcom- 
ings in China shall be retrieved without delay. China can 
dispense with Japan, but Japan can hardly hope to survive 
in the new age of economic development without unham- 
pered access to the resources and markets of China. 

There remains the third possible solution of Japan’s in- 
creasing population, that is, an occupational readjustment— 
an industrial revolution. “That movement is in progress 
and is, on the whole, apparently working successfully. Japan 
is an oceanic country surrounded by waters teeming with 
fish. Since Perry’s visit to Japan the rapid growth of the 
fisheries enterprises has been an important factor in devel- 
_ oping a valuable source of food supply and in affording oc- 
cupation to a considerable number of people. The value of 
the marine products increased from somewhat over $6,000,- 
000 in 1893 to more than $85,000,000 twenty-five years later. 

A second outlet was found in the development of maritime 
trade. The growth of Japanese merchant shipping has been 
a remarkable achievement. In 1888 it amounted to less 
than 200,000 tons. Twenty years later it was 1,200,000; and 
ten years later still, it was approximately 2,800,000 tons. 
This development on the part of the Japanese is quite as 
natural as the growth of British maritime power since the 
time of Queen Elizabeth. Taken together, however, the 
fisheries and maritime commerce afford a living to a com- 
paratively small proportion of the population, and do not 
directly make a large contribution toward solving the prob- 
lem of food supply. Indirectly, the extension of the Japa- 
nese maritime shipping business offers a means of securing 
advantageously from other countries the necessary food 
supplies to make up the home deficiency. 

The expansion of Japanese trade, however, must in large 
measure depend upon the ability of Japan to produce com- 
modities which can be sold at advantage in the world’s mar- 
kets or in exchange for food supplies. This means a devel- 
opment of manufacturing enterprise or the possession of 


JAPAN 227 


mineral products which can be exported. In the latter case, 
however, Japan is peculiarly unfortunate. Whereas England 
has a remarkable wealth of coal and iron, Japan lacks a 
supply of these minerals adequate for its own needs, and it 
has no surplus wealth of any other mineral product. Conse- 
quently the question narrows down to that of manufactures. 
By this process of logical exclusion, it would seem that the 
nation has recognized the necessity of directing its genius 
into this new line of activity with all possible zeal. 

The growth of manufacturing enterprises in Japan stands 
absolutely unrivaled by any country outside of Europe and 
North America. It is true, the progress thus far made is 
not great as compared with the United States, Great Britain, 
Germany, and some other countries. Nevertheless it is 
sufficient to indicate the ability of the Japanese to engage in 
such undertakings, and the possibility, even the probability, 
of their finding therein a successful solution of their prob- 
lem. In 1918, the latest date for which statistics are avail- 
able, the industrial census showed that Japan had 22,391 
factories employing more than ten hands each, in which 
1,409,196 workers were employed, of whom more than half 
were females. The chief products were cotton, silk, and 
woolen goods, paper, matches, earthenware, lacquers, mat- 
ting, and leather. In addition to these, Japan produces 
various minor articles which, taken together, count for a 
considerable amount in the national exports. The possi- 
bility of Japanese industrial competition with the United 
States and other western nations is sometimes suggested as 
a menace. Lack of sufficient raw materials, if no other 
reason, will prevent the Japanese from effective competition 
with western nations, except in a few special lines. Japan 
must find its principal markets in the neighboring eastern 
lands. 

By all odds the most important product of Japan, from 
the point of view of agriculture, manufacturing, and com- 
merce combined, is silk. Of this article Japan produces a 
large proportion of the world’s supply, its chief competitors 
being China and Italy. The value of the silk exports of 
Japan in 1921 amounted to over $250,000,000, being over 


228 THE AWAKENING EAST 


two fifths of the nation’s total export trade for the year. In 
considering the distribution of the Japanese export trade it 
appears that, in 1920, 29 per cent went to the United States, 
2I per cent to China, and the next most important custom- 
ers in order were British India, the Dutch Indies, Great 
Britain, Hong Kong, and Australia. Of the import trade, 
in 1920, 37 per cent came from the United States, and then 
followed in order British India, Great Britain, China with 
Q per cent, Australia, and the Dutch Indies. Japan now 
ranks third among the nations from which the United 
States makes imports and fifth among those which take its 
exports. 

As in every country, prior to the industrial revolution, 
there was necessarily a considerable amount of manufactur- 
ing under the so-called domestic system. Most of the prod- 
uct was for local consumption, but little went into the wider 
market of the nation at large, and only a very small part 
found its way into the international market. This was still 
true in Japan less than forty years ago, and even now con- 
tinues, to some extent, to be the case, for the industrial revo- 
lution is only at the beginning of its development in the 
country. Twenty years ago there were some factories of 
the modern type. To-day, as the figures already given have 
shown, there is a goodly number of factories, employing a 
considerable percentage of the population. 

As in England and other countries, the industrial revo- 
lution is associated not merely with a transition from agri- 
cultural to industrial occupations, but also with a move- 
ment of population from the country into cities. The urban 
population of Japan has increased at a remarkable rate dur- 
ing the last twenty years, while the rural population has 
shown a comparatively slight growth. In 18098 there were 
only two cities with over 400,000 population, Tokyo and 
Osaka, which together had 2,261,000 inhabitants. In 1918 
these two cities each exceeded 1,250,000 in population and 
had a total of 3,425,000, and there were four other cities 
with over 400,000. The total number of cities with over 
100,000 inhabitants in 1898 was eight; in 1918 it was four- 
teen, while five others fell but a little short of that figure. 


JAPAN 229 


This development of great urban populations has carried 
with it the same evils with which western nations have been 
familiar, but perhaps to a somewhat heightened degree. 
Osaka is Japan’s great industrial center, and the problems 
of labor and pauperism found there are as acute probably 
as in any place in the world. The conditions are vividly por- 
trayed in the widely circulated writings of Toyohiko 
Kagawa, a graduate of Princeton University, who is living 
as a Christian social worker in the slums of Kobe and who 
is considered “the most influential labor leader in the Japa- 
nese Empire.” It is only fair, however, to consider the 
present situation as one of momentary transition, and to 
believe that the Japanese will display the necessary qualities 
to solve the extraordinary new problems which confront 
them. | 

One evidence for this belief is the way in which the Japa- 
nese have handled the question of education. Elementary 
education is not merely compulsory by law, but is actually 
operative as successfully as anywhere in the world, so that 
Japan is at present able to pride itself on its statistics for 
literacy in comparison with the most advanced nations of 
the West. In 1918 over 8,000,000 children were in attend- 
ance at elementary schools. There is a fair number of 
higher schools and of universities. While the elementary 
schools and the universities are perhaps reasonably meeting 
the demands placed upon them, the number of middle or 
high schools is insufficient, as is also the case with pro- 
fessional, technical, and vocational schools. The demands 
for admission to these far exceed the capacity, and only a 
small proportion of those examined each year gain admission. 
Undoubtedly with a more adequate development of these 
schools the demand for university training would increase 
correspondingly and would require greater facilities. The 
government is earnestly striving to solve this problem. This 
favorable comparison of Japanese educational conditions 
with the situation in China, Egypt, or India may, therefore, 
be taken as justification for the judgment just offered, that 
Japan will presumably prove as efficient as western nations in 
solving the problem of urban population, 


230 THE AWAKENING EAST 


The great changes in Japan which date from the restora- 
tion have not been without important consequences in the 
religious life of the nation. ‘While the constitution guaran- 
tees complete freedom of faith, two religions have long en- 
joyed full legal status. The ancient religion of the country 
is Shintoism; Buddhism has prevailed throughout the coun- 
try since the seventh century. The latter, owing to its more 
highly developed character, long exercised a marked influ- 
ence upon the older religion. The two faiths were not neces- 
sarily mutually exclusive and in course of time tended to 
become more or less blended with one another. While the 
restoration was in no wise hostile to Buddhism it naturally 
gave its chief patronage to Shintoism. Efforts were made 
to dissociate the latter from its Buddhist connection and 
restore it to its ancient purity and simplicity. The results, 
however, have not been enduring. Buddhism, thus stimu- 
lated to activity, has appropriated various modern methods 
to recover and extend its influence. 

The restoration opened the way for the readmission to 
Japan of another religion, Christianity, which three centuries 
before had made its first appearance in the country, only 
to be driven out by the early Tokugawa shoguns. The year 
1872, practically speaking, marks the beginning of success- 
ful missionary enterprises undertaken by the Greek Ortho- 
dox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant churches. Measured 
by the number of converts, their achievements have not 
been remarkable. To-day there are somewhat more than 
100,000 Protestants, less than that number of Roman Catho- 
lics, and less than 50,000 Greek Orthodox adherents. Chris- 
tianity, however, has made highly important contributions 
to the development of education both through its own in- 
stitutions and through its influence upon the national system. 
Christianity has also wielded a moral influence of extraor- 
dinary importance, entirely out of proportion to the number 
of its professed followers, as witnessed, for example, by 
the extensive practice of using Sunday as a day of rest. 
Both the standards of private life and the ideals of national 
life have been profoundly modified by influences emanating 
from Christianity, and its adherents are among the foremost 


JAPAN 231 


promoters of all undertakings for the advancement of the 
nation. 

As the Confucian code of ethics has fixed the standard of 
national life for China, so the code of honor has determined 
the ideals and actions of the Japanese. The Confucian ethics 
were the creation of a scholar and ministered to the indi- 
vidual’s spirit of contemplation and sense of complacency. 
Bushido is, however, the code of chivalry inspiring the in- 
dividual to knightly activity and accomplishment. The code 
of ethics and the code of honor symbolize the differences in 
national character and achievement between the Chinese and 
the Japanese. The spirit of bushido stamps every move- 
ment in the extraordinary progress of the nation in the last 
half century. The defects as well as the merits of the 
Japanese achievement have been inherent in bushido. Sym- 
pathetic critics have observed that where the Japanese have 
not succeeded, the failure has been a moral one—an inability 
to understand and cope with the moral forces involved by 
bringing superior moral power to bear. Bushido is as inade- 
quate for Japan as Confucianism is for China. Each nation 
must find the missing element and introduce it into its life. 
The past generation has given Japan material and political 
progress: the.new generation faces the task of developing 
the nation’s spiritual resources and moral power. 


RECENT EVENTS 


After the death of Baron Kato on August 24, 1923, 
though the Setyukai had a majority in the diet, a nonparty 
cabinet was formed under the leadership of Count Yama- 
moto, who had been premier in 1913-1914.5 This ministry 
was in the process of organization when the earthquake of 
September 1 occurred, and fortunately Baron Goto, formerly 
mayor of Tokyo, had already been selected for the home 
office. Though the main task of the ministry was the 
handling of the difficult situation following the earthquake 
and the formulation of plans for reconstruction, its political 
tenure was insecure because of the opposition of the Seiyu- 


° See above, pages 209, 215. 


232 THE AWAKENING EAST 


kai. The attitude of one group in the administration was 
indicated in the proposal by Baron Goto and Mr. Inukai, 
the minister of posts, to introduce a bill for manhood suf- 
frage. Suggestions of reforms affecting the house of peers 
were also discussed. The fall of this ministry on December 
29, however, was immediately occasioned by the attempted 
assassination of the prince regent while he was driving to 
the ceremony of opening the regular session of the diet 
two days earlier. 

Again a nonparty cabinet. was formed. For the post of 
premier there was selected Viscount Kiyoura, a man sev- 
enty-three years of age, who had spent his life in govern- 
ment office and had frequently occupied cabinet positions 
as a trusted lieutenant of Prince Yamagata. Though the 
selection, as in the previous instance, seemed to indicate a 
reactionary tendency, it was probably influenced by a dis- 
trust of party politicians and particularly of the Seiyukai. 
The questions of party government and ministerial respon- 
sibility have also apparently produced a contest for power 
between the two houses of the diet. Attempts were made 
to form a coalition of opposition elements on a platform of 
manhood suffrage. After the failure of this plan, a break 
was forced in the ranks of the Seiyukai and one hundred 
and forty-eight seceders, calling themselves the Seiyu-honto, 
rallied to the support of the premier. In the tense political 
situation, a train on which three opposition leaders were 
traveling to Tokyo was wrecked. The consequent outburst 
of disturbance in the lower house on January 31, 1924 led 
to the dissolution of the diet. 

The ensuing elections for a new diet which occurred 
on May 10, 1924 were marked by more than usual disorder 
and corruption. It is estimated that under the existing 
franchise, five sixths of the members of the lower house are 
returned by rural voters. Owing to the small number of 
urban members, the industrial and commercial interests of 
the country are insufficiently represented. A surprising re- 
sult of the balloting was the small number of candidates for 
reelection who were chosen. About two hundred and fifty 
of the successful candidates were new members. The ele- 


JAPAN 233 


ments opposed to the ministry in power demanded universal 
suffrage, constitutional government, and reform of the upper 
house of the diet. The returns showed the election of one 
hundred and forty-six members of the Kenseikai; one hun- 
dred and twenty of the newly organized Seiyu-honto; one 
hundred and one of the Seiyukai; and ninety-seven of other 
affiliations. The defeat of the ministry was unmistakable, 
and on June Io it resigned. Viscount Takaaki Kato, the 
leader of the Kenseikai, formed a new ministry with the 
assistance of the Seiyukai and the Kakushin Club. In con- 
trast with the previous ministry, which was drawn largely 
from the upper house, the new cabinet, with a single excep- 
tion, is drawn from the lower house. Though it represents 
the younger and less reactionary elements, the new ministry 
has been so distracted with questions of international con- 
cern in the few months of its existence that it has had no 
opportunity to initiate a program of reform legislation in 
internal affairs, other than financial. 

The earthquake of September 1, which destroyed nearly 
the whole city of Yokohama, the major portion of Tokyo, 
the naval port of Yokosuka, and many other places within 
a considerable radius from Tokyo, resulted in the loss of 
about one hundred and fifty thousand lives, the injury of 
about as many more persons, and a property loss officially 
estimated at from 7,000,000,000 to 10,000,000,000 yen.® 
The prompt response of sympathetic and generous aid from 
most civilized countries, especially from the United States, 
was remarkable. The warm expressions of appreciation by 
the Japanese of American assistance augured for an era of 
better relations between the two countries. This situation 
was suddenly changed in November when the United States 
supreme court announced decisions upholding the constitu- 
tionality of the anti-Japanese land laws of California and 
Washington. Much more serious cause of displeasure was 
given by the congress of the United States when it passed, 
in April, 1924, in defiance of the protest of President 
Coolidge and Secretary Hughes, the new immigration act 


*One yen is almost exactly equal to fifty cents in American 
money. 


234 THE AWAKENING EAST 


including a provision annulling the “gentlemen’s agree- 
ment” of 1907, under which the restriction of Japanese 1m- 
migration to the United States had been administered pri- 
marily by the Japanese government. Though there are 
plausible explanations for the congressional action, they do 
not remove the cause of provocation felt by Japan. In July, 
Japan enacted a new citizenship law abolishing dual na- 
tionality, with the purpose of removing one of the causes of 
complaint alleged in the United States. 

In view of the demands for retrenchment of expenditures 
and, more recently, in view of the vast outlays entailed 
by the earthquake, the budget of 1924 was fixed at $635,000,- 
000, a saving of $52,000,000 as compared with the 1923 
budget, in which extensive economies were effected after 
the earthquake. The diet, in December, 1923, even scaled 
down the proposed appropriations for reconstruction, so 
that the government was forced to announce important 
modifications in the plans for rebuilding Tokyo. ‘The first 
international loans for reconstruction were floated on terms 
which were regarded as eminently fair among international 
financiers, but in Japan as none too favorable. The extraor- 
dinary difficulties of the economic situation led the Kiyoura 
cabinet to create an imperial economic council composed of 
one hundred and ten leading representatives of the financial 
and economic interests of the nation as an advisory body 
which first met in April. Owing to the unfavorable move- 
ment of trade during the first half of 1924, which resulted 
in a heavy excess of imports over exports, due to the im- 
portation of materials for reconstruction and of luxuries, 
the government introduced a measure placing an import 
duty of one hundred per cent on two hundred and fifty 
articles of luxury, which was promptly passed in July. A 
committee is also engaged in an effort to reorganize the 
administrative offices of the government with a view to re- 
ducing the number of positions and curtailing expenses. 
Further plans for army reduction, which will probably limit 
the period of service with the colors to one year, are also 
under consideration. 

In March, 1923, an agreement was reached between Japan 


JAPAN 235 


and the United States for the abrogation of the Lansing- 
Ishii agreement, with the understanding that it would be 
supplanted by the nine-power treaty signed at the Washing- 
ton conference. The disarmament treaty drafted at the 
Washington conference was finally ratified by France in 
August, and later in the same month the ratifications of this 
treaty were exchanged in Washington. The so-called nine- 
power treaty, however, still awaits similar ratification.? 
Owing to these agreements the Japanese government was 
able to cut approximately $20,000,000 from the estimates 
for the navy both for 1923 and for 1924. There has been 
a reduction of the army by four divisions, and the military 
budget for 1924 is nearly $100,000,000 below that of 1923. 
The appropriations for education have been increased. The 
arbitration treaty between Japan and the United States was 
extended in April, 1924, for a term of five years. It has 
been announced that the American Red Cross will furnish 
$3,000,000 for hospital construction in Tokyo and that the 
Rockefeller Foundation will contribute $1,000,000 toward 
the rebuilding of the University of Tokyo. 

The Japanese government has been alarmed not only over 
its relations with the United States but also over those with 
China and Russia. The representatives of soviet Russia 
had been negotiating, at intervals, for many months with 
both China and Japan when their treaty with China of 
May 31, 1924, was suddenly announced. The Japanese, 
especially among the commercial classes, who favored 
the reopening of relations with Russia, felt confirmed in 
their views and demanded the prompt renewal of negotia- 
tions. In July it was announced that the cabinet had agreed 
upon the bases for negotiations with Russia and on August 7 
negotiations were actually resumed in Peking. No an- 
nouncement of the results has yet appeared. With reference 
both to Russia and China, the attitude of the Kato ministry 
is clearly conciliatory and apparently inspired by the desire 
to establish as favorable economic relations with both na- 
tions as possible. 

The Kiyoura ministry was responsible in March, 1923, 





*See above, page 139. 


236 THE AWAKENING EAST 


for the final enactment of a reform measure of distinct im- 
portance which provides for the introduction of jury trial. 
A commission is at present visiting other countries to study 
the subject, preparatory to putting the measure into opera- 
tion. Recent statistics have shown the remarkable rise of 
wages in recent years. For work in Kobe which received 
in 1914 a maximum daily compensation of one yen, the max- 
imum is now from four to five yen. Reports concerning 
the conditions in Korea are favorable. The foreign trade 
of Korea for 1923 surpassed all previous records. The death 
of Prince Matsukata in July, 1924, removed the last sur- 
vivor of the elder statesmen, with the exception of Marquis 
Saionji. The marriage of the prince regent to Princess 
Nagako, eldest daughter of Prince Kuni, was celebrated in 
the early part of 1924. The public demonstrations, espe- 
cially in Tokyo, testified to the popularity of the young sov- 
ereign. In the effort, at the meeting of the assembly of 
the League of Nations in Geneva in September, 1924, to 
draft preliminary measures in anticipation of a scheme of 
universal disarmament, Japan, inspired with the idea of 
promoting equality of racial treatment for its own citizens, 
and for Asiatics in general, insisted on certain adjustments 
of the provisional plan as the condition of its adherence. 


SUGGESTIONS FOR READING 


A brief introductory survey of Japanese history is furnished by 
Professor Kenneth S. Latourette of Yale University in The Devel- 
opment of Japan (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1918) ; 
and a more scholarly account by Professor Katsuro Hara, of the 
University of Kyoto, in An Introduction to the History of Japan 
(New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1920). A Political History 
of Japan during the Meiji Era, 1867-1912 (New York, Charles 
Scribner’s Sons, 1916), by Professor Walter W. McLaren, of Wil- 
liams College, gives a reasonably complete and accurate, but rather 
unsympathetic, account of the great period of modernization. A 
comprehensive survey of the various phases of Japanese life and 
their development during the same period written by native authori- 
ties will be found in Fifty Years of New Japan (2nd ed., 2 vols., 
New York, E. P. Dutton & Company, 1910), edited by Count 
Shigenobu Okuma, former prime minister. 

Some acquaintance with the Japanese people, their life, thought, 
and institutions may be obtained from Things Japanese (5th ed., 


JAPAN 237 


London, J. Murray, 1905), by Basil H. Chamberlain; Japan, Day 
by Day, 1877, 1878-79, 1882-83 (2 vols., Boston, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, 1917), by Edward S. Morse; Japan, an Attempt at Inter- 
pretation (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1904), by Lafcadio 
Hearn; and The Foundations of Japan, Notes Made during Jour- 
neys of 6,000 Miles in Rural Districts as a Basts for a Sounder 
Knowledge of the Japanese People (New York, D. Appleton & 
Company, 1922), by J. W. Robertson Scott, who all write from 
extended first-hand acquaintance. A History of Christiamty in 
Japan (2 vols., New York, Fleming H. Revell & Company, 1909), 
by Otis Cary, is a comprehensive survey. 

For the relations between Japan and the United States good 
accounts will be found in The Early Diplomatic Relations between 
the United States and Japan, 1853-1865 (Baltimore, The Johns Hop- 
kins Press, 1917), and Japan and the United States, 1853-1921 
(Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1921), both by Professor Pay- 
son J. Treat of Stanford University, and in The Americans in East- 
ern Asia (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1922), by Tyler Den- 
nett, who has been permitted to use the archives of the American 
department of state. Japan’s Pacific Policy,. especially in Relation 
to China, the Far East, and the Washington Conference (New York, 
E. P. Dutton & Company, 1922), is by Kiyoshi K. Kawakami, who 
is also the author of several other works written to interpret to the 
American people the Japanese and their interests. 

The Japan Year Book (16th year, 1921-22, New York, Dixie 
Book Shop, 1922), edited by Professor Y. Takenob, of the Waseda 
University, Tokyo, contains a wealth of current information, includ- 
ing a Who’s Who section. 


CHAP DEROV: 
THEARHIEL BIN ies 


Tue Philippine Islands are, in the extent of cultivated 
area and in size of population, closely comparable to Egypt. 
The island character of the area involved and the racial 
traits of the people relate the situation, in some particulars, 
to that in Japan. The problems of status and government 
are comparable to those of Egypt and of India. As Egypt 
is valuable to England for maintenance of control of the 
route to India, so the Philippine Islands are useful to the 
United States in affording a convenient base for commerce 
and other interests in eastern Asia and in the western Pa- 
cific. The Filipino peoples, within a more limited range, 
exhibit almost as many ethnographic varieties and linguistic 
diversities as do the people of India. 

In an important particular, however, the Filipinos stand 
out in sharp contrast against the populations of the other four 
countries which have here been studied. Over go per cent of 
them are Christian and have been so for about three cen- 
turies. This Christian character of the Filipino peoples 
not only distinguishes them from all other eastern peoples in 
religion, but has helped to develop an attitude toward west- 
ern civilization radically different from that of any other 
people in the East. 

This difference is clearly evidenced in the higher status 
of women. Religious, legal, and social restrictions do not 
seclude or hamper them like their sisters in other eastern 
lands. In the Philippines woman plays her part in all the 
affairs of life in a way not very different from the customs 
of the West. The emancipation of women is, therefore, 
in the Philippines, unlike the other eastern countries, a ques- 
tion already settled in most particulars other than political. 
The freer status of women in the Philippines greatly sim- 
plifies many of the problems of assimilating the national life 
to the conditions obtaining in western lands. 

238 


OPE Ole BIN ES 239 


In still another important particular there is a marked 
contrast between the Filipinos and the other eastern peoples 
whose problems have here been considered. The Filipinos 
are not the possessors of an ancient culture or of a national 
history extending over millenniums. Their rise to the higher 
stages of culture has been chiefly during the period of their 
contact with western civilization. Under the tutelage of 
Spain for three centuries and a half their rate of progress 
was slow, but the total advance attained was considerable 
and has made possible the remarkable progress during the 
quarter century of American supervision. The absence of 
long-established cultural and political forms and of deep- 
seated traditions accounts for the remarkable mobility and 
adaptability displayed by the Filipino people in their 
extraordinary advancement during recent years. 

These cultural diversities from the peoples of the Asiatic 
continent are, no doubt, in considerable measure explained 
by the insularity of the Philippines and by their location at 
a distance from the continent five times greater than in the 
case of Japan. The Philippines consist of 11 larger islands, 
2,400 smaller ones, and 4,600 of trivial size. In this respect 
the group is much more broken up than is Japan. Further- 
more, the four main islands of Japan are so close to one 
another as to permit of regular railway connections by 
ferries. The smaller size of the main islands of the Philip- 
pines and the greater distances separating them have pre- 
vented anything like the unity of development that has oc- 
curred in Japan. The total area of the Philippines is 115,026 
square miles, of which 10 per cent only is under cultivation. 
The area is between 75 and 80 per cent of that of Japan 
proper and about 95 per cent of that of the British Islands. 
The group lies between 5° and 20° north latitude, corre- 
sponding to Central America and the extreme northern part 
of South America. Manila is situated about 14° north of 
the equator, approximately on the same parallel as the city 
of Guatemala, the island of Martinique, and Cape Verde. 

According to census returns, the population of the Philip- 
pine Islands increased from 7,635,426 in 1903 to 10,314,310 
in 1918. At the latter date there were domiciled in the 


240 THE AWAKENING EAST 


islands 43,802 Chinese, 7,806 Japanese, 5,774 Americans, 
3,945 Spanish, 1,140 British, and 1,570 other foreigners. 
Practically the whole trade of the islands is controlled by 
these various peoples of alien origin. Manila has a popula- 
tion of nearly 300,000. There are seven other cities with 
populations ranging from 50,000 down to 10,000 inhab- 
itants. As most of the alien population is found in the 
cities it will be seen that the vast majority—over 90 per cent 
—of the Filipino people is. rural in character and unac- 
quainted with urban life. 

Scientists count 43 ethnographic groups or tribes among 
the Filipino peoples, but these tribes are almost exclusively 
of Malay stock. Though the number of distinct dialects 
spoken is 87, eight! being used by more than 500,000 each, 
many of these languages are more or less closely related. In 
general, the diversity of race and language in the Philippines 
among 10,000,000 people corresponds to the conditions in 
both respects among the 300,000,000 people of India; but in 
India both the racial and the linguistic variations are much 
more marked, for some of the races and languages of India 
are radically different in character from others. 

The diffusion of so many tribes with such a variety of 
languages over such a scattered and broken island area has 
naturally operated against the development of national co- 
hesion. Though the islands were under Spanish rule for 
over three centuries the Spaniards accomplished compara- 
tively little in breaking down either tribal or linguistic 
barriers. Not over 10 per cent of the people acquired the 
use of the Spanish language. The one great service 
wrought by the Spaniards was the introduction and estab- 
lishment of the Christian religion. About 4 per cent of the 
population, massed in the extreme southern islands, are 


* These leading native languages are: 1, Tagalog, used by 1,789,- 
049; the three chief Visayan dialects: 2, Panayan, 1,289,142; 
3, Cebtian, 1,848,613; 4, Samar-Leyte, 601,683; 5, Iloko, 988,841; 
6, Bikol, 685,309. The other two are the leading non-native tongues: 
7, Spanish spoken by 757,463 persons over ten years of age; 
8, English spoken by 896,238 persons over ten years of age. These 
figures are for 1918. 

*Census of the Philippine Islands, 1903, vol. 2, p. 78. 


THE PHILIPPINES 241 


Mohammedans. In the rest of the islands about 5 per cent 
of the population, mostly in the remoter and more moun- 
tainous areas, remain pagan. Approximately 91 per cent 
of the population, therefore, are Christian and predominantly 
Roman Catholic. 

Since the American occupation several Protestant denom- 
inations have undertaken missionary work and have won a 
considerable number of converts. The Protestant Episcopal 
Church has followed the policy of limiting its labors to the 
non-Christian tribes. Other denominations have imposed no 
such restrictions upon their activities, but have agreed to 
work in separate districts. While proselyting by one Chris- 
tian denomination from another is open to criticism, it can- 
not be denied that Protestant missions have had a valuable 
influence in toning up the Roman Catholic Church by their 
presence and competition. The educational and medical en- 
terprises conducted by the missions have been valuable in 
themselves and have afforded an excellent example. 

Unlike the Japanese, who can boast of a single native dy- 
nasty covering their twenty-five centuries of history, the 
Filipino peoples have practically never enjoyed independence, 
much less unity, of government. Prior to the arrival of the 
Spaniards in 1565 the islands, as far back as it is possible to 
trace their history, had been more or less controlled by some 
Malay empire with headquarters in Indo-China, Sumatra, 
Java, or Borneo. Besides, in a larger or smaller number of 
the islands, there had been periods of Chinese and of Japa- 
nese intervention. 

At the time of the arrival of the Spaniards the Malay 
migration was still in progress, as it had been for an in- 
definite number of centuries. There still remain in the 
archipelago small tribes of primitive peoples representing 
two races that antedate the coming of the Malays. The 
earlier and more primitive of these peoples belong to the 
race known as negritos. The later group, whose repre- 
sentatives are now somewhat more advanced than the ne- 
gritos, are known to the ethnologists as Indonesians. Their 
racial affinities are with certain of the older elements among 
the peoples of India. In general, the path of migration into 


242 THE AWAKENING EAST 


the Philippines has been from the south northward. The 
descendants of the earliest comers of Malay race are to 
be found mainly in Luzon, the most northerly of the main 
islands. The latest comers, who did not arrive until Mo- 
hammedanism had spread to the East Indies, are to be 
found in the most southerly of the large islands, Mindanao, 
and in the Sulu archipelago to the southward. To these 
latest comers, whom they were never able to bring under 
their sway, the Spaniards gave the name of Moros because 
of their Mohammedan religion. 

The stage of civilization attained by the pagan Malay 
Filipinos, before the arrival of the Spaniards, in agricul- 
tural and industrial life was not inferior to that reached 
by the Incas in Peru. Though it is doubtful whether they 
had made equal advancement in their social organization, 
they had surpassed the Incas by developing alphabets and a 
considerable written literature.* Politically they had failed 
to establish an indigenous empire and at best had been dis- 
tant members of some short-lived Malay empire. The Span- 
iards found well-ordered towns. Manila, already a city with 
extensive commercial connections, was fortified and de- 
fended with cannon made in a local foundry. It would per- 
haps not be unfair to compare the Moros with the Aztecs 
as a fighting race, though not as the creators of an empire. 
The Moro pirate, though no less ruthless than the Aztec 
warrior, had at least outgrown the practice of human sac- 
rifice, which seems to have been unknown in the Philippines. 
The custom of head-hunting, however, prevailed among a 
few of the more primitive mountain tribes. 

The establishment of Spanish control was largely accom- 
plished by Legazpi, who, in a milder-mannered fashion, was 
to the Philippines what ‘Cortez was to Mexico. The work 
of establishing Spanish domination throughout the archi- 
pelago took approximately a half century. On most of the 
early voyages, except the first one under Magellan, the 
Spaniards arrived in the Philippines from Mexico. The 
consequence was that the islands remained administratively 





*C. E. Russell, Outlook for the Philippines, pp. 27-30, and illustra- 
tion, p. 48. 


THE PHILIPPINES 243 


dependent upon Mexico until 1821, when that country 
became independent of Spain. In this period a single 
annual ship, known as the Manila galleon, served to carry 
the trade of the islands to and from Mexico. Commercially 
and politically, therefore, Spanish rule in the Philippines 
was not a matter of great importance prior to 1821. 

The most significant fact of Spanish domination in this 
period was the zealous activity of Roman Catholic mission- 
aries, mainly members of the several mendicant orders. The 
islands may be said to have been under the rule of the friars 
rather than under the rule of Spain. As a consequence of 
their conversion through the activities of these missionaries, 
the Filipinos have ever since been proud to rank themselves 
as the only Christian nation in the Orient. During the 
period of Spanish rule a considerable number of schools was 
established, but they were mainly church schools and not 
very efficient. The University of Santo Tomas, established 
at Manila in 1611, robs Harvard of the honor of being the 
oldest university under the American flag. 

Only a single episode interfered with the uneventful 
course of existence in the islands during this period. That 
was the seizure of Manila by a British expedition fitted out 
from Madras in 1762 at the close of the Seven Years’ War. 
In accordance with the treaty of Paris in 1763 the English 
restored the archipelago to Spain. 

From that date forward, the administration of the islands 
was conducted on somewhat more liberal lines, and was, on 
the whole, not open to serious criticism. After the independ- 
ence of Mexico in 1821, the government was administered 
directly from Spain and the trade relations were correspond- 
ingly readjusted and permitted to develop more freely. The 
expulsion of the Jesuits in 1767 left the religious activities 
in the islands almost exclusively in the hands of the friars, 
whose influence both over the life of the people and over 
the government tended to increase. The introduction of 
steam navigation about 1850 and the opening of a shorter 
trade route through the Suez canal in 1869 brought the 
Philippines into closer relations with the mother country and 
stimulated trade. This development of commerce made 


244 THE AWAKENING EAST 


necessary renewed efforts to extend Spanish sway in the 
southern islands of the group and to repress the piratical 
activities of the Moros. 

The revolution of 1868 in Spain, which dethroned Isa- 
bella II, resulted in a brief period of unusually progressive 
administration in the islands but, after the restoration of the 
monarchy under Alfonso XII, the policy of the government 
became reactionary and the influence of the friars reached 
its height. It was under these conditions that the first mani- 
festations of serious discontent among the Filipino people 
appeared. Soon after 1890 secret societies to promote pol- 
icies of reform and even of revolution began to organize. 
Insurrection finally broke out in August, 1896, and the exe- 
cution, on December 30, 1896, of José Rizal, the brilliant 
exponent of Filipino aspirations, whose novels* had scath- 
ingly indicted the friars and the abuses under the Spanish 
regime, inflamed feeling throughout the islands. As a re- 
sult of negotiations and of the promise of reforms by the 
Spanish authorities, the insurgent leader Aguinaldo was per- 
suaded to leave the islands in December, 1897. Nevertheless, 
order had not been fully restored when war between Spain 
and the United States was declared in April, 1808. 

The rule of Spain in the Philippines during more than 
three centuries had resulted in important contributions to 
the advancement of the people. Western civilization was 
thoroughly established, Christianity had been introduced and 
made the prevalent religion, schools and even a university 
had been founded, the position of woman had been improved 
in accordance with Christian ideals, European forms of gov- 
ernment and law were in operation, a considerable trade, 
especially with Spain, had been developed; the Filipino peo- 
ple, in short, had come to live in regular contact with the 
West and its civilization. Not a few Filipinos had traveled 
and resided abroad, especially as students. The Spanish had 
accomplished in the Philippines what no other European 
power had done in any eastern land in the same period: 
they had established ‘Christianity and European civilization 


“Noli Me Tangere (The Social Cancer), and El Filibusterismo 
(The Reign of Greed). 


THE PHILIPPINES 245 


as the prevalent condition. Despite certain obvious faults, 
the Spanish administration had in a large way proved 
beneficent. 

Throughout this period the Filipino people had shown 
themselves responsive to the efforts for their advancement, 
and at its close were clearly prepared for greater progress 
than the reactionary government of Alfonso XII and the 
queen regent was prepared to concede. The blame for 
conditions perhaps attaches more correctly, not to the Span- 
ish government, but to the clericals in Spain and to the 
strongly intrenched friars in the islands. There was also 
an economic element in the problem arising from the exten- 
sive landed interests of the friars, whose treatment of the 
peasant laborers on their estates was far from liberal. The 
grievances which led to the insurrection were considerable 
and obvious. Though Rizal had put forward a definite and 
reasonable program of reform, it is not so certain that 
Aguinaldo and his revolutionary followers entertained such 
intelligent ideas or were prepared to carry into execution a 
definite and consistent policy to establish independent gov- 
ernment and improved conditions. 

Admiral Dewey’s naval victory in Manila Bay on May 1, 
1898, was soon followed by the landing of American forces 
in the island of Luzon and the capture of Manila on August 
13. The presence of the Americans revived the insurrec- 
tionary movement, and Aguinaldo was brought back from 
Hong Kong, on an American ship, to resume his leadership. 
The claim made by Aguinaldo and his followers that they 
were promised independence has, however, been specifically 
denied by Admiral Dewey. The United States did not con- 
sider its connivance at the activities of the insurgents against 
Spain as constituting recognition of their insurrectionary 
government or approval of their aims. Indeed, the United 
States for months avoided committing itself to any policy 
with regard to the Philippines and debated at length the 
question of the disposition of the islands. In the course of 
the negotiations with Spain the United States finally de- 
manded the cession of the islands, which was accorded in 
the treaty of peace of December 10, 1898. The relations 


246 THE AWAKENING EAST 


between the Americans and the insurgents had been growing 
steadily less satisfactory. Immediately after the news of 
the cession arrived, an insurgent government was formed 
under the so-called Malolos constitution, with Aguinaldo as 
president. Soon after, on February 4, 1899, fighting broke 
out between the insurgents and the Americans around 
Manila. The details of the insurrection and of its suppres- 
sion may be passed over as without special relevance to the 
discussion in hand. 

The entrance of the Americans into the Philippines came 
entirely as a war measure directed against Spain, and with- 
out any anticipation of the consequences involved. When 
the war was over, the resulting problem had to be solved. 
President McKinley ultimately decided to demand the ces- 
sion of the islands because he felt that the Filipinos were not 
prepared to establish a stable and satisfactory government 
for themselves, that it would be unjust to return them to 
Spanish control, that it would be unjustifiable to leave them 
as a prey to any other imperialistic power, and that conse- 
quently by process of elimination it became necessary for the 
United States to assume possession or control. President 
McKinley, however, was determined that this control should, 
from the outset, be exercised exclusively for the benefit 
of the Filipino people and their advancement toward self- 
government. He undoubtedly hoped that the Filipino people 
would accept this arrangement and did not foresee the se- 
rious insurrection which followed. The insurgents, on their 
side, felt that the cession was an unjustifiable transfer from 
one alien domination to another. Whether rightly or 
wrongly, they also felt that the Americans had not dealt with 
them fairly and honorably. Whatever may have been the 
original purpose of the insurrection, whether directed 
against Spanish authority or against the Americans, it be- 
came a struggle for independence. 

Though the Filipinos made a brave fight, it soon became 
clear to them that their effort to combat the American forces 
was hopeless. They also discovered that the American goy- 
ernment was proceeding to introduce all the reforms which 
Rizal had demanded or which the Spaniards had promised 


THE PHILIPPINES 247 


to Aguinaldo. They were, accordingly, gradually convinced 
that submission was necessary and that American rule would 
be a vast improvement over any which they had previously 
experienced. They found that the American government 
was prepared to do even more for them through its policies 
of sanitation and of education, as well as through its policy 
of acquiring the lands of the friars and of detaching the 
activities of the Roman Catholic Church entirely from con- 
trol both of the land and of the government. They learned 
further that the administrative policies and methods of the 
United States were aimed, not at maintaining the old tribal 
and linguistic barriers, but at breaking them down and 
merging all the Filipino peoples into a single national group 
speaking a single language. 

It must be admitted that the policy of the American gov- 
ernment toward the Philippine Islands, both with regard to 
acquiring control of them and with regard to developing 
administrative policies, is open to criticism, and that it was 
already receiving extremely vigorous discussion within the 
United States at that time. The suppression of the Filipino 
insurrection was regarded by many in the United States with 
emotions very different from those of pride. Even those 
in the United States who favored the assumption and exer- 
cise of American control in the islands were prone to regard 
the undertaking as a disagreeable necessity rather than as 
a desirable or laudable national enterprise. There were 
some in the United States, on the other hand, who had a 
clear conception of the significance of the occupation of the 
Philippines with reference to the promotion of American 
interests, both commercially and politically, in the western 
Pacific and in eastern Asia. 

Whatever may have been the attitude of extreme imperial- 
ists or anti-imperialists, and whatever may have been the 
ignorance of the mass of the American people concerning 
the Filipinos, their progress and culture, or their insurrec- 
tionary government, there can be no doubt that the general 
sentiment in the United States was accurately voiced by 
President McKinley. Beginning with his instructions of 
May 19, 1898, to the secretary of war, every one of his 


248 THE AWAKENING EAST 


utterances and formulations of policy expressed a high de- 
termination to safeguard the interests of the Filipino people 
and to promote their welfare. His instructions of Decem- 
ber 21, 1898, to General Otis, after providing that civil and 
municipal government shall be conducted “by officers chosen 
as far as may be practicable among the inhabitants of the 
islands,” concluded with these words: 

“Finally it should be the earnest and paramount aim of 
the military administration to win the confidence, respect, 
and affection of the inhabitants of the Philippines by assur- 
ing to them in every possible way that full measure of in- 
dividual rights and liberties which is the heritage of free 
peoples, and by proving to them that the mission of the 
United States is one of benevolent assimilation, substituting 
the mild sway of justice and right for arbitrary rule. In 
the fulfillment of this high mission, supporting the temperate 
administration of affairs for the greatest good of the gov- 
erned, there must be sedulously maintained the strong arm of 
authority to repress disturbance and to overcome all ob- 
stacles to the bestowal of the blessings of good and stable 
government upon the people of the Philippine Islands under 
the free flag of the United States.” 

A month later and two weeks prior to the outbreak of the 
insurrection his instructions to the first Philippine commis- 
sion, headed by Doctor Schurman, closed with the expres- 
sion of the hope that they would be received “as bearers of 
the good will, the protection, and the richest blessings of a 
liberating rather than a conquering nation.” Probably more 
than to any other single individual the credit for the definite 
formulation of American policy in the Philippines is due to 
Elihu Root, who served as secretary of war from August I, 
1899, to February I, 1904. 

It is not necessary to describe in detail the successive 
forms of administration through which American control 
of the islands has been exercised. Military government 
was maintained from 1898 to 1900. In 1899 a supreme court 
was established with six of the nine justices Filipinos. 
From 1900 to 1907 the government was conducted by the 
Philippine commission, of which three members were Fili- 


THE PHILIPPINES 249 


pinos after 1901.5 William H. Taft, the president of the 
second commission, was installed as civil governor in Igor. 
He was succeeded, in 1904, by Luke E. Wright, whose title 
was changed, in 1905, to governor-general. In 1907 the 
people were permitted to elect an assembly which shared 
legislative authority with the commission. This situation 
endured until 1913, when a further change was made by 
President Wilson in substituting a Filipino majority for an 
American majority in the membership of the commission. 

In 1916, under the Jones act, the commission disappeared ; 
the United States government was represented instead by a 
governor-general and a vice-governor; and the Filipino 
people were authorized to elect both a senate and an assem- 
bly, which taken together were henceforth to exercise full 
lawmaking powers and, with certain limitations, to control 
the finances. Such is the form of government at present 
prevailing. In the local administration in the Christian 
provinces, many officials have been elected almost since the 
establishment of American civil administration.® The 
judicial officials are likewise almost entirely native except 
that five of the nine members of the supreme court are now 
Americans. Positions in the civil service have from the 
outset been open by preference to the natives. In 1913 they 
held 72 per cent of the places; in 1921 they occupied 96 
per cent of the posts. 

The supreme court of the United States reaffirmed in 
I9OI its previous judgment that “the constitution is appli- 
cable to territories acquired by purchase or conquest only 
when and so far as congress shall so direct,” and that full 
legislative power with regard to such territory was vested 
in congress.? Accordingly, congress undertook, as soon as 
conditions in the islands permitted, to legislate for the estab- 
lishment of civil government therein. Its acts have been, 

*The number of American members was five. 

*The Maura act of 1893, under Spanish rule, had made somewhat 
similar provision, but no great progress had been made toward 
putting it into operation. Under American rule all the municipal 
officials, except the treasurer, and about half the provincial officials, 


are elected. 
“Downes vs. Bidwell 182 U. S. 244. 


250 THE AWAKENING EAST 


from the beginning, without exception, inspired by the same 
high principles which President McKinley had earlier enun- 
ciated. By its action there has been extended to the Philip- 
pine people every practicable American constitutional guar- 
antee, and every law passed by it has provided for its 
application equally to Americans and to Filipinos in the 
islands, with a single exception, the proviso that preference 
shall be given to Filipinos in civil service appointments. By 
the tariff act of 1909 free trade was established between the 
islands and the United States. It may be added that con- 
gress has not acted to make the eighteenth and nineteenth 
amendments to the constitution applicable within the islands.8 

The Democratic party in the United States had con- 
sistently denounced the policy of the Republican administra- 
tions as imperialistic. Consequently, when President Wilson 
entered office in 1913 he promptly adopted a more liberal 
attitude toward the Philippines and selected, as governor- 
general, Congressman Francis Burton Harrison, who was 
known to be acceptable to the Filipinos. Throughout his 
administration Governor-General Harrison pursued a policy 
of Filipinization and of friendly cooperation with the Fili- 
pino leaders. After the passage of the Jones act in 1916 he 
allowed himself and the Philippine legislature to interpret 
and apply it with marked liberality. Though the Jones act 
did not alter the preceding practice of separation of powers 
between the executive and legislative branches of the gov- 
ernment, he took upon himself the responsibility of creat- 
ing an extra-legal body, called the council of state, which 
was composed, in addition to himself and the heads of 
the executive departments, of the president of the senate, 
Mr. Quezon, and of the speaker of the house, Mr. Osmena, 
the two recognized political leaders of the Filipinos. This 
body established a link between the executive and the legis- 
lature, and provided a certain degree of legislative control 


In 1924 the United States department of justice ruled that, 
though the Volstead act does not apply to the Philippines, the 
eighteenth amendment by its own terms does apply and that the 
administration may and must act in accordance therewith in so far 
as practicable in the absence of an enforcement act. 


THE PHICIPPINES 251 


over the administration, though it did not actually introduce 
full parliamentary responsibility. Subsequent acts passed 
by the legislature confirmed this body and extended its 
powers by intrusting to it the execution of certain measures. 
Governor-General Harrison also permitted the speakers of 
the two houses to exercise a large influence over official ap- 
pointments and administrative policy. Finally, near the 
close of their administrations, both Governor-General Har- 
rison and President Wilson definitely committed themselves 
in favor of the prompt bestowal of Philippine independence. 

When President Harding, the choice of the Republican 
party, entered office in 1921, he consequently faced the prob- 
lem of determining promptly whether the proposal of his 
predecessor should be carried out. In order to secure infor- 
mation to govern his decision, he appointed Major-General 
Leonard Wood and former Governor-General W. Cam- 
eron Forbes as special commissioners to make a full inves- 
tigation of conditions in the islands. Their report, sub- 
mitted on October 8, 1921, revealed the thoroughness of 
their investigations and the judicious temper in which they 
had approached their problem. They offered certain crit- 
icisms of the Harrison administration and indicated certain 
reasons which they believed proved that the Filipinos were 
not yet prepared to maintain a stable government. Soon 
after the presentation of the report President Harding ap- 
pointed General Wood governor-general. He also gave 
assurance that there should be “no backward step” in the 
American policy toward the Philippines. While this promise 
has been literally observed, it has been the practice of Gov- 
ernor-General Wood, in contrast with his predecessor, to 
interpret and apply the Jones act strictly. The Filipinos took 
strong exceptions to certain portions of the Wood-Forbes 
report and viewed the appointment of General Wood with 
distrust. It is not surprising, therefore, that, as the adminis- 
tration has progressed, there has developed a steadily widen- 
ing breach between the governor-general and the legislature. 
The discussion of the various problems and issues involved 
must occupy the remainder of this lecture.® 


*For later developments, see below, pages 2orff. 


252 THE AWAKENING EAST 


This liberality of governmental privileges accorded by the 
United States to the Filipinos far surpasses anything 
granted by the British in the administration of Egypt?® or 
of India. The people of the Philippines enjoy self-govern- 
ment, in general, as fully as do the Japanese. In 1920, 5 per 
cent of the population of Japan were legally entitled to vote; 
in I9QIQ, I1 per cent of the Filipinos were qualified electors, 
and 6.5 per cent actually did vote.1! The Philippine senate 
and assembly under the Jones act have fuller legislative 
power than is granted to the diet in Japan under the con- 
stitution of 1880. 

The attention given to education in the Philippine Islands 
under American control is probably without parallel in the 
history of colonial administration. From the very outset of 
American occupation careful attention has been given to the 
development of an adequate school system, based upon the 
use of English as a common language. In order to lay the 
foundations for the new system, a large number of Amer- 
ican teachers was engaged for service in the islands in 1901 
and succeeding years. The trials experienced by these 
earlier teachers and the value of the work which they ac- 
complished can scarcely be exaggerated. Evidence of the 
success of the new system of education appeared very 
promptly. By 1902 there were approximately 200,000 pu- 
pils enrolled; in 1907, 480,000; in 1914, 621,000; and in 
1920, approximately 943,000. The present total school en- 
rollment, when the attendance at the private schools is in- 
cluded, somewhat exceeds the million mark; but the total 
number of children between six and fourteen years of age 
in 1918 was over 2,400,000. 

Quite properly, the chief attention has been centered upon 
the development of elementary schools as widely as possible 


* True only prior to the proclamation of the constitution and the 
termination of martial law in Egypt, in July, 1923, though it will 
again become true should the United States enact the Fairfield bill 
(see below, pages 295-296) or a similar measure. 

“The census of 1918 showed 2,125,423 males over twenty-one 
years of age, of whom 1,097,937 were qualified to vote. The num- 
ber of voters registered in 1919 was 717,295, and the number of 
votes cast was 672,122. See below, page 201. 


THE PHILIPPINES 253 


through the islands, but such institutions are not yet accom- 
modating one half of the population of suitable age for 
attendance. The difficulties involved in establishing schools 
sufficient to accommodate the whole population of suitable 
age are due to several conditions. The population is 
primarily rural, and widely diffused. The costs of securing 
land and erecting a school building, of employing a teacher 
and maintaining a school, are all items of very considerable 
weight. Perhaps the most difficult problem is the securing 
of teachers adequately trained to teach both the elementary 
subjects and the English tongue. 

The progress of instruction in the quarter century since 
the American occupation has been notable and creditable, 
but it will obviously take another quarter century to make 
elementary education available for the whole population, 
and to insure that every Filipino child may be trained to 
become a literate person. The census of 1918 showed over 
30 per cent of the total population literate. The advance- 
ment of women is shown by the fact that 28 per cent of the 
females are literate as compared with 32 per cent of the 
males. At the present time, it is estimated that 37 per cent 
of the total population are literate. Japan is the only nation 
in the East with a better record, and no other eastern nation 
approaches anywhere near the standard attained by the 
Filipinos. 

The significance of a uniform system of education, fur- 
nishing a common body of instruction to the youth of the 
whole nation, has an importance far beyond imparting the 
ability to read and write. The educational system is a highly 
efficient agency for breaking down the old tribal barriers and 
for the creation of the spirit of unity and nationality. It 
also tends to obliterate certain quasi-feudal conditions which 
have survived from the Spanish regime, or perhaps even 
from the days prior to the arrival of Europeans. Instead, 
the schools are daily inculcating the principles of democracy 
and self-reliance. Not the least important elements in the 
educational system are provisions for the care of the health, 
for physical training, and for athletics. Nowhere in the 
East have these modern methods been so fully utilized. The 


254 THE AWAKENING EAST 


valuable results are daily becoming more obvious in both 
the physical and mental alertness of the people. 

From the very beginning of American occupation it was 
considered that the diversity of native dialects made impos- 
sible the selection of any one of them as the common lan- 
guage for the islands. Some recent writers have contended 
that this decision was both unjustifiable and unwise. Their 
arguments are based upon a later experiment, made under 
the Dutch in Java, to substitute a single common dialect for 
a group of diverse but related ones, through training in the 
schools. The small extent to which Spanish had come into 
use likewise ruled it out. The American authorities, there- 
fore, determined to make English the common language and 
to introduce its use through training in the schools. 

The gratifying character of the results is shown by the 
fact that, after a quarter century of American occupation, 
the prevalence of English in the islands exceeds that of 
Spanish, though three centuries and a half have elapsed since 
the Spanish conquest.12 The utilization of English as the 
common language for the islands instead of some indigenous 
tongue has the decisive advantage of giving to the people 
one of the great culture languages of the world, which 
affords them immediate access to all that is most important 
in human knowledge. English is more advantageous than 
either a native language or even Spanish, because of its 
widespread use, even outside of strictly English-speaking 
lands, especially in commercial intercourse in the Far East. 

Nevertheless, the extension of the use of English is still, 
perhaps, the most vital single problem which conditions the 
future of the islands. Belgium with two languages in co- 
ordinate use, and Switzerland with four, are, indeed, exam- 
ples of successful national unity in spite of linguistic di- 
versity, but they do not disprove the importance of a single 
language as a bond of nationality. There can be no Philip- 
pine nation characterized by genuine unity until all the people 
of the islands abandon their eighty-seven diverse tongues 


* Owing to instruction in the schools probably a larger proportion 
of the Filipinos can use Spanish now than in 1898. It is noteworthy 
that more can read Spanish than can speak it. 


THE PHILIPPINES 255 


for a common language. It is accepted almost without 
dispute that such uniform language for the Philippines must 
be English. Only when it does actually come to be used 
by substantially the whole population will one of the funda- 
mental conditions for the creation of a Philippine nation 
have been met. Even Mr. Quezon is reported to have 
acknowledged recently that it might be desirable to postpone 
the establishment of independence for ten or a dozen years 
to permit the more general establishment of English as the 
national language. 

The diffusion of knowledge of English must be effected 
almost exclusively through the elementary schools. It is, 
therefore, necessary that the teachers in the schools shall 
have received training adequate to make them proficient in 
the language, not merely in its written form, but also as a 
spoken vehicle. As it is impossible to supply a sufficient 
number of American teachers for this purpose, native teach- 
ers must be given the necessary training, which ought, in a 
goodly proportion of cases, to include a period of residence 
and study in the United States or some other English- 
speaking country. There should be enough American 
teachers devoting their attention exclusively to language 
instruction to provide regular normal training and also 
supplementary vacation courses. There should also be an 
adequate number of Americans to serve as supervisors of 
instruction in English in the schools. To meet these two 
requirements there should be two or three times the present 
number of Americans on the staff of the department of 
education in the islands. It has been a serious misfortune 
that the policy of the government under the Harrison admin- 
istration led to a decrease in the number of American teach- 
ers by approximately 50 per cent, whereas the undoubted 
need was for an increase of approximately the same pro- 
portion. 

Effort has rightly been directed toward the extension of 
the number of elementary schools and little attention has 
been given to secondary and higher schools. Only approx- 
imately one per cent of the population of the islands has hith- 
erto received an education of a higher grade than that fur- 


256 THE AWAKENING EAST 


nished by the primary schools. There are good high schools, 
especially in the cities, and there has been organized the 
University of the Philippines, which has over four thousand 
students. In addition, there are various private, denomina- 
tional, and special schools of higher standing. The educa- 
tional system in the islands will, of course, lack much of per- 
fection until there has been developed a number of high 
schools and colleges, and especially of normal schools and 
other institutions for professional and vocational education, 
adequate to supply the needs of the islands. 

As yet advanced training of any sort is practically reserved 
for those who can afford the private expense, and conse- 
quently this privilege is open only to a very small class. 
Similar opportunities can come to the youth of the islands in 
general only when sufficient educational institutions of 
higher grade are established and maintained at public ex- 
pense. Fortunately a considerable number of the Filipino 
youth are seeking higher education abroad, mainly in the 
United States. Because of their broader horizon they should 
wield greater influence when they return to spend their 
lives in service among their own people. A spirit of gen- 
erous helpfulness displayed toward them by the American 
people, among whom they may temporarily reside, can do 
much to strengthen the bonds of friendship between the 
great republic and the island people. Closely associated 
with the development of higher education is the extension 
of scientific research in the Philippines. Experts are ren- 
dering highly important service in nearly every branch of 
the government. The correlation of their activities through 
the bureau of science has proved very advantageous. 

Credit for the remarkable educational advancement made 
in the Philippine Islands during the past quarter century is 
due not merely to the enlightened and liberal policy of the 
United States government, but also to the earnestness of the 
Filipinos in availing themselves of the opportunities placed 
at their disposal. Not only does the younger generation show 
itself eager to secure education of a primary and even of a 
higher grade, but the older generation is also wise enough 
to sympathize with the ambitions of youth, and to make ex- 


THE PHILIPPINES 257 


traordinary sacrifices to assist the children in acquiring 
education. 

The development of journalism in the Philippine Islands 
has been, in large measure, an achievement of the period 
since American occupation. Under Spanish rule, the press 
was, in all its activities, an instrumentality controlled almost 
exclusively by the government and the church. This re- 
strictive care has disappeared under American rule, and 
the diversified activities of a free press constitute an im- 
portant supplement to the educational system. The stand- 
ard of Filipino journalism is fairly creditable, though by no 
means so excellent as might be desired. Manila, for in- 
stance, has some moderately good newspapers, but they do 
not compare with the two best dailies of either Hartford 
or New Haven, each of which cities is less than half as 
large. Neither do they equal the best English journals 
printed in Japan, China, or India. Besides the papers pub- 
lished in English, there are also journals in Spanish and in 
several of the native dialects. Some newspapers are pub- 
lished bilingually, and a few trilingually. The circulation 
of the papers is not very extensive, the total of all period- 
icals in the islands being equal to only about 3 per cent of 
the population. A much larger development of journalism 
and the establishment of a higher standard are indispensable 
to the existence of an intelligent electorate. 

The public health work conducted under the American ad- 
ministration presents an excellent record of achievement. 
The reduction of the death rate in Manila has amounted to 
approximately 50 per cent, and in the provinces to about 
20 per cent. The decline of infant mortality is even more 
striking. The birth rate in Manila has shown a considerable 
increase, while in the provinces there has been a slight de- 
cline. Among the activities of the Federation of Women’s 
Clubs in the Philippines, none has been more important than 
its contribution to the improvement of conditions in con- 
nection with maternity and the care of infants. 

The favorable showing in mortality statistics is subject 
to some modification for the period of the Harrison admin- 
istration, from 1913 to 1921, when there was a slight increase 


258 THE AWAKENING EAST 


in the death rate.18 The same period also showed an increase 
in the number of cases of preventable diseases, such as 
typhoid and tuberculosis. On the other hand, this admin- 
istration effected a very considerable extension of hospital 
and dispensary work, though the facilities of both sorts are 
still woefully inadequate to the needs of the islands as a 
whole. ‘There are, for instance, less than one thousand 
nurses for a population in excess of ten millions. There is 
a similar shortage in the number of properly trained physi- 
cians and surgeons. 

The sanitary work accomplished by the Americans in the 
Philippine Islands undoubtedly surpasses anything achieved 
by the British in the East, though it still falls far short of 
what needs to be done. As in the matter of education, the 
response of the Filipinos to the measures of sanitary reform 
has been remarkable, so that to-day they rank as the cleanest 
of oriental peoples. Though dire poverty exists in Manila, 
one does not now find conditions in any section of the city 
so repulsive or pitiful as those that one frequently en- 
counters in nearly every city of the East. A related fact, 
which should be recorded to the credit of the Filipino peo- 
ple, is the almost complete absence of mendicancy, which is 
prevalent in most eastern lands. 

The maintenance of public health requires extensive public 
works in order to provide pure drinking water, to dispose of 
sewage, and to eliminate unhealthy surroundings, as well 
as provision for hospitals and dispensaries. The work ac- 
complished in these matters has been creditable, but much 
yet remains to be done. The Filipino government must in 
the future consider as one of its chief obligations the prose- 
cution of all reasonable measures for the maintenance of 
public health, and the supply, through taxation, of adequate 
funds for the purpose. In a similar way much work at 
public expense must be undertaken for the purpose of ex- 


** The number of deaths per thousand was 16.82 in 1913; 17.57 in 
1914; 18.55 in 1915; 20.04 in 1916; 21.10 in 1917; 35.47 in 1918, owing 
to epidemics of influenza, cholera, and smallpox, and 29.98 in 1919. 
Later figures are not available. In both 1918 and 1919 the number 
of deaths exceeded the number of births. 


THE PHILIPPINES 259 


tending agriculture by means of irrigation and reclamation 
projects. 

As only 10 per cent of the land of the islands is under 
tillage, and as it has usually been necessary to make con- 
siderable yearly importations of rice, which is the staple 
food, it is clearly one of the obligations of the government 
to undertake measures for bringing additional lands under 
cultivation at an early date. In the Philippines there is no 
question, as there is in Japan, of the existence of enough 
land available for agriculture to make the population of the 
islands self-sufficing. The allotment of these lands has been 
thoroughly safeguarded by wise legislation. No change in 
the land laws can be made without the approval of the 
president of the United States. In the future only Amer- 
icans or Filipinos may acquire land from the public do- 
main. The existing laws also contemplate the allotment 
of land from the public domain primarily to peasant pro- 
prietors rather than the creation of large landed estates or 
exploitation through a system of great plantations con- 
trolled by commercial corporations, such as has been de- 
manded for the encouragement of the production of rubber. 

A large portion of the friar lands, acquired in 1902 (the 
actual transfers were made in 1904 and 1905) for $7,000,000 
through negotiations conducted by Mr. Taft, has already 
been sold by the government to peasant proprietors. The 
forests of the islands are extensive and offer valuable op- 
portunities for their scientific exploitation. Competent ob- 
servers are convinced that the islands are capable of supply- 
ing the necessary amounts of every sort of tropical product 
needed by the United States. The large extension of the 
cultivated area under American rule and the success of the 
efforts already made to supply the American market with 
Filipino products are a fair indication of what may be ac- 
complished. Just as natural conditions seem to require that 
the future development of Japan shall be industrial, so they 
point to the promotion of agriculture as the wisest economic 
policy for the Philippines. 

The agricultural development of the islands, and especially 
the ability to place the products at the disposal of American 


260 THE AWAKENING EAST 


and international trade, will require adequate means of 
communication and transportation. Under American rule, 
there has been no great extension of the railroad mileage. 
At the present time there are approximately only nine hun- 
dred miles of railroads in operation, as compared with one 
hundred and twenty miles in 1898. This small mileage, 
however, gives access to about one quarter of the population. 
The existing lines are inferior in construction and equip- 
ment. On the other hand, over six thousand miles of high- 
ways have been constructed, of which nearly half are rated 
as first-class metaled roads. . Moreover, automobile transpor- 
tation for both passengers and goods is being steadily de- 
veloped, and it is possible that the transportation problem 
of the islands will, in considerable measure, be solved in this 
manner rather than by the construction of railways. During 
the Harrison administration the extension and care of roads 
was not up to the standard set in earlier days of American 
occupation. If all parts of the islands are to be brought 
into satisfactory communication, the Filipino government 
in the future must be prepared to make large expenditures 
both for new roads and for maintenance of the system. The 
matter of communications in the Philippines, however, is 
by no means entirely a land problem. The number of the 
islands and their scattered location require a large degree 
of dependence upon methods of interisland navigation. To 
solve this problem there will be required expenditures not 
merely for the establishment of numerous steamer lines but 
also for harbors, lighthouses, and various other improve- 
ments of navigation. Though this phase of the problem has 
hitherto received less attention than it deserves, there are 
already in operation in interisland navigation about four 
hundred boats, and the number is being steadily increased, 
especially by motor boats. Political as well as commercial 
interests require the existence of adequate, cheap, and easy 
means of intercommunication throughout the archipelago. 
The national unity of the Filipino people cannot be attained 
without full and constant intercourse among the diverse 
peoples and various sections of the islands. 

The foreign trade of the Philippine Islands has expanded 


PE De be EN ES 261 


with remarkable rapidity during the period of American 
control.1# This commerce reached an annual value of $50,- 
000,000 in 1901. By 1912 it had increased to $100,000,000, 
and in 1920 the total was in excess of $300,000,000. Over 
60 per cent of this trade is at present with the United States, 
whereas prior to 1898 the annual trade between the United 
States and the Philippines did not exceed $5,000,000. The 
chief exports are sugar, hemp, tobacco, and coconut prod- 
ucts. Hats and embroideries, which are perhaps the most 
important manufactures of the islands, are also largely ex- 
ported. 

From the point of view of the United States the trade of 
the Philippines is a very minor matter in comparison with 
its total commerce. The United States could conceivably 
lose the whole trade of the islands without any serious in- 
convenience. Potentially, however, the trade with the Phil- 
ippines, through extension of the cultivation of various 
tropical products, might become of the greatest value to the 
United States. The position of the islands in the western 
Pacific and in relation to eastern Asia constitutes an im- 
portant strategic advantage to the United States com- 
mercially as well as politically.15 For American exports the 
Philippines might become a market of some value, but it is 
unlikely that the United States will ever find it possible to 
sell any considerable portion of its manufactured goods in 
the islands themselves. For the period of American occu- 
pation as a whole the balance of trade, both for the total 
trade and for the trade with the United States, has been in 
favor of the Philippines. 

On the other side, the loss of the American market would, 
at least for a considerable period of years, be a serious mis- 
fortune for the Filipinos. At the present time the products of 
the Philippine Islands enjoy free entry into the United 

% Compare the contemporaneous growth of the trade of Formosa 
under Japanese rule. The comparison on other lines, as well, be- 
tween American policy in the Philippines and Japanese policy in 
Formosa is illuminating. See Ralston Hayden, Japan’s New Policy in 
Korea and Formosa. (Foreign Affairs, 2, 474-487, March 15, 1924.) 

**Numerous proposals have been made to establish Manila as a 
free port. See below, page 292. 


262 THE AWAKENING EAST 


States. This privilege could not continue if the islands 
became independent or passed under the control of any 
other power. It will be seen, therefore, that the economic 
argument against independence is a very strong one when 
the question is viewed from the Philippine side, but is of 
less concern when viewed from the American side. 

This problem, however, is not quite so simple. There are 
objections, both from the Filipinos and from other nations 
interested in the trade of the islands, to the American.action, 
in 1909 and 1913, establishing free trade between the United 
States and the Philippines.1® These measures are criticized 
because they indirectly give the United States a monopolistic 
position with reference to the trade of the Philippines, as 
is shown by the resultant doubling of its percentage therein. 
While this arrangement is not so objectionable as the co- 
lonial trade restrictions of most other countries, it is much 
less liberal than the practice prevailing within the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, for example, in India, where the 
trade is open to other nations on absolutely equal terms with 
the English. Moreover, in contrast with its policy of in- 
sisting on the open door in China, the United States is 
practically maintaining a closed door in the Philippines. 
The objection raised by the Filipinos 1s that they are placed 
at the mercy of the American capitalists both in their buying 
and selling, because the disadvantages created by the tariff 
duties make it impracticable for them, in many cases, to 
trade with anyone but Americans. The United States ought 
certainly to investigate these complaints, and if the regula- 
tions concerned operate unjustly to the disadvantage of the 
Filipinos or unfairly internationally, remedy should be 
sought. Ever since President McKinley’s announcement at 
the beginning of American occupation the United States has 
repeatedly disclaimed any intention of exploiting the Filipino 

** By the Underwood tariff of 1913 the duties on imports into the 
Philippines from countries other than the United States are, in 
general, distinctly lower than the rates established in the United 
States. An act of congress has authorized the president, by procla- 
mation, to include the Philippines within the operation of the law 


restricting coastwise shipping to American vessels but, wisely, the 
power has not been exercised. 


THE PHILIPPINES 263 


people. It is, therefore, in honor bound to repeal or modify 
any legislation that operates to the contrary, even though 
there was no evil intent in its enactment. Under the Jones 
act of 1916, indeed, a partial remedy has already been placed 
in the hands of the Philippine legislature, which is em- 
powered to enact tariff laws with reference to countries 
other than the United States, but the authority has remained 
practically unexercised. A further objection to the free 
entry of American goods is that it deprives the Philippine 
government of needed revenue, for the receipts from cus- 
toms duties would be trebled if imports from the United 
States paid the regular tariff rates. Even if this deduction 
be valid it does not prove that free trade is injurious or un- 
just to the Filipinos. 

Closely related to this question of trade is the exploitation 
of the islands through capital investment. Very few Fili- 
pinos hitherto have had sufficient capital for investment 
except in land. The development of industrial, commercial, 
and banking institutions has, therefore, become dependent 
upon capital supplied by the government or attracted from 
outside. Prior to the American occupation a small amount 
of foreign capital had been invested in the islands. The 
most notable case was the British corporation known as the 
Manila Railroad Company. Since that time, however, but 
little capital, either foreign or American, has been attracted. 
More recent enterprises have been dependent upon govern- 
ment rather than private capital. 

A wholesome fear of falling into the clutches of American 
“big business” and of creating a privileged interest which 
would oppose independence has led the insular government 
to enter upon a number of important financial undertakings 
requiring considerable capital. The first of these was the 
chartering of the Philippine National Bank in order to free 
the islands from the control of the foreign banking institu- 
tions which were doing business in Manila. This was fol- 
lowed by the purchase of the Manila Railroad Company 
from the British stockholders. Later there were created 
the National Coal Company, the National Cement Company, 
and a few other corporations. These quasi-public cor- 


264 THE AWAKENING EAST 


porations have served the purpose for which they were in- 
tended, but have met with severe criticism from the sup- 
porters of the American capitalistic interests. This attitude 
was in part responsible for the unfortunate experiences of 
the bank, which also had to meet the intrenched opposition 
and vigorous competition of the great and long-established 
English banks in the Far East. These corporations are, 
strictly speaking, not socialistic in character, but are a gov- 
ernmental expedient to protect the Filipinos from alien or 
American exploitation. Their very existence has sufficed 
to check the forms of alien exploitation which have aroused 
so much resentment in both China and India. 

There is, however, real question whether, in the absence 
of Filipino capital for investment, suitable laws might not 
be devised to attract American private capital for the de- 
velopment of the islands, yet with abundant safeguards 
against the evils of exploitation of the people, land, or re- 
sources. Means must be found to secure a much fuller de- 
velopment of the insular resources as a basis both for the 
economic stability and progress of the archipelago and for 
the creation of a body of taxable wealth competent to sup- 
port the necessarily increasing costs of government. New 
York state, for example, has almost precisely the same popu- 
lation as the Philippines, but only 40 per cent of the area, 
yet its expenditures for the state government alone are three 
times those of the Philippine government. The taxable ca- 
pacity of the islands is indicated by the income-tax returns, 
of which there were 9,519 in 1920, distributed as follows: 
Filipinos, 3,667; Chinese, 3,123; Americans, 1,434; other 
foreigners, 1,295. Thus, I out of 14 of the non-Filipinos 
filed an income-tax return, exactly the same proportion as 
in the United States, but only 1 out of 2,790 Filipinos did. 

The Filipino people, as already indicated, are almost ex- 
clusively engaged in agricultural pursuits. Such manufac- 
turing as is conducted is largely under the domestic system. 
Factories are almost unknown. Mercantile and commercial 
activities are rarely carried on by the Filipinos. Practically 
the entire wholesale and retail trade of the islands is in the 
hands of aliens. The leading business people are the Chi- 


THE PHILIPPINES 265 


nese, but Japanese, Americans, British, and others share in 
the conduct of commercial enterprise. Consequently, the 
Filipino people, as in the case of Egypt, lack the private ex- 
perience in money matters which is a necessary prerequisite 
to ability to handle successfully problems of public finance. 
It is unfortunately necessary to record that the Filipinos have 
not yet developed a proper sense of the value of money, or 
good judgment in business matters. What is worse, their 
standards of honor in handling of banking and of public 
funds have been brought under serious suspicion in the 
proved mismanagement of the Philippine National Bank 
in its earlier years. 

It is to be alleged on behalf of the Filipino that the eco- 
nomic policy of Spain did not permit his acquiring any large 
degree of commercial or even of minor mercantile experi- 
ence. This was due both to the policy of trade restriction 
and also to the policy of utilizing Filipino labor in agricul- 
ture, as on the friar lands. Experience since the American 
occupation has, however, revealed the adaptability of the 
Filipino to many pursuits other than agriculture. The prim- 
itive instinct for the sea reappears in the success with which 
Filipinos have undertaken the conduct of the interisland 
shipping, and in the extent to which they have entered a 
wider range of seafaring occupations. The American and 
foreign business houses in Manila and other ports of the 
islands have followed, in recent years, a policy of steady 
Filipinization of their staffs of clerks and other employees. 
Moreover, there is a growing number of Filipinos who are 
successfully undertaking mercantile and industrial enter- 
prises on their own account. These are certainly signs of 
hope for the future. 

Another legitimate plea may be entered in defense of 
the Filipino in business. Many of his early undertakings 
coincided with the period of the World War, and conse- 
quently suffered seriously from the unusual conditions ob- 
taining in the financial world at that time and, even more, 
immediately after the close of the war. This fact may be 
alleged in mitigation of the misadventures of the Philippine 
National Bank. The experience of Filipino financial under- 


266 THE AWAKENING EAST 


takings, during these years, was not without numerous paral- 
lels in similar enterprises, both native and foreign, in every 
other Far Eastern land. This is not commendation, but it 
is evidence thoroughly relevant to the formation of a fair 
judgment of Filipino character and ability. 

The evil influence of the World War upon the financial 
and economic conditions in the Philippines was far-reaching. 
Specie was drawn from the islands to the United States in 
payment for generous subscriptions to liberty loans and to 
Red Cross and similar war charities, as well as in other ex- 
traordinary ways. The diversion of trade from normal 
channels caused varied and serious difficulties, which led to 
a policy of government control for price regulation in the 
case of certain commodities, especially of rice. This ex- 
periment at government regulation of business proved dis- 
tinctly unfortunate. The wide and rapid fluctuations in ex- 
change throughout the East were a constant temptation to 
speculate, one might almost say to gamble. That con- 
ditions in the Philippines were not so bad as they have been 
sometimes painted is clearly shown by the stability of the 
peso, which fluctuated in value less than any other oriental 
currency, not excepting the dollars of Hong Kong or the 
Straits Settlements. 

In government finance, practice in the islands was really 
in advance of that in the United States, for the budget sys- 
tem was adopted by the first Filipino Legislature under the 
Jones act in 1916, five years ahead of similar action by the 
United States government. The increase in annual expendi- 
ture and in the debt of the insular government has not been 
disproportionate since the outbreak of the World War in 
1914. The authorization, in 1921, for the increase of the 
debt limit of the insular government from $15,000,000 to 
$30,000,000, exclusive of $7,000,000 friar land bonds, has 
been fully utilized, and has afforded somewhat greater flexi- 
bility to the financial situation. In 1922 congress raised the 
debt limit to ten per cent of the assessed value of real prop- 
erty, which amounts, by the latest assessment, to about 
$74,000,000. 

Prior to American occupation, and for some years there- 


ee de be LN Pos 267 


after, nearly all European trade with the Philippines, not re- 
served by Spain, was in British hands. For several years 
after 1898, indeed, the British controlled a larger share of 
the trade of the islands than any other country, not except- 
ing the United States. Though the proportion of British 
trade has fallen rapidly in later years, the British trading 
community in the islands continues to exercise an influence 
quite out of proportion to its numbers. The Americans 
were surprisingly slow in developing their commercial and 
financial interests in the islands. It was not until the civil 
service policy of Governor-General Harrison in 1913 for- 
bade office holders to engage in trade that considerable num- 
bers began to give their exclusive attention to commercial 
affairs. This number was still further increased by the un- 
usual conditions in the years during the World War and the 
period immediately thereafter. | 

The commercial connections of the Philippines with the 
neighboring lands of the Far East are important, especially 
with China. Apparently Chinese had been trading in large 
numbers with the islands for centuries before Magellan’s 
arrival, and, despite several attempts by the Spaniards to 
expel them, they have continued to trade there ever since. 
A large part of the retail trade of the islands has been in 
their hands. Their position is not viewed very kindly by the 
Filipinos, who seem to think of them somewhat as the Turk 
does of the Greek or Armenian trader. The ‘Chinese inter- 
ests in the islands have not, however, expanded on the large 
scale to which they have developed in the Straits Settlements. 

The situation with regard to the foreign business com- 
munity in the Philippines is not dissimilar to that which has 
already been discussed in the case of Egypt. Contrary to 
the practice in India, the foreign business community has 
no voice in the legislature. It is true that Americans may 
become Philippine citizens and thus vote for legislative rep- 
resentatives, but they have not done so. The consequence 
is that the financial and economic interests of the country 
are not likely to secure such thorough consideration as might 
be desired. It may be argued that this result is not dissonant 
with the interests of the Philippine nation at large, since over 


268 THE AWAKENING EAST 


go per cent of its population is rural and agricultural. On 
the other hand, if the Filipino people are to achieve their in- 
dependence in the near future, there are many considerations 
which will compel their serious attention to economic ques- 
tions of far-reaching significance. This being the case, one 
of the questions which might be raised is whether it would 
not be to the advantage of the Filipinos to secure an arrange- 
ment by which they should have commercial attaches in con- 
nection with the American consular service, at those ports, 
especially in the Far East, where their trade is most con- 
siderable. This would certainly be a helpful step in prep- 
aration for self-government. 

It must be admitted that the people of the Philippine 
Islands have had little opportunity to acquire experience in 
business matters, and that a single failure or several failures 
must not be taken as conclusive evidence of inherent incom- 
petence. The real question is whether they show ability to 
profit by their mistakes. If the people of the Philippines are 
wise, they will set themselves to the task of mastering mer- 
cantile affairs and acquiring control of a reasonable share 
of their own wholesale and retail trade, instead of depend- 
ing, as hitherto, upon foreigners. It is also essential that 
they shall develop, both in legislative and administrative 
positions, the ability to deal both intelligently and honestly 
with economic questions. Furthermore, they must secure 
the investment of sufficient capital to assure the steady de- 
velopment of the national resources. A country which fails 
to do so cannot maintain a stable government. 

The question is one not merely of business ability but 
also of individual thrift. Perhaps the Filipinos have never 
developed this virtue; at any rate its practice does not seem 
to have been encouraged under the rule of the Spanish and 
the friars. The development of education and the extension 
of other privileges under American rule are encouraging in 
the ordinary Filipino a sense of self-dependence and of the 
desirability of personal financial solvency. The shortcom- 
ings of the Filipino in economic matters are but the faults 
of his virtues. Among the finest traits of the Filipino are his 
generosity and his cheerful, care-free disposition. To steady 


THE PHILIPPINES 269 


these virtues and to prevent their lapsing into faults is an- 
other prerequisite to the development of the quality of na- 
tional character which will assure genuine independence. 
Postal savings banks are already inculcating thrift, and in 
time, no doubt, other influences will conduce to the attain- 
ment of sound business sense, without any undue sacrifice of 
the characteristic virtues of the nation. 

Although the Filipinos are not good business managers, 
that is not the main reason why public taxation and ex- 
penditure have been considerably increased in the period 
since 1916, when they acquired full legislative control of the 
insular finances. The necessities of education, sanitation, 
transportation, and other public concerns have naturally 
appealed to the Filipinos for prompt and liberal expenditures. 
As long as the responsibility rested with the agents of the 
United States government there was a natural hesitation to 
proceed with undue rapidity in these matters. A moderate 
tax levied by alien authority might readily be more vehe- 
mently criticized than four times that sum levied by the rep- 
resentatives of the people themselves. In 1913 the rate of 
taxation was estimated at $1.32 per capita. By 1920 it had 
risen to $2.50 per capita.1* National taxes alone in the 
United States are in excess of $25 per capita. 

The Philippine government is equally fortunate in the 
smallness of its net indebtedness, which amounts to about 
$3 per capita. Though the taxes and the indebtedness of 
the Philippines are apparently trivial, they amount to really 
considerable sums when judged by the relative economic ad- 
vancement of the people as compared with conditions in the 
United States. The Philippine government does not, how- 
ever, pay all the costs involved. The United States govern- 
ment pays the charges for army, transport, navy, fortifica- 
tions, diplomacy, coast survey, and in addition has made 
other occasional appropriations rightly chargeable to the 


* Had the decline in the purchasing power of money been as 
great as in the United States, this would have meant no real increase 
in taxation. Though proper data are not available to determine the 
change in price levels in the Philippines, it is probable that the 
change was not as great as in the United States. 


270 THE AWAKENING EAST 


administration of the islands. It is estimated that the total 
disbursements by the American government on the Philip- 
pine account have amounted to about $700,000,000.18 The 
credit of the United States government, not merely in theory, 
but in absolute fact, has supported the currency of the islands 
in accordance with the gold standard, the bonds issued by 
the government, and even the Philippine National Bank. 

In the administration of justice the Filipinos have, from 
the beginning of the American occupation, enjoyed a large 
amount of responsibility. The local or minor courts are 
regularly officered by Filipinos. At the present time the 
only distinct reservation of judicial office to Americans is in 
the case of five of the nine appointments to the supreme 
court of the islands. The chief justice, however, is a Fili- 
pino. This almost complete native control of the judicial 
system has probably worked as well as could have been ex- 
pected. 

Unfortunately, there have arisen considerable causes for 
criticism. A certain amount of laxity and of delinquency 
in the conclusion of cases might naturally be anticipated 
with an oriental people. This is undesirable, but not se- 
rious. On the other hand, there have been rather too many 
complaints that the judicial officers have allowed political 
and other improper influences to determine the disposition 
of cases before them, especially of those which deal with 
elections. This is due not so much to lack of honesty or ca- 
pacity on the part of officials as to the lack of reasonable 
safeguards to assure their judicial integrity. There does not 
exist a body of enlightened public opinion sufficient to hold 
judges to strict account. There is likewise no suitable gov- 
ernmental supervision or instruction which would serve to 
hold local officials to a rigidly upright and impartial attitude 
in the discharge of their duties. 

In two respects the judicial administration in the Philip- 


* This sum equals the total expenditures of the Philippine gov- 
ernments, insular, provincial, and municipal, for the same period. 
Such claims as are made in the article, Philippine Government Is 
Self-Supporting, Philippine Press Bulletin, January, 1924, are, there- 
fore, misleading. 


THE PHILIPPINES 271 


pines differs radically from that in the United States. The 
local official combines administrative and judicial functions, 
and furthermore acts without a jury. These practices, like 
the legal system, are inherited from Spanish rule. The ar- 
rangement has its faults, but on the whole works with rea- 
sonable satisfaction, and efforts are being made to remove 
the more obvious objections. Every year of American con- 
trol, however, witnesses a large and natural extension of the 
ideas and forms of American law. The tendency to alter 
to an American standard is naturally very much stronger 
in the law regarding persons than in the law of property. 
The absence of a guaranty of jury trial in all cases seems, 
from the American point of ‘view, open to serious criticism, 
but it is, in fact, not discordant with the established legal 
conditions in the islands. Criticism of the absence of guar- 
anty seems to come not so much from the Filipinos them- 
selves as from some Americans who speak with sentiment 
rather than with knowledge. 

In the offices of civil administration the record is similar. 
Many Filipinos have displayed a high degree of competency 
and of official integrity, but there have also been rather too 
many examples of the opposite sort. The reasons already 
alleged in explanation in the case of judicial office hold 
equally in this instance. Though President McKinley had 
laid down the principle that, whenever possible, Filipinos 
were to be employed as their own governmental officials, a 
goodly number of Americans held governmental positions 
in the islands down until 1913. At that date Americans 
occupied approximately 2,600 out of 9,000 positions in the 
classified civil service in the Philippines. The criticism was 
not so much against the proportion of Americans in the 
service as against their almost exclusive monopoly of the 
higher offices. 

In 1913 Governor-General Harrison reported that only 
one bureau was under a Filipino chief. He made it his 
policy, wherever possible, to replace the American incum- 
bent by a Filipino, so that at the close of his administration 
in 1921 there were 30 Filipino chiefs of bureaus. Only nine 
bureaus, which required scientific experts to direct them, 


272 THE AWAKENING EAST 


remained under American chiefs. In the words of Gover- 
nor-General Harrison, “for a period of a year from the date 
of my arrival the number [of separations of Americans from 
the civil service] was 716, but their places were filled by 
Filipinos, not by Americans brought over for the purpose.” 
A regulation forbidding civil servants to engage in business 
caused many Americans to resign office; the Osmena 
retirement act in 1916, which provided a bonus to officials 
retiring after six years or more of service, resulted in the 
withdrawal, in the ensuing five years, of 913 Americans, as 
contrasted with 212 Filipinos. A third explanation of 
extensive withdrawals of Americans from the Philippine 
civil service was the World War, which called many into 
military service or other positions elsewhere. 

The Filipinization of the civil service has been in compli- 
ance with the demand for self-government, but there is 
serious doubt whether the process has not been carried too 
far, or at least introduced too rapidly. As a rule, Filipinos 
have avoided seeking positions requiring expert scientific 
ability, but even in the broader fields of general administra- 
tion it is not unlikely that better results might be obtained 
through the employment of a somewhat larger number of 
expert Americans. Doubt has also been raised whether 
Christian Filipino officials can serve acceptably among the 
Mohammedan Moros or among the pagan aborigines. Ex- 
perience has tended to remove this doubt. 

The American civil officials in the islands, especially in 
higher positions, are brought into contact incessantly with of- 
ficers of the American army, and to some extent with officers 
of the American navy. In general the relations with naval of- 
ficers have afforded little cause for complaint. The same 
cannot be said in the case of the army officers. From the 
time when Mr. Taft became civil governor to the close of 
the administration of Governor-General Harrison, friction 
between the military and civil officials developed repeatedly. 
As a rule, wisdom has seemed to be on the side of the civil 
officers, and the tendency has been to increase the power of 
the civil authority at the expense of the military. The un- 
fortunate emphasis placed by Governor-General Harrison 


THE PHILIPPINES 273 


upon the impolitic and reactionary character of army officers, 
at the close of his administration and in his book issued 
shortly thereafter, seriously prejudiced the situation at the 
arrival of the Wood—Forbes commission, and later at the 
appointment of General Wood as governor-general. In 
view of these circumstances and of the events which have 
since occurred, it seems that, in spite of the high character 
and ability of General Wood, the appointment of an army 
officer to the governor-generalship was ill-advised. 

Under the Jones act the franchise may be exercised by 
men 21 years of age who can read and write either Spanish, 
English, or a native language, or by those owning real prop- 
erty worth at least 500 pesos or paying taxes of at least 30 
pesos annually. Under these restrictions, the census of 
1918 showed that 53 per cent of the men of voting age en- 
joyed the right of suffrage.19 This proportion is very much 
greater than is authorized in any other eastern land. It is 
sometimes objected that free exercise of the franchise, 
especially in the more backward rural communities, is re- 
stricted by the traditional influence of certain individuals of 
local importance, because of official position, the headship of 
the family, or wealth. It is impossible to form a satisfac- 
tory judgment of the validity of these charges. Even if they 
are true, they are not necessarily serious in their conse- 
quences, and they may be overcome by the extension of edu- 
cation and the development of more intelligent public 
opinion. On the other hand, it may be reasonably argued 
that a much more liberal extension of the franchise should 
precede independence, and that it should be obtained through 
enabling a much larger proportion of the population to meet 
the educational qualification. It is doubtful whether a gov- 
ernment can be considered stable which rests upon the suf- 
frages of only 6.5 per cent of the population, as was the case 
with the legislature elected in 1919. 

The bicameral legislature established by the Jones act 
possesses wide powers of legislation subject to veto by the 
governor-general. A vetoed measure may be passed by 


* See above, page 252, footnote II. 


274 THE AWAKENING EAST 


a two-thirds vote of both houses, but even then the governor- 
general may withhold such a measure for final decision by 
the president of the United States. Moreover, all legisla- 
tive enactments must be reported to the congress of the 
United States, which has power of annulment, though it has 
never been exercised. This legislature also chooses two 
resident commissioners to Washington for terms of three 
years, who have the right of participating in debate in the 
house of representatives. The membership of the legisla- 
ture is made up entirely of Filipinos, all elected, except two 
senators and nine representatives appointed by the governor- 
general to represent the non-Christian tribes. In this respect 
the legislature is as completely native as in China or Japan, 
and far more representative, because practically every mem- 
ber is elected for a short and definite term of years, under a 
distinctly liberal franchise. No Americans or aliens sit in 
the legislature, a contrast to the situation prevailing in India. 

Both in the legislative assembly established in 1907, and 
in the full legislature created by the Jones act in 1916, the 
Filipinos have shown themselves surprisingly good parlia- 
mentarians, and, in general, the conduct of the sessions has 
been thoroughly commendable. Taken as a whole, the 
legislation enacted has been ample in quantity and of high 
character. While the Filipino may rightly be proud of the 
behavior of his legislative representatives, a disinterested 
observer can hardly avoid recognizing the insufficient char- 
acter of their parliamentary experience to justify the 
concession of full responsibility or independence for the 
present. It is true tha€ within the space of less than a 
quarter century they have established an apparently stable 
government, but it must be remembered that the English 
required centuries of similar experience to perfect their 
parliamentary institutions.2° In view of the extensive 
powers already enjoyed, it does not seem unfair that the 
Filipinos should be asked to consult their own future welfare 
and await patiently the establishment of their desired inde- 
pendence until further progress and experience shall have 


» The Filipino nationalists quite naturally prefer the comparison 
with Japan, but the two cases are not analogous. 


THE PHILIPPINES 275 


furnished additional guaranties for its successful mainten- 
ance. 

As it may be admitted without risk of serious dispute 
that the present status of the Philippines cannot satisfac- 
torily be maintained for a much longer time, the question 
arises concerning the practicability of other possible solu- 
tions. In all cases of territory acquired by the United States 
prior to 1898 ultimate incorporation into the Union through 
statehood was finally conceded, with the single exception 
that Alaska has not yet attained such rank. There can be 
little doubt that the Filipino people would, with almost com- 
plete unanimity, reject the proposal of statehood, and that 
the American people would be equally averse to granting it. 
In spite of this strong adverse opinion, the idea is not with- 
out merits, and might simplify some of the problems more 
satisfactorily than any other solution.?2!_ The Filipinos reject 
the plan because it is not consonant with their ideas of 
independence. American opposition arises partly from anti- 
imperialists, and partly from a general antipathy to annex- 
ing a distant area whose defense would be a constant liabil- 
ity and to incorporating people of an alien race. American 
opinion is profoundly influenced by experience with the 
negro question, and there is a marked unwillingness to take 
on any other racial problem. This latter point of view is 
undoubtedly exaggerated by the ignorant assumption that 
the Filipinos are a backward people inferior to the negroes. 

Though dominion status might not be more desirable than 
statehood as the ultimate solution of the Philippine question, 
it is not improbable that it may be the wisest arrangement 
for the immediate future. By dominion status would be 
signified such a quasi-independent relation as obtains be- 
tween the Dominion of Canada and the United Kingdom, 
together with the form of responsible parliamentary govern- 
ment which is in operation in Canada and the other British 
dominions. This plan seems to have been in the minds of 
Governor-General Harrison and of his Filipino advisers 
when they desired to replace the former by a Filipino gover- 


* On the other hand it would give the Philippines equal voice 
with New York in congress and in all national matters. 


276 THE AWAKENING EAST 


nor-general and to secure permission for Filipino representa- 
tives at the Paris peace conference. Both these proposals 
were negatived by President Wilson. While individuals 
may have different opinions on the abstract question of the 
relative desirability of the British system of responsible 
parliamentary government and of the American system of 
presidential government or of government by a system of 
checks and balances, it may be admitted that a modified form 
of dominion status with responsible parliamentary govern- 
ment offers the most convenient temporary solution for the 
Philippine problem. It has usually been overlooked that 
the mutual relations between the United States and the 
Philippines are not, and never can be, parallel to those be- 
tween Great Britain and its self-governing dominions. They 
are more nearly comparable to those between Great Britain 
and India. 

One of the strong arguments against immediate independ- 
ence might also be an argument against the concession of 
dominion status, were it not that this arrangement would 
provide a satisfactory period of trial and experience ante- 
cedent to independence. Practically speaking, there are no 
parties among the Filipinos, though there have been oc- 
casional efforts to secure an alignment with reference to a 
greater or lesser degree of self-government, or to immediate 
or deferred independence. The active political forces in the 
islands are practically all nationalists and supporters of the 
demand for Philippine independence at the earliest possible 
date. This is of genuine significance, for where no party of 
opposition exists there is no means of enforcing upon the 
majority and upon its representatives in a ministry a sense 
of legislative responsibility. 

If, on the other hand, the representatives in the senate 
and assembly were more or less evenly divided into two 
groups representing, for instance, radical and conservative 
views with regard to the establishment of national inde- 
pendence, the minority party would constitute an unfailing 
check upon the majority and hold that party to a substan- 
tially consistent policy and behavior. The minority would 
also be chastened by the realization that at any time a turn 


THE PHILIPPINES 275 


of the political wheel might place them in the majority. It 
is at this point that the Filipinos have not yet obtained the 
sort of experience in effecting a real party organization, 
both without and within the legislature, which is essential 
to the successful working of parliamentary institutions, 
whether of the British or of the American type. Insufficient 
time has elapsed to determine whether the split in the Nacion- 
alista party in 1922 between Osmena and Quezon will result 
in real advance toward the development of parties. The 
nonpartisan character of the Filipino senate and assembly 
would almost inevitably disappear with the establishment 
of independence or of dominion status, and parties or groups 
would undoubtedly arise in these bodies. A situation would 
then present itself for which the Filipinos would be to- 
tally unprepared by experience, which might be obtained 
more wisely under dominion status than after the establish- 
ment of independence. 

Whether with dominion status or under some other new 
adjustment, the real interests of the Filipino people in their 
progress toward self-government clearly render desirable, 
for a considerable period of time, their continued enjoyment 
of the benefit of a small but effective amount of American 
guidance and supervision. It is not merely that the expert 
knowledge of the Americans furnishes a certain measure 
of enlightenment to the Filipinos in dealing with govern- 
mental problems, but it is perhaps of even greater importance 
that the Americans, in a capacity as instructors or super- 
visors, can act impartially in toning up the Filipino of- 
ficials to a high standard of honesty, justice, and efficiency. 
Americans are needed in the government of the islands to 
furnish advice and sympathetic guidance, rather than to 
dictate or control. 

Thus far, during the period of American occupation, the 
educated Filipinos have, in general, been those trained dur- 
ing the period of Spanish domination. For some time to 
come Filipinos of this type may continue to be in the ma- 
jority and to exercise a controlling influence in political 
affairs. It is perfectly obvious that these men, no matter 
how sincere may be their loyalty and their good intentions, 


278 THE AWAKENING EAST 


are prevented by the circumstances of their training from 
being genuinely competent supporters of a regime in which 
American ideals are dominant. The new generation, trained 
under American auspices, will be free from certain preju- 
diced influences which necessarily affect the older genera- 
tion, and they will have grown up in full acquaintance with 
American methods and ideals, so that they should be able to 
approach all matters of public concern with far greater hope 
for success in dealing with them. It has already become 
possible to see the difference of attitude toward public mat- 
ters displayed by the old Spanish-trained generation and by 
the young American-trained generation. 

At this point it becomes necessary to refer to the most 
delicate question involved in the future of the islands. The 
Spanish-trained generation was also a friar-trained genera- 
tion, or at least grew up in a political society in which 
church and state were almost synonymous terms. Since 
over 88 per cent of the Filipino people are Catholics, of 
whom over 75 per cent are Roman Catholics, the immediate 
or early establishment of self-government and independence 
might permit the Roman Catholic Church, with a personnel 
which has not yet forgotten its days of supreme influence 
under Spanish rule, once more to dominate the islands. 
When it is recalled that the insurrection of 1896 was di- 
rected rather against the church than against the Spanish 
government, it appears how natural a return to the former 
condition would be. A sufficient period of time prior to 
independence and complete self-government ought to elapse 
to permit the thorough establishment of the American prin- 
ciple and practice of separation of church and state and of 
the full emancipation of the individual from clerical control 
in matters not of spiritual concern.22 The statement of this 
very vital situation is made absolutely without prejudice 
to the spiritual leadership of the Roman Catholic Church 
among the Filipino people. 

While emphasis is thus laid on the firm establishment of 
the principle of separation of church and state, it must be 


* The experiences of the several Latin-American nations are sug: 
gestive in this connection. 


Deere PINE Ss 279 


admitted that the attitude of the Catholic Church has ap- 
peared favorable to American control rather than to the 
aspirations for independence. Catholic opposition to inde- 
pendence may be explained by fear of the development of a 
definitely anti-clerical movement in the islands, if the re- 
straining influence of the United States were removed. 
There does indeed exist throughout the archipelago an inde- 
pendent Catholic Church, popularly known as the Aglipayan 
Church, established in 1902, under the leadership of Gregorio 
Aglipay, a priest who was active in the insurrection. The 
census of 1918 showed that 13 per cent of the people were 
adherents of this church, which is hostile to the Roman Cath- 
olic hierarchy. 

The need for American assistance has already been pointed 
out as essential not only in matters of government but also 
for the completion of an educational system that will estab- 
lish English as a common language, for the development of 
better journalism and a more active press with greatly ex- 
tended circulation, and for the establishment of an improved 
system of public works, to provide for sanitation, communi- 
cations, and transportation. All these matters are things es- 
sential to the welding of the Filipino peoples into a unified 
and intelligent nation, competent for self-government. With 
American assistance the desired end can undoubtedly be at- 
tained more rapidly than by the hastier, though perhaps more 
gratifying, method of immediate independence. It would 
seem to be a far greater injustice to the Filipino people for 
the Americans to leave the islands without accomplishing 
these tasks essential to national unity and genuine independ- 
ence than for them to continue their control and to refuse 
a premature grant of complete independence. 

The American people may justly pride themselves on their 
achievement in the Philippines. They have made enormous 
advances toward molding the diverse tribes into a single, 
united people, and for the first time have actually estab- 
lished the supremacy of a single government over them all. 
They have made extraordinary progress in extending the 
use of one of the great culture languages as the common 
speech, and have rapidly enlarged and improved the fa- 


280 THE AWAKENING EAST 


cilities for education. A single system of law uniformly ad- 
ministered has been extended through the archipelago. The 
public health has been improved by extensive measures of 
sanitation to a degree which has permitted the rapid growth 
of the population. By the construction of roads and by 
numerous other means, improved methods of transportation 
and communication have been established. The Americans 
have carried out, with remarkable consistency and sincerity, 
a policy of training the Filipino people for self-government, 
and they have administered the financial and commercial 
regime in a manner so satisfactory as to produce remarkably 
little discontent. Indeed, the American treatment of the 
Filipinos in these particulars has been exceedingly gen- 
erous. Although the problem of dealing with the Philip- 
pines, both as regards area and the amount of population, 
iS a comparatively small one, yet the American people may 
justly feel that they can challenge comparison with any other 
nation in the administration of a dependency inhabited by 
people of a different race from themselves. 

The liberality of the American policy toward the Filipinos 
has, in numerous cases, actually resulted in more liberal or 
progressive legislation for the islands than has been enacted 
in the United States itself. This situation has been not un- 
like that of Ireland, for which British legislation was more 
liberal, in many particulars, than for England itself. In 
their respective cases the Americans and the British were 
undoubtedly on their good behavior and dared not do less 
in behalf of the wards for whom they had gratuitously made 
themselves guardians. On the other hand, it may be in- 
quired whether the Filipinos could have achieved similar 
results within the same time had Aguinaldo and the insur- 
gents won in their struggle twenty-five years ago. With 
all due credit to the Filipinos for their share in the achieve- 
ment of the past quarter century, there can be little doubt 
that this question must be answered in the negative, for they 
were not a unified nation with a long-established government 
like the Japanese. They had, moreover, never had the 
benefit of experience in governmental affairs. 

The Filipinos are a virile people, not a dying race like the 


THE PHILIPPINES 281 


aboriginal population of many of the islands of the Pacific. 
They are, on the contrary, increasing rapidly in numbers and 
also advancing in culture. Furthermore, the Filipinos are 
a moral people. Western observers, from the earliest times, 
have found few immoral practices or barbarous customs 
among them, and contact with western peoples has not in- 
troduced alien vices. The faults which have been charged 
against the Filipino character are negative or passive in 
nature rather than offensive and active. Contact with the 
Chinese has not introduced the opium habit, nor has contact 
with Europeans or Americans made the Filipinos addicted to 
drink. It is true that there are native drinks of an alcoholic 
character, and that the wealthier classes import liquors, but 
drunkenness is practically unknown among them. There 
are strong arguments for the application of the eighteenth 
amendment to the Philippine Islands, but no one has sug- 
gested that it is necessary as a protection so far as the Fili- 
pinos are concerned, contrary to American experience where 
the negro has been involved. The chief argument, indeed, 
for the application of prohibition in the islands would be, 
if not to save the white residents from themselves, at least to 
save them from becoming ridiculous in the eyes of the Fili- 
pinos. Chastity, as well as sobriety, is one of the character- 
istic virtues of the Filipinos. Their attitude toward com- 
mercialized vice has been far more commendable than that 
of the white population. Efforts for its suppression, indeed, 
have been among the acts creditable to Filipino opinion and 
officials. 

The Filipino people have shown themselves remarkably 
loyal to the United States, and eager to fit themselves, with 
all promptitude, for self-government in accordance with 
American ideals. They have been quick and generous in 
their recognition of all that the United States has done for 
them. They also recognize that there are certain advantages 
which can accrue to them only through American control 
or protection. Reciprocally they concede that some form of 
American occupation in the islands, even though it be as 
limited as a naval base, is not merely essential for the Fili- 
pinos themselves, but of very great value to the United 


282 THE AWAKENING EAST 


States with reference to the western Pacific and eastern 
Asia, 

While from the point of view of political idealism and 
abstract justice it may be conceded that the United States 
should withdraw from the islands, and accord to the Fili- 
pino people immediate and complete independence, the dic- 
tates of practical politics, in the existing period of interna- 
tional turmoil and competition, furnish abundant reasons 
why the United States should continue to maintain a 
position in the Philippine Islands as a suitable safeguard 
both for its extensive interests in the regions of the Far 
East and for the welfare of the Filipinos. No nation outside 
of eastern Asia itself has a greater interest in the future de- 
velopments in eastern Asia and the western Pacific than has 
the United States. 

The Philippine Islands are too small in area and in popula- 
tion to be able to maintain independence and security under 
present world conditions. American control or protectorate 
is essential unless similar control ‘by some other nation is 
to be substituted. The islands offer such rich advantages, 
through their intrinsic wealth and through the strategic 
nature of their location, that they would naturally attract 
the covetous interest of various powers. Governor-General 
Harrison and many others felt convinced that the establish- 
ment of the League of Nations would solve satisfactorily 
the problem of international status for the Philippines, 
without resort to an American protectorate or to a specific 
international act of neutralization.2® This hopeful augury 
has not been justified by ensuing events, particularly since 
the United States has not entered the League. 

It is, therefore, a matter of mutual concern to the Amer- 
ican people and to the peoples of the Philippines that, in 
some form, American control over the islands should be 
continued. The problem of determining what that form 


* Such an international act would now involve modification of 
the four-power pact signed by the United States, Great Britain, 
France, and Japan at the Washington conference, and would be 
valueless without the assent of each of these powers. See below, 
pages 284-286, 290-291, 2906. 


THE PHILIPPINES 283 


shall be is open to a variety of possible solutions. The con- 
tinuance of the present status or the adoption of a policy 
of anticipating statehood have been shown to be impracti- 
cable. Dominion status has been discussed as a possible next 
step of a temporary character. The impracticability of ab- 
solute independence, as has been seen,?4 is admitted even by 
the Filipinos. 

There remain two possible solutions, somewhat similar in 
character, but differing rather in form. The first would be 
complete independence and self-government safeguarded by 
an offensive and defensive alliance with the United States. 
While this plan would apparently afford a nearer approach 
in form to absolutely independent international status, it 
would practically bind the Philippines to the United States 
in permanent subordination, with less power to influence 
American policy than under present conditions. The other 
solution, that of qualified independence, has been repeatedly 
suggested, ever since 1898, and has usually been accepted as 
satisfactory by all Filipinos except some extremists. Its 
advantages to the United States are not so clear. It would 
seem to impose liabilities out of proportion to the benefits 
that might be derived. The exact form which such qualified 
independence might take is usually defined as an arrangement 
somewhat similar to the Platt Amendment in the case of 
Cuba. Owing to the vastly greater distance of the Philip- 
pines from the United States the application of this plan to 
them might not be so satisfactory to either party, and would 
certainly involve some different adjustments. 

Either of these two solutions which have just been sug- 
gested involves the question of defense or protection of the 
Philippine Islands in their international status. Since 1898 
the responsibility for this has rested entirely upon the army 
and navy of the United States, and the expense has been 
entirely defrayed by the American government. The de- 
fense of the islands also involves some responsibility in 
matters of foreign intercourse. The detached position of 
the islands, moreover, has made it convenient, if not neces- 
sary, that the governor-general shall be responsible for 


** See above, page 281. 


284 THE AWAKENING EAST 


handling a good many matters of international concern. 
Particularly during the period of the World War, important 
responsibilities and burdensome routine of this sort rested 
upon him. 

When the United States was engaged in the World War, 
it almost entirely denuded the islands of troops and diverted 
its effective naval vessels to other waters. The thoroughly 
pacific conditions in the islands during that period are elo- 
quent testimony to the satisfactory character of the Amer- 
ican administration and of the behavior of the Filipino 
people. They desired to organize a volunteer force to be 
placed at the disposal of the United States government in 
the war. This generous proposal, unfortunately, received 
rather cavalier treatment by the authorities in Washington. 
The only native organization in the nature of a defense 
force is the Philippine constabulary, numbering about five 
thousand, which has for twenty years proved itself an ex- 
cellent organization, somewhat similar to the state police 
forces in the United States. Its activities are more varied 
and exacting. Upon it rests the responsibility for main- 
tenance of order in the less civilized portions of the islands. 

It is only possible to surmise from the attitude of neigh- 
boring or interested nations since the American occupation 
of the Philippines what their attitude would be toward the 
islands as an independent, or even quasi-independent, state. 
In 1898 and the immediately following years the chief bug- 
bear was the possibility of German intervention in the 
islands, or German ambition to seize them. At that time 
the attitude of Japan was considered favorable, but since 
the Russo-Japanese War imperialistic designs of that coun- 
try upon the archipelago have been repeatedly alleged. 
Japanese experience in Formosa, however, as well as in the 
Philippines themselves, has shown that it is extremely un- 
likely, if not impossible, that the islands should become a 
field for Japanese colonization. Their experience in under- 
taking business projects in the islands has also been unsat- 
isfactory, and indicates the lack of qualities necessary for 
dealing satisfactorily with the Filipino as a laborer. It is 
doubtful, therefore, whether Japan would seriously consider 


THE PHILIPPINES 285 


intervention in the islands unless provoked thereto. The 
danger of aggression by the Chinese in any political form 
is apparently beyond the bounds of immediate possibility, 
but their economic expansion in the islands might at any 
time create serious difficulties unless their migration into 
the archipelago continues to be carefully restricted. 

It is by no means likely that any one of the European 
powers with colonies in the vicinity of the Philippines, 
namely, the British, French, Dutch, and Portuguese, would 
undertake intervention unfavorable to an independent 
Philippine nation unless they were given serious provoca- 
tion. The islands would offer few, if any, advantages ad- 
ditional to those enjoyed in the territories they already 
possess, and would, on the contrary, impose upon them se- 
rious new problems. On the other hand, there is no doubt 
that the policy pursued by the American government since 
its occupation of the Philippines is viewed with impatience 
and disapproval by each one of these countries, especially 
by the colonial officials and by those interested in colonial 
exploitation. This feeling would undoubtedly be increased 
to serious irritation by the grant of full independence or 
quasi-independence to the Philippines. The reason for this 
attitude is that the United States has pursued toward the 
Philippines a policy infinitely more progressive and liberal 
than has any one of these other nations in dealing with east- 
ern peoples. 

The rapid extension of educational facilities and the 
avowed and maintained policy of preparing the Filipinos for 
self-government have set an example which the European 
colonizing powers view with alarm. That this alarm is not 
without foundation is obvious from the encouragement 
which the natives of British India, of French Indo-China, 
and of the Dutch East Indies have drawn from the steady 
progress made by the Filipinos in enlightenment and po- 
litical capacity. The American policy and Filipino achieve- 
ment have driven each of these European powers to adopt 
for their eastern possessions policies of an unwontedly lib- 
eral character. Should the United States grant independ- 
ence, either complete or conditional, to the Philippines, 


286 THE AWAKENING EAST 


Great Britain would find it extremely difficult to withhold 
similar concessions from India, and the other powers would 
be impelled to bestow liberal reforms as an alternative to 
revolution. Even the Japanese situation in Korea would be 
affected. Under these circumstances it is not at all sur- 
prising that these governments should permit, if not en- 
courage, their press to assume a critical attitude toward the 
American administration in the islands and particularly to- 
ward the independence movement. 

The attitude of President Wilson’s administration in re- 
fusing to enlist a Filipino corps in the United States army 
during the World War, his efforts to prevent a Filipino 
commission from visiting Washington after the armistice, 
and his refusal to permit a Filipino delegation to the Paris 
peace conference are close, almost illuminating, parallels to 
the British policy toward Egypt on exactly the same points. 
The discordance of these procedures with the general tenor 
of President Wilson’s policy suggests that in these matters 
he was making concessions to British susceptibilities. Presi- 
dent Harding’s reply to the Filipino delegation in 1922 was 
certainly franker and in strict accord with the policy of 
preceding Republican administrations, though the nature of 
his declarations could not have been considered acceptable to 
a large body of Filipino opinion. In spite of these official 
rebuffs Filipino nationalists have continued to maintain an 
extremely skillful propaganda in the United States, and their 
appeal to the spirit of American institutions is ably con- 
ceived and difficult to resist. 

It is not easy to combat the argument that the spirit of 
the Declaration of Independence and of the Constitution of 
the United States does not accord with the maintenance of 
American control over the Filipino people, or to dissent 
from the Filipino assertion that their ambitions are identical 
with those pursued by the Americans in their own struggle 
for liberty. 

In one form or another, with more or less definiteness, at 
many times during the twenty-five years of American occu- 
pation, it has been announced that it was the policy of the 
United States to accord to the people of the Philippine 


THE PHILIPPINES 287 


Islands full self-government. In certain instances, notably 
in President Roosevelt’s message to congress in 1908 and 
in President Wilson’s message to the Filipino people in 
October, 1913, the word “independence” has also been used. 
Many people in the United States believe that the nation is 
definitely and officially pledged to accord to the Philippine 
Islands, in the immediate future, not only complete self- 
government but also full independence. As for the Filipino 
peoples, there can be no doubt that they have interpreted the 
American promises in the most favorable construction as 
regards the early concession of both self-government and 
independence. 

The critical case in question is the preamble of the Jones 
act of 1916, especially its second clause, which reads: 

“Whereas it is, as it has always been, the purpose of the 
people of the United States to withdraw their sovereignty 
over the Philippine Islands and to recognize their independ- 
ence as soon as a stable government can be established 
therein.” 

Much argument has been consequently spent upon the 
question whether a stable government has yet been estab- 
lished in the islands, and over the meaning of the phrase 
“stable government.” The significance of this preamble was 
emphasized by an important episode in the debates over the 
bill. 

An amendment introduced by Senator Clarke of Arkan- 
sas provided for the complete and unqualified independence 
of the Philippines in not less than two years and not more 
than four years from the date of the approval of the act. 
This amendment passed the senate by the deciding vote of 
Vice-President Marshall. It was understood that it had 
the approval of President Wilson. The amendment was 
defeated in the house of representatives by a vote of 213 
to 165. It has been alleged that this defeat was due to the 
opposition of twenty-eight Democrats, who were nearly all 
adherents of the Roman Catholic Church, and whose action 
was at the instigation of the ecclesiastical authorities in the 
Philippines. Whether this allegation is justified or not, the 
circumstance gave occasion for a clever and pertinent re- 


288 THE AWAKENING EAST 


joinder by Mr. Quezon, the president of the Philippine sen- 
ate, at the ensuing St. Patrick’s Day banquet in Manila. 
Referring to Irish politics he said, “We wish for your 
Irishmen the same independence you wished for us.” 

Many observers, not only Americans and Filipinos, but 
also from other nations, have expressed the judgment that 
the United States should promptly fulfil these prom- 
ises, actual or assumed, and have declared that failure to do 
so would involve a serious conflict between the Americans 
and the Filipinos. Other observers take the more moderate 
view that the United States should definitely announce its 
policy, whether it is to be that of granting independence in 
the near future in full or in modified form, or whether such 
grant is to be delayed for some specified period, or is to be 
postponed indefinitely. These latter feel that the real dif- 
ficulty in the situation is not with which policy may be 
adopted, but chiefly in the uncertainty which now exists. 
This view is probably more nearly correct than the former, 
but it is doubtful whether it is either possible or necessary 
that the American government should make a definite and 
binding pronouncement at this or any future time. The 
situation is open to so many possibilities of change that it is 
impossible for even the most far-seeing statesman to lay 
down a policy which circumstances might not render un- 
desirable at any moment. 

The generosity, justice, and progressiveness of American 
rule in the Philippines have been so complete that it is ex- 
ceedingly difficult for anyone to find reason for objection 
or serious criticism. The differences of judgment have to 
do almost entirely with questions of status and but slightly 
with the policy of ordinary administration. Americans may 
well be proud of the high character of their record in the 
Philippine Islands, and, indeed, the Filipinos are frank and 
generous in their recognition of the benefits which they have 
received. The liberal reforms accomplished quite outdis- 
tance the program sketched by Rizal less than thirty years 
ago. The progress made in the Philippine Islands in the 
past quarter century has not been due solely to the Amer- 
icans. It has been due, in at least as great a degree, to the 


THE PHILIPPINES 289 


readiness with which the people of the islands have accepted 
American rule and cooperated with the administration in 
carrying out the various reforms and measures for improve- 
ment. 

The advance made by the Filipino people themselves is 
an achievement which it would be difficult to parallel and is 
most highly praiseworthy. At the present time a consider- 
able percentage of the people of the islands is fitted, at least 
to a moderate degree, to undertake self-government, but an 
adequate proportion of the people of the islands will not be 
fitted for complete independence until a system of com- 
pulsory primary education with suitable higher schools is in 
full operation throughout the archipelago. It is difficult 
to consider a government based upon the present limited 
suffrage, which is really a government by a few leaders, by 
a sort of Filipino aristocracy, as conforming reasonably 
to the definition of a “stable government.” Substantially 
the whole population of voting age, at least among the Chris- 
tian element, should become qualified to vote and a reason- 
able proportion of them should customarily exercise the 
suffrage, as a prerequisite to independence. As previously 
indicated, there are other advances, such as the general use 
of English and greater ability to deal with economic ques- 
tions, which will also be necessary to fit the people as a 
whole to undertake self-government with satisfactory pros- 
pect of success. These reasons seem to indicate that some 
measure of American guidance and protection will be neces- 
sary for perhaps another generation. Meanwhile, the wisest 
provisional arrangement will probably be found in the estab- 
lishment of some form of the dominion type of responsible 
government. 

No one will doubt that the American government can and 
should guarantee to the Filipinos the same constitutional 
rights, the same excellent administration, the same privileges 
of self-government which they have hitherto enjoyed under 
the sovereignty of the United States, in other words, that 
there shall be “no backward step.” The American govern- 
ment should also assure the people of the islands that it will 
be the continued policy to promote the spread of educa- 


290 THE AWAKENING EAST 


tion, the improvement of public health, and all other meas- 
ures for the public advancement and welfare which have 
already been undertaken, with the purpose of extending 
these advantages as rapidly and completely as possible 
throughout the islands. A third assurance can also be given 
by the United States, that the interests and security of the 
islands internationally will be protected. On a fourth point 
the United States can give assurance, namely, that adequate 
hearing shall be given to the Filipino people at Washington 
on all matters which concern them, by guaranteeing the con- 
tinuance of the privileges now exercised through their resi- 
dent commissioners in Washington and, if necessary, by 
creating additional agencies. 

It is, however, seriously doubtful whether it is expedient 
for the United States to make any promises or give any 
guarantees with reference to the question of independence 
or as to future changes in the governmental status. These 
questions should be solved when the time is ripe, without 
any prejudices from promises of a prophetic character. At 
the present time American relations to the Philippines are 
almost entirely in the nature of according international pro- 
tection and political guidance, or, in other words, of main- 
taining and guaranteeing the safety and stability of their 
position and government. The absolutely political character 
of American relations to the Philippines needs to be con- 
sidered in contrast with the rule of Japan in Korea, of 
France in Indo-China, of the Dutch in the East Indies, and 
of the British in Malaya, where each power is actually exer- 
cising administrative authority over subject peoples which 
have at best only trifling voice in the management of their 
governmental affairs. Each one of these dominant powers 
would naturally assume an unfriendly attitude toward an 
independent Philippine state, which might prove seriously 
detrimental without extending to any measures of a hostile 
character. 

The international status of the Philippine Islands was af- 
fected both favorably and unfavorably by the actions of 
the Washington conference. The international guaranty 
of territorial possessions in the Pacific by the powers con- 


THE PHILIPPINES 201 


cerned?5 may be considered as assurance that the Philippine 
peoples need have no fears of aggressive action from the 
several nations party to that conference. Should the Philip- 
pines, however, assume an entirely independent national 
status, they would not be a party to the Washington treaties, 
without new international agreements to that intent. The 
disarmament provisions adopted by the conference, on the 
other hand, prevent any further fortification or strengthen- 
ing of the islands as an American naval base. This, unfor- 
tunately, will leave the strategic situation of the Philippine 
Islands at a disadvantage in comparison with Japan and 
with the neighboring British possessions, though it may 
be fairly assumed that there need be no fear of action, by 
either of these nations, hostile to the interests of the Amer- 
icans in the islands, or of the Filipinos themselves. 

The future of the Philippines will be as bright as has been 
their past under American rule, if both peoples will continue 
to deal with one another in the same spirit of justice and 
fair play, of magnanimity and codperation, that they have 
hitherto displayed. It is to the credit of both nations that 
the highest attainment in the matter of self-government by 
any eastern people has been achieved by the Filipinos under 
American guidance. The premier nation of the East in the 
acceptance and practice of Christianity and democracy is 
entitled to sing of itself as 


Land of the morning. 


RECENT EVENTS 


The results of the elections held in 1922 involved no 
significant change. Eighty-six per cent of the 824,058 reg- 
istered electors voted, a larger number but a smaller 
proportion than in 1919.26 The session of the Philippine 
legislature in the early part of 1923 resulted in almost no 


* The four-power pact signed by the United States, Great Britain, 
France, and Japan affords substantial assurances, though it is not 
an explicit and ironclad mutual guaranty of their respective pos- 
sessions. 

7° See above, pages 251-252. 


202 THE AWAKENING EAST 


completed legislation. Among the measures considered were 
bills to permit the introduction of woman suffrage, to estab- 
lish hospitals in each of the twenty-eight of the forty-eight 
provinces still without them, and to make Manila a free 
port. Various projects are being carried out and others 
have been suggested for the improvement of Manila. The 
design is to make it not merely an important distributing 
port for American trade in the Far East, but also one of 
the greatest ports of the whole East. 

In the summer of 1923 Governor-General Wood called 
the legislature into special session to consider legislation 
to encourage the growing of rubber, and other matters. It 
is the policy of Governor-General Wood to withdraw the 
government from connection with the Philippine National 
Bank,?? with the railroads, and with other business enter- 
prises; and instead to secure legislation which shall attract 
American capital for the development of resources and 
business. The legislature is strongly opposed to both these 
proposals, which are reversals of the policy of the Harrison 
administration. 

The dispute between the governor-general and the legis- 
lature, however, actually came to a head over a minor in- 
cident on July 23, 1923, when the two houses of the legis- 
lature adopted a joint resolution demanding his immediate 
recall. A week previous the cabinet had presented its 
resignation, for which the immediate pretext was the rein- 
statement, as chief of the secret service, of Ray Conley, 
who had been tried three times on charges of bribery and 
acquitted. It is alleged that these charges were brought 
against him because of his activities in suppressing gambling, 
in which certain influential Filipinos were interested. On the 
other hand, the action of the governor-general was censured 
as a breach of Filipino legislation enacted in pursuance of 
the Jones act and, consequently, as an unwarranted and ar- 
bitrary exercise of power. The governor-general continued 
to conduct the administration through the under-secretaries 
of the departments and, in general, administrative affairs 


7 The government is still fully associated with the bank, which is 
steadily recovering from its unfortunate experience. 


THE PHILIPPINES 203 


seemed to run smoothly. The fiscal year ending in 1923 
was closed with a surplus, as the result of a policy of rigor- 
ous retrenchment by which expenditures were reduced from 
$50,600,000 in 1921 to $33,500,000 in 1923. A further 
saving of $150,000 is promised in the budget for 1924. 

Political agitation, on the other hand, continued active, 
with Mr. Quezon as the chief spokesman for the supporters 
of independence. Governor-General Harrison, by his crea- 
tion of the council of state, with Speaker Osmena of the 
house and President Quezon of the senate as members, and 
by his regular consultation with these two nationalist lead- 
ers on questions of appointment and policy, had given these 
two men and the interests which they represented large 
influence and power. Governor-General Wood, on the con- 
trary, by his policy of interpreting the Jones act strictly and 
conducting the administration as nearly as possible inde- 
pendently of the legislature, distinctly lessened the influence 
in governmental matters wielded by these two men. They 
have, however, adhered consistently to the principles of 
self-government and independence, which they have advo- 
cated throughout their public careers, and have insisted that 
their opposition to Governor-General Wood is based entirely 
upon principle. They believe that the executive authority 
in the Philippines should be responsible to the legislature, 
and that such responsibility is not inconsistent with the Jones 
act but, rather, in accordance with its spirit. 

The governor-general, on his side, has maintained that, 
in his position as chief executive in the islands, he is respon- 
sible to the American government. He adheres to the prin- 
ciple enunciated in the final paragraph of the Wood-Forbes 
report that, so long as the government of the United States 
holds “a position of responsibility” in the Philippines, it 
must not be “without authority.” This difference in point 
of view between the legislature and the governor-general 
is due to apparently contradictory provisions in a single 
sentence of the Jones act: 


“The Philippine legislature may thereafter by appropriate 
legislation increase the number or abolish any of the ex- 
ecutive departments, or make such changes in the names 


294 THE AWAKENING EAST 


and duties thereof as it may see fit, and shall provide for the 
appointment and removal of the heads of the executive de- 
partments by the governor-general: Provided, That all ex- 
ecutive functions of the government must be directly under 
the governor-general or within one of the executive depart- 
ments under the supervision and control of the governor- 
general.” 


The legislature practically rests its case in favor of par- 
liamentary responsibility on the first part of the above sen- 
tence; the governor-general depends upon the latter part 
of the sentence in asserting his control over the administra- 
tion. A further complaint of the legislature and the nation- 
alists against Governor-General Wood is that he has vetoed 
a considerable number of measures of strictly local legisla- 
tion. They argue that the veto power conferred by the 
Jones act does not properly extend to this class of measures. 

There are, then, two main issues involved: the constitu- 
tional relation between the government of the United States 
and the government of the islands and the provision of 
capital for the development of insular resources. As set 
forth in the original lecture,?8 the best solution of the former 
question would probably be the concession to the Philippines 
of responsible self-government more or less similar to the 
British type of dominion government. Though Great Brit- 
ain has responsibility for its dominions, it has practically 
surrendered authority over them. It is questionable whether 
corresponding concession is desirable in the case of the 
Philippines. Dominion status would obviously carry with 
it the determination of the other issue in accordance with 
the wishes of the Philippine legislature, unless a different 
plan should be authorized in the new constituent act. The 
absence of capital in the islands sufficient for business in- 
vestment makes doubtful the practicability of the legisla- 
ture’s policy. Either support of Philippine credit by the 
United States government or arrangements for the invest- 
ment of American private capital seems to be the alterna- 
tive if the insular resources are to be developed. Hitherto 


* See above, pages 275-270. 


Tah PHILIP PIN BS 295 


the economic elements in the problem of independence have 
received too little consideration. 

Dominion status, as a provisional arrangement, seems ac- 
ceptable to the Filipino leaders, as indicated by a joint reso- 
lution of the legislature on October 17, 1923, renewing the 
petition for the recall of Governor-General Wood and add- 
ing a request for the appointment of a Filipino in his stead. 
On the following day Secretary of War Weeks issued a 
statement upholding Governor-General Wood and his use 
of the veto power. Advantage was taken of a special elec- 
tion for a member of the Philippine senate to register an 
expression of opinion on the questions at issue. Though the 
Nacionalista candidate won, his Democrata opponent re- 
ceived 42 per cent of the votes. In November, leaders of 
the Democrata party offered their cooperation to the gover- 
nor-general, perhaps with the hope of receiving appoint- 
ments to the vacant cabinet offices. 

The legislature decided to send Mr. Manuel Roxas, who 
had succeeded Osmena as speaker of the house, on a special 
mission to Washington in advocacy of the independence 
cause. On March 5, 1924, in reply to Speaker Roxas’s pres- 
entation of the case to him, President Coolidge issued a 
reply strongly upholding the administration of Governor- 
General Wood and declaring in the most specific terms that 
the Filipinos could not yet be considered prepared for self- 
government. This statement was probably the most pointed 
and severe in tone of any that ever emanated from the gov- 
ernment of the United States with reference to the govern- 
ment of the Philippines. The absence of evidences of con- 
ciliation may possibly be explained on the ground that the 
document was addressed as much to the opponents of the 
presidential policy in the United States as to the advocates 
of independence in the islands. On May 10, 1924, the com- 
mittee on insular affairs of the house of representatives re- 
ported a bill introduced by Representative Fairfield of In- 
diana which has the approval of Mr. Quezon. This measure, 
known as the Philippine Commonwealth bill, provides that 
the people of the island shall draft a constitution for the 
Commonwealth of the Philippines, subject to certain reser- 


296 THE AWAKENING EAST 


vations including the final jurisdiction of the United States 
supreme court, the ultimate supremacy of the president 
of the United States, American control of foreign affairs, 
and financial guaranties. here is to be a commissioner ap- 
pointed by the president and directly representing him in 
the islands. At the expiration of twenty years, the Philip- 
pines shall be recognized by the United States as independ- 
ent, but with the proviso, similar to the Platt Amendment 
in the case of Cuba, that the national constitution shall con- 
tain certain guaranties, mainly financial. The new nation, 
it is further provided, “shall never enter into any treaty or 
other compact with any other foreign power or powers 
which will impair, or tend to impair the independence of the 
Philippine Islands, nor in any manner authorize or permit 
any other foreign power or powers to obtain by colonization 
or for military or naval purposes or otherwise, lodgment in 
or control over any portion of said islands.” The United 
States, however, may retain such military and naval reserva- 
tions as the President may consider necessary. A some- 
what similar measure prepared by the corresponding com- 
mittee of the senate provides for a plebiscite in the islands 
on the question of independence in 1935. 

In the presidential election of 1924, the platform of the 
Republican party declared, “When it is evident to congress 
that independence would be better for the people of the 
Philippines with respect to both their domestic concerns and 
their status in the world, and the Filipino people then desire 
complete independence, the American government will 
gladly accord it.” It then continued, “The time for such 
action has not yet arrived.” On the other hand, the Demo- 
cratic platform announced, “It is now our liberty and our 
duty to keep our promise to these people by granting them 
immediately their independence, which they so honorably 
covet.” The Independent Progressive party platform 
made no reference to the Philippines. Aside from the 
platform pronouncements, the subject seems to have at- 
tracted no discussion in the campaign. In view of these 
party declarations and of the bills before congress, it seems 
likely that there may be enacted in the near future a measure, 


THE PHILIPPINES 207 


more or less similar to the Fairfield bill, establishing pro- 
visionally a government of the dominion type and fixing a 
date for the determination of the question of independence. 
Apparently in expectation of this result, the relations be- 
tween the administration in the islands and the nationalists 
have tended to become less strained in recent months. 

For some years there has appeared as a permanent item 
in the Philippine budget an annual appropriation of 1,000,000 
pesos ($500,000) for the promotion of the independence 
cause. Within recent months this item has been the subject 
of serious discussion both in Washington and Manila. 
Though Governor-General Wood has meticulously avoided 
any interference in this matter, the auditor of accounts in 
the Philippines has recently forbidden any further drafts on 
this fund, and the attorney-general of the United States has 
sustained the ruling. To offset this action an attempt has 
been made, apparently with success, to raise a sum twice as 
large by popular subscription. 

Considerable disturbances occurred in the southern part 
of the archipelago among the more backward Mohammedan 
Moros during several months in 1923-1924. ‘The troubles 
were, in part, caused by religious fanatics, but it is also al- 
leged that they represented a Mohammedan protest against 
the participation of Christian Filipinos in their government 
and against the independence movement. Another unpleas- 
ant episode occurred in July, 1924, when it was discovered 
that a strike plot existed among the Filipino scouts or con- 
stabulary. The purpose of the plot, which resulted in the 
trial and conviction of a considerable number, was to de- 
mand pay equal to that of the United States army in the 
islands. 

The latest report of the bureau of education shows the 
existence of 8,174 schools in the Philippines, of which 7,641 
are public schools with 1,394,472 pupils, while the 533 pri- 
vate schools have an attendance of 64,835. The total num- 
ber of teachers employed is 24,878, of whom only 341 are 
Americans. The budget for 1924 assigns over twenty-five 
per cent of the appropriations to the support of education. 
Arrangements have been made for a commission of Amer- 


298 THE AWAKENING EAST 


ican educational experts to visit the Philippines in the near 
future’ to investigate the working of the school system and 
to present recommendations. 


SUGGESTIONS FOR READING 


Brief surveys of Philippine history are given by Professor David 
P. Barrows of the University of California, formerly director of 
education for the Philippines, in A History of the Philippines (3rd 
ed., Yonkers, World Book Company, 1914), and by Professor 
Leandro H. Fernandez, of the University of the Philippines, in 
A Brief History of the Philippines (Boston, Ginn & Company, 1919). 
A fuller account of the Spanish period will be found in The Philip- 
pine Islands (3rd ed., New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1906), 
by John Foreman, an English observer. For the close of Spanish 
rule and the establishment of American administration the three 
following works are standard accounts and include much descrip- 
tive as well as historical material: The Americans in the Philippines 
(2 vols., Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1914), by James A. — 
Le Roy, covers events to 1900; The Philippines Past and Present 
(2 vols., New York, The Macmillan Company, 1914), by Dean C. 
Worcester, member of the Philippine commission from 1900 to 1913, 
covers events to 1913; and The Philippines (2 vols., Indianapolis, 
The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1916-17), by Charles B. Elliott, mem- 
ber of the Philippine commission from I9gI0 to 1912, covers to IQI6. 
These may be supplemented by The Corner-stone of Philippine Inde- 
pendence, a Narrative of Seven Years (New York, The Century 
Co., 1922), by Francis Burton Harrison, governor-general of the 
Philippines from I913 to 1921, though its chief value is as an 
apologia for his administration. 

A readable, descriptive volume is Philippine Life in Town and 
Country (New York, G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1905), by James A. 
Le Roy, who was for a time connected with the Philippine commis- 
sion. The following manuals of information on economic and 
social conditions present much information in convenient form: 
A Handbook of the Philippines (3rd ed., Chicago, A. C. McClurg 
& Co., 1909), by Hamilton M. Wright; and Economic Conditions 
in the Philippines (2nd ed., Boston, Ginn & Company, 1920), by 
Hugo H. Miller; both by authors acquainted at first-hand with 
the islands. An excellent manual on governmental and political 
affairs is Philippine Government (New York, D. C. Heath & Com- 
pany, 1923), by George A. Malcolm, a justice of the supreme court 
of the Philippines, and Maximo M. Kalaw. 

The views of the Filipino advocates of independence are set 
forth by Professor Maximo M. Kalaw, of the University of the 
Philippines, in The Case for the Filipinos (New York, The Century 
Co., 1916), and in Self-Government in the Philippines (New York, 


THE PHILIPPINES 299 


The Century Co., 1919). The Philippine Commission of Indepen- 
dence Press Bulletin (Washington, 1g1off.), issued nine times a 
year, is an able compilation of the latest materials for propaganda 
purposes. The Philippine Republic (Washington, 1923ff.) is an 
illustrated monthly devoted to the spread of information favorable 
to Philippine independence. There is no good recent exposition of 
the case except from the Philippine side, but a carefully impartial 
statement is the article, Philippine Independence (Foreign Affairs, 
2, 488-499, March 15, 1924), by Charles C. Batchelder, who was 
delegate of the secretary of the interior of the Philippine Islands 
from 1914 to I9g16. 

Of fundamental importance, despite its brevity, is the famous 
Wood-Forbes Report: Condition in Philippine Islands, Report of 
the Special Mission to the Philippine Islands to the Secretary of 
War (House of Representatives, 67th Congress, 2nd Session, Docu- 
ment No. 325, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1921). In 
reply to it there has been issued the Filipino Appeal for Freedom, 
the Philippine Parliamentary Mission's Statement of the Actual 
Conditions in the Philippine Islands and a Summary of Philippine 
Problems (House of Representatives, 67th Congress, 4th Session, 
Document No. 511, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923). 
Owing to its later publication it utilizes information not available 
at the writing of the Wood-Forbes Report. 


CHAPTER GV 
PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS IN THE EAST 


THE contacts of western nations with eastern peoples are 
not primarily the contacts of superiors with inferiors. It 
is customary for most people in western lands to look down 
upon the populations of the East in general as distinctly in- 
ferior to themselves. It must be borne in mind, however, 
that in making comparisons between two different sets of 
peoples it is necessary to make them with a certain amount 
of detail, taking care always that people of the same corre- 
sponding position in the two nations are brought into com- 
parison. It is absurd, for instance, that people of noble 
birth or of high intellectual training should be regarded as 
typical of the West, but the coolie laborer as representative 
of the Chinese. 

Most peoples of the East are of entirely different race from 
the peoples of the West, so that the comparison involves the 
question of the relative merits of the different races. It is 
customary for members of the white race to regard them- 
selves as unquestionably superior to any others. In Amer- 
ica, where the white is brought into sharp relief against the 
African negro, there is a tendency to regard all persons not 
of white race as being as much inferior to the best of white 
people as are the majority of the descendants of negro 
slaves once brought from the Guinea coast of Africa. This 
inference is obviously erroneous when one is dealing, as in 
the case of the Filipinos, with peoples who have been Chris- 
tianized for about three centuries, or with a people with cen- 
turies of high artistic development like the Japanese, or with 
peoples such as the Hindus, with more than two millenniums 
of literary tradition. 

In the comparison of East and West it is customary for 
the westerner to regard whatever backwardness there may 

300 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 301 


be in the East as due to the inferiority of eastern peoples. 
To westerners, the persons of the Asiatic nations seem to be 
on a distinctly lower intellectual and moral level and in- 
capable of the same sort of achievement as their own. 
Hence they talk in the parlance of Kipling of “the white 
man’s burden.” It is, of course, true that there are differ- 
ences in the degree of development between the nations of 
western Europe and those of eastern Asia, and it is also 
true that there are various gradations in the different coun- 
tries of eastern Asia. There are those to whom the idea of 
the white man’s burden is fairly applicable, while there are 
others to whom it is utterly irrelevant. An educated Amer- 
ican lady visitor to the Louisiana Purchase Exposition at 
St. Louis who was being guided through certain exhibits 
by a young Filipino friend of mine expressed great surprise 
that a Filipino could be so cultured and intelligent. She 
had just seen in a different part of the exposition some 
Igorrots, who belong to one of the most backward tribes 
in the world and who happen to live in the Philippine 
Islands. The young man who was her guide, however, was 
descended from a long lineage of Christian and cultured 
people and might fairly claim equality with people of Chris- 
tian culture in any land. 

If the contacts of the western nations with the eastern na- 
tions are not primarily the relations of superiors with in- 
feriors, the question arises as to what the nature of those 
contacts really is, what the proper comparisons between the 
contrasting racial types may be. Careful comparison of the 
culture and progress of any European people at any date 
prior to 1500 with the conditions obtaining among the peo- 
ples of Egypt, India, China, or Japan at the same date would 
reveal surprisingly few differences in relative advancement 
in civilization, due attention being given to comparing groups 
of like social status. Down to about that date the eastern 
and western peoples alike maintained substantially the same 
status of existence and progress. 

For the West, however, at the opening of the sixteenth 
century, the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama, the 
scientific discoveries of Copernicus and Vesalius, the religious 


302 THE AWAKENING EAST 


reforms of Luther and Calvin, and later the new philosophy 
of Bacon and Descartes, loosened old bonds and broke 
through old barriers so that the West was set free to think 
and act. One may speculate on the different results for the 
future of the world had an Indian fleet reached the coast of 
Portugal in 1498 and had a Chinese expedition entered San 
Francisco Bay in 1492. The fact is they did not, and therein 
lies the difference between the nations of Asia and the na- 
tions of Europe. The changes which took place in the West 
and which are spoken of as constituting the Renaissance 
have had no parallel in the East and, while in the West it 
became possible to get beyond the scholastic philosophy and 
theology of the Middle Ages, in the East there was no such 
new departure. The Chinese continued to think in the terms 
of the teaching of Confucius, who had been in his grave for 
more than twenty centuries, and in a similar way the peoples 
of the other eastern lands remained under bondage to old 
traditions of thought. 

Comparisons of the East with the West in 1750 would 
have shown no great differences among the masses of the 
peoples, but would have revealed the leaders, the better 
classes in the East, clearly but not hopelessly distanced by 
their western compeers. The critical changes had been in 
the relative areas of geographical and intellectual activity. 
The peoples of Europe by their voyages of geographical dis- 
covery had brought the whole circuit of the globe within 
their ken. No such enlargement of the geographical horizon 
occurred for any of the eastern peoples. They remained 
hemmed in by the same narrow bounds for the physical 
world as had encompassed their ancestors. While in the 
West great scientific thinkers were teaching entirely new 
views of the relation of the earth to the universe, no cor- 
responding broadening of the view of life as a whole in the 
universe occurred in the East. 

In the West the Renaissance brought to Christianity, after 
fifteen centuries of development, the advantages of compari- 
son with the highest intellectual attainments of ancient 
Greece and Rome. This developed a broader way of looking 
at the problems of life in all that group of ideas customarily 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 303 


called religion. In the East it is true that Buddhism, for 
instance, has for centuries stood the test of contact with 
other faiths, but with a different result, probably due to dif- 
ferences in the nature of the comparisons made. The com- 
parative tests of religions in Egypt and India have served to 
sharpen the lines of demarcation between the faiths, and 
in China and Japan, on the other hand, to blur them, rather 
than to give to the leaders of each, or any, of the faiths a 
broadened vision. 

As has been indicated, between 1500 and 1750 there had 
occurred in the West a broadening of the outlook of the 
cultured class upon the world and upon life, while the East 
had seen no similar change. On the other hand, as late as 
1750, no changes had taken place in either the East or 
the West, which sufficiently affected the conditions under 
which people lived and worked to create a clear contrast 
between Europe and Asia, nor had marked differences yet 
appeared in matters of government. The description of the 
condition of peasant life in France in the eighteenth century, 
given by numerous writers and made familiar by Taine, 
might well apply with slight change to the peasant of China 
at the same date. The administration of the French gov- 
ernment under Louis XV stands in comparison rather than 
contrast with that of China under his contemporary, Ch’ien 
Lun. The French navigator La Perouse, who visited Manila 
in 1787, declared of the Filipinos, “These people seemed to 
me no way inferior to those of Europe.” 

The industrial revolution in England and the political rev- 
olutions in America and France in the latter half of the 
eighteenth century started Europe and America ahead of 
the Asiatic countries by leaps and bounds. One might again 
speculate on the difference for the world’s history had James 
Watt, Benjamin Franklin, and George Stephenson been Chi- 
nese, and had India produced Washington and Jefferson, 
Rousseau and Napoleon. It is not yet determinable what the 
relative potentialities of European and Asiatic peoples may 
be. The fact is that the orientals have not developed their 
potentialities but remain medieval while the occidentals have 
developed, have passed through the Renaissance and the 


304 THE AWAKENING EAST 


industrial and political revolutions, and have become mod- 
ern. There is no need to discuss questions of inferiority 
and superiority. There are two insuperable facts, the ex- 
istence of a difference and the nature of the difference which 
is that between medieval and modern. 

As the Renaissance had affected the freedom of man’s 
thought and the breadth of his vision, so the industrial revo- 
lution altered the conditions under which people lived and 
worked, and the American and French Revolutions rad- 
ically modified both the form of government and the views 
of the people concerning the relations between themselves 
and government. These latter changes, which happened 
contemporaneously, might conceivably have occurred at dif- 
ferent times. They both took place long after the Renais- 
sance, though there is no very good reason why either or 
both of them might not have occurred at the same time 
with that great movement. This point with regard to the 
time element in these changes is of significance to the pres- 
ent discussion because the nations of the East are at the 
present time being called upon to crowd together at the 
same time all three of these movements. They are being 
asked to gulp down in a single generation the dose of reform 
at which the Europeans sipped slowly for four centuries or 
more. ‘This incidentally brings into question the relative 
potentialities of the East and the West for adaptation and 
progress. 

The political reform represented by the American and 
French Revolutions has given the world that great complex 
of political ideals and governmental methods known as 
democracy. It has, indeed, changed the form of government 
by creating republics and setting up parliaments where 
once monarchs governed, as they claimed, by divine right 
and imposed laws by their own personal authority. The 
growth of democracy has, however, involved a great deal 
more than this outward change of the form of government. 
It has effected an enormous extension in the size of the 
political class. In the monarchies of the olden time there 
was, in addition to the king or emperor, a very small num- 
ber of people to whom he intrusted authority and upon whom 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 305 


he relied for the execution of his will. The political class 
was, consequently, but a very small fraction of the whole 
community. 

Democracy, on the other hand, has by rapid stages brought 
one group after another of the population into the political 
class. First, the right of suffrage was granted to large 
property owners; next, the franchise was extended so that 
all property owners might enjoy it; then came the idea of 
universal manhood suffrage; and only yesterday, as it were, 
women were allowed the enjoyment of this same privilege. 
The change, however, has been more even than the enlarge- 
ment of the political class ; it has also given to these successive 
groups the facilities to become politically minded so that 
they might be intelligent actors in the civic life of their na- 
tions. The change may be summed up as the transition of 
the individual from the status of subject to the status of 
citizen. : 

The industrial revolution, which began in England with 
Watt’s invention of the steam engine in 1765, had not yet 
had time to spread beyond the bounds of England before the 
French Revolution upset conditions upon the continent of 
Europe. This great political upheaval postponed the spread 
of the industrial revolution among the continental nations 
until after the overthrow of Napoleon. From that time for- 
ward it progressed rapidly in western Europe, particularly 
in France and in the valley of the Rhine, and less rapidly in 
other nations in proportion as one moved further south, 
east, or north. The United States was brought within the 
scope of this movement by the necessities of the Napoleonic 
struggle which, for it, culminated in the War of 1812. The 
first clear evidence of a change in the United States is regis- 
tered in the tariff act of 1816. 

The phrase industrial revolution covers a vast range of 
ideas which it is necessary to define with some clearness. 
In its broadest sense the industrial revolution includes all 
changes in the processes of economic production and dis- 
tribution. In its narrowest sense, however, the phrase is 
customarily applied to the change in the methods of manu- 
facture brought about by the substitution of power-driven 


306 THE AWAKENING EAST 


machinery for hand work.1 Even so, it includes more than 
the mere mechanical change, because under the old order it 
was possible for practically any individual to be a manu- 
facturer in his own home. Under the new system the cost 
of installing and maintaining the machinery was prohibitive 
to any such arrangement. It became necessary to erect the 
machinery in special buildings and to provide, by the utiliza- 
tion of capital, for the great cost involved. The workers 
then came and contracted with the individuals who con- 
trolled the capital, and hence the manufacturing machinery, 
to operate the machines in return for fixed payments known 
as wages. Thus the industrial revolution changed both the 
method of manufacture from hand work to machine work 
and the condition of life of the industrial workers from the 
domestic to the factory system. 

As the factories turned out more goods it was necessary 
to find larger markets in which to sell the goods, and the 
demand for the manufactured goods, in its turn, made it 
necessary to draw from larger and more distant sources of 
supply the raw materials which were to be utilized. In other 
words, both in securing the materials to manufacture and 
in marketing the output the industrial revolution created a 
commercial revolution. Each of these, because of their 
large demands for prompt and easy exchange of commod- 
ities and of the necessity of utilizing invested capital either 
to maintain the factory or to carry stocks of goods in transit 
between the producer and the consumer, required, in ad- 
dition, the development of banking on an extensive scale. 
Even the workingman had his need of the bank, and for his 


* The potent fact was that the new machines were power-driven. 
This required not merely the establishment of factories, but also 
their location where streams furnished water power or where coal 
mines assured a convenient supply of fuel to develop steam power. 
Hence arose the aggregation of workers in urban industrial com- 
munities. Progress in the distribution of electric power may not 
only diffuse the factories among smaller communities, but even dis- 
place the factory system by a new domestic scheme of manufac- 
turing. Other factors, such as efficiency of operation, may, however, 
prevent such a reversion. 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 307 


purposes, in large measure, grew up the savings banks, and 
later still the postal savings banks. 

The development of the factory system carried with it 
the gathering of large numbers of people into areas closely 
adjacent to the factories. This took them away from the 
land, so that they were no longer able, as had been the case 
under the domestic system, to work part of their time in 
raising their food supply from the plot of land on which 
they lived and to devote odd hours to their particular manu- 
facturing enterprise. Henceforth they lived packed in 
tenement quarters without any such opportunity and en- 
tirely dependent for their food supply upon their money 
wages. There was thus created in the population a large 
element which made no contribution whatsoever to the pro- 
duction of the food which they ate. This made it necessary 
that those who still remained on the land should supply a 
larger output of edible products. This in its turn, therefore, 
meant an agricultural revolution which involved the use of 
improved implements and of farm machinery as well as the 
development of scientific methods of agriculture and of 
animal husbandry. 

Furthermore, all these changes involved the prompt trans- 
portation of goods from one place to another; of food from 
the farm to the factory city, of the raw materials, perhaps 
from distant countries, to the factory, and of the manufac- 
tured goods from the industrial centers to the consumers in 
all parts of the world. These demands made necessary ex- 
traordinary improvements in the means of transportation. 
First came the development of the steamboat, followed soon 
by oceanic steam navigation. Then came the railroad, and 
much more recently the trolley and the automobile and most 
recently of all, the aeroplane. Then, too, it became necessary 
to make communication upon business propositions more 
promptly. It became important, for instance, that both 
buyer and seller should be aware of the prices ruling at a 
particular moment, hence came improvements in the postal 
service and the development of the telegraph and the tele- 
phone. 

The differences between the East and the West resulting 


308 THE AWAKENING EAST 


from the political and industrial revolutions reached the 
maximum about 1880, when constitutional government and 
the new industrial systen had become well established in 
most European countries and in America, while but few, 
if any, of their effects were visible in the eastern lands. At 
this critical juncture, following the Congress of Berlin, be- 
gan the intense rivalry of the western nations in the com- 
mercial and colonial exploitation of Asia and Africa. In 
other words, at about this date most of the European coun- 
tries had attained the full development of the most important 
changes involved in the political and industrial revolutions 
while as yet practically none of these changes had occurred 
in the East. 

The contrast appeared with peculiar sharpness, since the 
European nations, all enjoying the benefits of these changes, 
found themselves plunged into bitter competition with one 
another in the effort to secure more advantageously the nec- 
essary supplies of raw materials and of food, while at the 
same time seeking extended markets for their products. 
Under the mistaken theory that trade follows the flag, the 
commercial competition became rather more obviously a 
race in colonial expansion. Each of the different nations 
sought to secure monopoly control for itself over a large 
part of the earth’s surface and of its population. This con- 
test began about 1880 and reached its climax in the World 
War, which came at a time when the available supply of un- 
appropriated lands and peoples was practically exhausted, 
and when the competition between the expanding, exploit- 
ing nations had become keenest. 

This aggressive activity of the western peoples has in its 
turn forced upon the eastern peoples a struggle for economic 
and political existence. The peoples of Japan and China 
and India are finding that the conditions of life for them 
are not being determined in their own communities or their 
own nations but are dependent upon conditions far from 
them. Large numbers in Japan and China, for instance, are 
dependent upon the rate ruling in the silk market in New 
York. The question of food or famine for the people of 
India appears to be determined by the price of wheat on the 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 309 


Liverpoolexchange. The importation of an adequate, instead 
of an inadequate, supply of rice into the Philippine Islands 
is dependent not upon the market conditions at Manila or 
Saigon, but on the price quotations in London and New 
York. 

Though the oriental has long experienced the necessity of 
reducing his wants to a minimum and has complacently 
sought in philosophy and religion to achieve the negation of 
desire, he is now confronted not only by an economic order 
directed to the abundant satisfaction of needs but also by 
religious and philosophical systems intent on the stimulation 
of desire. The philosophic and economic asceticism of the 
East is being placed on trial in competition with a philosophy 
of satiety and a system of economic abundance. 

Politically, in like manner, the activities of the western 
nations have radically changed conditions for the nations 
of Asia. The problem of government in China to-day 
might exist in a measure were there none of these western 
contacts, but it would not exist in the same kind or to the 
same degree except for these very western contacts. More 
than twenty times in its history China has turned out one 
dynasty of monarchs and established another, but never be- 
fore has China turned out its monarchs and created instead 
a republic. China has changed its dynasties repeatedly with- 
out any consideration of even the existence of Europe or 
America. To-day the rise and fall of its cabinet ministers 
are dependent in no small measure upon the frowns or the 
smiles of the statesmen of Europe and America. More im- 
portant still is the fact that the people of China, of Japan, 
and of India are coming to think of their problems of gov- 
ernment in very much the same way that the people of Eng- 
land and of the United States do. The process of the ex- 
tension of the franchise is going forward rapidly. The 
transition from subject to citizen is occurring at many times 
the rate of speed under which it was effected in western 
lands. 

This juxtaposition of the civilization of the West, moved 
by the industrial revolution, with the old civilizations of the 
East, absolutely unchanged by any readjustments for many 


310 THE AWAKENING EAST 


centuries, raises the serious question which of the two will 
be able to survive the inevitable conflict. Will the whole 
world be plunged back into medievalism by an Asiatic 
triumph, or will all move forward together in modern ways 
under the leadership of the more progressive western na- 
tions? The situation is not wholly unlike that which existed 
when the Germanic barbarians confronted the ancient Ro- 
man Empire and its classical culture. 

While this struggle is inevitable, and one or the other of 
the two types of civilization, the medieval or the modern, 
must triumph, there can be little doubt that the fittest will 
survive, that western material progress has made the world 
so small that it will force the eastern peoples to adjust their 
economic life to the modern system created by the industrial 
revolution. Such evidence as is available from the changes 
which have already taken place clearly indicates this as the 
probable result. Thus far at any rate it is the West which 
is modifying the East, and it is not the East which is causing 
readjustments in the West. 

As the industrial revolution in the West coincided with a 
tremendous political change—the development of greater 
democracy in government—so it seems inevitable that if the 
eastern nations are to accept the changes involved in the in- 
dustrial revolution they too will find it obligatory to recon- 
struct their political systems. They will, however, find this 
necessary not merely for the purpose of democratization to 
correspond with the rights in economic welfare and in in- 
tellectual development of the masses, but they will also find 
it indispensable as a means of guaranteeing their own na- 
tional integrity and of assuring to themselves freedom for 
the development of their own national life. They must give 
themselves vigorous governments able to contend on equal 
terms with the great imperialistic governments of the West 
unless their political independence is to go down at the very 
time that they are accepting the western economic methods 
in place of their own. 

It must not, however, be inferred that the constitutional 
and administrative changes in the eastern nations will be 
along the same lines as in the West, or that they will result 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 311 


in producing the same types of government. There are 
elements in the racial character, the geographical surround- 
ings, and the historical developments of the eastern peoples 
that make it not merely possible, but probable, that they will 
find it expedient to work out their political progress in ac- 
cordance with new theories and with the creation of new 
methods and instrumentalities suitable to their peculiar con- 
ditions and needs. 

In each one of the countries studied in these lectures the 
last forty years have seen rapid extension of all the modern 
forms of improved communication and transportation: 
steam navigation, railways, metaled roads and automobiles, 
telegraphs and telephones, even wireless and aeroplanes. 
In every case there is an obvious intention to carry these de- 
velopments further rather than to check them. The East is 
clearly finding it to its own advantage to adopt these impor- 
tant inventions of the West. It might seem to be a fair test 
of the degree of progress of these different eastern countries 
to take the ratio of railway mileage to the area of the coun- 
try, or to its population. That, however, would result in 
certain inequalities in each case, but especially in the case of 
the Philippine Islands, where there is an unusual degree of 
dependence upon shipping; yet the ratios of railway mileage 
to area may be indicated for such rough value as they may 
possess. The number of square miles of area to one mile 
of railroad is approximately 18 in Japan, 48 in India, 115 
in Egypt, 143 in the Philippines, and 278 in China, as com- 
pared with 12 in the United States. A more exact measure 
is probably to be found in the ratio of telegraph mileage to 
area. The number of square miles of area to one mile of 
telegraph line is approximately 5 in Japan, 17 in the Philip- 
pines, 20 in India, 38 in China, and 40 in Egypt, as compared 
with ro in the United States, where the development has 
been limited by the unexampled extension of the telephone 
service. Outside large cities with considerable foreign com- 
munities, the telephone is rarely found in the eastern coun- 
tries named. 

None the less, the improvements in transportation which 
have been effected in the several countries have resulted in 


312 THE AWAKENING EAST 


a tremendous expansion of commerce in each case, and this 
the eastern peoples as well as the western are clearly find- 
ing to their advantage to maintain and develop. In 1921 
the proportion of the total foreign trade to each inhabitant 
was about $4 in China, $6 in India, $19 in the Philippines, 
$25 in Japan, and $29 in Egypt, as compared with $70 for 
the United States and $180 for the United Kingdom. For 
1922 the figures are apparently somewhat higher, amounting 
in the case of both Egypt and the Philippines to about $35. 
This growth of commerce has resulted in the steady re- 
placement of barter by the use of money, which in turn has 
resulted in rapid expansion, especially in the last twenty 
years, of banking facilities. These changes have likewise 
found obvious and ready acceptance in the East, though the 
several nations differ widely in their capacity to profit by 
their utilization. 

In the fields of manufacturing, mining, and agriculture, 
however, the situation is radically different. These occu- 
pations concern the habits of life and work and the interests 
of the great masses of the people instead of the affairs of 
small selected classes who have been chiefly affected by the 
changes previously considered. The eastern peoples have 
been accustomed to carry on such manufactures as they 
found desirable in their homes, or in neighboring little shops, 
with a minimum use of primitive tools or appliances. Manu- 
facturing with them remains prevailingly a mere adjunct to 
other occupations of life as was formerly the case in Europe 
and America. Indeed, it has largely been a matter of family 
economy or, in certain respects, of village economy, to make 
the articles necessary to supply the needs of the immediate 
group. This domestic system continues to exist everywhere 
throughout the East and the observer will see abundant evi- 
dences of it as he passes along the street in any city or 
village. 

Beside this ancient domestic system, there is, however, 
growing up the new factory system of the West. In India, 
China, or Japan the introduction of this new system involves 
more radical adjustments to-day than it did in Europe a 
century ago, and consequently greater hardships for the 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 313 


working classes. Except in Japan the development of the 
factory system has been mainly dependent on foreign enter- 
prise, and in no case has the progress been very remarkable 
until since the outbreak of the World War in 1914. It is, 
therefore, quite too soon to venture a prediction of the out- 
come. 

The new system offers two entirely different sets of prob- 
lems. In the first place, there is the problem of the migra- 
tion of people from the rural districts into new and rapidly 
growing urban communities, and, therefore, into crowded 
and unsanitary surroundings. It places the people in en- 
tirely unfamiliar conditions of living and produces not only 
the absolutely inevitable evils of poverty, but also numerous 
social evils which are more difficult either to avoid or to 
combat. 

The East, however, has the advantage of being fore- 
warned and also forearmed by the experience of the western 
nations with exactly these same difficulties in their own 
industrial revolution. The East is not avoiding and cannot 
entirely evade these unpleasant developments, but it can do 
much to hasten their passing and to ameliorate the evil con- 
ditions while they last. The East has the advantage of being 
able to benefit by the experience of the West, not only 
through observation, but also through the direct advice and 
assistance of those familiar with the problems in the West, 
who are anxious to assist the East to avoid such evil prac- 
tices as child labor, excessive hours of work, unsanitary 
factories, and unguarded machines. 

On the other hand, there are not merely the problems of 
the actual manual labor involved in manufacture but also 
the managerial and capitalistic problems. There can be 
little doubt that the peoples of the East can learn to become 
more or less efficient factory workers. One who has visited 
the factories of Japan or China or India can testify to their 
skill. It must be recognized, however, that there is genuine 
doubt as to the ability of any of these eastern peoples to 
compete in efficiency with the factory workers of western 
Europe or the United States. Perhaps it is only a matter 
of time and experience to bring them up to similar stand- 


314 THE AWAKENING EAST 


ards, though it is more probable that a really fundamental 
change will be required, for the oriental must learn the 
value of the quick use of time. The oriental attitude is that 
of having all the time there is, and such a view of life does 
not make for efficiency in terms of the factory system. 

On the managerial side the situation is apparently even 
worse. Oriental management of factory enterprises, whether 
in the supervision of the shops or in organization and direc- 
tion through the office, has revealed unfortunately few exam- 
ples of ability and success comparable to those demanded and 
achieved in the West. Cases have been cited where attempts 
have been made to carry out manufacturing enterprises as 
purely native undertakings, and where, after their failure, 
a few western experts have stepped in and made the same 
plants with the same workers not merely successful, but 
highly profitable. In the matter of capital Japan is the only 
one of the oriental nations which has yet learned the lesson, 
to any considerable degree, of the conduct of business enter- 
prises on the joint-stock corporation basis, which in the 
West has come to be regarded as indispensable in all great 
industrial undertakings. 

The Philippines is the only one of the five countries under 
consideration which may be regarded as a new or young na- 
tion economically. In the other four countries the economic 
order is hoary with age but suffering from arrested develop- 
ment. Japan is the only one of the four that has made 
considerable progress in the modernization of its venerable 
economic order. The outstanding fact is the terrific poverty, 
the enormous masses living very close to the margin of 
existence. Modern methods and greater efficiency can 
probably raise the standard of living, but these will require 
capital. With the masses living close to the margin of ex- 
istence the countries have no stores of savings on which to 
draw. The deposits per capita in their postal and other 
savings banks are pitifully small. There is undoubtedly a 
large amount of hoarded, consequently unproductive, wealth 
mainly in the hands of a small number of persons, especially 
in India, but to a less degree probably in China as well. 

The welfare of these eastern peoples demands that they 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 315 


learn as speedily as possible to get their talents out of the 
napkins and into investments in productive enterprises of 
their own. Until this happens their talents will continue 
to be taken from them and given in interest payments to the 
western investors who already have more. Egypt, India, 
and China each already have considerable burdens of in- 
debtedness to the West, partly, if not chiefly, incurred for 
the development of railways and other modern enterprises 
necessary for the progress of the country. Japan and the 
Philippines are not free from these encumbrances but their 
obligations are less onerous. The faster the East learns 
to invest such funds as it has, the more rapidly will it de- 
velop its own supplies of capital and the sooner will it be 
able to free itself from economic dependence and from in- 
debtedness to the West. Pending this accomplishment, 
eastern nations must make such accommodations of their 
affairs as will not merely permit but actually attract the 
investment of western capital to assist in their development. 
The financiers of the West, on their side, should limit to 
the minimum their demands for guaranties of political, 
legal, and economic security, in order to make the period 
of economic dependence as brief and as little irritating as 
possible. , 

Undoubtedly the East will find itself compelled to accom- 
modate itself to the West, or more correctly to the modern 
economic order created by the industrial revolution, not 
only in the matter of capital but also in its labor system. 
Already Japan, the most progressive of these nations, finds 
itself confronted by a labor problem, that is, a readjustment 
of the position of the laborer in the economic and social 
order. Ideas of social democracy, and even of socialism, 
have gained extraordinary currency in Japan in the last 
decade. Undoubtedly similar influences will pervade the 
other countries as soon as they attain similar progress in 
their industrial revolution. 

It is a real puzzle for an occidental to understand how it 
has happened that the vast mineral resources of some of 
these eastern lands have remained hitherto almost un- 
touched. There are, however, several factors which furnish 


316 THE AWAKENING EAST 


the explanation. Besides the difficulty of actually extracting 
the minerals from the earth there are the problems of carry- 
ing on the processes necessary to transform the crude min- 
erals into usable metal products. Furthermore, there are 
the questions of capital investment, of management, of 
labor, and of transportation. When all these items are con- 
sidered it does not appear so strange that little mining had 
been conducted in any eastern country prior to the present 
generation. 

At least one other factor of importance enters into the 
case. In China, for instance, the system of “squeeze” is 
said to be so serious as to make it almost prohibitive to mine 
and market coal which is found in perfectly satisfactory 
condition and location with reference to important cities. 
Meanwhile those cities are importing from overseas, at 
great expense, such coal as they can afford to use. Again, 
except in Japan, the exploitation of mineral wealth in the 
East has been conducted chiefly by foreigners, and in all 
cases the major development has been within the present 
decade. 

Turning to agriculture, it must be observed that most of 
the land now under cultivation in these countries of the 
Fast is of necessity, owing to the character of the land or to 
the size of the holdings, worked on the small farming, or 
almost horticultural, basis. Rarely in any of these countries, 
except in newly developed sections such as Hokkaido, the 
northern island in Japan, or Manchuria, can large-scale 
farming with modern agricultural machinery be carried on. 
Most of the farm work is done with primitive implements 
and by methods which have been employed for centuries 
but have passed out of use even in the small farming areas 
of western Europe. Much advantage could be gained by the 
use of the improved hand implements of western lands. The 
steel hoe and spade possess a far greater efficiency than the 
miserable makeshifts still in use in China, India, and else- 
where. 

Scientific agriculture seems still to be a novelty in western 
countries, but it already has achieved highly important re- 
sults which can render rich contribution to the needs of 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 317 


the East through studies of fertilizers, seeds, pests, and many 
other subjects. This same observation also applies in the 
case of animal husbandry. Beginnings are actually being 
made in each of the countries studied but, except in a few 
special lines such as silk culture in Japan and in certain areas 
of China, no considerable results have yet been obtained. 

One of the greatest achievements effected by the eastern 
peoples themselves with reference to agriculture, and one 
to which western experts have also added most, has been 
the extension of irrigation. This has had the double advan- 
tage of enlarging the cultivable area and of helping to 
stabilize production. A considerable extension of the area 
of tillage has also been effected in recent years in each of 
the countries through other means as well. 

The use of improved implements and methods and the ap- 
plication of science will be absolutely necessary in the agri- 
cultural development of all these lands if the industrial revo- 
lution in its other phases is to proceed in them as it has in 
Europe. These changes cannot be effected rapidly enough 
under the normal working of economic laws. Much will 
need to be done by various educational methods such as have 
been worked out by the agricultural schools and colleges of 
the western nations in their extension services. 

In every one of the countries discussed the poverty is 
appalling and is increasing with the growth of the urban 
population, but in the major portion of their areas the 
climatic conditions reduce needs for a tolerable existence 
to a minimum. In spite of the destitution in southern ‘China 
and India, for instance, little expenditure is required for 
housing, heat, or clothing, which are all indispensable and 
expensive for those living in cooler climates. Even the food 
supply involves less difficulty and expense. If the West 
with its industrial revolution continues to press upon the 
East, there must result either the adoption of the western 
methods for increasing and cheapening the supply of the 
necessities of life, or famine. A tragic aspect of the desti- 
tution is the number unfitted by age, disease, and physical 
defects to support themselves properly in the social con- 
ditions under which they exist. 


318 THE AWAKENING EAST 


Underlying the various considerations which have been 
thus far presented are two fundamental economic consid- 
erations known as the law of diminishing returns and the 
Malthusian theory of population. With the probable ex- 
ception of the Philippines, it seems clear that the law of 
diminishing returns is already operating. Japan, China, 
and Egypt are importing more food products than they 
export. India is exporting slightly more than it imports, 
but the situation is deceptive, partly because a large pro- 
portion of the exports is for the single item, tea, and partly 
because of the British control of the economic situation. 
India really needs far more than Mr. Gandhi’s emphasis on 
home industries, the active consideration of its agricultural 
situation and the development of its food supply. Though 
the Philippine exports of food articles greatly exceed in 
value the food imports, the exports are made up chiefly 
of two specialized items, coconut products and sugar, but 
the imports include considerable amounts of several staple 
articles, especially rice. In view of these facts it does not 
seem probable that any of these countries, except the Philip- 
pines, can expect to maintain a population much in excess 
of the present number, even when allowance is made for 
possible extensions of the cultivable area and for the utiliza- 
tion of improved methods of agriculture. 

Turning to consider the application of the Malthusian 
theory to the situation, it appears from the latest census 
returns that the population of Egypt has increased 85% 
in 30 years; of the Philippines, 35% in 15 years; of Japan, 
52% in 38 years; of India, 11% in 30 years; of the United 
Kingdom, 24% in 30 years, and of the United States, 68% 
in 30 years. The annual rate of increase in the United 
States, the Philippines, and Egypt has therefore been nearly 
identical; for Japan, which has increased a little more than 
half as rapidly, the rate has been about 50% greater than 
in the United Kingdom, while in India the rate has been 
less than half that for the United Kingdom. The evidence 
is unmistakable that the extraordinary rates of growth in 
Egypt and the Philippines were due to the unusual con- 
ditions created by the British and American occupations 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 319 


respectively, just as it is that the rate in the United States 
was due to immigration. In the case of each of the coun- 
tries mentioned the census returns show that the rate of 
increase was slower in the last ten-year period, except in 
the Philippines, for which a census return is not available, 
but their records of vital statistics reveal a similar decline 
in the rate of growth. Though such calamities as war and 
plague were prevalent in the decade, careful study of the 
data proves that they were not wholly accountable for the 
decline. 

These facts indicate that the law of diminishing returns 
is already operative, in accordance with the Malthusian 
theory, to check the growth of population. For China no 
reliable data are available, but careful students have come 
to the conclusion that, whereas the population increased with 
extraordinary rapidity in the eighteenth century, it has re- 
mained stationary or nearly so through the past century. 
Observers are practically unanimous in the conviction that 
not even the utilization of undeveloped lands and of im- 
proved agricultural methods will permit China to maintain 
a population much in excess of the present number. Con- 
sequently, if better sanitary conditions and medical service 
shall reduce the present excessive death rate, there must be 
a corresponding limitation of the present unusually high 
birth rate. The situation of India is substantially similar. 
Only some extraordinary economic readjustment, which 
one cannot now forecast, will relieve Egypt from arresting 
its abnormal increase of population in the very near future. 
The Philippines may be able to postpone for some time the 
diminishing of its birth rate, but only by rapid expansion 
and improvement of its agriculture. The case of Japan has 
already received full consideration.? 

If, therefore, as seems probable, the situation in these 
eastern lands is resolving itself in accordance with the Mal- 
thusian theory, the time is not far distant when extreme 
economic distress will confront them each unless the birth 
rate is limited to the point necessary to maintain a stable 


*See above, pages 222-229. 


320 THE AWAKENING EAST 


population, as has become the case in France.2 The alterna- 
tives are apparently restricted to vast importations of food 
products or to migration. The opportunities for either of 
these solutions are already limited and are annually being 
lessened, quite apart from any question of international 
action or race prejudice. The effort of any one of these na- 
tions to force an adjustment on either of these lines, espe- 
cially the latter, such as has been frequently imputed to 
Japan, could scarcely fail to produce an international catas- 
trophe. Passion or sentiment are dangerous explosives to 
employ in the matter. Thorough study and expert adjust- 
ment alone can furnish a secure and reasonable settlement 
of the problem in its international ramifications. 

From the West the East needs to learn the methods for 
arresting the spread of plague and other preventable pesti- 
lences, and for the care and cure of the sick and the de- 
fective. It must even learn some of the rudiments of sani- 
tation, starting with provision for pure drinking water and 
for the disposal of sewage and garbage. The excessively 
high death rates and especially the frightful infant mor- 
tality in all these countries is incompatible with economic 
welfare and with reasonable standards of civilization. The 
figures with regard to infant mortality furnish another test 
of progress which is illuminating. In the United States 
Io per cent of the children under one year of age die an- 
nually; in Japan, 17 per cent; in the Philippine provinces, 
14 per cent; in Manila, 21 per cent; in India, at least 21 per 
cent; while official data are not available for Egypt or 
China, it is estimated that the rate is about 25 per cent 
in the former and approaches 50 per cent in the latter. 
The results of the efforts already made for improvement are 
convincing arguments for the steady prosecution of every 
possible enterprise for the promotion of public health; for 
instance, in the Philippine provinces the infant deaths in 
1920 were only 75 per cent of the number in 1910, and in 


*For an up-to-date discussion of these problems on broad lines, 
but with slight attention to the East, see E. M. East, Mankind at 
the Crossroads (New York, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1923). 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 321 


Manila the number decreased to only 50 per cent of the 
total a decade earlier. 

Although these matters primarily concern the peoples of 
the East it is obvious that they are not without their effects 
upon the West. Unwholesome sanitary conditions in several 
different ways hamper the extension of intercourse and the 
development of commerce. There is a natural repugnance to 
traveling in unsanitary lands, and to contact with peoples 
or with goods that have come from pestilential countries. 
The West, moreover, must not only quarantine itself 
against infection from the East, but it has an obligation to 
itself and to humanity as a whole to do everything possible 
for the improvement of conditions of living in eastern 
lands. Such institutions as the Peking Union Medical Col- 
lege and Hospital, and such work as has been accomplished 
by the Americans in the Philippines are illustrations of what 
can and ought to be done. After all, the West can make but 
little direct contribution to the East in this matter or any 
other. Its chief responsibility lies in teaching the East 
to care for itself. 

With all allowance for the poverty of the countries studied, 
it does not seem that taxes are excessive or that public debts 
constitute an unreasonable burden. The per capita propor- 
tions of the taxes and of all public debts in India, China, 
and the Philippines are among the very lowest in the world. 
The burden of Japan is distinctly larger but, with greater 
progress in adjustment to western ways, it is prob- 
ably not much more seriously felt. Egypt fares worst of 
the five, but its affliction is inherited from the period prior 
to British occupation and is due to the reckless extravagance 
of a single despot, Ismail. The five countries taken to- 
gether have a population at least seven times greater than 
the continental part of the United States, but the total of 
their annual taxes is only one half that for the support of 
the national government of the United States, and their 
national debts amount to less than one fourth the national 
debt of the United States. 

Considering the favorable showing of the United States 
in comparison with Great Britain or France in the per capita 


322 THE AWAKENING EAST 


incidence of either debt or taxes it becomes clear that the 
financial situation of the eastern lands cannot be regarded 
as disproportionately burdensome even in view of the dif- 
ferences in economic status. Their situation, however, may 
become unduly and unjustly burdensome unless adjustment 
to the conditions created by the industrial revolution is 
steadily advanced in such a way as to assure that production 
will keep pace with the growing needs. The basic problem 
is, of course, a problem of food supply, but there is the 
further problem in each country of producing enough out- 
put of one sort or another to insure to the population of 
the country concerned at* least the indispensable means of 
existence. 

While the western peoples worked out the industrial revo- 
lution by the tedious, painful, and costly process of trial 
and error, eastern peoples, as already suggested, have the 
opportunity, through intelligent study and application, to 
arrive at the results by short-cut methods, but they must 
avoid the opposite danger of a short circuit. Educational 
progress at the most rapid possible rate is, therefore, neces- 
sary for the eastern peoples, and in this educational devel- 
opment the emphasis must at the outset, at any rate, be placed 
upon vocational and professional rather than literary train- 


ing. 


“Including all imposts national and focal, the tax rate per capita 
for Japan in 1912-13 was $5.54, in 1920-21, $12.35; for the United 
States in 1912-13, $22.95, in 1920-21, $79.15; for the United Kingdom 
in 1912-13, $26.07, in 1920-21, $124.84. Calculated on the prewar pur- 
chasing power basis the figures per capita for 1920-21 would amount 
to $5.35 for Japan, $40.59 for the United States, and $46.07 for the 
United Kingdom. Reckoned on the prewar purchasing power basis 
as percentage of the prewar national income the figures for Japan 
were 19.1% in 1912-13 and 18.4% in 1920-21; for the United States 
in I9I2-13, 6.9%, in 1920-21, 11.4%; for the United Kingdom in 
1912-13, 10.7%, in 1920-21, 19.0%. ‘These data are derived from 
Taxation and Income, Research Report Number 55, National Indus- 
trial Conference Board (New York, The Century Co., October, 
1922), which contains much other interesting information. No figures 
are available for any country considered in these lectures, except 
Japan, to show the real, as contrasted with the apparent, burden 
of taxation. 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 323 


Literary study, however, cannot be entirely deferred, and 
it must be taken up with as much speed as possible, for the 
peoples of the East must also meet the problems of political 
and social readjustment, and to do so successfully requires 
training in many fields of thought which are quite apart 
from those connected with professional and vocational edu- 
cation. 

In this matter of education Japan has a brilliant achieve- 
ment to its credit and has shown to the other peoples of the 
East a way, quite probably the way. In view of the shorter 
time involved, the progress in the Philippines is, perhaps, 
no less gratifying. India, Egypt, and China, in order, trail 
far behind in educational achievements, as indicated by the 
percentages both of literates and of pupils in schools. If 
judged by priority and scope of their educational schemes, 
the order would be China, India, and Egypt. 

The general introduction of elementary education is, of 
course, desirable, but it is something that cannot be attained 
at once or within a brief period of years. The establishment 
of a full system of elementary education in any country can 
hardly be effected in less than a generation, because of the 
necessities of acquiring the requisite lands, of erecting suit- 
able buildings and, even more important, the training of 
an adequate supply of competent teachers. The experience 
of Japan and the Philippines affords definite evidence on 
these subjects and makes clear that the starting point must 
be the development of normal training schools suitable in 
number and in character. 

Next to the elementary schools the universities are prob- 
ably most essential, because of the need in each country for 
a limited number of persons with the highest training. The 
high schools or, as they are called in the East, the middle 
schools, are usually the last to be developed adequately, and 
that is apparently not merely accidental, but the genuine 
logic of the situation. While in general the educational in- 
stitutions to be established in the eastern lands will, with 
the necessary allowances for linguistic and national dif- 
ferences, undoubtedly follow more or less closely the western 
types of curricula, it is certain that there must also be some 


324 THE AWAKENING EAST 


modifications, especially in the period of the first genera- 
tion. The schools must be the means in the East of render- 
ing a service similar to that which is expected of them in 
the United States in the training of children of foreign-born 
parentage. Both in the mission schools and the schools 
established under governmental control these considerations 
have already received no small amount of attention. 

Closely allied to education by the schools is the continued 
education in later life through the press, and especially 
through journalism. As a consequence progress in the num- 
ber and quality of newspapers, magazines, and books for 
general reading becomes of great importance. Japan also 
leads both in the development of journalism and in the size 
of its reading public. The contrast, for instance, between 
the amount of reading observable on the trains in Japan and 
in the other countries is remarkable. In the Philippine 
Islands the growth of journalism and of the reading habit 
does not seem to have been commensurate with the extension 
of education. Though the development in China may be no 
greater than in India or Egypt, it is certainly a healthier 
growth. 

In all five countries the improvement and extension of 
education, whether through the schools or through the press, 
is a problem of primary importance. In every case wisdom 
will dictate careful study of western methods and the em- 
ployment of experts from the West as councilors and ad- 
visers or even for a time in more responsible capacities. 
The West will serve itself well if it puts forth extraordinary 
efforts to assist in this all-important work. The aid already 
given is warmly appreciated in each of these countries, and 
is perhaps better understood than any of the other efforts 
of the peoples of the West to assist the peoples of the East 
or to intervene in their affairs. 

Some of the best help can be rendered in the case of the 
students who come to the colleges of the western lands to 
complete their education. Whatever is done to smooth the 
way for these young men and young women and to aid them 
in their efforts will be even more tangibly valuable than 
bread cast upon the waters. The two chief diplomatic rep- 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 325 


resentatives of China at the Washington Conference re- 
ceived their training first in mission schools in China and 
later in universities in the United States. Their cases are 
not exceptional, for wherever one turns among the persons 
most active in the advancement of their respective nations 
it will be found that a large proportion of those persons 
has been trained under the western influences, and in the 
most important cases educated in western lands. 

The training of the masses in each country, that is, the 
work of elementary education and also of secondary educa- 
tion in the main, must be done by the privileged individuals 
from that particular country who are able to benefit from 
western training whether in their home land or abroad. The 
rate of progress in the extension of education and journalism 
is a measure of the fitness of the people for political prog- 
ress. The statistics are of some value as another index of 
advancement. In Japan 17 per cent of the population is in 
schools; in the Philippines, 10 per cent; in India, 2.6 per 
cent ; in Egypt, 2 per cent; and in China, 1.5 per cent, as com- 
pared with 20 per cent in the United States. Japan ranks 
as one of the most literate countries in the world; in the 
Philippines 37 per cent are literate; in Egypt, 8 per cent; in 
India, 6 per cent, while the percentage in China is probably 
even less. Japan has approximately one periodical to 18,000 
persons, the Philippines one to 96,000, India one to 200,000, 
and China one to 300,000. 

Universal, gratuitous, compulsory, elementary education 
has been legally established in principle in each of the five 
countries under consideration, except India, where some 
provinces have taken similar action. In the Philippines the 
actual establishment of the system has been about half com- 
pleted and in Japan it is in practically full operation. The 
significance of these facts for the movement of the East 
toward democracy must not be minimized. Generally 
training for citizenship is not only an avowed principle of 
the educational system but also the actual practice. Even 
where it is not, the unconscious influences of the schools 
are inevitably in the direction of greater freedom for the 
individual socially, economically, and politically. Through- 


326 THE AWAKENING EAST 


out the East education is advancing rapidly and carrying 
liberalism, if not democracy, in its train. 

The achievements of the Japanese and of the Filipinos in 
political and governmental affairs are highly commendable. 
In each case the advances made seem to reach the maximum 
possible in view of the conditions and of the time involved, 
though one nation has worked independently and the other 
under foreign authority. Considering the great difficulties 
to be faced China has made hopeful progress. To India 
the British have probably given at least as full a measure 
of self-government as the circumstances justify, but they 
are open to criticism for failure to do more in education and 
in other ways to prepare the people for self-government. 
The same criticism is even more pertinent in Egypt, where 
their rule has savored of benevolent despotism rather than 
of the English traditions of free institutions. 

In each nation the tendency has been to follow the western 
methods of creating constitutions and of establishing par- 
liamentary representation. There is, however, considerable 
variation in the several cases, and in no instance has the 
result been the adoption of either the British system of 
responsible parliamentary government or the American 
system of presidential government, though the tendency 
seems td be toward the latter rather than the former. The 
problems of the several countries differ greatly from one 
another and the situations in them all are radically differ- 
ent from those in western lands. It is therefore probably 
wiser temporarily, even permanently, that each country 
should work out a form of government suited to its own 
conditions and needs. 

It can scarcely be other than disastrous for a nation to 
break with the traditions of its past and to undertake to es- 
tablish any new form of government, no matter how per- 
fect theoretically. It is of the highest importance for each 
of these countries that the changes made in its government 
shall grow as naturally as possible out of the traditions of 
its past. Outward conditions may be modified in the course 
of time, but a people’s habits of thought are altered only 
with the utmost difficulty. Material conditions may be 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 327 


changed with comparative ease, but political readjustments 
must be made with due consideration for these facts if they 
are to be effected with safety and permanence. Contrary 
methods can scarcely fail to result in revolution with all its 
attendant evils. 

With any people adjustments of such serious sort require 
no small amount of time. Parliamentary government, for 
instance, has been slowly worked out in England from the 
days of Magna Carta seven centuries ago. To-day critics 
express themselves harshly in judgment of the Japanese, 
the Filipinos, and others if they do not prove able within 
a few years to adapt themselves to the utilization of parlia- 
mentary methods with the expertness of English or Amer- 
icans. It is absurd to expect such results. Indeed, com- 
parison with the national legislatures not merely of the 
smaller or newer countries of Europe or America but also 
of such older countries as Spain and Italy does not prove 
unfavorable to the parliamentary institutions of these east- 
ern lands in the character of personnel, organization, pro- 
ceedings, or achievement. In any case the transition must 
take time, and this is the more true with the peoples of the 
East who have, as has been said before, been accustomed to 
regard the value of time somewhat lightly. 

Hurry is something with which the East is unfamiliar. 
If a mistake is made orientals feel there is plenty of time to 
try again. Their patience in the matter of time is, it must 
be confessed, infinitely provoking to the occidental. These 
facts, however, must be taken into consideration in all the 
work that is done for the adjustment of the East to western 
ways or for the modernization of the East. Their habit is 
to take things easily. The situation requires them, and the 
world looks to them, to make the adjustments with almost 
astonishing rapidity. The West will need to learn patience, 
though perhaps not as much as the East will need to learn 
the value of speed, even its necessity. 

The attitude of. the foreign residents is of some sig- 
nificance in each country. These residents, in general, may 
be divided into two groups, the business people and the 
missionaries. The position of the latter group is based upon 


328 THE AWAKENING EAST 


toleration rather than on reciprocity. Consequently, the 
sense of favors received or expected makes the normal mis- 
sionary attitude pro-government, or at least apologetic for 
the government. Nevertheless, the missionaries have cus- 
tomarily wielded a strong influence both on the government 
of the country in which they are located and on the govern- 
ment of the nation of which they are citizens with respect 
to the country in which they are stationed. 

The business group is not so homogeneous and its position 
is based on reciprocity. Its attitude is therefore more inde- 
pendent, though perhaps no less conventional. The business 
man in a foreign community is almost inevitably strongly 
nationalistic on every question involving his own country. 
He is also alert to influence the policy of his nation with 
reference to the country in which he is domiciled for the ad- 
vancement of his interests. Discretion normally dictates 
to him an attitude of outward, if not sincere, support of the 
government in whose domain he is trading. 

In Egypt and India the British missionaries and traders, 
and in the Philippines the American missionaries and busi- 
ness people are inclined to regard themselves as possessed 
of a preferred interest in the country and vested with spe- 
cial privileges in urging their views upon both the local 
authorities and the home governments. The missionary, 
however, usually regards himself as the foreordained spokes- 
man of the people among whom he ministers, whereas the 
business man rarely considers the welfare of the native 
population. 

Though the western business man engages in trade in the 
East on a status of reciprocity, there are comparatively few 
orientals who are similarly resident and employed in Europe 
or America. The missionaries are offset by the considerable 
body of oriental students attending the educational institu- 
tions of the West. Their position is not based upon reci- 
procity. They concern themselves little with the govern- 
ment under which they are temporarily domiciled and rarely 
afford it concern. On the other hand, both in their student 
days and afterward, they assume a keen interest in the af- 
fairs of their home government, especially in matters involv- 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 329 


ing the nation in which their studies are pursued. This 
officiousness appears in exaggerated form among the youth 
who pursue their studies in the country which dominates 
their own land, though fortunately it is not a general char- 
acteristic. Asa whole, the group of western-trained oriental 
students is well aware of the value of its opportunities and 
of the responsibilities which they impose. The influence of 
the students after their return to their native land is prop- 
erly disproportionately great. 

Another personal factor in the contact and mingling of 
civilizations is the casual traveler, who, unfortunately, is 
rarely aware that he leaves impressions upon the countries 
through which he passes as well as carrying home new in- 
formation and judgments concerning the peoples among 
whom he has journeyed. The oriental, no doubt, under- 
stands this fact better than the occidental and is more cau- 
tious and circumspect in his behavior when he fares abroad. 
He is also probably a shrewder, certainly a more serious, 
observer when he travels in the West than is the occidental 
when he visits the Orient. 

The preceding observation suggests a vital question. Are 
the peoples of the West who consider themselves cultured 
and progressive preparing to meet the East as intelligently 
as the orientals are schooling themselves to face the West? 
How does the number of Americans who can use the Japa- 
nese language or pretend to a familiarity with Japanese lit- 
erature, even in translation, compare with the number of 
Japanese who are proficient in the English tongue and well 
acquainted with the literatures of England and America? 
How many Americans possess a knowledge of the writings 
of Confucius comparable to that hundreds of non-Christian 
Chinese have of the Bible? How many English university 
graduates versed in the history of India for the last two cen- 
turies could be found to match the number of Indians fa- 
miliar with the last four centuries of English history? How 
many Americans could continue their business in China 
without a compradore? Is there not some question whether 
it is not the West that 1s asleep and the East that is awake? 

The internal problems of government in any country are 


330 THE AWAKENING EAST 


rarely entirely divorced from considerations of international 
relations. It has already been pointed out how intimately 
the modernization of China has been linked with questions 
of diplomacy. The Japanese government has had to give 
close attention to the correlation of internal with interna- 
tional policy. Its foreign relations have at times required 
restraint and at other times acceleration in the progress 
of internal reform. In the last half-dozen years domes- 
tic political feeling has been a powerful agent in modifying 
Japanese policies in dealing with other countries, while at 
the same time interests of an international sort have pro- 
foundly affected the political thought of the people and the 
domestic policy of the government. 

International and imperial considerations have been almost 
exclusively responsible for the establishment of British con- 
trol in Egypt and for its continuance. Conditions in inter- 
national trade led to England’s entrance into India. The 
importance of the resulting commerce compelled England 
to wage a prolonged international contest for its maintenance 
which resulted in the establishment of political control. In- 
ternational situations have required England to fight various 
wars, not confined to Asia, to safeguard its position in the 
country. The incorporation of more than one province in 
the Indian Empire has been due to international considera- 
tions. These facts have been responsible in large measure 
for the military establishment in India and for the conse- 
quent burden of taxation upon the people. Perhaps some 
of these problems arose from the presence of the British in 
India, but others would certainly have arisen even had India 
been free from any European intervention. 

Both in Egypt and in India the British have repeatedly 
adjusted their legislative and administrative programs to the 
exigencies of international affairs. An illustration from In- 
dia, where the case is less obvious, will suffice. The costly 
second Afghan war necessitated unfortunate curtailments 
of expenditure, especially for internal improvements and 
famine relief. Imperial relations have also seriously af- 
fected internal administration in both Egypt and India. 
The concession of responsible government to the former 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 331 


Boer republics and the proposals for the Union of South 
Africa were among the reasons which made necessary the 
Morley reforms in the government of India and they, in 
turn, furnished an argument for the corresponding legisla- 
tion for Egypt in 1913. 

Political thought in England and the alternations of the 
parties in power in London have been constantly reflected 
in the policy of the government in India. It is notorious 
that parliamentary legislation for India often embodies 
English political sentiment rather than the judgment of the 
responsible British officials in India. On at least two im- 
portant occasions, 1784 and 1880, cabinet changes and par- 
liamentary elections have been determined in large degree 
by questions of Indian policy. For more than a century 
England's relations with Egypt have been dependent 
primarily on Indian considerations, and British policy in the 
Near East has customarily been conducted in defiance of 
the national conscience, but in accordance with the apparent 
necessities. or interests of India. 

The decision of the United States to acquire the Philip- 
pines from Spain by the treaty of 1898 was partly based on 
international considerations which were not all strictly rele- 
vant to the islands themselves. The subsequent history has 
afforded repeated evidence that American policy with ref- 
erence to the islands cannot be conducted without careful 
adjustment to the international situation. Certainly, the 
foreign policy of the United States has been strongly influ- 
enced by the occupation of the Philippines. Public opinion 
and partisan interest in the United States have frequently 
affected the principles and methods of government employed 
in the islands. The Philippine question, on the other hand, 
was a prominent issue in the presidential election of 1900. 
Not least significant has been the effect throughout the East, 
upon the colonizing powers and upon their subjects, wrought 
by the policies and performances of the United States in 
training the Filipinos for self-government. 

The great war which has recently been fought out in 
Europe could hardly have failed to have its repercussion 
in the nations of the East. Indeed, in each of these coun- 


332 THE AWAKENING EAST 


tries serious changes were occasioned in the economic situa- 
tion, and from four of them considerable numbers of indi- 
viduals, either as troops or as military laborers, saw service 
in remote lands from which they returned with new ideas 
and a broader intellectual horizon. Not only these occur- 
rences but also the very fact of the war awakened thought 
in the East which has been particularly significant in the 
tendency of the pacific oriental to compare himself favor- 
ably with the belligerents of the West. The conditions of 
universal military service and the nature of the issues at 
stake between the two vast warring alliances also operated 
to stimulate the growth of democratic ideas in the East. 

The progress of the great world conflict was already gen- 
erating unwonted activity in many an oriental brain, when 
the ideas were crystallized by the declarations of President 
Wilson in favor of the two splendid principles of making 
the world safe for democracy and of assuring the self-de- 
termination of peoples. These twin purposes gave to the 
progressive and nationalist movements among the oriental 
peoples a definiteness and a motive power which had pre- 
viously been lacking. Whatever may be said concerning the 
correctness or the wisdom of President Wilson’s declarations 
there can be no doubt of the potency of their influence. The 
same generous principles, moreover, were enunciated, per- 
haps with less boldness of epigrammatic idealism, by the 
British premiers, Asquith and Lloyd George. 

Throughout the East the advocates of national independ- 
ence and democratic government acquired new confidence 
and authority from the indorsement given to their principles 
by the responsible rulers of the two nations which were 
recognized as the world’s greatest exponents of political 
liberty. By strange irony these two nations were the very 
ones that were controlling the destinies of Egypt, India, and 
the Philippines in apparent violation of the doctrines of na- 
tional independence and democratic self-government. They 
were likewise the two nations whose behavior was scanned 
with most intense interest and hesitant expectation by Japan 
and China. Another effect of no less significance was the 
awakening of consciousness, alike in the East and in the 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 333 


West, that the political developments in the several nations 
of the East had ceased to be local phenomena. Unity of 
interest stands clearly revealed both to the peoples of Asia 
and to the western nations concerned in their affairs, though 
unity of action has thus far been absent. The World War 
has wrought a tremendous change in the situation in the 
East. Wisdom and patience in dealing with the problems are 
consequently infinitely more necessary. Never has the pres- 
sure for change been so great as within the last half-dozen 
years. The nature of the elements involved has not been 
altered but their action has been immensely accelerated. 

The factors involved in the national readjustments of the 
Fast are necessarily not only economic and political, but also 
ethical and religious. The western nations have all built 
their systems upon a civilization long saturated with Chris- 
tianity. Among the eastern nations which have been con- 
sidered, only the Filipinos approximate such a condition. 
The major portion of the population of the Philippine 
Islands has been Christian for about three centuries. In 
the other four countries the religious and ethical factors are 
entirely dissimilar. Notwithstanding certain appearances of 
dissent, Egypt as Mohammedan, China as Confucianist, and 
Japan as Shintoist enjoy substantial unity and conformity of 
ethical concepts and standards. India, however, suffers 
from sharp diversities which render difficult, if they do not 
preclude, the adoption within the nation of common ethical 
standards. 

Within each one of these countries the Christian ethic is 
exerting a strong influence in determining selection and em- 
phasis within the field of indigenous ethical systems. Thus, 
under Christian influence, the Chinese are passing over as 
quietly as possible some of the teachings of Confucius and 
are giving a greater emphasis to others. In India this form 
of influence of the Christian ethic is of surprising im- 
portance, for there it is serving as a useful guide in the se- 
lective and harmonizing process among the prevailing rival 
systems. It is of no small interest to observe in the native 
writings, intended more or less wholly for native consump- 
tion, to what an extent the discussion of the problems of 


334 THE AWAKENING EAST 


the country is based on ethical principles which are Chris- 
tian, or if they are Mohammedan or Hindu, are those which 
may most easily be assimilated to the ‘Christian standards. 
It is necessary in this connection to distinguish clearly the 
difference between the utilization of the Christian ethic and 
its acceptance. 

In a practical way the Christian ethic is wielding a wide 
and effective influence on the development of the new social 
and political order in the several eastern lands. In each one 
of these countries the last half century has seen accomplished 
a vast amount of new law-making. The old native laws have 
either given place to new laws copied more or less directly 
from western Christian models, or else the native laws have 
been revamped in such a way as to remove at least those 
features which might seem seriously objectionable in the 
eyes of western and Christian nations. Part of this has, of 
course, been done as in India directly under the guidance of 
British authority. It has been done in Japan, and is in 
process in China, with the different purpose of meeting 
western standards in order to remove the impairment of 
national sovereignty by the privilege of extra-territoriality. 

This same influence has appeared even more clearly in the 
administration of justice. The systems of both criminal and 
civil procedure have been radically modified and practices 
repugnant to western and Christian sentiment have in large 
measure been eliminated. Not merely has torture been abol- 
ished, but the courts have been freed from corruption and 
bribery and from superstitious practices. One is inclined 
to say that the greatest actual contribution which the West 
has given to the East has been the example of the honest, 
prompt, and efficient administration of justice, admirably 
illustrated by the British in Egypt and India, and by the 
Americans in the Philippines. The progress of the Japanese 
and the Chinese in the administration of their own govern- 
ments can very well be measured by the advances which 
they have made in this particular. 

The influence of the Christian ethic permeates other forms 
of governmental administration as well as that of justice. 
Mention has been made of the notable change in Egypt due 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 335 


to the substitution of a just system of military conscription 
for the old methods. A much more important illustration, 
however, is the reform in the collection of taxes and the dis- 
bursement of public funds. In this respect there is no doubt 
that the case of Egypt already discussed is the clearest ex- 
ample. Notwithstanding whatever faults there may be in 
the system in India, there can be little doubt that taxes have 
never been more justly levied, or public funds more hon- 
estly administered in that country than at the present time 
under British rule. 

Examples are numerous in the history of Japan in the 
last half century of the influence of the Christian ethic in 
determining the practice of government. A negative illus- 
tration is furnished by the recent unfortunate experience 
of the Filipinos with their national bank. Even the Chinese, 
who have seemed furthest removed from the ‘Christian ethic 
in all these matters because of their system of “squeeze,” 
are beginning to realize the importance of the fundamental 
principle of administration, that public office is a public 
trust. 

Quite apart from religious considerations the Christian 
ethic is in another way forcing its utilization upon the East, 
that is, in the field of international relations. Like the in- 
ternal polity, the international intercourse of western na- 
tions, both commercial and political, has been built upon 
the common acceptance of the Christian ethical and religious 
teachings, though unfortunately there have been many fail- 
ures to practice those teachings. While this development 
among the western nations has been quite unconscious it 
has none the less been fundamental. International law came 
into existence as a Christian creation for the purposes of 
Christian nations. Hitherto in so far as non-Christian na- 
tions have been admitted into international comity, such 
action has been based upon implicit acceptance of the Chris- 
tian-made system of international law. 

The situation is clearer if approached from the negative 
side. Non-Christian nations have been considered without 
the pale, as not merely different, but inferior, and have been 
so treated. Such was the case, for instance, with Japan until 


336 THE AWAKENING EAST 


1894, when it convinced western nations, after prolonged 
effort, of its readiness to discharge international obligations 
in harmony with the western Christian conceptions. Only 
then were extra-territoriality, conventional tariffs, and other 
discriminations gradually removed. 

The entrance of Japan into a position of international 
equality with the peoples of the West was dependent upon 
Japanese conformity to western and Christian standards. 
This is a fact entirely apart from any question whether 
Japan is or is not a Christian nation as regards the religion 
of the majority of its people, or as regards the motives and 
policies of those who administer its government. China and 
Egypt still labor under this disadvantage from which Japan 
has been freed, though it has been recognized that they too 
must soon receive concessions of a similar sort. 

In the case of India the problem takes a somewhat differ- 
ent form. In negotiations at the Paris conference and in 
the League of Nations India has been granted, to a certain 
degree, an international position. This has not resulted 
from anything inherent in India itself, but is due to India’s 
position in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The real 
question then is, How far is the Christian ethic involved in 
India’s position in that commonwealth. There can be no 
doubt whatsoever about the answer. India is able to play 
a part in the British Empire more or less similar to that of 
Canada, or Australia, only in so far as India conforms itself 
in thought and act to the same standards as do the self-gov- 
erning dominions of the empire. It must be recognized, 
however, that this situation has its correlative, for not un- 
naturally the Indian peoples demand, in return for such con- 
formity, equality of treatment with the other dominions and 
their inhabitants. They are keen enough to recognize that 
they may be fairly excluded from Australia or Canada or 
South Africa, but they are utterly unable to see the equity 
of a policy which places them in an inferior position in the 
crown colony of Kenya. No such issue has yet been raised 
in the case of the Filipino with the United States, but it is 
not difficult to foresee various circumstances which may 
present serious difficulties. In this instance, unlike that of 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 337 


India, the questions will appear to involve primarily mat- 
ters of race, of geographical position, and of constitutional 
law because the Filipinos are a Christian people and fa- 
miliar with the Christian ethic. In this respect their situa- 
tion is markedly different from that of India. 

It is scarcely conceivable that international law should 
fail to remain essentially Christian or that Christian prin- 
ciples should fail to rule in its application. On the other 
hand, Christian exclusiveness and superiority toward non- 
Christian nations must give place in the future to Christian 
brotherhood. Any other policy can only breed hatred and 
even worse. The question at this point turns not upon race, 
but upon faith. If Christianity is the only true faith, it 
does not need to adopt a supercilious attitude toward those 
who are adherents of another faith. Unless Christianity 
can meet the other faiths, whether Mohammedan, Buddhist, 
or Hindu, upon their own ground and by its inherent su- 
periority, quite apart from any privileged position or from 
any self-assumed superiority, win the peoples of those coun- 
tries to a recognition of its superior qualities, then it is 
utterly unfit to claim such superiority and such exclusive 
recognition. Christianity can afford to be tolerant if it is 
right. 

Any failure on the part of Christianity to demand to be 
judged on its merits and on them alone will prove highly 
detrimental, not only to Christianity but also to the Chris- 
tian nations in their governmental capacities. Great Brit- 
ain and France especially, with their vast numbers of co- 
lonial Mohammedans, must not only be considerate in the 
treatment of those Mohammedan subjects, but they must 
make their policy toward the independent Mohammedan 
states one of unquestioned justice unless they are prepared 
to alienate the Mohammedan subjects within their own do- 
minions. Adherence to an anti-Mohammedan attitude and 
to a policy of destroying or curtailing the political independ- 
ence of Mohammedan peoples is bound to create hate with 
all its attendant evils. It is possible to work out a policy for 
the fair and honorable treatment of Mohammedan and other 
non-Christian nationalities without sacrificing Christian 


338 THE AWAKENING EAST 


ideals or the standards of international law. The solution 
of this problem is one of the most important issues, though 
one of the least comprehended, before the world at the 
present day. 

The social contacts between the peoples of the West and 
of the East are of no less significance than the contacts of 
religions; indeed, they merely involve the application in 
daily life of the same principles. The political position of 
white peoples in the East is built upon the assumption of 
racial superiority. This assumption is incompatible with 
equality of social intercourse, without which mutual under- 
standing, sympathy, and codperation are impossible. Every 
act of social superiority or exclusiveness builds higher the 
barrier between the races and embitters feelings. There can 
be little doubt that few remedies would contribute so much 
to the amelioration of the situation as the absolute removal 
of this barrier. The case is perhaps most acute in official 
circles. 

The responsibility for the lack of equal social intercourse 
is, however, not confined to the occidental. The oriental, 
by his religious and social restrictions, especially in the se- 
clusion of women, denies the opportunity for satisfactory 
exchange of social amenities. Another difficulty is that most 
orientals have not learned to prepare food and drink under 
such reasonably sanitary conditions that an occidental may sit 
at table with them without risk of his health or even his life. 

There are other manifestations which afford cause for 
concern. Some white people are so insolent and devoid of 
any sense of noblesse oblige that they visit physical abuse 
upon coolies and other humble folk with whom they lose 
their temper over some petty provocation. The position of 
the Eurasians, especially in India, would be little worse if 
they bore the brand of Cain. Few generalizations are more 
false than that they lack the virtues and possess the faults of 
both the races from which they are blended. 

The white race seems to be irrevocably opposed to racial 
miscegenation and there is little reason to doubt the ex- 
istence of similar feelings among other races. There are, 
nevertheless, numerous exceptions in practice, but they do 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 339 


not conclusively prove racial intermixture either desirable 
or dangerous. Jor the present, at least, it is imprac- 
ticable to effect a scientific or convincing demonstration of 
the superiority of any one race over any other race, or, at 
any rate, it is impossible to deny the inherent or potential 
equality of races. This being the case it is the dictate of 
wisdom to avoid raising such issues in any political or social 
fashion. On the other hand, there can be little doubt that 
for a long period to come the wise policy will be one which 
will permit the fullest development of each race unhampered 
by confusion with any considerable numbers from other 
races. 

Adjustments must be made, therefore, not on the basis of 
the superiority or inferiority of a particular race, but upon 
principles honorable to all parties, with due reference to the 
maintenance of the original geographical distribution of 
races into separate units. The establishment of large num- 
bers of Japanese laborers in California or of Hindu labor- 
ers in Australia will be of doubtful value to either party, 
but so would the establishment of colonies of white laborers 
in Japan or India. There is no necessity for racial abuse 
and recrimination in securing a workable adjustment of the 
questions of migration. 

Members of other races now domiciled among a different 
race must be accepted and treated with full equality of privi- 
leges and duties unless mutually agreeable arrangements 
for repatriation can be made. Another exception must be 
provided for in full equity, namely, freedom for travel, 
trade, and study, including privileges of temporary residence 
and other facilities necessary for the reasonable accomplish- 
ment of the purposes involved. All such arrangements must 
necessarily be upon a reciprocal basis. The questions of 
capitulations and of extra-territoriality which are at present 
involved in these problems make clear that reciprocal re- 
lations can be established only upon the basis of eastern ac- 
ceptance of western ethical standards in the administration 
of justice and in the conduct of commercial and diplomatic 
intercourse. 

In all these developments Christianity will necessarily be- 


340 THE AWAKENING EAST 


come less exclusive and superior in its attitude, but it will, 
on the other hand, become more brotherly and, because of 
these contacts with other faiths, will be required to exem- 
plify its best ideals in practice rather than to sacrifice them. 
If Christianity, as has already been suggested, cannot stand 
the contacts without losing character, it is not good enough 
to be the world religion. 

The pouring of coolie labor into a white man’s country is 
not a very different interracial offense from western con- 
cession-grabbing in Asiatic lands. On no basis of equity 
or reciprocity can the white man maintain his attitude on 
both these matters. If it is unjust to put coolie labor into 
competition with the labor of white people of civilized na- 
tions, it is also unjust for peoples of these western nations to 
undertake to exploit the resources of eastern lands, while 
refusing to be subject to the laws of the land concerned and 
to conduct their activities in every way on the basis of equal- 
ity with the peoples in the jurisdiction in which they are 
working.5 It is fairly clear that the concession-hunter who 
relies upon his home nation to support him in a privileged 
position is a pest to be eliminated. 

This does not mean that the resources of eastern lands are 
not to be developed. It does mean that their development is 
the national prerogative of the people concerned. In this 
they may, and perhaps ought, to utilize western aid. The 
benefits, for example, accruing from placing its national 
resources at the disposal of the trade of the whole world 
belong to China just as they do to England or to the United 
States in their respective cases. It is full time for the closing 
of the age of exploitation and for the opening of the era of 
reciprocity. 

The traditions of American foreign policy are against 
exploitation and in favor of reciprocity. Those are the ideals 
which inhere in the Monroe Doctrine and which have char- 
acterized American dealings with the nations of the Far East. 
To make sure against error in the statement of the ideals of 
American policy it will be wise to quote the words of the 


° Provided, of course, that the nation conforms to proper stand- 
ards of justice and maintains the security of life and property. 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 341 


fathers who formulated those ideals and inaugurated those 
policies. In his farewell address President Washington 
said, “The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign 
nations is, in extending our commercial relations to have 
with them as little POLITICAL connection as possible.” At an- 
other point in the same address he said: “Harmony, liberal 
intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, 
humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy 
should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor 
granting exclusive favors or preferences; consulting the 
natural course of things; diffusing and diversifying by gen- 
tle means the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; 
establishing with powers so disposed, in order to give trade 
a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to 
enable the government to support them, conventional rules 
of intercourse.” . 

President Jefferson in his first inaugural address declared 
for “Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all na- 
tions, and entangling alliances with none.” Finally Presi- 
dent Monroe, in the famous message of December 2, 1823, 
in formulating the doctrine which still bears his name, said: 
“But with the governments who have declared their inde- 
pendence and maintained it, and whose independence we 
have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowl- 
edged, we could not view any interposition for the purpose 
of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their 
destiny, by any European power in any other light than as 
the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the 
United States.” 

These same ideals have recently been embodied in the 
actions of the Washington conference. The American 
people desire no special favors at the expense of any east- 
ern nation nor of any western nation. They desire just 
and generous relations with the eastern peoples, and equality 
of opportunity with every other western nation in intercourse 
with the East. The Americans desire equal privileges of 
trade, but they seek no political privileges for themselves, 
and they insist that others shall not seek them to the disad- 
vantage of the United States. This policy with regard to 


342 THE AWAKENING EAST 


the Far East is not a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, it 
is the expression of its very spirit. 

In the cases of India and Egypt the United States has 
merely the general interest of humanity and of trade to con- 
sider. On the other hand, Japan, China, and the Philippines 
face the United States across the Pacific. In these cases the 
United States has very special interest to guard against any 
development there unfavorable to its own welfare. It has 
the positive interest of promoting by every generous means 
the economic, political, and moral progress of those who are 
its nearest western neighbors. The interest of the United 
States in the affairs of eastern Asia is superior to that of any 
European country. 

There remains for consideration another question of the 
highest potential significance. If non-Christian nations are 
to enter the general brotherhood of nations on equitable 
terms, whether that brotherhood be the League of Nations 
created by the treaty of Versailles, or any other, there will 
arise the question whether Christian ethics shall continue as 
the basis of international relations, and if so, how. At the 
present time the populations of India and China each rep- 
resent approximately one fifth of the world’s total, while 
Japan outnumbers the British Islands, and taken together 
with Egypt and the Philippines approximately equals the 
continental United States. One does not need to raise any 
alarmist cry about a “yellow peril,’ or a “Mohammedan 
menace,” or anything of the sort, but it requires no em- 
phasis to make clear how serious a situation may confront 
the world in the near future. 

It is not easy at the present time to foresee how the prob- 
lem may be worked out. Some light upon the ultimate so- 
lution, however, may be derived from a consideration of 
the history of the last century. Compare, in the first place, 
the progress of the various Christian nations with the prog- 
ress of the various non-Christian nations in the same period, 
both as to the extension of their independent sway and as 
to the improvements made in their systems of government. 
Compare, in the second place, the area and population of 
the world that could properly be called Christian a century 


PROBLEMS OF PROGRESS 343 


ago, with the corresponding situation to-day. Then make 
a similar comparison for Hinduism, Buddhism, and Mo- 
hammedanism. These considerations will make clear how 
remarkable has been the advance of Christianity and of the 
Christian political powers within a hundred years. 

Very few nations which are not Christian still maintain 
complete political independence. Many areas and popula- 
tions have within the century come under Christian juris- 
diction. Mohammedanism is the only non-Christian faith 
which has shown any possibilities of expansion within the 
past century, and its achievements have been insignificant 
compared with those of Christianity. 

The progress of the Christian faith, both as a religious 
and as a political influence, has been vastly greater in the 
past hundred years than in any other period of its history. 
Such evidences of its vitality and power afford a reason- 
able hope that Christianity will be able to hold its own in 
furnishing the principles and affording the driving power of 
administration in whatever organic form the brotherhood 
of nations may take. 





INDEX 


Abbas Hilmi, Khedive, 18, 19, 20. 

Abdul-Hamid, 18 

Abyssinia, 69. 

Accident compensation, in Japan, 211. 

Act, Egypt, five-feddan, 29. 

India, Lord North’s regulating, 55; Government of India, 1858, 
56; Indian councils, 1861, 57, 60, 73; Indian councils, 1892, 
GOT GT 7207 3; Indian councils, LQOU MOP OL.) ayaa se, 237s 
Defense of India, 78; Rowlatt, 78, 79; Government of India, 
1919, 20, 76-79, 83, 84, 87, 107. 

Philippines, Maura, 249; Jones, 249-251, 263, 266, 273, 274, 287, 
292, 293; Volstead, does not apply, 250. 

Adli Pasha, 21, 24, 25. 

Adowa, 69. 

Advisers, foreign, western, or expert, Egypt, 48; India, 68, 102; China, 
128, 148; Japan, I9I; Philippines, 272 ATT 2008 Eastern lands, 324. 

Afghans, Afghanistan, 55, 66, 70, 86. 

Aglipay, Gregorio, 279. 

Aglipayan Church, 279. 

Agricultural revolution, 207% 

Agriculture, Egypt, 15, 27-29; India, 92; China, 144, 145; Japan, 191, 
222-224; Philippines, 259, 265; Eastern lands, 312, 316, 317; 
scientific, 307, 316, 317. : 

Aguinaldo, 244-247, 280. 

Ahmad Shah, 55. 

Ahmedabad, 85, 108. 

Airplanes, 307; China, 148. 

Akbar, 54. 

Alexander the Great, 13, 14, 52, 8I. 

Alexandria, 17. 

Ali brothers, Mohammed and Shefket, 82-85, 105, 106. 

Allahabad, India, 84, 107; Pioneer, 97. 

Allenby, Viscount, 22, 23, 25. 

Allied powers, 135, 21I, 214. 

All-India Moslem League, 73-75, 83, 106. 

America (see United States). 

American Red Cross, in Japan, 235; subscriptions for, Philippines, 266. 

American Revolution, significance of, 303, 304. 

American University in Cairo, 36. 

Americans, status of, Philippines, 267. 

Amoy, I17. 

Amritsar, India, 78, 79, 84. 

Amur provinces, 120. 

Ancestor worship, China, 152; Japan, 179, 

Andrade, at Canton, I16. 

An-fu party, China, 136. 

Anglican Church, 90. 


345 


346 INDEX 


Anglo-French entente of 1904, 18, 49, 74. 

Anglo-French war with China, 120. 

Anglo-Indian opinion of British rule, 59, 78. 

Anglo-Japanese alliance, 127, 204-208, 210, 213. 

Anglo-Russian convention of 1907, 66, 70, 74, 206. 

Angora Turks (see Turks, government at Angora). 

Anhwei party, China, 136. 

Animal husbandry, 307, 317. 

Animistic religions, India, go. 

Antimony, China, 146. 

Arabi Pasha, 17. 

Arabic language, Egypt, 34, 38, 44; literature, 34. 

Arabs, Egypt, 31. 

Arbitration, Japan and United States, 235. 

Area, Egypt, 28; India, 88; China, 114; Japan, 174, 175, 222; Philip- 
pines, 238, 239; United Kingdom, 175, 239; United States, 88. 
Area, cultivable (or tillable), Egypt, 28, 29; India, 92; Japan, 222, 223; 

Philippines, 238, 259; Eastern lands, ching 

Armenians, Egypt, 32. 

Armistice, 1918, 21. 

Army, Egypt, 17, 30, 42, 43; India, 74, 86, 87, 102, 105; China, 119, 
134, 143, 150, 159-161, 166; Japan, 186, 188, 191, 196, 200, 202, 
209, 210, 215, 221, 234, 235; Philippines, United States in, 272, 
273, 283, 297. 

Arts, fine, Japan, 191. 

Aryan peoples, India, 57, 89. 

Ashikaga shoguns, 182. 

Asia, 66, 70, 115, 135, 183, 198, 205, 211, 308, 309, 333. 

Asia, eastern, 201, 205-207; American interests in, 124, 238, 247, 261, 
282. 

Asoka, 53-54. 

Asquith, British premier, 21, 74, 332. 

Assam province, India, 8 

Assembly (see Legislature, Philippine, and Legislature, Indian national). 

Assuan dam, 28. 

Assuit college, 36. 

Athletics, China, 154; Philippines, 253. 

Aurangzib, 54. 

Australia, 70, 225, 336, 339. 

Automobiles, 307; China, 147; Philippines, 260. 

Aviation (see Airplanes). 

Azhar, El, Cairo, 26, 34, 35, 37. 


Babar, 54. 

Bagdad railway, 93. 

Baikal, lake, 206. 

Banditry, China, 139, 160, 161, 166, 172. 

Bank, Philippine National, 263, 265, 270, 20274 38 

Banks and banking, China, 149; Japan, 221; Philippines, 263; as factor 
of economic life, 306, 307; Eastern lands, ata: 

Banks, agricultural, Egypt, 29:7 apan; 221. 

Banks, postal savings, 307; Egypt, 29; China, 149; Japan, 221; Philip- 
pines, 269; Eastern lands, 314. 

Banks, rural savings, Egypt, 29. 


INDEX 347 


Baring, Sir Evelyn, Lord Cromer, 16, 18, 30; book, 51. 

Beans, bean products, China, 145, 150. 

Belgium, interests in China, 170. 

Bengal, 55, 58, 63, 89, 106; partition of, 69, 71-74. 

Bentinck, Lord William, 64. 

Berlin, 121. 

Besant, Mrs., 75. 

Bhagavadgita, 82. 

Bibliography (see Reading, suggestions for). 

Bihar and Orissa, province, India, 89. 

Birth rate, eastern lands, 319, 320. 

Bismarck, Prince, example of, 193, 194, 199, 220. 

Board of control, president of, India, 55, 56. 

Boer War, effect of, India, 69, 70, 331. 

Bolshevism (see Soviet government), Egypt, 42; India, 105; Russia, 135. 

Bombay, 54, 56, 57, 59, 84, 89, 93, 95, 104, 106. 

Bonaparte, Napoleon, in Egypt, 13, 14, 16. 

BUbe sit }a C., 07.97; 

Boxer indemnity, 126, 127, 129, 134, 135, 165, 169. 

Boxer rebellion, 123, 126-128, 205. 

Boycott, Egypt, 23; India, 81, 84, 95, 106; China, 136, 165. 

Brahmins, 67, 68, 82, 9I. 

Bridgman, Elijah, 116. 

Brigandage (see Banditry). 

British Commonwealth of Nations, 20, 262, 336. 

British high commissioner, Egypt, 20-22, 25, 48. 

Buddha, 52. 

Buddhism, India, 53, 90; China, 115, 152; Japan, 179, 184, 187, 230; 
Eastern lands, 303, 343. 

Budget, Egypt, 40, 47; China, 143, 150; India, 60, 72, 86, 105, 108; 
Japan, 200-204, 208, 210, 221, 234, 235; Philippines, 266, 293, 297. 

Bureau of science, Philippines, 256. 

Bureaucracy, Japan, 193, 195. 

Burgevine, China, I19. 

Burke, Edmund, on India, 65. 

Burlingame, Anson, 120, I2I. 

Burma, 77, 89, 90, 122. 

Bushido, 181, 231. 

Business (see Finance, private, and Commerce). 


Cabinet (see Ministry). 

Cable, submarine, China, 122. 

Cairo, 22, 23, 26, 34, 38, 46, 47, 50. 

Caisse, Egypt, 16. 

Calcutta, India, 54, 59, 69, 71, 73, 84, 93, 95- 

California, 124; Japanese problems in, 213, 225, 233, 239. 
Caliph, question of title of, 14, 26, 47, 109. 

Caliphate, 14, 26, 47, 82, 83, I09. 

Caliphate movement in India, 82. 

Canada, 70, IOI, 225, 275, 336. 

Canals, Egypt, 15; India, 94; China, 147 (see Irrigation, Panama, Suez). 
Canton, 115-117, 146, 147, 160, 166, 168, I71. 

Canton government, 134, 135, 137-139, I41, 142, 167, 168. 
Cape-to-Cairo route, 46. 


348 INDEX 


Capital, investment, capitalism, China, 146, 149; Japan, 314; Philip- 
pines, 263, 268, 292, 294; Western lands, 306; Eastern lands, 313- 
316; native, 314, 315; quasi-public investment of, 263. 

Capital, seat of ‘government, Japan, 178-180, 183. 

Capitulations, Egypt, 32, 33, 39, 45, 49, 117. 

Caroline islands, 210. 

Cassel, Sir Ernest, 39. 

Caste, "India, 64, 82, 90, 91, 

Catholics (see Greek Orthodos Church, and Roman Catholic Church). 

Cattle, China, 144. 

Central Provinces and Berar, province, India, 89, 106. 

Certification of laws, India, 76, 105, 108. 

Chamber of princes, India, 77, 84. 

Champollion, 14. 

Chang Hsun, General, 134, 156. 

Chang Tso-lin, 135; 137, 141,142,170, 171. 

_ Changsha, China, riot, 166. 

Characteristics, national, China, 162. 

Charka, 81, 82. 

Chauri Chaura, India, mob affair at, 85. 

Chekiang, province, China, 170, 171. 

Chelmsford, Lord, Viceroy, India, 75, 76, 84. 

Chenchow, China, 170. 

Chengtu, China, 168. 

Ch’ien Lun, emperor, China, 303. 

Chi Hsiehyuan, General, 170, 171. 

Child labor, regulation of, Japan, 211. 

Chi-li, province, China, 137, 143. 

China, I12-173; commerce, with Japan, 228; with Philippines, 265, 
267; communications with India, 93; comparison with Japan, 174, 
185, 220, 224, 229, 231; Philippines, 257, 264, 274; Europe, 163; 
France, 303; relations with Japan, 123, 127, 132, 133, 135, 136, 
139, 140, I4I, 150, 161, 164, 165, 166, 171, 190, 197, 198, 205-207, 

209, 211-213, 215, 226, 235; Philippines, 241, 265, 285. 

Chinese Eastern Railway, 169. 

Chinese influence on Japan, 178-180, 184. 

Chinese Turkestan, 114, 121, 140, 141. 

Ching, Prince, premier, China, 130. 

Cholera, Egypt, 38; Philippines, 258. 

Choshu, clan, Japan, 186, 196, 200, ae) 217. 

Christian ethics, 333-337, 342. 

Christian missions, Egypt, 34, 328; India, 90, 96, 328; China, 116, 118, 
T1Oug i732, Japan, 182, 192; Philippines, ZAT R243. 328; Eastern 
lands, 328. 

Christian rule in Mohammedan lands, 34, 74, 82, 337. 

Christian leadership, training for, 153. 

Christian (mission or church), schools and colleges, Egypt, 36; India, 
68, 95, 96; China, 128, 129, 152, 153, 163. 

Christianity, influence of, 154 (see Greek Orthodox Church, Protestant 
churches, Roman Catholic Church). 

Christianity, position of, Egypt, 34-36; India, 90, 109; China, 115, 116, 
152, 164; Japan, 183, 230, 237; Philippines, 238, 240, 241, 244, 
290, 333; Western lands, 302; Eastern lands, 333-340, 342, 343. 

Christians, Syrian, 90. 


INDEX 349 


Chun, Prince, regent, China, 129, 130. 

Church and state, Philippines, 278. 

Cities, India, 64, 91; China, 158; Japan, 228; Philippines, 240. 

Civil and military authorities, friction between, Philippines, 272. 

Civil and. military governors, China, 159 (see Military governors). 

Civil disobedience, India, 106. 

Civil government, Philippines, 248, 249. 

Civil governor, Philippines, 249. 

Civilization, pre-Spanish in Philippines, 242. 

Civil service, Egypt, 37, 38; India, 56, 61-63, 68, 69, 102, 108; China, 
128; Japan, 194; Philippines, 248, 249, 267, 271, 272. 

Civil service, natives in, Egypt, 43; India, 56, 61, 62 (see Indianiza- 
tion); Philippines, 249, 250, 271, 272 (see Filipinization). 

Civil war, China, 139, 142, 160, 170-172; Japan, 186, 189. 

Clans, clan influences, Japan, 178, 179, 181, 183, 185-187, 195-197, 200, 
202, 206, 200, 215, 217. 

Clarendon, Lord, 121. 

Clark, President, Amherst Agricultural College, 191. 

Clarke Amendment, 287. 

Clarke, Senator from Arkansas, 287. 

Class distinctions, India (see Caste); Japan, 180, I81I, 190. 

Cleveland, President, 124, 162. 

Clive, Lord, 55. 

Coal, India, 92; China, 146, 169, 316; Japan, 227. 

Cocanada, India, 106. 

Coconut, Philippines, 261, 318. 

Codes of law (see Law). 

Colleges 2 Christian schools and colleges; education, higher; univer- 
sities). 

Colombo, Ceylon, 93. 

Colonization policy, Japan, 223-225, 261. 

Colonization, western, 308. 

Commerce, as a factor of economic life, 306. 

Commerce, chambers of, China, 159. 

Commerce, domestic or internal (see Finance, private). 

Commerce, foreign, Egypt, 15, 27, 32, 41, 48, 312; India, 53-55, 93, 94, 
312; China, 112, 116, 122, 145, 149, 150, 170, 312; Japan, 174, 182, 
212, 222, 226-228, 312; Philippines, 240, 243, 260-263, 267, 312; 
Great Britain, 312; United States, 312; Eastern, 312; Western, 308. 

Commission, Philippine, 248, 249. 

Communications, means of, 307; India, 93, 94; China, 122, 147, 148, 
154, 1573 Japan, 22 hs Philippines, 260; Eastern lands, 311. 

Communications, means of, as a factor in economic life, 307. 

Concessions, port, China, 140, 168 (see Treaty ports). 

Concessions, railway, mining, etc., China, 122, 123, 169; Eastern lands, 340. 

Conferences, international (see Paris Peace Conference; Washington 
Conference). 

Confucianism, China, 152, 333; Japan, 179. 

Confucius, 302, 333. 

Congress (see Indian National Congress; United States, Congress of). 

Conley, Ray, chief of secret service, Philippines, 292. 

Conscription, military, Egypt, 30, 42, 334, 335; Japan, 188, 213, 218, 
221, 234. 

Connaught, Duke of, 84. 


350 INDEX 


Constabulary, Philippine, 284, 297. 

Constantinople, 14, 18. 

Constitution, Egypt, 44, 45; China, 131, 132, 135, 167; Japan, 192- 
196, 198, 216, 219, 220; Philippines, Malolos, 246; United States, 
in Philippines, 249-250; 18th Amendment, 250, 281; Eastern 
lands, 326. 

Consular courts, Egypt, 39. 

Consuls and consular representation, Egypt, 47; Philippines, 268. 

Conventional tariffs (see tariff, conventional). 

Coolidge, President, 233, 295. 

Coolies, Chinese, in France during World War, 135; Indian, in South 
Africa, 70, 80; Fiji, 75; West Indies, 75. 

Codperation, American policy of, in Far East, 118, 123, 125, 126. 

Copper, China, 146. 

Copts, Egypt, 35, 36. 

Cornwallis, Lord, Governor-general, India, 63. 

Corruption, in government, Egypt, 30, 40; China, 151, 160, 162, 167; 
Japan, 197, 201, 204, 208-210, 217, 232; Philippines, 271; Eastern 
lands, 334. 

Corvée, Egypt, 29, 30. 

Cost of living, Egypt, 42; Japan, 211, 212. 

Cotton, cultivation of, Egypt, 20, 28, 29; India, 92; China, 145; 
Sudan, 46. 

Cotton duties, India, 65, 75. 

Cotton, manufacture of, India, 92; China, 146, 149, 170; Japan, 227. 

Council, national or viceroy’s executive, India, 55-57, 72, 76. 

Council, national legislative, Egypt, 19, 21; India, 57, 60, 72, 74, 76, 
79 (see legislature, Indian national). 

Council of India (in England), 56, 72. 

Council of state, India, 76; Philippines, 250, 251, 293. 

Councils, district, India, 59,,60. 

Councils, municipal, Egypt, 19; India, 57-59. 

Councils, provincial executive, India, 56, 57. 

Councils, provincial legislative, Egypt, 19, 36; India, 57, 60, 72, 77, 
84, 85, 106; China, 130, 132; Japan, 193. 

Councils, rural or local, India, 59, 60. 

Courbash, Egypt, 30, 39. 

Courts of justice, Egypt, 39; China, 151; Philippines, 270; Supreme, 
248, 249, 270. 

Crime, Egypt, 40; India, 64, 79, 90. 

Cromer, Lord, 16, 18, 30; book, 51. 

Crops, principal, Egypt, 28; India, 92; China, 144; Philippines, 261. 

Crown prince, Japan (see Hirohito). 

Crusades, 13, 14. 

Cuba, United States in, 33. 

Currency system, China, 148; Japan, 188, 202. 

Curzon of Kedleston, Lord, 25; viceroy, India, 66, 68, 71, 72. 

Cushing, Caleb, 117. 

Customs duties (see Tariff duties). 

Cyrenaica, 49. 


Dacoity, India, 90. 
Daika, era, Japan, 179, 186. 


INDEX 351 


Daimyo, rank in Japan, 180, 181; feudal rights surrendered, 187. 

Dalhousie, Marquess of, Governor-general, India, 65, 66. 

Dane, Sir ‘Louis, in Afghanistan, 66. 

Darbar, India, 70, 73. 

Das, C. R., Indian nationalist, 87, 106, 108. 

Death rate (see Mortality). 

Debt, public or national, Egypt, 40, 41, 45, 321; India, 321; China, 
143, 150, 151, 321; Japan, 206, 208, 221, 321; Philippines, 266, 
269, 321; Debt limit, 266; United States, 151, 321; Eastern lands, 
ev) Chew ee 

Decentralization, administrative, India, 58, 59; China, 157, 167. 

Defense, national, Philippines, 283, 284. 

Delhi, India, 53, 54, 70, 73, 84, 105, 106, I09. 

Delta, Nile, 28. 

Democracy, democratic ideas, and democratic tendencies, 21; Egypt, 
17, 27, 32; China, 160, 163; Japan, 219; Philippines, 253, 290; 
Western lands, 304, 305; Eastern lands, 310, 325, 332. 

Democrata party, Philippines, 295. 

Democratic party, United States, 250, 287, 296. 

Deshima, Japan, 184. 

Dewey, Admiral, at Manila, 245. 

Diet, national, in Japan, 193-197, 199-204, 210, 2I1, 217, 219, 231, 
232, 234, 252. 

Diminishing returns, law of, 318, 319. 

Diplomatic representation, representatives, or agents, Egypt, 47; 
China, 120, 121. 

Disarmament, universal, relation of Japan to, 215, 221, 236. 

Dispensary (see Hospital). 

Disraeli, British premier, 16. 

Domestic system of manufactures, Japan, 228; Philippines, 264; Eastern 
lands, 312; Western lands, 306. 

Dominion status, India, 75, 78, 101, 108, 336; Philippines, 275-277, 
289, 294, 295, 297. 

Dravidian races, India, 89. 

Dual control, India, 55. 

Dual nationality, abolished, Japan, 234. 

Dufferin, Lord, in Egypt, 19, 30; viceroy India, 58. 

Dupleix, French governor, India, 55. 

Dutch, relations with India, 54; China, 116; Japan, 184, 185; Philip- 
pines, 285; in Java, compared with Philippines, 254. 

Dutch East Indies, 285, 290. 

Duties, customs (see Tariff duties). 

Dutt, Romesh Chunder, Indian nationalist, 65, 110. 

Dyarchy, plan of government, India, 77, 107. 

Dyer, General, at Amritsar, India, 78-80. 


Earthenware, manufactures, Japan, 227. 

Earthquake, Japan, 231, 233, 234. 

East Africa, 46, 74, 105. 

East and West, comparison, 81, 300-313. 

East India Company, English, 54-56, 65, 94; trade with Canton, I17. 
East Indies, 183; (see Dutch East Indies). 

East, western acquaintance with, 329. 

Economic and political retardation of the East, 308-315. 


352 INDEX 


Economic conditions, interests, and development, Egypt, 28-32, 41; 
India, 92-94, 308, 314; China, 144-150, 308, 314; Japan, 221-229, 
234, 308, 314; Philippines, 258-268, 309, 314; Eastern lands, 308- 
322, 339, 340. ; 

Economic drain, from India, 65, 94. 

Education, Egypt, 15, 31, 34-38, 43, 44, 323; India, 58, 62, 63, 67, 75, 
77, 87, 95, 96, 323; China, 128, 129, 152-154, 163, 323; Japan, 
IOI, 196, 213, 218, 219, 229, 235, 323; Philippines, 243; 247, 252— 
257, 269, 273, 285, 297, 323; Eastern lands, 317, 322-326; Great 
Britain, 63; (see Christian schools and colleges, universities). 

Education, elementary or primary, Egypt, 36, 37; India, 62, 96, 107; 
China, 153; Japan, 229; Philippines, 252, 253, 255, '289: Eastern 
lands, 323, 325. 

Education, higher, collegiate, university, Egypt, 31, 34, 36-38; India, 
62, 95; China, 153; Japan, 229; Philippines, 243, 255, 256; East- 
ern lands, 323. 

Education, normal, teacher training, Egypt, 37; India, 96; China, 129, 
153; Japan, 323; Philippines, 255, 256, 323; Eastern lands, 323. 

Education of females, Egypt, 37; India, 96; China, 154. 

Education, public or government control, Egypt, 44; India, 107; 
China, 152, 153; Japan, I9I, 218, 219, 229, 235; Philippines, 
289. 

Education, private and privately controlled institutions, Philip- 
pines, 256. 

Education, secondary, India, 62, 95; China, 153; Japan, 229; Philip- 
pines, 255, 256; Eastern lands, 399 32%. 

Education, vocational, professional, technical, Egypt, 37; India, 62, 
96; China, 129, 153, 155; Japan, 229; Philippines, 256; Eastern 
lands, 322. 

Edward VII, King, England, 70. 

Eggs, China, 145, 150. 

Egypt, 13-51; comparison with India, 52, 63; China, 115, 117, 155; 
Japan, 174, 229; Philippines, 238, 252, 265, 267, 286. 

Egyptian expeditionary force, 22. 

Eighteenth Amendment to United States Constitution, in Philippines, 
250, 281. 

Elder statesmen (see Genro). 

Election, privilege of, Egypt, 44; India, 58, 59, 60, 72; China, 130; 
Japan, 193, 196; Philippines, 249; Great Britain, 60. 

Elections, particular, Egypt, 45; India, 105, 106, 108; Japan, 197, 201, 
2040210. 211.0218) 232.) 2aa: Philippines, 270, 291, 295; United 
States, 2096. 

Electric railroads, China, 147; Japan, 222. 

Elizabeth, Queen, England, 54. 

Embroideries, manufacture, Philippines, 261. 

Emperor, Japan, 180, 181, 184, 186, 187, 194, 195, 197, 203, 204, 216; 
(see Mutsuhito, Yoshihito: China, see Kwang-su, Pu-yi). 

Empress, dowager, China (see Tsu- hsi). 

Engineering service, India, 61. 

England (see Great: Britain). 

English language, Egypt, 38; India, 89; Japan, 219; Philippines, 240, 
252, 254, 255, 289. 

Epochs in intercourse of China with western nations, first, to 1842, 
115-117; second, 1842-1860, 117-120; third, 1860-1894, 120-122; 


INDEX ats: 


fourth, 1894-1904, 122-127; fifth, 1904-1912, 127-131; sixth, 1912- 
1922, 132-142; seventh, since 1922, 142-144, 164-172. 

Epochs of Chinese revolution, first, Ig1I-I912, 131; second, 1912-1916, 
132-133; third, 1916-1917, 133-135; fourth, 1917-1920, 135-137; 
fifth, 1920-1922, 137-142; sixth, since 1922, 142-144, 164-172. 

Eritrea, 49. 

Eta, class, Japan, 181. 

Ethical considerations in East, 333-337, 342. 

Ethnography (see Races). 

Eurasians, 338. 

European (see Western). 

Europeans (see Foreign communities). 

Ever-Victorious Army, China, I19. 

Examination system, China, 128, 153. 

Exchange, rate of (money rate), Egypt, 41; India, 94; China, 122, 149, 
165; Philippines, 266. 

Expansion, policy, Japan, 223-226. 

Expenditure, public or governmental, Egypt, 40, 48; India, 94, 105; 
China, 150, 165; Japan, 201, 213, 221, 234; Philippines, 266, 269, 
270,203. 

Experts (see advisers). 

Exports, Egypt, 41, 318; India, 94, 318; China, 122, 144, 149, 150, 318; 
Japan, 222, 227, 228, 318; Philippines, 261, 318. 

Extra-territoriality, Egypt, 33, 39; China, 117, 137, 139, 140, 169, 171, 
172, 334; Japan, 174, 185, 199, 200, 202, 334-336; Eastern lands, 339. 


Factory management, Eastern lands, 314. 

Factory system of manufactures, India, 92; China, 146; Japan, 313; 
Philippines, 264; Eastern lands, 312-314; Western lands, 305, 306; 
(see Industrial Revolution, Industry, Labor, Manufactures). 

Fairfield bill, 252, 295. 

Family, social unit in China, 158, 159; Japan, 190. 

Family life, China, 156. 

Famine, India, 64, 71, 93; China, 145, 170. 

Far East, American interests in, 124, 139, 214, 282; (see Asia, Eastern; 
Pacific, Western). 

Far East, American policy in, 118, 125. 

Far East, European interests in, 139, 209. 

Far East, European policy in, 207. 

Far East, situation in, 169, 205, 215, 220. 

Far Eastern Republic, 141. 

Federation of Women’s Clubs, Philippines, 257. 

Fellaheen, Egypt, 15, 20, 27-32, 42; defined, 30; as soldiers, 43. 

Feng Kuo-Chang, acting president, China, 134. 

Feng Yu-hsiang, Christian general, China, 143, 166, 171. 

Feudalism, feudal institutions, feudal conditions, Egypt, 29; Japan, 
179-181, 184, 187, 188; China, 157, 163; Philippines, 253. 

Fiji Islands, 75. 

Filipinization, 250, 265, 271, 272, 275, 276. 

Filipino governor, appointment proposed, 275. 

Finance, public, Egypt, 40, 41, 47, 48; India, 59, 65, 74, 86, 87, 94, 
105; China, 131, 132, 141, 143, 148-151, 160, 165; Japan, 188, 207, 
208, 210, 221, 234; Philippines, 266, 269, 270, 293, 296; Eastern 
lands, 335 (see Budget, Debt, Expenditure, Revenue). 


354 INDEX 


Finance, private, Egypt, 15, 27, 32; India, 93; China, 148, 149, 160; 
Japan, 207, 314; Philippines, 263-266, 294; Eastern lands, 314 
(see Banks, Foreign business interests). 

Financial depression, Egypt, 71; Japan, 200, 207, 212. 

Financial stability, national, Egypt, 32; India, 93, 94; China, 151; 
Japan, 188, 221; Philippines, 264, 265, 268, 269. 

Firearms, Japan, 182. 

Fish and fisheries, China, 144; Japan, 226. 

Flies, Egypt, 39. 

Floods, China, 145, 146, 170. 

Flour-mills, China, 146, 149. 

Foochow, China, 117, 168. 

Food production or supply, Egypt, 318; India, 318; China, 144, 318; 
Japan, 318; Philippines, 318; Eastern lands, 317, 318, 322. 

Foot-binding, China, 156. 

Forbes, W. Cameron, Governor-general, Philippines, 251. 

Foreign business interests, Philippines, 263, 267; Eastern lands, 328 
(see Concessions, Foreign communities). 

Foreign communities, Egypt, 23, 31, 32, 49; India, 59; China, 126, 168; 
Japan, 186, 200; Philippines, 240, 264, 265, 267; Eastern lands, 
327-329. 

Foreign cultural influences, Japan, 177, 184, 185. 

Foreign domination, native attitude to, India, 60, 100-104; Philip- 
pines, 246, 247, 281, 286-288. 

Foreign influences, native attitude to, India, 81; China, 113, 114, 122, 
126, 128, 129, 144, 155; Japan, 178, 182, Igo. 

Foreign intervention, China, 139, 140, 160; Japan, 174, 176; Far East, 
12454120) 127. 

Foreign intervention, native attitude to, China, 114, 126, 136, 161, 171, 
172; Japan, 183, 189. 

Foreign loans, Egypt, 16, 17, 40, 47, 315; India, 65, 93, 94, 315; China, 
122, 130-132, 137, I41, 143, 150, 151, 161, 168, 315; Japan, 208, 
221, 224, 315; Philippines, 270, 315. 

Foreign troops, China, 139. 

Forests, India, 61, 92; China, 145; Philippines, 259. 

Formosa, 123, 190, 198, 200, 201, 223, 225, 261. 

Four-power pact, Washington conference, 235, 282, 291. 

France, interests in and relations with, Egypt, 13-18, 31, 32, 46, 47, 
49; India, 55; China, 112, 116-118, 120, 121, 123, 132, 140, 165, 166; 
Japan, 123, 191, 197, 198, 207, 220, 225; Philippines, 285. 

Franchise, right of, Egypt, 44; India, 60; Japan, 196, 202, 208, 213, 
218, 220, 232, 233; Philippines, 252, 273, 289, 291, 292; Eastern 
lands, 309; Great Britain, 60; Western lands, 305 (see Election, 
right of; Suffrage, woman). 

Free Trade between Philippines and United States, 261, 262. 

. French language, Egypt, 14, 38. 

French legal codes, influence of, Egypt, 39. 

French Revolution, significance of, 303, 304. 

Friar lands, Philippines, 245, 247, 259, 265. 

Friars, Roman Catholic, India, 54; China, 115; Philippines, 243- 
245, 278. 

Fuad, King, Egypt, 13, 21, 26, 44-47, 49, 50. 

Fujiwara family, Japan, 180. 


INDEX 355 


Fukien, province, China, Japan in, 225. 
Further India (see Indo-China). 


Gama, Vasco da, 53, 54. 

Gandhi, Mahatma, 75, 80-87, 91, 95, 104-106, 108-110, 318. 

Ganges, 92. 

Gaya, India, 87. 

Geddes commission, Great Britain, 87. 

Genghis Khan, 115. 

Genro, Japan, influence of, 195, 201, 203, 209, 217; passing of, 218, 236. 

Gentlemen’s agreement, 225, 234. 

George V, King, England, 73, 84. . 

Germany, interests in and relations with, Egypt, 19, 20, 47; India, 74; 
China, 117, 121; 123, 132, 134, 135, 137, 160, 171,212; Japan, 123, 
I9I, 193, 198, 209, 210; Philippines, 284. 

Germany, possessions in Pacific, 210. 

Gladstone ministry, 58. 

Glass, manufactures, China, 146. 

Gold, India, 92, 94. 

Gold standard, China, 149; Japan, 202, 221; Philippines, 270. 

Gordon, Charles George, General, in China, 119. 

Gorst, Sir Eldon, British agent, Egypt, 18, 19. 

Goto, Baron, 231, 232. 

Governor-general, India, 55, 56, 64; Korea, 214; Philippines, 249-251, 
283, 292, 293; veto power, 273, 274, 294, 295. 

Governors (see Military governors). 

Grant, General U. S., in Japan, 191. 

Great Britain, army of, Egypt, 42; India, 86, 87. 

Great Britain, commercial relations with, Egypt, 41; India, 54, 55, 94, 
262; China, 116, 150, 170; Japan, 228; Philippines, 265, 267 (see 
Tariffs, conventional). 

Great Britain, communications of, with India (see Suez Canal). 

Great Britain, diplomatic and political relations of, China, 112, 117, 
118, 120-123, 132, 140, 165, 166; Japan, 185, I9I, 199, 204-208, 
210; Philippines, 243, 285. 

Great Britain, domestic politics of, influence on, Egypt, 331; India, 331. 

Great Britain, estimate of rule of, Egypt, 27, 30, 36, 39, 40, 43, 44; 
India, 60, 100-102. 

Great Britain, history of rule of, Egypt, 15-33, 44-50; India, 54-87, 
104-109. 

Great Britain, ministry of, 22, 25, 45, 48, 50, 58, 75, 107. 

Great Britain, parliament of. (including House of Commons), action 
concerning India, 56, 75, 107, 117 (see Act, India). 

Great Mughals (see Mughal empire). 

Greek Orthodox Church, missions, China, 120; Japan, 192, 230. 

Greeks, ancient, Egypt, 13; India, 52, 53, 81 

Greeks, modern, Egypt, 31, 32. 

Guam, island, 124. 

Guilds, China, 158. 


Hankow, China, 131. 

Hanyang, China, 146. 

Hara, Japanese premier, 212-214, 218. 

Harding, President, policy of, Japan, 214; to Philippines, 251, 286. 


356 INDEX 


Hardinge, Lord, Viceroy, India, 73, 75. 

Harris, Townsend, in Japan, 185. 

Harrison, Francis Burton, Governor-general, Philippines, 250, 251, 255, 
257, 260, 267, 271, 272, 275, 282, 292, 293; book by, 273, 298. 

Hart, Sir Robert, in China, 119, 122. 

Hartal, India, 84. 

Hats, manufactures, Philippines, 261. 

Hawaii, 124, 225. 

Head-hunting, Philippines, 242. 

Heads of bureaus, Filipino, 271, 272. 

Health, public (see sanitation). 

Hedjaz, kingdom of, 47. 

Hemp, Philippines, 261. 

Hideyoshi, general, Japan, 182, 183. 

Highways (see roads). 

Hindu states, or rulers, India, 53, 54. 

Hinduism and Hindus, 53, 68, 69, 71-73, 82-84, 90, 91, 105, 109, 343. 

Hindustani, language, India, 89. . 

Hirohito (crown prince of Japan), 214, 218, 232, 236. 

Historical.experience or development, influence of, Egypt, 13, 14, 27; 
India, 52, 99; China, 114, 156; Japan, 176, 178, 181, 220; Philip- 
pines, 239; Eastern lands, 326, 327; Western lands, 327. 

History, early period, Egypt, 13-15; India, 52-55; China, 115-117; 
Japan, 178-185; Philippines, 241-243. 

Hokkaido, 175, 191, 223, 316. 

Holland commission, India, 75. 

Home industries, promoted by Gandhi, 81. 

Honan, province, China, 170. 

Honesty in public office (see Corruption). 

Hong Kong, 117, 118, 140, 150. 

Hospitals, clinics, dispensaries, Egypt, 15, 38; China, 155, 321; Japan, 
235; Philippines, 258, 292, 321. 

Hsu Shih-chang, President, China, 135-137, 142. 

Hsuan-tung (see Pu-yi). 

Hunter commission, India, 79. 

Hussein, King, Hedjaz, 47. 

Hussein, Sultan, 20, 21. 


Illiteracy (see Literacy). 

Immigration, restriction of Chinese, by United States, 121; opposition 
to Japanese, in United States, 213, 225, 233, 234. 

Imperial Maritime Customs service, China, 119, 148, 168. 

Imperial relations, British, effect of, Egypt, 330, 331; India, 330, 331. 

Imperial War Conference, British, 75. 
Imperialism, Japan, 185, 189, 190, 199-201, 204, 206, 212, 215, 217, 
220; Great Britain, 330; United States, 247, 250; Western, 308. 
Imports, Egypt, 41, 318; India, 94, 318; China, 122, 149, 150, 318; 
Japan, 222, 228, 318; Philippines, 309, 318. 

Inchcape commission, India, 87, 104. 

Income tax returns, Philippines, 264. 

Increase of population (see Population, increase of). 

Indemnity (see Boxer indemnity). 

Independence, question of, Egypt, 21, 25, 26, 33, 43-45, 47, 50; India, 
52, 103, 106; Philippines, 241, 245, 246, 251, 255, 262, 263, 268, 


INDEX 357 


269, 273, 274, 276-279, 281-287, 289, 290, 293, 295-297, 299; 
Eastern lands, 332. 

Independence, spirit of, China, 112, 113, 141; Japan, 174, 175. 

India, 52-111; comparison with China, 112-115, 155, 163; Japan, 
ig @ 193; 229; Philippines, 238, 240, 252, 257, 262, 264, 267, 
274, 270. 

India, borderlands, 55, 100. 

India, British, 66, 88, 285. 

India, native states and princes, 66, 75, 77, 88; British control of, 88; 
suggestion to create more, 88. 

Indian Empire, 66, 88, 90, 99. 

Indian mentality, 67, 68, 97, 98. 

Indian National Congress, 68, 69, 71, 73, 75, 85, 87, 105, 106, 108. 

Indian opinion of British rule, 60. 

Indianization, 102, 105. 

Indo-China, 93, I21, 285, 290. 

Indo-European (see Aryan). 

Indonesians, in Philippines, 241. 

Indus, river, 104. 

Industrial revolution, 144, 304-307; India, 81, 92; China, 144, 146; 
Japan, 174, 226, 228; Great Britain, 303; Eastern lands, 308-322; 
Western lands, 303-307. 

Industry, industrial development; Egypt, 15, 27; India, 75, 81, 92; 
China, 146; Japan, 212, 227, 228; Philippines, 261, 264; Eastern 
lands, 312-314 (see Domestic system, Factory system, Industrial 
revolution, Labor, Manufactures). 

Infant mortality (see mortality, infant). 

Influenza epidemic, Philippines, 258. 

Insane, hospitals for, Egypt, 38. 

Insularity, Japan, 174-179; Philippines, 239. 

Insurgent government, Philippines, 245, 246. 

Insurrection, Japan, 189, 190; Philippines, against Spain, 244; against 
United States, 246, 247. 

Integrity, territorial (see Territorial integrity). 

Interisland navigation, Philippines, 260, 265. 

International law, relation to non-Christian lands, 335-337. 

International relations, Egypt, 14-21, 33, 39, 46, 47, 49; India, 53-55, 
66, 70, 74, 93; China, 112, 116-128, 132, 134-137, 139-I4I, 150, 
161, 165-172; Japan, 174, 182-186, 190, 198-200, 204-207, 210— 
215, 224-228, 233-236; Philippines, 243, 245, 267, 268, 282-286, 
290, 291, 296; Eastern lands, 315, 327-331, 335-343 (see Trea- 
ties, War). 

Interpellation, parliamentary, India, 60, 72. 

Intervention (see Foreign intervention). 

Intervention, American, in Japan, 176. 

Inukai, Mr., Japanese statesman, 232. 

Iron, India, 92; China, 146; Japan, 227. 

Irrigation, Egypt, 28, 29, 46; India, 65, 92-94, 104; China, 145, 146; 
Philippines, 259; Eastern lands, 317. 

Islam (see Mohammedanism). 

Ismail, Khedive, 16, 17, 43. 

Isolation, policy of, Japan, 183-185. 

Italy, 74; interests in and relations with, Egypt, 31, 32, 49. 

Italy, failure to retrieve disaster at Adowa, 69. 


358 INDEX 


Ito, Prince, Japanese statesman, 193, 194, 197-200, 202-204, 209, 216, 
217; Resident-general in Korea, 208. 

Iyemitsu, Shogun, Japan, 183. 

Tyeyasu, Shogun, Japan, 183. 


Jallianwala Bagh, 78, 79. 

Japan, 174-237; comparisons with China, 113, 122, 127, 155; Philip- 
pines, 238, 239, 241, 252, 253, 257, 274, 290; Great Britain, 175- 
178, 199, 220; relations with Philippines, 183, 241, 265, 284, 286. 

Japan Advertiser, 219. 

Jefferson, President, quoted, 341. 

Jesuits, China, 116; Japan, 182, 183; Philippines, 243. 

Jewelry, India, 94. 

Jews, Egypt, 32. 

Jinrikisha, China, 147; Japan, 222. 

Joffe, Adolf, Soviet envoy, 141. 

John of Montecorvino, at Peking, 115. 

Johnson, ‘‘Pussyfoot,’’ in India, 95. 

Jones act (see act, Jones). 

Joseph, Hebrew patriarch, 28, 29. 

Journalism (see press, newspaper). 

Jubilee, Queen Victoria’s, 1887, 70. 

Judaism, China, 115. 

Jury trial, right of, Japan, 236; Philippines, 271. 

Justice, administration of, Egypt, 30, 33, 39, 40, 334; India, 334; China, 
I5I, 152, 172, 334; Japan, 199, 334; Philippines, 248, 249, 270, 
271, 334; Eastern lands, 334. 

Jute, India, 92. 


Kagawa, Toyohiko, 229. 

Kakushin Club, party, Japan, 233. 

Kalgan, China, 148. 

Kamakura, Japan, 183. 

Kana, Japanese script, 180. 

Kang Yu-wei, reformer, China, 126. 

Karachi, India, 93. 

Karakhan, Mr., Soviet envoy, 168, 169. 

Kassala, Sudan, 46. 

Kato, Baron, 214-216, 218, 231. 

Kato, Viscount, Takaaki, 233, 235. 

Katsura, Prince, premier, Japan, 203, 204, 207-209, 216, 217. 
Kens, Japan, 192. 

Kenseikai, party, Japan, 209, 233. 

Kenya, East Africa, 105, 106, 336. 

Kiangsu, province, China, 170. 

Kiao-chao, China, 123, 132, 136, 139, 140, 166, 210, 225. 
Kipling, works of, 42, 43, 64, 67. 

Kitchener, Lord, in Egypt, 19, 29; in India, 72. 

Kiushiu, island, Japan, 182, 189. 

Kiyoura, Viscount, premier, Japan, 232, 234, 235. 

Kobe, Japan, 200, 229, 236. 

Kokuminto, party, Japan, 193, 201, 209. 

Komura, Count, foreign minister, Japan, 208. 

Kono, Mr., president, house of representatives, Japan, 204. 


INDEX 350 


Koo, Wellington, diplomat, China, 143, 167, 168. 

Koranic law, 37, 39. 

Korea, 123, 174-176, 178, 179, 182, 190; cause of Chino-Japanese war, 
198; Japanese control of, 201, 206-209, 214, 223-226, 236, 286, 290. 

Kowloon, peninsula, China, 123, 140. 

Kublai Khan, 54, 115, 181, 182. 

Kurile Islands, 184, 190. 

Kutab Minar, India, 53. 

Kwangchow-wan, China, 123, 140, 166. 

Kwang-su, Emperor, China, 125, 126, 129. 

Kyoto, Japan, 175, 180, 181. 


Labor, labor conditions; Egypt, 42; India, 75, 104; China, 146, 170; 
Japan, 179, 218, 229, 236; Eastern lands, 313, 315, 316, 339, 340 
(see Corvee, Factory system, Strikes). 

Lacquer, manufactures, Japan, 227. 

Laenas, Popilius, Roman envoy, in Egypt, 13. 

Land laws, Philippines, 259. 

Land tax, India, 63; China, 150; Japan, 188. 

Land, tenure of, Egypt, 15, 28, 29; India, 63; Japan, 179, 187, 188. 

Landholders, landowners, Egypt, 29, 42; India, 61. 

Languages, Egypt, 38; India, 52, 89, 90; China, 154; Japan, 177; 
Philippines, 240, 247, 254, 255, 280 (see Arabic language, English 
language, etc., Native languages). 

Lansing-Ishii agreement, concerning China, 135, 212, 235. 

La Perouse, quoted, 303. 

Latitude, Japan, 174, 175; Philippines, 239. 

Lausanne, treaty of, 47. 

Law, legislation, Egypt, 32, 33, 39; India, 334; China, 151, 334; Japan, 
I9I, 194, 199, 202, 236, 334; Philippines, 271, 273, 274; Eastern 
lands, 334. 

Law, rule of or enforcement of, Egypt, 30, 39; India, 86, 90; China, 
159; Philippines, 280. 

Lazarist missions, China, 116. 

League of Nations, 137, 236, 342; India, 336; China, 169; Philippines, 
effect on, 282; council of, 137, 169. 

Leather, manufactures, Japan, 227. 

Lee of Fareham, Lord, commission, India, 108. 

Legazpi, Spanish conqueror of Philippines, 242. 

Legislature, Indian National, 76, 84, 85, 105, 106, 108. 

Legislature, legislative institutions (see representative institutions). 

Legislature, Philippine, 249-252, 266, 273, 274, 276, 277, 291-293. 

Lepers, India, 95. 

Lesseps, Ferdinand de, 16. 

Li Yuan-hung, President, China, 131, 133, 134, 142, 143, 166, 167. 

Liang Shih-yi, premier, China, 141. 

Libraries, public, Japan, 219. 

Liao-tung, peninsula, 198. 

License, drink traffic, India, 95. 

Likin (see Provincial duties). 

Lighthouses, Japan, I9gI. 

Lincheng, China, bandit raid, 166, 167, 171. 

Lincoln, President, 120. 

Linguistic comparisons, 254. 


360 INDEX 


Literacy, Egypt, 35, 37, 323, 325; India, 62, 323, 325; China, 152, 323, 
325; Japan, 229, 323, 325; Philippines, 253, 323, 325. 

Literature, Egypt, 34; India, 97; China, 154; Japan, 179; Philippines, 
242, 244; (see Press). 

Liu Chiu Islands, 190. 

Lloyd George, British premier, 21, 332; proposals of 1922 for Egypt, 


25, 45. 

Lo Wen-kan, finance minister, China, 143. 

Loans, internal, China, 137, 150; Japan, 208, 221; (see Foreign loans). 

Loans, Liberty, Filipino subscriptions, 266. 

Local government, Egypt, 19; India, 57-60; China, 159; Japan, 191, 
193; Philippines, 249; Great Britain, 60. 

London, England, 47, 48, 121. 

London pact, of Allied powers, 211. 

Longitude, Japan, 175. 

Lucknow, India, 75, 106. 

Lu Yung-hsiang, General, China, 170. 

Luzon, Philippines, 242, 245. 

Lytton, Lord, lieutenant-governor, Bengal, 106. 


Macao, Portuguese at, 116, 140. 

Macaulay, Lord, in India, 62. 

MacDonald, Ramsay, British premier, 45, 48, 49, 107. 

Machinery (see Factory system). 

Madras, 54, 56, 58, 59, 84, 89, 91, 93, 106. 

Magellan, 242. 

Magna Carta, 40. 

Mahabharata, 82. 

Makiabs, elementary schools, Egypt, 36. 

Makwar, Sudan, barrage, 46. 

Malay, racial element in Japan, 177; race, in Philippines, 241, 242. 

Malaya, British, 290. 

Malaysia, 54. 

Malolos, Philippines, 246. 

Malthusian theory of population, 318, 319. 

Mamelukes, Egypt, 14, 15. 

Manchu dynasty, China, 116-131, 134. 

Manchuria, 114, 127, 135, 137, 140-142, 170, 198, 205, 316; Japan in, 
141, 206, 207, 224. 

Mandate, territories under, 214. 

Mandarin, dialect, 154. 

Manganese, India, 92. 

Manila, 239, 240, 242, 243, 246, 257, 258, 261, 263, 288, 292, 297, 303, 
R20 Naa 1) 

Manila Bay, 245. 

Manila galleon, 243. 

Manila Railroad Company, 263. 

Manufactures, principal, India, 92; China, 146; Japan, 227; Philip- 
pines, 261 (see Industry). 

Mariana Islands, 210. 

Maritime customs service, China, 119, 148, 168. 

Marshall, Humphrey, in China, 119. 

Marshall, Vice-President, 287. 

Marshall Islands, 210. 


INDEX 361 


Martial law, Egypt, 25, 26, 42 

Mary, Queen, England, ? 74. Pants 

Match factories, China, 146, 149; Japan, 227. 

Matsukata, Prince, 202, 236. 

Matting, manufactured, Japan, 227. 

Mayo, Lord, Viceroy, India, 58. 

McKinley, President, policy i in Philippines, 246-248, 250, 262, 271. 

Mecca, 47. 

Medicine rahe work, China, 155; Japan, 191 (see Sanitation, Hos- 
pitals 

Mediterranean, 49. 

Mehemet Ali, Pasha of Deyo 15, 16, 17, 27, 28, 37, 30, 42: 

Meiji era, Japan, 216, 218. 

Meiji Tenno, Japan, 209. 

Mendicancy, Eastern lands, 258. 

Menes, 13. 

Mesopotamia, 74. 

Mexico, relations of, Philippines, 242, 243. 

Migration, problem ‘of, 339, 340. 

Militarism, Japan, 196, 201-204, 206, 210, 211, 213, 215, 217, 220. 

Military affairs (see Army, Navy, War). 

Military caste, Japan, 181, 187, 188. 

Military government, Philippines, 248. 

Military governors, China, 133-137, 143, 150, 159-161, 170. 

Milner Commission in Egypt, 23, 24, 25; report of, 24, 51. 

Minamoto family, Japan, 180. 

Mindanao, Philippines, 242. 

Mines, mining, principal mineral resources, Egypt, 27; India, 92; China, 
123, 146; Japan, 227, 316; Eastern lands, 312, 315, 316. 

Ming dynasty, China, 116, 133. 

Ministerial responsibility (see Responsible government). 

Ministry, cabinet, Egypt, 16, 21-25, 31, 45, 47, 48, 50; China, 130, 
133-135, 137, 141, 143, 167; Japan, 194-197, 200-203, 208-215, 
231-233; Philippines, 292. 

Minorities, minority groups, Egypt, 31, 32, 49; India, 61, 72; Philip- 
pines, 272, 274. 

Mint, established, Japan, 178. 

Minto, Earl of, Viceroy, India, 68, 72, 73. 

Missions (see Christian missions, ‘Greek Orthodox Church, Protestant 
Churches, Roman Catholic Church, Friars, Jesuits). 

Mixed tribunals, Egypt, 39. 

Modernization, the distinctive characteristic of the West in contrast 
with the East, 304. 

Mohammedanism, Egypt, 34, 35, 36, 44, 333; India, 53, 54, 82-84, 90, 
105, 109; China, 115, 152; Philippines, 240-242, 272; East, 343. 

Mohammedanism, political interests of, Egypt, 35; India, 53, 54, 61, 
69, yok kos. 83, 85. 

Mohammedanism, religious interests of, Egypt, 35, 36, 47; India, 82, 84. 

Mohammedan lands, rule of Christian powers in, 34, 73, 82, 337. 

Mohammedan rule in Egypt, 13-14; India, 53-54. 

Monetary system, China, 148. 

Money lenders, Egypt, 29. 

Money, replaces barter, 312. 

Mongolia, 114, 140, 141, 169, 206, 224. 


362 INDEX 


Mongolian racial element in Japan, 177. 

Mongols, rule in China, 115, 116; attack Japan, 181-182. 

Monroe Doctrine, quoted, 341; relation to Far East, 342. 

Montagu, secretary of state for India, 75, 76, 85. 

Montagu-Chelmsford reforms, for India (see Act, Government of 
India, 1919). 

Moplah affair, India, 84. 

Morality, of Filipinos, 281. 

Morley, John, Lord, 72, 75, 76. 

Morley-Minto reforms (see Act, Indian councils, 1909). 

Morocco, 74. 

Moros, Philippines, 242, 244, 272, 297. 

Morrison, Robert, in China, 116. 

Mortality, infant, Egypt, 39, 320; India, 320; China, 320; Japan, 320; 
Philippines, 257, 258, 320, 321; United States, 320. 

Mortality, Philippines, 257; Eastern lands, 319-321 

Moslem League (see All-India Moslem League). 

Most favored nation provision in treaties, China, 117, 123, 125; 
Japan, 185. 

- Motor boats, Philippines, 260. 

Muddiman commission, India, 107, 108. 

Mughal Empire, India, 54, 81. 

Municipal institutions (see Cities; Councils, municipal; Local govern- 
ment); India, 57; China, 158, 159; Philippines, 248. 

Munro, Sir Thomas, in India, 63. 

Mutiny, Sepoy, India, 55, 56, 66, go. 

Mutsuhito, Emperor, Japan, 186, 194, 209. 


Nacionalista party, Philippines, 277, 295. 

Nadir Shah, invades India, 55. 

Nagasaki, Japan, 184, 192, 200. 

Nanking, 170. 

Nanking, treaty of, 112, 117. 

Naoroji, Dadabai, Parsi, 69. 

Nara, Japan, 179. 

National Cement Company, Philippines, 263. 

National Coal Company, Philippines, 263. 

Nationalism, nationalist, 21; Egypt, 17, 22, 23, 27, 31, 35, 42, 45, 50; 
India, 65, 68, 87, 88, 97, 100, 102-106, 108; China, 154; Philip- 
pines, 240, 241, 247, 253-255, 260, 276, 286, 293, 294, 297; East, 
332; (see Indian National Congress). 

Native States (see India, native states). 

Native attitude to foreign domination, etc. (see Foreign domina- 
tion, etc.). 

Native fitness for political responsibility (see Political responsibility). 

Native languages, India, 89; Philippines, 240, 254 (see Language). 

Natives in civil service (see Civil service, natives in). 

Naval base, American, in Philippines, 281, 291, 296. 

Navigation (see Shipping; Steam navigation). 

Navy, Japan, 186, 191, 196, 200, 209, 210, 215, 221, 235; United States, 
in Philippines, 272, 283. 

Negritos, in Philippines, 241. 

Neutralization, possible, Philippines, 282; Suez and Panama canals, 48. 

Nile, river, value for irrigation, 27, 28, 46. 


INDEX 363 


Nine-power pact, Washington conference, 165, 235. 
Ningpo, China, 117. 

Nobility, new, Japan, 194. 

Non-Brahmins, India, 91. 

Non-Christian tribes, Philippines, 241, 272, 274. 
Non-codperation, India, 81, 83, 85, 87, 108. 
Non-Egyptian peoples in Egyptian population, 31, 32, 36. 
Non-resistance, India, 81, 83, 85, 108. 

North, in China (see Peking government). 

North, Lord, regulating act of, India, 55. 
Northwest frontier, India, 52, 66, 100, 109. 
Northwest Frontier Province, India, 66. 
Northwest Provinces, India, 57. 


Oath, imperial or charter, Japan, 187, 191, 192, 195. 

O’Dwyer, Sir Michael, lieutenant-governor, Punjab, India, 80. 

Office holders, officials (see civil service). 

Okuma, Marquis, Japan, 193, 201, 202, 209-211, 217, 218. 

Open-door policy, China, 118, 125, 135, 139, 164, 262. 

Ophthalmic troubles, Egypt, 39. 

Opinion, of British residents in India, 59, 78. 

Opium, cultivation, China, 145; smoking, China, 156; trade, China, 
117, 145. 

Opium War, China, 117. 

Oregon, 124. 

Organic law, Egypt, 19. 

Osaka, Japan, 228, 229. 

Osmena retirement act, Philippines, 272. 

Osmena, speaker of assembly, Philippines, 250, 272, 277, 293, 295. 

Otis, General, Philippines, 248. 

Ottoman Empire (see Turks, Ottoman). 

Ozaki, Mr., statesman, Japan, 221. 


Pacific Ocean, questions, 139; German possessions in, 209, 210. 

Pacific, Northern, American interests in, 124, 184. 

Pacific, Western, American interests in, 238, 247, 261, 282. 

Pagans, Philippines, 241, 272. 

Palestine, 74. 

Panama Canal, 48. 

Pan-Islamism, 34, 74, 82. 

Paris, 47, 121; treaty of, 1898, 245. 

Paris Peace Conference, Egypt, 21, 22, 23; India, 336; China, 135, 136; 
Japan, 212; Philippines, 276, 286. 

Parliament (see Great Britain, parliament of). 

Parliament, Egypt, 45; China, 130, 132, 134, 135, 142, 143, 167. 

Parliamentary institutions or government (see Representative institu- 
tions, Responsible government). 

Parsis, India, 69. 

Parties, political, Egypt, 45; India, 87, 91, 106, 108; China, 136, 138; 
Japan, 196, 197, 201, 202, 209, 217, 231-233; Philippines, 276, 277, 
295; United States, 296. 

Party government (see responsible government). 

Passive resistance (see non-resistance). 


364 INDEX 


Pax Britannica, India, 70, 89, 90, 99, 100. 

Pax Romana, 13. 

Peers, House of, Japan, 194, 195, 197, 203, 208, 218, 232, 233. 

Peking, 115, 116, 119, 129, 134, 141, 148, 155, 166, 169, 171, 198, 235; 
siege of legations, 126, 205. 

Peking government, 133, 136, 138, 139, 142, 165, 168, 170, I71. 

Peking Union Medical College and Hospital, 321. 

Periodicals, circulation of, 325 (see Press). 

Permanent settlement of revenue, Bengal, 63. 

Perry, Commodore, intervention in Japan, 122, 176, 183-185. 

Persia, relations with India, ancient, 52, 81; modern, 55, 74, 93. 

Pescadores Islands, 198. 

Petroleum, India, 92; China, 146, 150. 

Pharaoh, 28. 

Philip II of Spain, 54, 183. 

Philippine Commonwealth Bill, 295. 

Philippines, 238-299; comparison with, China, 155. 

Phonetic writing, China, 154; Japan, 179, 180. 

Physical training, Philippines, 253. 

Pilgrimages to Mecca, 47. 

Pirates, China, 166, 172; Moro, Philippines, 242, 244. 

Plague, bubonic, Egypt, 38; India, 64, 71; Eastern lands, 320. 

Platt Amendment plan, in Cuba, suggested for Egypt, 33; Philippines, 
283, 296. 

Plebiscite, proposed, on independence, Philippines, 296. 

Political conditions and progress, estimate of, Japan, 215-221; Eastern 
lands, 309-311, 326, 327. 

Political mindedness, 98, 99. 

Political responsibility, native fitness for, Egypt, 32, 40, 42-44, 326; 
India, 58, 59, 62, 67, 68, 72-74, 76, 78, 86-88, 97-104, 326; China, 
326; Japan, 196, 219, 229, 326; Philippines, 273, 274, 276, 277, 
279-283, 289, 295, 326; Eastern lands, 326. 

Polo, Marco, India, 54; China, 115; Japan, 182. 

Population, Egypt, 30, 31, 41, 342; India, 88, 89, 342; China, 114, 115, 
144, 342; Japan, 174, 175, 222, 342; Philippines, 238, 239, 342; 
Great Britain, 175, 342; United States, 342 (see Foreign com- 
munities). 

Population, increase of, Egypt, 41, 318, 319; India, 318, 319; China, 
319; Japan, 222-229, 318, 319; Philippines, 239, 318, 319; Eastern 
lands, 318-320; United Kingdom, 318; United States, 318, 319; 
Malthusian theory and its application, 318, 319. 

Population, urban, 306; India, 91; Japan, 228, 229; Philippines, 240; 
United States, 91; Eastern lands, 313, 317. 

Pork, China, 144. 

Port Arthur, 123, 205. 

Port Sudan, 46. 

Ports (see Treaty ports). 

Portsmouth, treaty of, 206. 

Portugal, relations with, India, 53, 54; China, 116, 140; Japan, 182; 
Philippines, 285. 

Portugal, Spanish rule in, 183. 

Pound, Egyptian money, 4I. 

Poverty, India, 317; China, 317; Japan, 229; Philippines, 258; Eastern 
lands, 258, 313, 314, 317. 


INDEX 365 


Post office, postal facilities, India, 93; China, 122, 148, 150; foreign in, 
139; Japan, 191, 222, 

President, China, 131, 132, 134, 135, 171; (see United States, 
president of). 

Press, book and periodical, development and influence of, Egypt, 34, 
324; India, 96, 97, 324; China, 155, 324; Japan, 219, 324; Philip- 
pines, 257, 324; Eastern lands, 324 (see Periodicals, circulation of). 

Press, foreign language newspaper, Egypt, 38; India, 96, 97; China, 
155; Japan, 219; Philippines, 257. 

Press, freedom of, Egypt, 38; India, 79, 97; Japan, 219; Philippines, 257. 

Press, native or vernacular newspaper, Egypt, 31, 38, 50; India, 96; 
China, 155; Japan, 219; Philippines, 257. 

Price regulation, Philippines, 266. 

Princes, chamber of, India, 77, 84. 

Prisons, China, 152. 

Privy Council, Japan, 194, 195, 204, 215. 

Proclamation, Queen’s, for India, 1858, 56. 

Progress in East, indexes of, 311, 312, 318, 320, 321, 325. 

Progress in East, Problems of, 300-343. 

Propaganda, Filipino, in United States, 286, 297, 299. 

Protectorate, American, possible plan for Philippines, 282. 

Protectorate, British, in Egypt, 20, 21, 23, 25. 

Protestant Churches, missions of, Egypt, 36; China, 116, 118, 128, 152, 
164; Japan, 184, 192, 230; Philippines, 241; (see Christian schools 
and colleges). 

Protestant Episcopal Church, Philippines, 241. 

Provinces, India, 56, 89; China, 114, 133, 153, 157-159, 167, 170; 
Japan, 192 (see councils, provincial; local government). 

Provincial duties, China, 139, 150. 

Public works, Egypt, 29; India, 61 (see Canals, Irrigation, Railroads, 
Roads, Sanitation, etc.). 

Punjab, the, province, India, 57, 79, 80, 84, 89. 

Pu-yi, Emperor, China, 129-131, 134 (reigning title, Hsuan-tung). 


Quarantine, Egypt, 38. 
Queue, China, 156. 
Quezon, President of Philippine senate, 250, 255, 277, 287, 288, 293, 295. 


Races, India, 52, 89, 90, 99; China, 112, 114, 141; Japan, 177; Philip- 
pines, 238, 240, 275; Eastern lands, 300. 

Racial equality, 300, 301, 304, 320, 336-340; Japan, 221, 236, 320; 
India, 336; Philippines, 336, 337. 

Radio-telegraphy, China, 148; foreign in, 139. 

Rai, Lajpat, Indian nationalist, 65, 105, I10. 

Railroads, 307; Egypt, 47; India, 65, 93; China, 123, 128, 138, 140, 
147, 148, 150, 166, 169, 170; Japan, 191, 207, 221, 222; Philippines, 
260; Eastern lands, 311; Sudan, 46. 

Railroads, mileage, Egypt, 311; India, 93, 94, 311; China, 128, 147, 311; 
Japan, 221, 311; Philippines, 311; United States, 311. 

Rainfall, India, 92. 

Rangoon, Burma, 93. 

Reading, Lord, Viceroy, India, 84, 85, 105. 

Reading, Suggestions tor, Egypt, 50-51; India, 1og-111; China, 172- 
173; Japan, 236-237; Philippines, 298-299. 


366 INDEX 


Recent events, Egypt, 44-50; India, 104-109; China, 164-172; Japan, 
231-236; Philippines, 291-298. 

Reclamation of lands, China, 146; Philippines, 259. 

Red Cross, China, 155 (see American Red Cross). 

Red Sea route to India (see Suez Canal). 

Reforestation (see forests). 

Regent, Prince, Japan (see Hirohito). 

Religion, religious conditions (see Buddhism, Christianity, etc.). 
Egypt, 34-36, 44, 47, 303; India, 52, 84, 90, 91, 99, 105, 3033 
China, 115, 116, 118, 152, 303; Japan, 179, 187, 192,°230,.235; 
303; Philippines, 238, 240, 241, 244, 278, 279; Eastern lands, 
303, 333-340. 

Religious strife, India, 84, 105, 109. 

Religious toleration, Egypt, 34, 44; China, 118, 152; Japan, 230. 

Renaissance, significance for West, 163, 301-304; absent from East, 302. 

Representative institutions, 304; Egypt, 27, 44; India, 57, 61, 73, 76, 
78, 98, 99, 101; China, 130; Japan, 192-198, 217, 218; Philippines, 
249, 273-278; Eastern lands, 326, 327. 

Representatives, House of, Japan, 194, 195, 202-204, 208, 218, 232, 233. 

Republic, established, China, 131; permanency of, 156. 

Republican party, United States, 250, 251, 296. 

Reserved subjects, India, 77. 

Responsible government, Egypt, 44; India, 76-78, 106-108; Japan, 
195-197, 201, 202, 217, 232; Philippines, 250, 275-277, 289, 293, 
294; Eastern lands, 326, 327. 

Restoration, Japan, 186-191, 216, 230. 

Revenue, national income, Egypt, 48; India, 94; China, 150, 159, 165, 
168; Japan, 188; Philippines, 263. 

Revenue, settlement of, India, 63. 

Revolution, China, 1911, comparisons with, 138, 144, 156, 157; effects 
of 157-160, 163, 164 (see Epochs of Chinese revolution). 

Revolution, in Spain, affects Philippines, 244 (see American Revolu- 
tion, French Revolution, Industrial Revolution). 

Rhodes, island, 74. 

Ricci, Jesuit, at Peking, 116. 

Rice, India, 92; China, 144; Japan, 179, 188; Philippines, 259, 266, 
309, 318; market value, 309. 

Ripon, Lord, Viceroy, India, 58-60, 64. 

Rizal, José, Filipino author and patriot, 244-246, 288. 

Roads, highways, Egypt, 15; India, 93; China, 147; Philippines, 260. 

Rockefeller Foundation, helps rebuild University of Tokio, 235. 

Roman Catholic Church, missions of (see Friars, Jesuits), Egypt, 36; 
India, 90; China, 116, 118; Japan, 182-184, 192, 230; Philippines, 
241, 243, 247, 278, 279, 287. 

Rome, 47, 81. 

Rome, republic and empire, control Egypt, 13, 49. 

Roosevelt, President, terminated Russo-Japanese War, 206; attitude 
to Philippines, 287. ;, 

Root, Elihu, secretary of war, 248. 

Rosetta stone, 14. 

Rowlatt acts, India, 78, 79. 

Roxas, Manuel, Speaker, Philippine assembly, 295. 

Rubber, Philippines, 259, 292. 

Rushdi Pasha, premier, Egypt, 21, 23. 


INDEX 367 


Russia, empire, relations with India, 66, 205; China, 120, 121, 123, 127, 
132, 141; Japan, 123, 127, 128, 184, 185, 190, 192, 198, 204-207, 211. 

Russia, Soviet government, relations with China, 117, 141, 161, 168, 
169, 171; Japan, 169, 235; Eastern lands, 215. 


Saad Pasha (see Zaghlul). 

Sadler commission, India, 75, 95. 

Saghalien, 184, 190, 206. 

Said, Khedive, Egypt, 16. 

Saigo insurrection, Japan, 189. 

Saionji, Marquis, premier, Japan, 204, 208, 209, 236. 

Saito, Baron, Governor-general, Korea, 214. 

Salem, Mass., 119. 

Salt, India, 92. 

Salt tax, India, 105; China, 150. 

Samurai, Japan, 180, 181, 187, 188, 193. 

San Francisco, Cal., 121, 124. 

Sanitation, Egypt, 38; India, 64, 95, 104; China, 155, 321; Philippines, 
247, 253, 257, 258, 269, 321; Eastern lands, 320, 321. 

Sanskrit learning, influence, Japan, 179. 

Sarwat Pasha, Premier, Egypt, 25, 26. 

Satt, widow-burning, India, suppressed, 64. __ 

Satsuma, clan, Japan, 186, 189, 200, 209, 217. 

Satsuma rebellion, Japan, 189, Igo. 

Scholars, China, 163. 

School attendance, Egypt, 36, 37, 323, 325; India, 96, 323, 325; China, 
153, 323, 325; Japan, 229, 323, 325; Philippines, 252, 297, 323, 325. 

Schools (see Christian schools and colleges, Education, School atten- 
dance). 

Schurman commission, Philippines, 248. 

Science, India, 97; Philippines, 256. 

Scouts, Philippine, 284, 297. 

Seamen, Philippines, 265. 

Secret societies, Philippines, 244. 

Secretary of state for India, British, 56, 57, 66, 72, 75, 85, 107. 

Secretary of war, United States, supervises Philippines, 247, 248, 295. 

Sedition, India, 79. 

Seiyu-honto party, Japan, 232, 233. 

Seiyukai party, Japan, 202, 204, 208, 209, 211-213, 231-233. 

Self-government, movement for and progress toward, Egypt, 27, 31-33, 
36, 43, 326; India, 58, 59, 62, 75, 78, 80, 81, 83, 86-88, 98-100, 104, 
107, 326; Philippines, 246, 252, 268, 272, 277-291, 295. 

Selim, Ottoman sultan, becomes caliph, 14. 

Sévres, treaty of, 34, 82, 83. 

Seward, American secretary of state, 121. 

Shameen, Canton, 168. 

Shanghai, 117, 119, 140, 146, 147, 155, 170, 171. 

Shantung, province, China, 145; Japanese interests in, 132, 135, 136, 
139, 140, 166, 212, 225. 

Shansi, province, China, 153, 170. 

Shensi, province, China, 170. 

Shintoism, religion, Japan, 187, 230, 233. 

Shipping, China, 147; Japan,‘I91, 226; Philippines, 262, 265 (see Steam 
navigation). 


368 INDEX 


Shogunate, shoguns, Japan, 180-186. 

Shop-keeping class, Egypt, 27, 32; Philippines, 264. 

Sianfu, China, 170. 

Siberia, Russia in, 141; Japan in, 212-215. 

Sikhs, people and religion, India, go. 

Silk, cultivation, China, 145, 150, 317; Japan, 317; manufacture, 
China, 146; Japan, 227; market value, 308. 

Silver, decline in exchange of, India, 94; China, 122, 148. 

Simla, India, 105. 

Sinha, Lord, Indian statesman, 67, 72. 

Smallpox, Egypt, 38; Philippines, 258. 

Social conditions and reforms, Egypt, 30-39; India, 89-92, 94-99, 109; 
China, 151-156, 161-164, 170; Japan, 181, 188-192, 211-213, 218- 
219, 228-231; Philippines, 252-259, 277-281; Eastern lands, 315, 
320-326 (see racial equality). 

Social democracy, Japan, 315. 

Social relations, between Europeans and natives, in East, 338-340. 

Socialism, Japan, 315. 

Soviet government (see Russia, Soviet government). 

South Africa, 69, 70, 80; Union of, 19, 331, 336. 

South, China (see Canton government). 

Spain, estimate of rule of, Philippines, 240, 244. 

Spain, relations with India, 54; China, 116; Japan, 183, 184; Philip- 
pines, 116, 239, 240, 242-244, 265, 271. 

Spanish language, Philippines, 240, 254. 

Spheres of influence, China, 123, 140. 

‘“‘Squeeze,’’ corrupt practice, China, 151, 162, 316, 335. 

“Stable government,’’ Philippines, 246, 248, 251, 268, 274, 287, 2809. 

Stack, Sir Lee, assassinated, Egypt, 50. 

State ownership, India, 93; Japan, 207, 221; Philippines, 263-264. 

Statehood, for Philippines, question of, 275. 

Statistics (see Area, Literacy, Mortality, Periodicals, Circulation, Pop- 
ulation, School attendance, Railroads, Telegraphs, etc.). 

Steam navigation, inland and coastal, China, 147; Philippines, 260 (see 
Shipping). ! ; 

Steam navigation, oceanic, 307; effect of, China, 122; Philippines, 243 
(see Shipping). 

Streets, China, 147. 

Strikes, labor and political, Egypt, 23, 26, 35, 42; China, 136, 168; 
Japan, 207 1213: 

Students, native abroad, Egypt, 15; China, 130; Philippines, 256; 
Eastern lands, 324, 328, 329. 

Students, political activity of, Egypt, 26, 35; India, 63; China, 130, 
163; Eastern lands, 329. 

Suakin, Sudan, 46. 

Sudan, Anglo-Egyptian, 42, 44-47. 

Suez canal and route to India and East, 16, 25, 45, 46, 48, 49, 93, 
124, 243. 

Suffrage (see Election, privilege of, Franchise, right of). 

Suffrage, woman, India, 60; Philippines, 292; Western lands, 305; 
Great Britain, 60. 

Sugar, Philippines, 261, 318; scandal, Japan, 208. 

Sukkur, irrigation project, India, 104. 

Sulu archipelago, Philippines, 242. 


INDEX 369 


Sun Pao-chi, premier, China, 167, 168. 

Sun Aaerry Chinese political leader, 131, 132, 137, 138, 141-143, 
167, 168. 

Sunday, Japan, 230. 

Super-tuchuns (see military governors). 

Surat, India, 69. 

Swadeshit, home industries, India, 72, 81. 

Swaraj, self-government, India, 81. 

Swarajist party, India, 108. 

Syrian Christians, in India, 9o. 

Syrians, in Egypt, 31, 32. 

Sze, Alfred, diplomat, China, 143. 

Sze-chuen, province, China, 131. 


Taft, William H., Civil Governor, Philippines, 249, 272. 

Tagalog, language, Philippines, 240. 

Taiping rebellion, China, 118, 119. 

Taira family, Japan, 180. 

Takahashi, Baron, Premier, Japan, 214. 

Taoism, religion, China, 152. 

Tao-kwang, Emperor, China, 117. 

Tariff, conventional, China, 118, 139, 140, 169; Japan, 185, 199, 200, 
208, 336. 

Tariff duties, India, 65; China, 119, 139, 150, 169; Japan, 200, 208, 234; 
Philippines, 250, 261-263. 

Tata Sons Corporation, India, 92. 

Tatnall, Commodore, in China, 120. 

Taxes, assessment of, Egypt, 30, 34; India, 58, 63; Japan, 193. 

Taxes, burden of, Egypt, 33, 41; India, 60, 63, 86, 105, 109; Japan, 
200, 206, 323; Philippines, 264, 269; Eastern lands, 321, 322; 
United Kingdom, 322; United States, 269, 322. 

Taxes, collection of, Egypt, 30, 41, 335; India, 335. 

Taxes, kinds of, China, 137, 150; Japan, 179, 188. 

Tea, India, 92, 318; China, 122, 144, 145, 150. 

Teacher training (see Education, normal). 

Teachers, American, in Philippines, 252, 255. 

Telegraphs, 307; Egypt, 311; India, 93, 94, 311; China, 122, 128, 148, 
150, 311; Japan, I91, 222, 311; Philippines, 311; Eastern lands, 
311; United States, 311 (see Cable, submarine; Radio-telegraphy). 

Tel-el-Kebir, battle, Egypt, 17, 42. 

Telephones, 307; China, 148; Japan, 222; Eastern lands, 311. 

Temperance, habit of and movement for, India, 95; Philippines, 281. 

Terauchi, Count, in Korea, 208; premier, Japan, 211, 212, 217, 218. 

Territorial integrity, China, 113, 118, 119, 123-126, 136, 140, I6I. 

Tewfik, Khedive, Egypt, 17, 18. 

Thagi, suppressed, India, 64, 90. 

Thomas, St., in India, 90. 

Thomason, James, in India, 64. 

Thrift, personal, needs inculcation, Philippines, 268, 269. 

Tibet, 114, 140; Younghusband mission to, 66, 70. 

Tientsin, China, 134, 147, 155. 

Time, value of, 304, 314; not realized by Orientals, 326, 327. 

Tin, China, 146, 150. 

Tobacco, China, 150; Philippines, 261; tax on, China, 137. 


370 INDEX 


Tokugawa shoguns, Japan, 182-186. 

Tokyo, 175, 183, 209, 228, 236; earthquake, 231, 233; reconstruction, 
234, 235. 

Torture, Egypt, 30, 39; China, 151; Eastern lands, 334. 

Trade (see Commerce, and finance, private). 

Trade, eastern, with Europe, in earlier times, 14, 53, 54, 115, 116. 

Trans-Caspian Railway, 93. 

Transferred subjects, India, 77, 107. 

Transportation, means of, 307; India, 93, 94; China, 147, 148; Japan, 
221; Philippines, 260, 269; Eastern lands, 311, 316 (see Automo- 
biles, Canals, Railroads, Roads, Shipping). 

Travelers, influence of, on East, 329. 

Treaties, affecting, Egypt, 18, 23, 49, 74; India, 66, 70, 74; China, 
112, 117-124, 127, 132, 135-137, 139, 140, 165, 168, 169, 198, 235; 
Japan, 127, 132, 135, 136, 139, 140, 165, 185, 198, 199, 204-214, 
235; Philippines, 235, 245, 282, 291 (see names of places where 
signed). 

Treaty nations or powers, China, 117-119, 121, 122, 125-128, 139, 140, 
161, 166, 168, 171. 

Treaty ports, China, 117; Japan, 200 (see Port concessions). 

Treaty revision, China, 119; Japan, 190, 197, 199, 200, 208, 217. 

Tripolitania, 49, 74. 

Tsao Kun, president, China, 137, 143, 167, 168, 171. 

Tsu-hsi, empress dowager, China, 126, 129, 130. 

Tsung-li-yamen, foreign office, China, 120. 

Tsushima, straits, 175. 

Tuan Chi-jui, Premier, China, 133-137, 171. 

Tuberculosis, Philippines, 258. 

Tuchuns (see Military governors). 

Turks, government at Angora, 26, 47, 109. 

Turks, Ottoman, debt of, secured by Egyptian tribute, 47; relations 
with Egypt, 14, 15, 18- —~20, 31, 47; Italy, 19, 34, 74; Balkan states, 
19, 34, 74. 

Turks, Young, reforming and revolutionary party, 18, 19, 74, 82, 83. 

“Twenty-one demands,” of Japan, on China, 132, 161, 209, 210. 

Typhoid, Philippines, 258. 


Unification of India under British rule, compared with unification of 
Italy and of Germany, 55. 

Union of South Africa, 19, 331, 336. 

United Presbyterian Church, missions, Egypt, 36. 

United Provinces, India, 85, 8 

United States, commercial relations of, Egypt, 41, 48, 342; India, 94, 
342; China, 116, 124, 125, 150, 170; Japan, 227, 228; Philippines, 
261-263, 265, 267. 

United States, congress of, and Philippines, 249, 266, 274, 295. 

United States, credit of, pledged to Philippines, 270. 

United States, domestic policy of, influence on Philippines, 331. 

United States, estimate of rule of, in Philippines, 261, 262, 279, 280, 
288-291. 

United States, expenditures of, for Philippines, 269, 270, 283. 

United States, foreign policy of, 340-342. 

United States, future policy of, in Philippines, 275-290, 294-297. 

United States, history of rule of, in Philippines, 245-251, 291-298. 


INDEX 371 


United States, Philippine commissions in, 274, 286, 295, 299. 

United States, policy of, in Philippines, 245-252. 

United States, political and diplomatic relations of, Egypt, 23, 342; 
India, 103, 106, 342; China, 112, 117-121, 123-127, 129, 132, 134, 
135, 140, 164, 165, 342; Japan, 135, 184, 185, I9I, 193, 205, 211- 
214, 233-235, 237, 342; Philippines, 124, 214, 238, 245, 246, 342. 

United States, president of, and Philippines, 274, 296. 

United States, rule of, in Philippines, native attitude to, 246, 247, 281, 
286-288. 

United States, supreme court of, 249. 

Unity, national, Japan, 177. 

Universal Postal Union, China, 148. 

Universities, Egypt, 26, 34-37; China, 129, 145, 152; Japan, 191, 229, 
235; Philippines, 243, 256. 

University, American, Cairo, 36; El Azhar, Cairo, 26, 34, 35, 37; State, 
Cairo, 37; Canton Christian College, 145; Nanking, 145; National, 
Peking, 152; Sapporo, 191; Tokyo, 235; Santo Tomas, Manila, 
243; the Philippines, Manila, 256. 

Unrest, India, 63, 66, 73. 

“Untouchables,” India, 82, 91. 


Vaccination (see Smallpox). 

Venetians, in Egypt, 14, 16. 

Venice, 54. 

Vernacular, use of, China, 154. 

Versailles, treaty of, 23, 136, 161, 214. 
Vice-governor, Philippines, 249. 

Viceroy, India, 56, 58, 64, 72, 76, 84, 108. 
Village community, China, 158. 

Visayan languages, Philippines, 240. 


Wales, Prince of, in India, 84. 

Wang Chung-hui, premier, China, 143. 

War, British First China War, 117; British Second China War, 120; 
Chino-Japanese War, 123, 197, 198, 217; Russo-Japanese War, 70, 
127, 128, 204-207, 217; Spanish, with United States, 123, 124, 244; 
Egyptian, in Sudan, 42; British with Afghanistan, 1919, 86; 
Balkan Wars, 19, 74; Italo-Turkish War, 19, 74. 

War, World, participation in, Egypt, 20; India, 74; China, 134, 135; 
Japan, 209-212; Philippines, 266, 284, 286; Effect of, Egypt, 19, 
20, 41; India, 74; China, 132, 134, 149, 164; Japan, 217, 224, 225; 
Philippines, 265-267, 272, 283; Eastern lands, 313, 331-333; 
Ottoman Empire, 34, 82. 

Ward, Frederick, in China, 119. 

Washington Conference, 1921-22, on Pacific and Far East problems, 
139-142, 161, 165, 166, 171, 173, 214, 215, 221, 225, 235, 237, 282, 


290, 341. 
Washington, D. C., 23, 47, 297. 
Washington, George, President, quoted, 341. 
Washington, Philippine resident commissioners at, 274, 290. 
Washington, state, 233. 
Weeks, J. W., Secretary of War, 295. 
Wei-hai-wei, China, 123, 140, 166. 
Wells, Sidney, Egypt, 37. 


372 INDEX 


West Indies, 75. 

Western nations, interests and relations of, Egypt, 16, 17, 27, 32, 33, 
47; India, 54, 262; China, 114, 116-126, 132, 134, 135, 140-165, 
167-172; Japan, 182-185, 198, 205-207, 211-216; Philippines, 
240-251, 283-286, 290, 291; Eastern lands, 330-343 (see under 
names of the several western countries). 

Wheat, India, 92; market value, 308. 

Wilson, President, 21, 23, 332; relations to China, 132, 135; attitude to 
Philippines, 249-251, 276, 286, 287. 

Wines, tax on, China, 137, 150. 

Wingate, Sir Reginald, in Egypt, 21. 

Wireless (see Radio-telegraphy). 

Woman, status of, Egypt, 37; India, 96; China, 156; Philippines, 238, 
253; Eastern lands, 338. 

Woman suffrage (see Suffrage). 

Women’s Clubs, Federation of, Philippines, 257. 

Wood, Sir Charles, educational policy for India, 62. 

Wood, General Leonard, Governor-general, Philippines, 251, 273, 292- 
295, 297- 

Wood-Forbes Report, on Philippines, 251, 293, 299. 

Woolen manufactures, Japan, 227. 

Wrecking policy, India, 87. 

Wright, Luke E., Governor-general, Philippines, 249. 

Wu Pei-fu, General, China, 136, 137, 142, 143, 160, 167, 168, 170, 171. 


Xavier, St. Francis, in China, 116; in Japan, 182. 


Yamagata, Prince, Premier, Japan, 202, 203, 205, 209, 218, 232. 
Yamamoto, Count, Premier, Japan, 209, 231. 

Yang-tse, river, 115, 142. 

Yap, discussion over, 214. 

Yedo (see Tokyo). 

Yellow peril, 161, 342. 

Yen Hsi-shan, General, China, 153. 

Yen, W. W., premier, China, 165, 168. 

Yokohama, 200; earthquake, 233. 

Yokosuka, naval port, earthquake, 233. 

Yoritomo, Shogun, Japan, 180. 

Yoshihito, Emperor, Japan, 178, 209, 214. 
Younghusband mission to Tibet, 66, 70. 

Young, John Russell, in China, 122. 

Young Turks (see Turks, Young). 

Yuan Shih-kai, President, China, 131-133, 135, 137, 156. 


Zaghlul Pasha (Saad), Premier, Egypt, 21-26, 44-50. 
Zaghlulists, Egypt, 44, 45. 



















































































